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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
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Title: Causal Skepticism and the Destruction of Antiquity 
 
 
This dissertation examines the development of skeptical views concerning 
causation from the medieval to the early modern period. While causal skepticism is often 
overlooked by intellectual historians, I argue that, in spite of its typical motivation as a 
religious response to shibboleths of ancient philosophy that stood askance from the 
dogmas of Abrahamic theology, causal skepticism was the greatest intellectual 
development of post-antiquity and ultimately culminated into modern Science. 
The first chapter examines Hume's famous analysis of causation and serves as a 
foil for the prior history of causal skepticism addressed in the subsequent chapters. The 
second chapter addresses the dispute over causation in medieval Islamic philosophy. I 
argue that virtually the entirety of Hume’s analysis was anticipated, and in some cases 
superseded, by al-Ghazali in the eleventh century. The third chapter examines Averroes’ 
critique of al-Ghazali, as well as the development of Aristotelian causal metaphysics in 
the Christian West. The fourth chapter concerns the development of the nominalist 
tradition skeptical attitude towards efficient causal explanation in the aftermath of the 
anti-Aristotelian condemnations of 1277. The fifth chapter addresses the Cartesian 
occasionalist tradition and its skeptical stance on secondary causation and the relation 
between this causal skepticism and central doctrines of Cartesian physics and 
metaphysics. The sixth and final chapter of my dissertation concerns the collapse of 
occasionalism and its many offspring. My ultimate thesis is that the hallmarks of both 
modern philosophy and modern science trace their origin to the failure of occasionalism 
to resolve its own internal contradictions. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
[E]ven if [God] wished to make a rock into a man all of a sudden, it would be impossible. 
And this is the point at which my teaching and that of Plato and the other Greeks who 
have treated correctly of natural principles differs from that of Moses. For him it suffices 
for God to have willed material to be arranged and straightway it was arranged, because 
Moses believed everything to be possible to God, even if he should wish to make a horse 
or beef out of ashes. We, however, do not feel this to be true, saying rather that some 
things are naturally impossible and that God does not attempt these at all but chooses 
from among the possible what is best to be done. 
—Galen, De usu partium 
 
Ab actu ad potentiam consequentia valet. 
—Bayle, Dictionnaire 
 
“The inference from what is actual to its possibility is always valid.”1 What manner of 
claim is this? Like many bromides, it appears sweeping and profound, but really amounts 
to: ‘If something is real or has happened, then it must be possible for it to be real or to 
have happened.’ Even a child knows as much! No matter how exhaustively a parent 
explains that monsters do not and cannot live under a bed, the child has heard them, 
maybe even seen them, and thus knows they can.2 Such a puerile bit of reasoning might 
                                                
1 Bayle, Dictionaire, art. Manichees, rem .D. This maxim, inverting the customary formulation, reasons a 
esse ad posse. It was employed by Bayle against optimists such as Spinoza and Leibniz who—either 
through the principle of plentitude (i.e. a posse ad esse) or through innovative distinctions between 
existence and actuality—denied both the reality and possibility of evil in the world. Thanks are due to 
Thomas Lennon for helping me track down this quote. 
2 While not a small child, Stephen LaBerge, one of the first psychologists to scientifically study the 
phenomenon of lucid dreaming, provides a useful example of the maxim: “In the late 1970’s, when I began 
my Ph.D. study on lucid dreams at Stanford, I found myself challenged by a seemingly…hopeless task: 
proving that lucid dreaming is real. The experts at the time were convinced that dreaming with 
consciousness that you were dreaming was a contradiction in terms and therefore impossible. Such 
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seem strange coming from the pen of any philosopher, much less one with the stature of 
Pierre Bayle—“the greatest master of the art of reasoning that ever wrote,” according to 
Voltaire.3 Yet, this little bromide formed the touchstone of one of the greatest intellectual 
transformations in human history: the change between the philosophy of the ancients and 
the philosophy of the moderns. 
 
1. Pagan Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Causation 
The philosophy of the ancients—from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics—was 
dominated by a structurally rationalistic ontology which extended from a hypostatization 
of human rationality that was accepted without exception. This hypostatization amounted 
to a projection of human intelligence and reason onto Being as such, often to 
displacement of human and its own particular share. As Heraclitus condescends: 
For though all things come into being in accordance with this [logos], men 
seem as if they had never met with it…But although the [logos] is 
universal, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to 
themselves.4 
While Heraclitus identifies this logos not with the gods but with elemental fire,5 the 
tendency of such thought in subsequent antiquity was in the direction of further 
personification and deification, culminating in the anima mundi of the Platonists and 
                                                                                                                                            
philosophical reasoning could not convince me, since I had experienced lucid dreams—impossible or not.” 
(Exploring the World of Lucid Dreaming (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 20) 
3 From Voltaire’s introduction to his Poème sur le dèsastre de Lisbonne. 
4 Frag. B1-2 
5 Frag. B30 
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Stoics,6 or the primum movens of the Peripatetics. Perhaps the supreme expression of 
Hellenic rationalism comes not from any Greek philosopher, but from Euripides’ Trojan 
Women and the “strange prayer” of Hecuba: “O thou base of the Earth, and thou that art 
enthroned above the Earth, whoever thou art, hard to know, Zeus, or Nature’s Necessity, 
or Reason of Man, to thee do I pray; for all things mortal do thou lead aright along their 
silent path.”7 Here, in an expression of the syncretic tendency intrinsic to pagan religion, 
divine Zeus, Nature’s immutability, and human comprehension are united in one 
invocation. Indeed, Hecuba’s prayer offers a virtual panoptic of the Greek intellectual 
landscape of Euripides day, where the mythology of old competed and mingled with 
Ionian science, Sophist humanism, and Socratic teleology.8 
Underlying all of these cosmologies was the assumption that human reason and 
the order of the universe are deeply connected if not coextensive, that the cosmos and 
Nature was itself rational, and that what was impossible to human reason was impossible 
to Nature—impossible absolutely. The most apparent and intractable manifestation of 
this assumption can be seen in nascent application of the principle of sufficient reason 
(i.e. that anything that happens must needs happen for a reason) to foundational questions 
in cosmology and physical ontology by Anaximander,9 Parmenides,10 Leucippus,11 and 
                                                
6 See Timaeus, 28a-30d; D. L. vii. 147 
7 Trojan Women, 886; qtd. By Greene, 194 
8 Ibid. 
9 As Aristotle notes in De caelo: “there are some, Anaximander, for instance, among the ancients, who say 
that the earth keeps its place because of its indifference. Motion upward and downward and sideways were 
all, they thought, equally inappropriate to that which is set at the centre and indifferently related to every 
extreme point; and to move in contrary directions at the same time was impossible: so it must needs remain 
still.” (285b10-15) 
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Plato.12 Such a principle, which stood as the font of Western philosophy and science from 
its very inception, remained utterly beyond question throughout the entirety of classical 
antiquity. The real was always the rational. 
 The metaphysical upshot of this hypostatization of human reason was the 
determinism that defined and largely consumed ancient philosophy. While the logical 
determinism (i.e. necessitarianism) of the Eleatics was highly contested, the causal 
determinism of Democritus was never meaningfully subject to question. Following his 
teacher, Democritus expunged chance, “generous but unreliable,”13 from the metaphysics 
of causation, declaring that: “Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for 
their own stupidity.”14 Everything that happens is an effect of a determinate cause; and 
thus chance is purely epistemic, referring to nothing more than our ignorance of this 
relation, which has no place in either physics of metaphysics. Such a view was essentially 
universal among the ancients. Aristotle relates as much in the Physics when, concerning 
“the necessary and its place in nature,” he says: “all writers ascribe things to this cause, 
arguing that since the hot and the cold and the like are of such and such a kind, therefore 
certain things necessarily are and come to be.”15 Even the Epicureans, whose notorious 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Parmenides argues for the eternality of ‘What Is’ by imploring the reader: “what creation of it will you 
look for? How, whence (could it have) sprung?...what necessity impelled it, if it did spring from Nothing, 
to be produced later or earlier.” (Frag. B8, Freeman, 43) 
11 The only extant fragment of Leucippius reads: “Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of 
reason and by necessity.” (Frag. B2, Freeman, 91) 
12 “If…there is something solid and evenly balanced at the center of the universe, it could not move to any 
of the extreme points, because these are all alike in all directions.” (Timaeus, 63a) 
13 Frag. B176 
14 Frag. B119 
15 198b11-15 
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doctrine of the ‘swerve’ was grounded on a metaphysical supposition of chance and 
indeterminacy, nonetheless made no attempt to apply this principle (denounced by their 
opponents as a “childish fancy” [ficta pueriliter]16) to the metaphysics of causation.17 The 
swerve never pretended to be anything more than the random dew-drops protecting the 
spider of purpose and morality18 from snagging and becoming trapped in the great snare-
web of causality;19 its ethical mandate was studiously quarantined from infecting physics 
and was never granted any place in the Epicurean account of causality, much less their 
epistemology of causal explanation.20  
Such was the topology of rationalist metaphysics, the best description of which I 
know of was provided by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his De fato. Being unable to 
improve upon it, I shall quote at length: 
[T]hey say that this universe, which is one and contains in itself all that 
exists, and is organized by a Nature which is alive, rational and intelligent, 
possesses the organization of the things that are, which is eternal and 
progresses according to a certain sequence and order; the things which 
come to be first are causes for those after them, and in this way all things 
are bound together with one another. Nothing comes to be in the universe 
in such a way that there is not something else which follows it with no 
alternative and is attached to it as to a cause; nor, on the other hand, can 
any of the things which come to be subsequently be disconnected from the 
things which have come to be previously, so as not to follow some one of 
them as if bound to it. But everything which has come to be is followed by 
something else which of necessity depends on it as a cause, and everything 
which comes to be has something preceding it to which it is connected as a 
                                                
16 Cicero, De finibus, i. 19 
17 Cicero, De fato, ix. 18. Cf. De rerum natura, 1.150, Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato, 192.25. 
18 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 594b 
19 De rerum natura, 2.253-260. Cf. De fato, x. 23. This restriction of the doctrine to the consideration of 
human volition was recognized even by Chrysippus. (See De stoicorum repugnatiis, 1045B) 
20 De rerum natura, 1.159-173; Philodemus, Col. 33-34 
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cause. For nothing either is or comes to be in the universe without a cause, 
because there is nothing of the things in it that is separated and 
disconnected from all the things that have preceded. For the universe 
would be torn apart and divided and not remain single for ever, organized 
according to a single order and organization, if any causeless motion were 
introduced; and it would be introduced, if all the things that are and come 
to be did not have causes which have come to be beforehand [and] which 
they follow of necessity…Fate itself, Nature, and the reason according to 
which the whole is organized, they assert to be God; it is present in all that 
is and comes to be, and in this way employs the individual nature of every 
thing for the organization of the whole.21 
Here we have an almost perfect summary of the rationalist causal determinism that was to 
dominate philosophy for fifteen centuries. 
That the ancients understood causality in such terms should not be particularly 
surprising given their conception of science and logic. As noted, the Greeks understood 
no fundamental (i.e. modal) distinction between human logos and cosmic logos. As such, 
logico-syllogistic axioms, extending from the law of non-contradiction itself, were 
understood to possess an ontological significance and foundation. Similarly, as Aristotle 
emphasizes, “understanding” was distinct from “opinion” insofar as it was a deductively 
constructed body of knowledge that concerned the “causes and the principles of things,”22 
and that which “is universal and through necessities, and that which is necessary cannot 
be otherwise.”23 Thus, from understanding: “we see that neither does fire have the 
capacity for coldness in itself, nor snow that for blackness, nor the things that are heavy 
that for lightness.”24 The upshot of the union of these various conceptions was precisely 
the identification of the relationship between cause and effect as an entailment relation. 
                                                
21 De fato, 191.32-193.1 
22 Metaphysics, 981b25-32 
23 Posterior Analytics, 88b30 
24 De anima libri mantissa, xxiii. 184.15-18 
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This relation was demanded by the ‘bottom-up’ metaphysic of ancient science, as such a 
standard was understood to provide the necessary foundation in re required for science 
and demonstrative syllogisms as the ancients understood them. 
 It behooves me to concede at this early juncture that not all—or even most—
scholars accept such an interpretation of the metaphysics of causation in antiquity, much 
less that one is able to speak in such sweeping terms given the extraordinary and vitriolic 
disagreement among philosophical schools spanning nearly a millennia.25 Did not 
Aristotle explicitly claim that “among things which are, some are always in the same 
state and are of necessity…and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most 
part”?26 Richard Sorabji thus argues that causal determinism was an essentially Stoic 
invention, coextensive with Stoic necessitarianism and fatalism, which was not accepted 
by earlier thinkers such as Aristotle.27 This is certainly a possibility, but only insofar as 
the extant Aristotelian corpus admits of no definitive answer. Later Peripatetic 
philosophers did explicitly describe causal relations as involving necessitation and 
Sorabji concedes as much, but he attributes this to the influence of the Stoic view.28 If 
this be indeed the case, the Stoics might well be regarded as the most influential 
metaphysicians of all antiquity; for even their arch enemies, such as Carneades, 
conceded: “If everything takes place with antecedent causes, all events take place in a 
                                                
25 One scholar in agreement with my position is Walter Ott. See Ott 2009, 20-32. 
26 Metaphysics, 1026b27-31; Physics, 196b10 
27 Sorabji 1980, 253 ff. 
28 Sorabji 1980, 254-255 
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closely knit web of natural interconnexon; if this is so, all things are caused by 
necessity;”29 
Against this classification of causal determinism as a Stoic invention, I should 
like to make three points in defense of my generalized interpretation. First, Aristotle’s 
distinction in Metaphysics Θ between rational and non-rational potentialities strongly 
implies the necessity of the latter. Aristotle says that: 
[E]ach of those [powers] which are accompanied by reason is alike 
capable of contrary effects, but one non-rational power produces one 
effect; e.g. the hot is capable only of heating…[And] since…contraries do 
not occur in the same thing…what can heat [produces] only heat and what 
can cool only cold.30 
While the issue at stake here is muddled with Aristotle’s causal ‘likeness principle’ (i.e. 
that like causes produce like effects), the notion that non-rational causes are limited to 
one distinct effect that they cannot but produce strongly implies a necessary connection; 
and this was notably the interpretation of the passage taken by Suaréz, who concluded: 
“every faculty which altogether lacks the use of reason exercises its operations by natural 
necessity.”31 Second, if one wishes to deny the above interpretation, one must answer the 
following: ‘If “what can heat” is not necessarily connected to heat as its effect, this 
entails that it could be present and active and yet its “one effect” be absent, or even its 
contrary present. But how could this be so?’ It is quite telling that wherever Aristotle or 
his scions attempt an answer to this question, or when they speak of an effect following 
                                                
29 De fato, xiv. 31 
30 1046b2-18 
31 DM, 19.1.12. Locke concurs with Suaréz and Aristotle on this point, arguing that “Wherever thought is 
wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes 
place…Agents that have no thought, no volition at all, are in everything necessary agents.” (Essay, II. xxi. 
§13) 
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for a cause “more of less,” they invariably attribute such an outcome to the contravention 
of other causal factors,32 and never to any ground-level ontic indeterminacy (i.e. that 
certain things happen or don’t happen for no cause or reason at all33). As Sarah 
Waterlow argues concerning ‘substantial natures’ as the irreducible unit of Aristotle’s 
model of causation: “the unity of a substance-expressing change that leads him to hold 
that any change in what diverges from some single typical tendency in a given direction 
represents nothing but interference.”34 Lastly, while philosophers typically refrain from 
arguments from authority, Cicero is a mighty authority, and in describing the views of 
“the old philosophers” he relates “the opinion of those who deemed that everything takes 
place by fate in the sense that this fate exercises the force of necessity—the opinion to 
which Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle adhered.”35 
This issue will be addressed extensively in later chapters; the point is: in addition 
to my overarching analysis concerning the ideogeny and history of causal skepticism, I 
also intent to provide a sustained defense of my interpretation of ancient causal 
metaphysics as deterministic to its core without exception. I will say at this juncture, 
though, that in the above quotation from Metaphysics E concerning those effects that 
come to be “for the most part,” Aristotle included a parenthetic caveat clarifying that the 
type of necessity he was denying was not “necessity in the sense of compulsion but that 
                                                
32 For a particularly explicit statement of this requirement, see DM, 19.1.14 
33 From this formulation it is evident that upholding such causal indeterminacy requires an abrogation of 
the principle of sufficient reason. 
34 1982, 33 
35 De fato, xvii. 39; emphasis added 
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which means the impossibility of being otherwise.”36 From this it is evident that the 
notion of ‘necessity’ Aristotle was rejecting was not the necessity of the efficient cause, 
but rather the Megarian necessitarian conception coming from Diodorus Cronus which 
was predicated on a hard application of the principle of bivalence and held the necessary 
to be ‘that which cannot be otherwise’ (i.e. that the actual exhausts the possible).37 This 
caveat is extremely important not just to my case, but because the notion of ‘necessity’ is 
remarkably variegated and, as will be seen, much of the incredible confusion circling the 
issue in the history of philosophy stemmed from a systemic failure to adequately 
understand and distinguish between various conceptions of ‘necessity.’ This failure 
inevitably fomented equivocation between, and conflation of, distinct notions of 
‘necessity’ with each other. 
To avoid repeating such an error, I shall distinguish between three different types 
of ‘necessity’ throughout this work: existential necessity, causal necessity, and material 
necessity. What I mean by ‘existential necessity’ is precisely the necessitarian conception 
of Diodorus Cronus, which holds that “nothing happens which was not necessary, and 
that whatever is possible is now or will be.”38 The best example of this conception is the 
“The Reaper” argos logos39 [‘golden argument’] which Zeno of Citium (a student of 
                                                
36 Metaphysics, 1026b29 
37 See De interpretatione, 18a28-19a5 
38 Cicero, De fato, ix. 17 
39 Cicero, De fato, xii. 28 
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Diodorus’) allegedly purchased from an anonymous dialectician for two hundred 
drachmas.40 Ammonius describes it thus: 
‘If you reap,’ it says, ‘it is not the case that perhaps you will reap and 
perhaps you will not reap, but you will reap, whatever happens; and if you 
will not reap…whatever happens, you will not reap. But in fact, of 
necessity, either you will reap or you will not reap.’ Therefore the 
‘perhaps’ has been destroyed…But the ‘perhaps’ was what introduced the 
contingent. Therefore, the contingent is gone.41 
This is the notion of necessity Aristotle was criticizing and it should be obvious that it 
has nothing to do with causality, but with the bivalence of propositions and the definition 
of terms.42 Indeed, Carneades rejected the argument on precisely these grounds, arguing 
that: 
[I]t does not immediately follow from the fact that every statement is 
either true or false that there are immutable causes…that forbid anything 
to fall out otherwise than it will fall out…For it makes a great deal of 
difference whether a natural cause, existing from all eternity, renders 
future things true, or things that are going to be in the future can be 
understood to be true even without any natural eternity.43 
This latter possibility is unintelligible insofar as the mere truth of a proposition (e.g. 
‘Fabius will die at sea’) does not bring its existential conclusion about, causes do.44 
                                                
40 D.L. vii. 25 
41 In Aristotelis de interpretatione commentarius, ix. 131,25-33. Ammonius identifies this argument as the 
“more verbal” sibling of the “more troubling” problem of divine foreknowledge. However, the reaper 
clearly concerns existential necessity, while the divine foreknowledge could be based on either existential 
or causal necessitarianism. 
42 See De fato, ix. 20 
43 De fato, xi. 28 
44 Chrysippus had already conceded this point to critics of Stoicism; he held that fate must follow causality 
(or vice versa), such that the true proposition and the antecedent causes that bring it about are 
“condestinate” [confatalia]. (De fato, xiii. 30) Similarly, Carneades asks the Stoics: “if a…chain of 
interlinked causes us not going to bring [an event] about, can it be true in any other manner?”( (De fato, xii. 
27) Yet Chrysippus had already—and perspicuously—noted that uncaused events violate the very principle 
of bivalence such considerations were grounded on: “If uncaused motion exists, it will not be the case that 
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This Megarian conception of necessity is very much distinct from what I term 
‘causal necessity’ insofar as the latter refers to the propositional ‘necessary connection’ 
underlying causal relationships, i.e. ‘if Φ then Ψ.’ The point of “The Reaper” is that the 
“if” is otiose: ◻ (Ψ ∨ ¬Ψ). By contrast, the causal proposition means only that ‘Ψ 
necessarily follows if Φ.’ Neither the existence or non-existence of Ψ is logically 
necessary, nor is the existence or non-existence of Φ; but rather, given Φ, Ψ must follow. 
These two notions of necessity were rampantly confused in ancient and medieval 
discussions and to avoid similar confusion I have endeavored to avoid the term ‘logical 
necessity’ as much as possible, given that such a designation could be coherently applied 
to both.45 However, what I term ‘causal necessity’ is subject to similar confusion in that 
this term is sometimes used to signify a supposedly non-logical mode of necessitation 
understood to exist between physical causes and their effects. It is similar to the 
propositional view, but presumes to avow a type of “necessitation” in which, somehow, 
‘Φ → Ψ’ is compatible with ‘Φ   ¬Ψ.’ This view I designate as ‘material necessity’ and, 
as will be seen, I reject its intelligibility, though not its possibility.46 
 Returning to the narrative at hand, the particular cultural latitude which permitted 
the conception of a determinist and autonomous natural order endemic to ancient 
philosophy was the deep ambiguity in Graeco-Roman religion as to the nature and extent 
of divine power. I say ‘ambiguity’ as I do not wish to suggest the notion of divine 
                                                                                                                                            
every proposition…is either true or false, for a thing not possessing efficient causes will be neither true nor 
false.”44 (De fato, ix. 20) 
45 Writing against the “Megaric school,” Aristotle very lucidly disentangled the two conceptions in terms of 
“the possible,” but unfortunately failed to systematically pursue his insight to ‘the necessary.’ (See 
Metaphysics, 1047b3-14) 
46 Assuming the term ‘possibility’ retains any meaning under a notion of material necessity. 
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omnipotence was entirely allochthonous to the ancients. Homer declared that “all things 
gods can accomplish,”47 and Epicharmus concurred: “Nothing escapes the divine: this 
you must realize. God himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for him.”48 
Similarly, in a remarkable late-antique dialogue spuriously attributed to both Plato and 
Lucian,49 but presumably pagan in authorship, Chaerephon expresses skepticism over the 
existence of the halcyon bird, or at least its supposed effect on the weather; and 
“Socrates” upbraids him for such doubts concerning what is possible in Nature by 
appealing directly to the power of the gods: 
My dearest Chaerephon, we men are but purblind judges of what is 
possible or impossible. For judging of such things we have nothing but our 
human faculties, which but too frequently can neither see, nor 
comprehend, nor believe….In a great many cases the fault may perhaps lie 
entirely in our inexperience; but very frequently it lies in the weakness and 
infancy of our understanding…Seeing now that we know so little of the 
powers of the gods and daemons, how, my dear friend, shall we be able to 
say, respecting objects of that nature, what is possible or impossible?...It is 
therefore reasonable to think, that a god, having very great powers, which 
are incomparably superior to ours, could execute all these things with the 
greatest ease….Seeing then the powers of the immortals are so great, how 
should such little and transitory creatures as we (who, far from being able 
to survey nature in the aggregate, even in what passes within the small 
sphere about us, are every moment in perplexity, and are obliged to 
confess our ignorance), how should we presume to decide peremptorily 
concerning halcyons and nightingales?50 
As with Homer and Epicharmus’ asseverations, such views were common in Graeco-
Roman religion as pietisms, but were never taken seriously philosophically: No ancient 
(pagan) philosopher of note ever dared to assert that the gods have the power to flaunt or 
                                                
47 Odyssey, Bk. x. 302-306 
48 Frag. B23 
49 Diogenes Laertius says that, according to Favorinus, it is “the work of a certain Leon.” (D.L. iii. 62) 
50 Halcyon seu de transformatione, 421-423 
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circumvent the causal order essential to Nature itself. The likely reason for such reticence 
was that the issue was simply never forced by ancient pagan mythology. As evident in 
Galen’s contrast between the demiurge of Plato and the God of Moses, the notion of 
divine omnipotence that was so central to the Jews was simply not to the pagans.51 Even 
though the gods were said to be able to do anything, it was entirely unclear what that 
nebulous power entailed; and insofar as almost nothing of religious importance hinged on 
such a capacity, ancient philosophers—who were often aloof to the very existence of the 
gods—never concerned themselves with the question. Yet the exact opposite was the case 
in later philosophical traditions situated in a Judeo-Christian-Islamic cultural background. 
Thus, as long as Yahweh remained the curious local deity of an obstinate 
Levantine people—or even if, following the death of Christ and the dispersal of his 
apostles, His cult spread to the gentile lower-classes across the Empire—His remarkable 
power posed no threat to the philosophical systems of the wider Mediterranean world. 
The Battle of the Milvian Bridge, which secured the political ascendency of Christianity, 
was thus of almost incomprehensible macro-historical importance—and in terms of 
intellectual as well as political and religious history. In paving the way for a Christian 
Empire, Constantine and his loyalist legionaries paved the way for seminal developments 
in philosophy, science, and logic that—over the body of ancient metaphysics as much as 
the bodies of Maxentius and his men—laid the foundation for modernity itself. 
 
 
                                                
51 This difference rests, of course, on the overarching difference between the oral and scattered tradition of 
pagan mythology, with the written and divinely codified tradition of Abrahamic Scripture. 
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2. Yet It Was Not Consumed 
How did this come to pass? How did the spread of a cosmopolitan Judaism and the 
victory of the God of Moses check what had been the totem and greatest assumption of 
Western thought—one that extended from its very birth? To speak of ‘ancient 
philosophy’ is to speak in the broadest generalities of a remarkably acephalous tradition. 
Nonetheless, what modicum of orthodoxy remained beneath the squabbling acrimony of 
the ancient schools was separated by a gaping chasm from the founding dogmas of the 
Abrahamic Faith. Regardless of their intractable disagreements and odium 
scholasticum,52 the schools of antiquity were united in agreement, or rather in 
disagreement, with the Jewish creatio ex nihilo cosmogony.53 This was no idle quarrel 
but struck at the heart of ancient determinism. When Epicurus and his followers dared to 
propound the doctrine of the ‘swerve,’ they challenged the causal determinism on which 
the entire edifice of ancient metaphysics sat.54 Yet while they upheld the doctrine 
morally,55 they recoiled from it metaphysically: Lucretius stridently denied the possibility 
of creation or change ex nihilo even though his opponents uniformly agreed that this is 
precisely what an atomic ‘swerve’—as an uncaused disturbance in the order of nature—
                                                
52 The relations between the Epicureans and their critics are perhaps the best example. See D.L. x. 3-8 for a 
compendium of the charges leveled against Epicurus in antiquity, which include: sorcery, plagiarism, 
political flattery, fabrication of his Athenian citizenship, vapid hedonism and overindulgence, consorting 
with unsavory figures, as well as being a pitiful syphilitic in wretched health. For his own part, Epicurus 
was happy to return the barbs, notably describing Aristotle as a mercenary and a drug-dealer. Such was the 
charmingly contentious world of Greek academia. 
53 Even Epicharmus supposedly rejected the possibility, though the fragment is possibly a later forgery. 
(See Frag. B1) 
54 De rerum natura, ii. 217-222 
55 De rerum natura, ii. 251-260 
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represented.56 Thus, for the ancients, the dictum nihil fit sine causa was simply a more 
precise reiteration of the dictum nihil ex nihilo. As Timaeus insisted, “everything that 
comes to be must of necessity come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is 
impossible for anything to come to be without a cause.”57 From this requirement no 
exception was deemed possible.58 
 While Yahweh’s creation of the universe ex nihilo was His greatest miracle, and 
provoked the greatest incredulity and offence among his pagan detractors, the specific 
miracles of the Old Testament ultimately proved more pernicious to the ancient 
metaphysics of causation. Judaism and its scions were religions grounded on the 
miraculous activity of their one true God. God’s miracles not only demonstrated His 
power and supremacy, but were described in the Torah as directly responsible for the 
very survival of the Jewish people. All of the miracles attributed to God involved a break 
in the natural causal order; indeed, that was precisely what made them miraculous.59 To 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims, then, the ancient philosophical model of causality—which 
flatly rejected the possibility of any disorderly break in the order of nature60—posed an 
existential threat to the very foundation of their Faith. 
What was the precise nature of this threat? As Dostoyevsky’s narrator in Notes 
from the Underground declares: 
                                                
56 De rerum natura, 1.159-173, De fato, x. 22, De finibus, i. 19, De animae procreatione in Timaeo, 1015c, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato, 192.25 
57 Timaeus, 28a 
58 Parmenedies, Frag. B8, B9; Melissus of Samos, Frag. B1; Empedocles, Frag. B9, 1b2; Aristotle, Physics, 
18a27; Epicurus, D.L. x. 38. 
59 Adversus Marcionem, 3.13 
60 Physics, 252a10-12 
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The impossible means the stone wall! What stone wall? Why, of course, 
the laws of nature, the deductions of natural science, mathematics…you 
have just to accept it, there is no help for it, for twice two is a law of 
mathematics…Nature does not ask your permission, she has nothing to do 
with your wishes, and whether you like her laws or dislike them, you are 
bound to accept her as she is, and consequently all her conclusions. A 
wall, you see, is a wall…61 
If causes necessitate their effects, any violation of the normal causal order thereby 
involves a formal logical contradiction. Along these lines, with Russian literature being 
apropos, Turgenev thus laments: “Whatever a man prays for, he prays for a miracle. 
Every prayer reduces itself to this: Great God, grant that twice two be not four.”62 If God 
possessed such a power, viz. to do the impossible, then the existence of miracles within a 
deterministic causal order would not pose a problem. Yet, such an interpretation of the 
divine omnipotence was strongly resisted by almost every major theologian of the 
Abrahamic tradition and the overwhelmingly orthodox conception of the limits of God’s 
power was identified as coextensive with the logically possible.63 Origen, for example, 
insists: “We…do not betake ourselves to a most absurd refuge, saying that with God all 
things are possible; for we know how to understand this word “all” as not referring either 
to things that are “non-existent” or that are inconceivable.”64 This point was repeated 
                                                
61 Pt. 1 Ch. 3 
62 “Prayer,” Poems in Prose. 
63 Whereas Descartes had maintained a radical theological voluntarism, such an extreme view of God’s 
power was not shared by the occasionalists. Even though, in their critique of Aristotelian determinism, the 
occasionalists had undermined many of the constraints placed on the divine omnipotence by Scholastic 
intellectualism, all remained committed to the supposition that God was bound by the law of contradiction. 
See Malebranche, Dialouges, VII.6, 153, for and explication of this. 
64 Contra Celsum, 5.23 
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eight centuries later by al-Ghazali: “No one has power over the Impossible. [But]…that 
which is not impossible is within [God’s] power.”65 
Under such a logical limitation, the threat of ancient metaphysics crystalizes: If 
God created a world dominated by an inviolable order of causes and effects, then His 
Creation would ultimately transcend Him, and He would be unable to act within it, 
unable to willfully effect the very miracles that form the basis of His worship. On this 
point Plotinus is clear:  
[S]ince all is one and belongs to one, one thing can be known from 
another, the cause from what is caused and the consequence from the 
antecedent…because the rational principle of the universe composes one 
part and another together. If this argument is correct…[that] coming from 
the gods…is not [from] their deliberate choices…but all that comes from 
above happens by natural necessity…as consequences of the life of the 
one universe.66 
In the third century, the divestment of choice and will from the Divinity was a well-
established principle among the philosophers of the Academy and the Stoa, much less of 
the Garden. Yet, two and a half centuries later, Boethius recoiled: 
[I]f any says that everything happens necessarily, it is necessary also that 
he rob God of benevolence; for [in that case] his good will produces 
nothing, since necessity governs all things, with the result that it is 
somehow of God’s necessity that he confers benefits, and not of his own 
will. For if some things happen of his own will, in such a way that he is 
confined by no necessity, then not all things occur necessarily.67 
                                                
65 Tahafut, 194 
66 Enneads, iv. 4.39.20-28 
67 Commentarius in de interpretatione, ix. 226,14-20 
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In a perfect emblem marking the transistion of philosophy from its ancient ratiocentric to 
its medieval theocentric form, Boethius deemed this theological consideration as of-itself 
sufficient to refute the doctrine. 
 This, then, returns us to Bayle’s maxim: “The inference from what is actual to its 
possibility is always valid.” While Spinoza caustically denounced appeals to “the will of 
God” as “the sanctuary of ignorance,”68 the miracles attested to in Holy Scripture were 
regarded by non-heretical members of the Abrahamic Faith as facts: they were the 
absolute, divinely certified, historical record of actual events. One such event comes in 
Exodus 3:2, where, when crossing the Sinai, Moses encounters a burning bush. On the 
relation between burning and burned, the ancient account of causality is clear: When a 
substance burns it is thereby consumed. That is to say: burning as cause entails 
consumption as effect; and yet, as the Vulgate relates: nec tamen consumebatur. 
Following ‘Bayle’s maxim,’ as the burning of the bush sans its consumption actually 
happened, it must therefore be possible for something to burn without being consumed, 
and thus the traditional conception of the metaphysics of causation inherited from 
Graeco-Roman philosophy cannot be correct. 
 The initial response of Christian theologians to the metaphysics of miracles was 
mysticism and an insistence on the fact je sais pas comment. Aside from Tertullian’s 
notorious misology,69 Hilary of Potiers provides a good example: 
[W]hen water was made wine, and five loaves satisfied five thousand 
men…we see a fact though we cannot understand it; a deed is done though 
                                                
68 Ethics, Bk. III, Appendix, 241 
69 For the most famous example, see De carne Christi, §5 
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it baffles our reason; the process cannot be followed, though the result is 
obvious. It is folly to intrude in the spirit of carping, when the matter into 
which we enquire is such that we cannot probe it to the bottom…[Thus,] 
when we doubt and criticize the mysteries and powers of God…all the 
while there has been confronting us the evidence of works done to assure 
us that God's action is not limited by our power of comprehending His 
methods.70 
Yet, as the initial hostility between Abrahamic monotheism and pagan philosophy wore 
off, when paganism ceased to pose any serious social threat to Christianity, what might 
be called ‘the philosophical question’ of Abrahamic theology beckoned for an answer.  
While theological considerations forced ‘the philosophical question,’ viz. ‘How 
are miracles possible?,’ any meaningful answer to it was necessarily dialectical; and 
would thus have to stand on its own outside of any theological presuppositions. 
Moreover, the concession that God cannot do the impossible puts the onus on the theist 
and believer in miracles to explain how such syncopations of the natural order are 
possible to begin with; for God’s capacity to effect miracles is dependent on their 
underlying possibility, and not vice versa.71 As Steven Nadler perspicaciously points out: 
If God can bring about some sequence of events (say A followed by not-
B) contrary to the usual course of nature, this is only because that 
sequence is, in itself and independently of God’s power, logically 
possible…Any appeals to the possibility of miraculous divine 
intervention, or to what order God could have originally instituted, are 
superfluous to this argument.72 
                                                
70 De trinitate, iii. 18 
71 Cf. Plato’s claim concerning the genesis of the world: “The god wanted everything to be good and 
nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all that was visible…and brought it from 
a state of disorder to one of order.” (Timaeus, 30a; emphasis added) Here Plato clearly constrains the 
activity of “the god” to the possible. 
72 Nadler 1996, 457-8 
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The defense of Abrahamic theology required an answer to ‘the philosophical question’ 
underlying the miraculous testimony of Scripture; which in turn required a philosopical 
critique of causal determinism. That is to say, it required the believer to do philosophy—
critical analytic philosophy—and thereby defeat the ancient philosophers at their own 
game. Thus, the point forced by ‘Bayle’s maxim’ was turned completely around: the 
actual must be possible—and it was up to the believer to explain how. In this way the 
Abrahamic critique of causation was fully compatible with the later secular critique most 
commonly associated with Hume.73 
 
3. The Marionette World 
In attempting a response to ‘the philosophical question,’ theologians of the Abrahamic 
religions advanced three distinct metaphysical positions to account for the ongoing causal 
relation between Creator and Creation. All of these assumed—studiously avoiding the 
pagan conception of an autonomous natural order—that God’s continual activity was 
needed to preserve creation, but disagreed as to the extent and means by which this 
preservation was effected: 
1) Conservationism—God creates the world in the beginning but after this initial act 
His causal activity is effectively exhausted in his continual existential 
preservation of the world, which thus operates semi-autonomously and on the 
                                                
73 As J. R. Milton notes: “It might be supposed that Hume’s atheism would have lead him to reject the 
voluntarist arguments against necessary connections which had relied for their force on the doctrine of 
divine omnipotence. In fact the conclusions survived, and the arguments were adapted with God being 
replaced by the human imagination.” (Milton 1987, 69) 
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basis of the causal powers of the created agents therein, who thus produce their 
effects alone and unaided. 
2) Concurrentism—God creates the world in the beginning and continually preserves 
it in existence, but also retains His status as the continual efficient cause of the 
world by actively “concurring” with the activity of created agents therein, who 
thus actively contribute to the production of their effects. Yet, He is capable of 
both withholding his concurrence, thereby rendering natural agents impotent, as 
well as producing their effects alone without any natural agent at all. 
3) Occasionalism—God creates the world in the beginning and preserves it by 
continually recreating it ex nihilo, the upshot of which is that He is the sole 
efficient cause and created “agents” contribute nothing to the production of their 
effects, but merely serve as the token occasions for the divine cause to act under 
His global causal aegis. 
A strictly mechanistic metaphysics, by which God creates the world and the causal order 
which governs it, then promptly absconds, leaving Nature to govern herself, was never 
taken seriously in the Abrahamic tradition as it stood so obviously askance from the 
depictions of God in Scripture and the testimony of the Prophets. Conservationism was 
similarly implicated and, with very few exceptions, was never seriously maintained 
beyond late-antiquity. Thus, for philosophers and theologians of the medieval and early-
modern periods, the metaphysics of causation came down to a dispute between 
concurrentism and strict occasionalism. 
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 Finding its inception in the thought of Augustine, concurrentism was the initial 
(and extremely influential) response to ‘the philosophical question.’74 Yet, while 
concurrentism saved the appearances and—in support of the great intellectual project of 
late-antiquity—served to mediate between Christian theology with pagan philosophy, like 
many middle-positions, it was overcome by severe difficulties. One of the most 
distinctive features of the Hebrew religion is its insistence—repeated almost ad nauseum 
in the Old Testament—that God alone was (and remains) directly responsible for creating 
everything. In the Abrahamic religions, God alone possesses the power of creation—a 
capacity that is not bestowed upon His creatures. This stands in marked contrast to the 
theogonies and cosmogonies of pagan religious traditions, which almost invariably 
describe a succession of creations from successively created agents. For example, 
consider the Babylonian “Legend of the Worm”: 
After Anu75 [had created the Heavens], 
The Heavens created [the Earth], 
The Earth created the Rivers 
The Rivers created the Canals, 
The Canals created the Marshes, 
The Marshes created the Worm.76 
Contrast this pyramid of secondary creation—much less an active and self-possessed 
natural order—with the boasts of Yahweh presented in the Hebrew Bible: 
                                                
74 See De genesi ad litteram, ix. 17 
75 Anu was the king of gods in Sumerian mythology. 
76 R. Campbell Thompson, Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia, vol. 1, lxiii-lxiv 
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Have you ever in your life commanded the morning, or made the dawn 
know its place, that it might seize the corners of the earth, and shake the 
wicked out of it? 
Who carves out a channel for the heavy rains, and a path for the rumble of 
thunder, to cause it to rain on an uninhabited land, a desert where there are 
no human beings, to satisfy a devastate and desolate land, and to cause it 
to sprout with vegetation? 
Do you hunt prey for the lioness and satisfy the appetite of the lions, when 
they crouch in their dens, when they wait in ambush in the thicket? Who 
prepares prey for the raven, when its young cry out to God and wander 
about for lack of food?77 
Similarly, Isaiah says: “Oh Lord, you make us secure, for even all we have accomplished, 
you have done for us.”78 And Paul notes that, of all good works, “there are different 
results, but the same God who produces all of them in everyone.”79 
Moreover, as Henry Wheeler Robinson notes: “The Hebrew vocabulary includes 
no word equivalent to our term ‘Nature’…The only way to render this idea into Hebrew 
would be to say simply ‘God.’”80 This theogonic reduction of ‘Nature’ also claims a toll 
on the contradistinctive notion of ‘miracle,’ such that, as Robinson claims: 
Any attempt to classify the Nature-miracles [of the Old Testament] 
statistically as supernatural events would be futile, if not impossible. We 
should have to include ordinary rain amongst the ‘miracles,’ whilst angelic 
visitation or possession by good or evil spirits is a normal explanation of 
certain physical or psychical phenomena.81 
This is no exaggeration, for the God of the Old Testament is routinely described as 
intimately involved in and directly responsible for an entire host of phenomena: 
                                                
77 Job 38:12-41 
78 Isaiah 26:12 
79 1 Corinthians 12:6 
80 Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, 1 
81 Ibid., 34 
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He makes the clouds rise from the far-off horizons. 
He makes the lightning flash out in the midst of the rain. 
He unleashes the wind from the places where he stores it.82 
As noted, the supreme miracle of the Abrahamic Faith is God’s creation of the world 
from nothing; yet in Genesis there is extraordinarily little attention paid to or emphasis 
placed on this marvel, or on nature miracles in general. God so dominates and steers the 
supposed “natural” events of the world that effectively “all nature is miraculous.”83 To 
see the matter otherwise, to believe in an autonomous natural order, is to fall in with the 
“idolaters” who worshipped that order,84 forgetting that it was only the effect of its 
Master’s will. 
 Thus, in spite of Augustine’s guidance, Abrahamic theology was 
nonetheless internally inclined towards an occasionalist philosophy—perhaps 
irrevocably so. The ancients had warned that without fate or necessity guiding the 
“ordered sequence” of natural (i.e. secondary) causes, the great edifice of Nature 
would collapse at its base.85 This consequence the occasionalists gladly accepted, 
as for them the ‘Nature’ of the ancients provided only fetters to God’s freedom 
and the temptations of idolatry. Malebranche thus averred that: “The most 
enlightened, and even the greatest number, of theologians, [saw]…that Sacred 
                                                
82 Jer 10:13 See also Psalms 147:9-18 
83 Grant, 157 
84 Jer 10:13 
85 De anima libri mantissa, xxv. 181.12-25; D.L. vii. 148-149 
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Scripture opposed the efficacy of secondary causes.86 In opposition to such 
secondary causes, Malebranche provided the occasionalist response: “there is only 
one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of 
each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are no true causes 
but only occasional causes.”87 
So much, then, for the impetus of occasionalism as a metaphysic; but what 
is an occasional cause? Arnauld and Nicole give the example of an open window 
being the occasional cause of the illumination of a room, where the sun is, of 
course, the “proper” cause here with the unshuttered window being “only a cause 
or condition without which the effect would not take place.”88 This example is 
helpful, but somewhat misleading insofar as it is not the window that is the 
occasional cause of the light passing through it, but rather the act of unshuttering 
it. The best example of an occasional cause that I have been able to come up 
with—sans speculative theology anyway—is a placebo: a designation that could 
be applied to almost anything, but is understood as such insofar as it serves as the 
“cause” of the placebo effect. Yet, as has been noted in clinical analyses of the 
placebo effect, this causal conception is erroneous insofar as a placebo is an inert 
compound or pointless procedure that doesn’t actually cause anything, much less 
                                                
86 Recherche, 676-677. This is not as obvious as Malebranche presents it. Gassendi, for instance, regarded 
occasionalism as contrary to Scripture, citing Genesis 1:11-12 where, at the behest of God’s command: 
“The land produced vegetation – plants yielding seeds according to their kinds, and trees bearing fruit with 
seed in it according to their kinds.” This, Gassendi thinks, presents a clear Scriptural commitment to 
secondary causality operant in Creatures. (Syntagma, 1.493a) 
87 Recherche, 448 
88 Logique de Port-Royal, 240 
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its salutary effect.89 Nonetheless, without the presence and administration of the 
placebo, the effect would not follow; and thus a placebo may be understood as an 
occasional or sine qua non cause of whatever underlying psycho-physical 
causality that produces the effect. 
How does this model of causation play out as a metaphysic? Antoine 
Rochon, a scholastic critic of Cartesianism, provides an ‘etic’ and incredulous—
but nonetheless accurate—explanation: 
[They say that] when we see that a cannonball from a cannon is carried 
with violence against a wall, we imagine that the ruin which follows in the 
wall is caused by the cannonball, but we are clumsily mistaken. It is 
neither the cannon, nor the powder, nor the cannonball, nor the machine, 
nor the man, nor an angel, nor any creature imaginable which is capable of 
shaking a tiny cottage. It is God alone who, on the occasion of the firing, 
shoots the cannonball and who, on the occasion of the bullet firing, 
collapses the wall, which would otherwise remain steady. Likewise, when 
we want to wiggle a finger, and when that finger wiggles, we think that it 
is we in effect who wiggle it; but it is an error which wrongs the sovereign 
domain of God. It is in no way we who wiggle the finger; all created 
forces are insufficient for that. It is God alone who, following the 
resolution which he made in the beginning, at the occasion of the act of 
our will, himself produces this movement in our finger. In a word, it is 
God who causes all the movements which occur in the world, and all 
which creatures do is serve God as the occasion for his executing what he 
resolved to do in such and such circumstances.90  
                                                
89 Irenaeus justifies this connection by appeal to the claim made in Luke 18:27, that “the things which are 
impossible to men are possible to God.” A similar identification is made by Theophilius of Antioch, 
(Apologia ad Autolycum, 2.13) also writing in the late second century, again in the third and fourth 
centuries by Lactanius (Divinarum Institutionum, 2.9) and Zeno of Verona (Tractatus, 1.7.1-3), before 
being codified by Augustine, who argues that if God is almighty, “it becomes matter of course that [one] 
must also acknowledge that He made out of nothing the things which He did make. For, granting that He is 
almighty, there cannot exist anything of which He should not be the Creator. (De fide et symbolo, 2.2) 
Other Church Fathers who explicitly upheld the ex nihilo doctrine include: Ambrose, Athanasius, Basil of 
Caesarea, Clement of Alexandria, Ephrem the Syrian, John Chrysostom, Lactantius, Minucius Felix, and 
Victorinus of Poetovio. 
90 This summary came in letter sent, anonymously but presumably by Rochon, to Robert Desgabets in 
1672—two years before Malebranche’s Recherche was published. See Rochon, A. Lettre d’un philosophe à 
un cartésienne des ses amis. Paris: Thomas Jolley, 1672, 83-4. It is worth nothing that Malebranche was 
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Such is occasionalism: a ludibrious doctrine entailing an even more ludibrious 
theocentric metaphysic that, in terms of causal explanation, seems to offer an absolute 
exemplar of an obscurum per obscruius; but, as I shall maintain, this strange philosophy 
was to be of absolutely decisive importance in the history of philosophy. 
 
4. Thesis of the Dissertation 
In narratives of the history of philosophy, the Hellenic tradition is typically regarded as 
being not only of paramount, but moreover of definitive importance: philosophy itself is 
defined with the intellectual project of—rather than begun in—ancient Hellas. Following 
such a definition, the narrative inevitably proceeds to the descent of “philosophy” in the 
Hellenistic and Roman era from the lofty perches where Plato and Aristotle had left it, 
until ending in its complete disappearance in late-antiquity and the Middle Ages with the 
political ascendency of Christianity and Islam. These latter traditions are customarily 
depreciated by historians as intrinsically anti-intellectual, superstitious, fervently 
fundamentalist, and even misologist. I reject this historical and interpretive chauvinism 
insofar as one of the most important philosophical advances in Western intellectual 
history, viz. the critique of causal determinism, traces its origins almost entirely within 
the Abrahamic religious tradition. The ramifications of this critique were profound, 
ultimately culminating in defining hallmarks of modern logic, epistemology, and science. 
                                                                                                                                            
likely aware of Rochon and his critique of occasionalism as he possessed a copy of the Lettre in his library. 
(See the inventory of Malebranche’s library in OM, vol. XX, 234-251) 
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 In attempting to answer ‘the philosophical question’ underlying their theology, 
Abrahamic philosophers were driven to seminal developments in logic that liberated it 
from the ontological undercarriage to which it had been bound in antiquity. If miracles 
were to be accounted for, the notion of ‘contradiction’ could not be understood causally 
as it was by Plato: “It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo 
opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time;”91 or 
by Aristotle, who essentially repeated Plato’s conception and tied it to the notion of “a 
privation of substance” or “the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus.”92 In 
challenging such a conception of contradiction, the Abrahamic philosophical tradition led 
not only to the modern modal formulation of the law, but also to modern notions of 
necessity, contingency, and possibility—all freed from the fetters of Nature or ontology. 
 In attacking the vincular necessity between cause and effect, Abrahamic 
philosophers also thereby challenged the deductivist model of causal explanation that 
largely dominated ancient natural philosophy. This line of critique had three fundamental 
upshots. First, by the thirteenth century and the development of Latin nominalism—borne 
largely as a counter to the unacceptable constraints placed on the divine omnipotence by 
Aristotelian scholasticism—it served as the impetus and foundation of a rigorous 
empiricist epistemology that had been almost completely absent among the schools of 
antiquity. This in turn was connected to developments that had their roots in antiquity, 
such as the problem of induction, but waited to be fully cashed out until the late-medieval 
and early-modern period. Second, the critique of causal determinism was implicitly a 
                                                
91 Republic, 436b 
92 Metaphysics, 1011b17-20 
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critique of the hermetic union between logos and physis, Nature and Reason, so broadly 
assumed by the ancients.93 This line of critique ultimately led to the central and defining 
problem of modern philosophy—that concerning the adequacy of the human faculties to 
represent and thus comprehend the natural world in-itself. 
Lastly, it was this nascent critique of causation that drove the attack on neo-
Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, the causal models of which had dominated human 
efforts to understand and explain the operations of Nature since antiquity. By the early 
seventeenth-century, the empiricist and anti-metaphysical epistemology developed in the 
Late Middle Ages in service of theological concerns burst out of its religious vessel, and 
in doing so formed the basis of modern scientific empiricism. Such an understanding 
directly challenges the traditional narratives of the history of science that proceed directly 
from Aristotle to Bacon, completely ignoring the eighteen-century interregnum between 
them, as well as the debt Western scientific thought owes to Western religious thought. 
Thus, while occasionalism and the critique of causation underlying it began in 
service of religious fundamentalism, it culminated, with Hume and Newton, into modern 
philosophy of science. This thesis should be shocking. Thales is credited as the father of 
Science insofar as he posited that natural events could be explained through natural 
causes rather than, immediately or mediately, by the activity and machinations of the 
gods. It is thus an astonishing irony that modern science owes its genesis to an 
intellectual tradition that denied and reversed this posit in the most strident of terms. Yet, 
with Laplace’s declaration to Napoleon (much less his ‘demon’), this intellectual tradition 
                                                
93 Which in the Christian tradition was transmuted into the maxim that, as Aquinas puts it: “God cannot act 
against the principles of reason.” (De potentia Dei, q.6, a.1) 
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and the destruction of ancient philosophy it accomplished had come full circle, thereby 
concealing itself and its role in history. 
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CHAPTER II 
 HUME AND THE DENOUEMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
 
There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus’d 
more disputes both among ancient and modern philosophers, than this concerning the 
efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects. 
 
— Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 
 
[N]ature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the 
knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those 
powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends.” 
     —Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
 
1. Introduction 
In many ways, David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature represents the culmination of 
modern philosophy, at least insofar as the skeptical epistemology therein can be roughly 
described as Descartes sans Dieu. It was Descartes who, in his Meditationes, bisected 
human episteme into the domains of ideas and matters of fact, which shared no 
connection save through the slender thread of the divine guarantee—a fetter Hume 
proceeded to cut. This scission was made by Hume’s relentless pursuit of three 
interlinked programs: 
1) The development of an empiricist epistemology that had been progressively 
radicalized by a half century of innovations since Locke’s publication of An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. 
  33 
2) The advancement of a centuries old occasionalist critique of causal explanation 
and associated doctrines stripped of their theological underpinnings and permuted 
within the strictures of the above epistemology. 
3) The adumbration of a philosophy of mind that sought to rescind Descartes’ 
exemption of human consciousness and ratiocination from his mechanistic natural 
philosophy.1 
The progeny of the first program has been well appreciated since the nineteenth-century. 
The second program has witnessed a scholarly renaissance since the 1980’s, but remains 
largely unknown outside scholarly circles in early-modern philosophy. The third program 
remains significantly less appreciated still, though in many ways Hume’s entire 
philosophy is directed towards it.2 
 In this chapter one shall attempt to elucidate Hume’s famous critique of causation 
primarily in terms of these latter two programs, both examining Hume’s debts to earlier 
philosophers, as well as framing Hume’s critique in terms that will make the subsequent 
chapters, which focus on the earlier history of causal skepticism, more easily relatable 
and comprehensible to a reader with an understanding of Hume, but not of Islamic or 
Cartesian occasionalism or medieval nominalism. 
                                                
1 This extension of Cartesian mechanistic physics to a mechanistic psychology was first suggested by 
Descartes himself in the Traité de l’homme; upon which Claude Clerselier remarks in his preface to the 
1664 publication: “Did it ever happen to you, as it did to me, that whilst reciting you prayers you did not 
pay attention to what you were saying, but that you still continues to say your prayers instantly without 
failing, much better in fact than if you had paid a lot of attention to it? This shows that it is only the 
mainspring of the machine that unwinds itself and slackens its cord.” 
2 See Wright, 1983. 
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 As a rough outline of his empiricist epistemology, Hume begins from a ground-
level distinction between impressions and ideas, maintains that the latter are derived 
exclusively from the former, and that they vary from them only in terms of the “force and 
liveliness with which they strike upon the mind.”3 Impressions gleaned from direct 
experience form the standard of vivacity, while the simple ideas they generate are 
presented by the memory and are distinguishable from them by their desiccated nature, 
where “The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.”4 These simple 
ideas presented by the memory can be combined into complex ideas in a near infinite 
number of ways by the imagination, which are in turn distinguishable from impressions 
and memories by their further diminishment in vivacity.5 By comparing related simple or 
complex ideas, the imagination can abstract further ideas from simple ideas, which are 
devoid of all vivacity.6 This exiguity is due to the fact that, while ultimately originating 
from impressions, these abstract ideas do not call forth any particular impression and thus 
lack the intrinsic phenomenal content of the simple ideas of the memory, or the complex 
ideas of the imagination.7 This is because such abstract ideas are only ideas of relation 
between corresponding simple or complex ideas. 
                                                
3 Treatise, 1 ff. 
4 Enquiry, 11 
5 Treatise, 8 ff. 
6 Treatise, 34. It is on this point that Hume breaks with Berkeley. (17) 
7 For example, one cannot think of a duck’s quack without some aural instance of it being brought to the 
mind. Similarly, one cannot entertain the idea of a green unicorn without forming some particular visual 
conception of it corresponding to possible experience. Conversly, one can think about time, as an abstract 
idea, without any such particular conception of possible experience. 
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 Hume divides the “sources of all philosophical relation” implicit to human 
experience into seven categories: 1.Resemblance, 2.Identity, 3.Space and Time, 
4.Quantity, 5.Quality, 6.Contrariety, 7.Causation.8 Hume notes that these philosophical 
relations “may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, 
which we compare together, and such as may be chang’d without any change in the 
ideas.”9 The first class are simple, “discoverable at first sight,” and latent in our 
experience, which includes “resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions 
in quantity of number,”10 all of which Hume describes as “more properly under the 
province of intuition.”11 The second class of ideas are complex and arise only in the 
comparison of certain ideas and includes “identity, the situations in time and place, and 
causation”12 all of which are distinct from the data of experience (i.e. impressions) and 
thus purely relational. Hume’s investigation into the origin and application of this latter 
class of ideas is the fundamental concern of Book I of the Treatise.  
 It’s worth noting at this juncture that, upon considering this latter class of 
relational ideas, Hume ultimately concludes that each is rationally warrantless and 
supported only by a combination of habituation provided from senses, along with and 
undergirded by a certain natural instinct derived from the mechanical activity of the 
mind. The most famous relation to be deconstructed by Hume in such a fashion was the 
last: causation. 
                                                
8 Treatise, 14-15 
9 Treatise, 69 
10 Treatise, 70 
11 Treatise, 70 
12 Treatise, 73 
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2. Hume’s Critique of Causation 
 Hume’s analysis of causation is based on four negative epistemological 
principles: 
1) We cannot experience causal connections directly, i.e., causation is not a 
phenomenon. 
2) We cannot infer causal connections on the basis of ‘forces’ or ‘powers,’ i.e., 
causal judgments cannot follow from a metaphysical insight into the properties of 
things. 
3) We cannot infer causal connections on the basis of past experience, i.e., causal 
judgments cannot follow as the conclusion of an inductive argument. 
4) We cannot deduce causal connections on the basis of a ‘necessary connection,’ 
i.e., causal judgments cannot follow as the conclusion of a deductive argument. 
None of these four principles were original to Hume, but each had extensive histories that 
will be examined in subsequent chapters. However, Hume’s influence lies in the fact that 
he provided the most extensive argument in support of said principles, linked them 
together into a systematic critique, and also imbedded them within a highly influential 
empiricist epistemology. I shall endeavor to explain Hume’s reasoning as well as some of 
the attendant history behind each principle before turning to Hume’s own positive thesis 
on causation. 
 
1) We cannot experience causal connections directly. 
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Plato was the first to question the empiricity of causality, noting that “we see (or think we 
see) the thing that we have just now been calling water condensing and turning to stones 
and earth…In this way, then, they [and the other elements] transmit their coming to be 
one to the other in a cycle, or so it seems.”13 Hume’s own reasoning behind this 
skepticism is straightforward and has been widely appealed to since at least the early 
eleventh-century, when al-Baqillani, an Ash’arite Islamic theologian, argued that we 
never actually observe causation or causal powers, but only the temporal congruence of 
regular changes in state.14 Such was the force of al-Baqillani’s insight that the point was 
even accepted by his arch-opponent among the rationalist ‘Philosophers,’ Avicenna, who 
concedes that, “As for sensation, it leads only to concomitance.”15 This argument of al-
Baqillani’s is developed by Hume within the framework of his empiricist epistemology. 
He notes that “All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a 
discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear 
to each other.”16 Given that no survey of the qualities of an object itself suffices to 
provide us with an understanding of its effect on anything, much less its complete range 
of effects on everything, Hume concludes that the idea “of causation must be deriv’d 
from some relation among objects.”17 However, Hume is adamant that such a relation is 
nowhere evident in the content of experience: 
                                                
13 Timaeus, 49c; emphasis added. 
14 McGinnis, 35. This particular argument is implied in by Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus, but was 
never explicitly advanced in antiquity. 
15 al-Ilahiyyat, 1.1.16, 6 
16 Treatise, 73 
17 Treatise, 75 
  38 
Let us therefore case our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and 
effect…Motion in one body is regared upon impulse as the cause of 
motion in another. When we consider these objects with the utmost 
attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the 
motion of it precedes that of the other but without any sensible interval.18 
Nowhere do we perceive the causal relation between the motion of one body and the 
motion of the other, but only their temporal conjunction and succession. 
 Many philosophers, before and after Hume, have taken issue with this claim and 
insisted that we do, in fact, and in one way or another see causation taking place. As 
Hume himself says: “When both the objects are present to the senses along with the 
relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning.”19 They concur here and claim, 
pace Hume’s division of relations, that causality is indeed a relation present to the sense 
along with its objects. Yet, caution is required here, for to claim that one can ‘see’ the 
casual connection between two events demands an epistemological account rather than a 
phenomenological asseveration. For Hume, a purely empirical account of causal 
connection would require an empirically veridical insight into the means, manner, or 
power by which the cause produces its effect. Hume follows the occasionalists in 
rejecting any such insight, but does so in a uniquely empiricist manner that stems from 
Berkeley, which regards possibility as coextensive with conceivability, which in turn is 
coextensive with perceivability, such that every object or event series that could manifest 
itself in possible experience, is itself possible; and the contrary, any object or event series 
of which we cannot conceive (i.e. can form no idea of what such a thing would look like), 
we regard as impossible. This means that, in the event of seeing a causal interaction take 
                                                
18 Treatise, 75-7. Hume’s particular example here was espoused some seventy years earlier by the early 
Cartesian occasionalist, Géraud de Cordemoy. (Discernement, 137) 
19 Treatise, 73 
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place, we could not conceive anything else happening because, given such empirically 
veridical insight into the nature of colliding bodies, “[e]very effect, then, beside the 
communication of motion, [would imply] a formal contradiction: and ‘tis impossible that 
it can exist, but also that it can be conceiv’d.”20 That is to say, supposing we had an 
empirically veridical insight into a causal event, we could not conceive any alternative 
outcome to the observed event without changing the ideas under consideration (i.e. if we 
saw one body cause the movement of another), we could not conceive of any other 
outcome happening without introducing an impediment, or conceiving of the fire or 
cotton as something other than what they are). But, Hume has already placed causation in 
the group of relations whose objects “may be chang’d without any change in the ideas”21 
because he is adamant that we can conceive of a collision sans the communication of 
motion insofar as that event series is within the realm of possible experience: 
[W]e may soon satisfy ourselves of the contrary, by forming a clear and 
consistent idea of one body’s moving upon another, and of its rest 
immediately upon the contact or of its returning back in the same line, in 
which it came; or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: and in 
short, of an infinite number of other changes, which we may suppose it to 
undergo.22 
 
2) We cannot infer causal connections on the basis of ‘forces’ or ‘powers.’ 
While this principle has been already alluded to above, it is worth considering in detail 
for it is the point on which Hume is most clearly and directly indebted to his 
                                                
20 Treatise, 111 
21 Treatise, 69 
22 Treatise, 111 
  40 
predecessors. Hume’s rejection of scholastic models of causal explanation on the basis of 
dispositional ‘forces,’ ‘powers,’ ‘potentialities,’ ‘capacities,’ ‘natures,’ etc., is derived 
almost entirely from the Cartesian tradition; for example, consider this clincher from the 
Logique de Port-Royal, which could have just as easily hailed from the Treatise: 
Whenever we see an effect whose cause we do not know, we imagine that 
we have discovered it if we connect the general word “power” or “faculty” 
to this effect. This word produces no other idea in the mind except that 
this effect has some cause, which we knew quite well before finding the 
word.23 
While this particular debt will be examined in detail in later chapters, it should suffice 
here to note that Hume reiterates standard nominalist and Cartesian criticisms of 
scholastic explanation, to the extent of duplicating entire passages from Malebranche. In 
his Recherche de la verite, Malebranche notes that: “There are some philosophers who 
assert that secondary causes act through…a substantial form; others through accidents or 
qualities, and some through certain virtues or faculties different from the above.”24 Hume 
must have been impressed by this formulation, for in the Treatise he writes: “There are 
some, who maintain, that bodies operate by their substantial form; others, by their 
accidents or qualities; several, by their matter and form; some, by their from and 
accidents; others by certain virtues and faculties distinct from all this.”25 
 Like Malebranche, Hume regards such a “prodigious diversity” in explanations of 
the “secret force and energy of causes” to be indicative of their common vacuity and 
                                                
23 Arnauld and Nicole 1662, 247 
24 Recherche, 658 
25 Treatise, 158. Prior to this passage, Hume directs the reader to “See Father Malebranche, Book VI. Part 
ii. Chap. 3, and the illustrations upon it.” This chapter of the Recherche is devoted to Malebranche’s attacks 
on scholastic principles of causal explanation, his argument that true causal connection requires a necessary 
connection, and his rejection that any such connection is possible between finite things. 
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rejects any meaningful distinction between “the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, 
energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality.”26 Hume’s contribution to this 
occasionalist line of criticism was to extend and situate it within an empiricist 
epistemology, for what Hume insists on is: given that “reason can never give rise to the 
idea of efficacy,27 that idea must be deri’d from experience.”28 As the mind is wont to 
confound the indurations of past experience with direct impressions, a true test of the 
possibility of actual experience of the force or efficacy of any object would be the ability 
to comprehend and predict the activity of an entirely novel object in an entirely novel 
situation. Hume is adamant that we are entirely lacking of such insight and ability, as 
“’tis impossible in any one instance to shew the principle, in which the force and agency 
of a cause is plac’d.”29 The upshot of this impossibility is that “we can only define power 
by connexion,”30 and never as a property of things. 
Later in the Enquiry Hume provides a thought experiment to elucidate the 
inadequacy of our minds to grasp natural powers: 
Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and 
abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, but the 
most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its 
causes or effects. Adam…could not have inferred from the fluidity and 
transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and 
warmth of fire that it would consume him.31 
                                                
26 Treatise, 157-158 
27 This principle follows from the general maxim of empiricism that all ideas are derived from impressions 
and thus “reason alone can never give rise to any original idea.” (Treatise, 157) 
28 Treatise, 157 
29 Treatise, 158 
30 Treatise, 248 
31 Enquiry, 27 
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Hume’s point here concerning Adam’s ignorance is an elaboration of an earlier argument 
by Locke (whom Hume dutifully cites) against substance-attribute metaphysics. Locke 
rejects the Aristotelian-scholastic model of causal explanation as epistemologically 
presumptuous and incapable of offering non-vacuous explanations of phenomena. 
Concerning any concept we have of a particular substance and the qualities it possesses 
which demarcate its identity in the order of beings, Locke points out that, “we perceive 
not [their] connexion or dependence one on another, being ignorant both of that real 
constitution in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it.”32 This lack of 
a necessary connection between the qualities that make up the complex idea we have of a 
substance is problematic insofar as “the chief part of our knowledge concerning 
substances is not, as in other things, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist 
separately; but is of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct ideas in 
the same subject, or of their repugnance to co-exist.”33 That is to say, when we consider 
the qualities that a particular substance has, insofar as these qualities make the substance 
what it is, we consider such qualities to be substantial, which is to say essential or 
intrinsic, rather than the merely extrinsic and contingent properties a thing might own 
simply by situational relation with other things.34 Yet, the coherence of our ideas of 
substances is plagued by fact that we do not see the necessary connections that bind the 
observed qualities together into a substantial haeccity. Locke concedes that, if we did 
                                                
32 Essay, IV, vi, §10, 499 
33 Loc. cit. 
34 For example, salt has qualities (taste, solubility, crystallinity, nutritivity, effect on the freezing point of 
water, etc.) that constitute its substantial identity such that they are considered intrinsic properties. By 
contrast, whether the salt is to be found dissolved in the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic is extrinsic and thus 
non-essential. 
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posses such insight, “and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consists, 
and how they are produced, we might frame such abstract ideas of them as would furnish 
us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions 
that should carry truth and certainty with them.”35 However, Locke regards such 
perspicuity as beyond the limit of our faculties: 
Our complex ideas of the sorts of substance are so remote from that 
internal real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are 
made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities 
our senses can discover…I imagine, amongst all the secondary qualities of 
substances and the power relating to them, there cannot any two be named 
whose necessary co-existence, or repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be 
known…No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can certainly 
know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has, nor what 
alterations it is capable to make of receive on or from other bodies.36 
This line of critique was not novel with Locke but had long been put forward in the 
skeptical tradition; for example, Sextus Empiricus argued that: 
[S]ince…so much divergency is shown to exist in objects, we shall not be 
able to state what character belongs to the object in respect of its real 
essence, but only what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of 
conduct, or law, or habit, and so on…[such that] we are compelled to 
suspend judgment regarding the real nature of external objects.37 
                                                
35 Ibid., 500. A little later Locke reiterates this point with a useful example, arguing that “could any one 
discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and the colour or weight of gold, or any other part 
of the complex idea signified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold 
in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition, that ‘all gold is malleable,’ would be as certain as of 
this, ‘The three angles of all right-lined triangles are equal to two right ones.’” (Loc. cit.) 
36 Essay, IV, vi, §10, 500; emphasis added. It is worth noting that while modern chemistry might be able to 
explain such connections, because the problem here is logical and metaphysical, such explanations do not 
resolve the fundamental difficulty so much as kick the can down the hill a bit further. That is to say, if a 
chemist were to explain the connection between salt’s crystallinity and solubility in terms of its molecular 
structure, this would only raise the question of why such a molecular structure has that effect rather than 
another, to which an atomic explanation would have to be sought, etc., ad infinitum with the arbitrary 
contingence of nature always remaining. 
37 PH, i. 163 
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For Sextus, this was primarily an epistemological point, while Locke extended it into a 
general critique of causal explanation. 
Malebranche further advanced Locke’s criticism of substance metaphysics by 
arguing that we have no experience of ‘force’ or ‘power’ in bodies whatsoever,38 a point 
reiterated by Hume: 
In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible 
qualities, discover any power or energy, or given us ground to imagine, 
that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which 
we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities 
are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which 
may result from them.39 
What Hume means by this rather odd assertion that the properties of body “are all 
complete in themselves” is that every one of them are distinct and epistemologically 
isolate ideas, and thus are capable of separation by the intellect. Given his insistence that 
power may only be defined “by connexion,” in order for a body to have such a power, 
one of the properties of said body would have to “point out” or be connected to some 
external consequent, to which that property would be an antecedent. This possibility 
Hume rejects on logical grounds, for reasons that will be addressed shortly. The 
epistemological point Hume wishes to drive home at this juncture is, given that we have 
no impression of any “power” in objects, and given that all ideas are derived from 
impressions, “the power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable 
merely from their idea;” from which Hume concludes: “tis evident cause and effect are 
                                                
38 Recherche, 660 
39 Enquiry, VII.1, 63. Like Malebranche, Hume also references the ideal nature of body in making his 
point. He also follows this argument by noting: “The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and 
one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force, which actuates the whole 
machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body.” 
(Loc. cit.) 
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relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract 
reasoning or reflexion.”40 That is to say, we recognize causes as such not on the basis of 
any empirical or inferential insight into their powers to produce effects, but rather only 
on the sequential relation between the two present in experience,41 the upshot of which 
is: causal explanations must be premised on event-relations rather than hidden 
substantial attributes or capacities of things. From this epistemological reduction, the 
Aristotelian ‘bottom-up’ metaphysic based on real causal relations in re is completely 
overthrown. 
 Before turning to principle three, I should like to note two objections Hume 
entertains to this line of reasoning. The first concerns the question: ‘is it possible that 
such notions derive not from object-perception, but rather from self-perception?’42 In the 
appendix to the Treatise, he notes that, “Some have asserted, that we feel an energy, or 
power, in our own mind; and that having in this manner acquir’d the idea of power, we 
transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to discover it.”43 Whom 
Hume is referring to is unclear. One candidate is Peter Browne, who declares: “the best 
Idea or Conception we have of Power, is from Strength of Body, or a Mighty Arm;”44 yet, 
Browne fails to complete the argument to which Hume refers. Another possibility is 
                                                
40 Treatise, 69 
41 I say “sequential” because Hume denies we ever experience such a causal relation directly, but only the 
sequential conjunction of associated phenomena. 
42 This argument essentially amounts to a causal analogue of the “argument from analogy” against 
solipsism in the philosophy of mind, but reverses that order of that argument, seeking to infer from mental 
states to physical states. 
43 Treatise, 632. As B.F. Skinner notes: “Man’s first experience with causes probably came from his own 
behavior: things moved because he moved them. If other things moved, it was because someone else was 
moving them, and if the mover could not be seen, it was because he was invisible.” (Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity, 7) 
44 III. viii. 451 
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William Wollaston, who argued (fifteen years before the publication of Hume’s 
Treatise): 
It is plain I can move my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster 
or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, just as I will…If then 
I have (as I am sensible I have) a power of moving my hand in a manner, 
which I would not move by those laws, that mere bodies already in motion 
or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends 
solely upon my will, and begins there.45 
While this is clearly a claim that Hume took issue with, Wollaston here is appealing to 
the “power” of the will in contradistinction to those “effects…determined by rules of 
mechanism” in order to defend human freedom against the vicissitudes of Newtonian 
mechanics and the conservation of motion which opposed to such a capacity. This is thus 
rather the opposite of claiming an epistemic “transfer” of our (supposedly sensed) 
volitional “power of moving” to inanimate bodies.46 Thus it seems likely that Hume is 
merely reiterating an argument made against this “transfer” by Malebranche, who avers: 
“The main proof adduced by philosophers for the efficacy of secondary causes is drawn 
from man’s will and his freedom.”though it seems likely he is reiterating an argument 
made against this “transfer” by Malebranche, who avers that “The main proof adduced by 
philosophers for the efficacy of secondary causes is drawn from man’s will and his 
freedom.”47 A later philosopher to directly make this claim in response to Hume’s 
critique of causation was Reid, who argues in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man: 
“It is very probable that the very conception or idea of active power, and of efficient 
                                                
45 The Religion of Nature Delineated, §IX, v. 346-347 
46 Ibid. 
47 Recherche, 668 
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causes, is derived from our voluntary exertions in producing effects.”48 However, Hume 
had proleptically occluded such a response: 
[T]o convince us how fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider, 
that the will being here consider’d as a cause, has no more a discoverable 
connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper 
effect. So far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and 
a motion of the body; ‘tis allow’d that no effect is more inexplicable from 
the powers and essence of thought and matter…The effect is there 
distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou’d not be foreseen 
without the experience of their constant conjunction.49 
Hume refutes this argument in greater detail in the Enquiry, again asking if “there is any 
principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body,” as well as 
noting the inexplicable nature of the will itself, by which we are “empowered, by a secret 
wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit.”50 Hume also points out 
                                                
48 Essays, IV.2 604 
49 Treatise, 632. Like many of the Scottish “common-sense” philosophers (as well as their contemporary 
American pragmatist heirs), Reid fundamentally failed to grasp and appreciate Hume’s critique. This is 
particularly obvious in his argument, pace Hume, that “theory ought to stoop to fact, and not fact to theory. 
Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both 
taken together, imply efficiency.” (Essays, IV.2 604) Reid apparently regards this as a refutation of Hume, 
but he is only reinforcing Hume’s overarching claim that we have no idea of causal efficacy—a point 
appreciated by his compatriot, Thomas Brown. (Lectures, vi. 71) The point is, if all of our ideas are derived 
from impressions, and there are never any impressions of efficacy but only of temporal priority, contiguity, 
and conjunction between phenomena, then any real idea of efficacy we possess must necessarily be 
complex and derived from a comparison of these impressions. Which is to say, it must be implied by them. 
Now, if temporal priority and constant conjunction did indeed “imply” causal efficacy, then, on the 
experience of the former, we would be logically impelled to an idea of the latter, on the basis of the 
“necessary connexion” between the two. Yet, Hume is adamant that if this were so, “Such an inference 
wou’d…imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different. But as all 
distinct ideas are separable, ‘tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind.” (Treatise, 1.3.6, 86-87) 
Reid buttressed his claim with the uninspiring cavil: “The very dispute, whether we have the conception of 
an efficient cause, shews that we have.” (Essays, IV.2 604) Hume likewise anticipated and responded to 
this argument indirectly but succinctly in the Treatise, claiming: “If it be a sufficient proof, that we have 
the idea of a vacuum, because we dispute and reason concerning it; we must for the same reason have the 
idea of time without any changeable existence; since there is no subject of dispute more frequent and 
common. But that we really have no such idea, is certain. For whence shou’d it be deriv’d? Does it arise 
from an impression of sensation or of reflexion? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may know its nature 
and qualities. But if you cannot point out any such impression, you may be certain you are mistaken, when 
you imagine you have any such idea.” (Treatise, 64-5) 
50 Enquiry, 65 
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that our will only has partial control over the operations of the body, which, if we had 
some direct perception into the power by which our will operates, would not be 
inexplicable, but rather we would be able to “perceive, independent of experience, why 
the authority of the will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such 
particular limits.”51 While Malebranche’s argument against such a ‘transfer’ had put 
particular emphasis on the Cartesian doctrine of incommensurability between mind and 
body52 (which Hume refuses to commit to53), Hume isolates necessary connection as the 
sine qua non of volitional efficacy, noting that “A man, suddenly stricken with palsy in 
the leg or arm…is as much conscious of power to command such limbs, as a man in 
perfect health.”54 Hume thus concludes that “the influence of volition over the organs of 
the body…is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by 
experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, 
which connects it with the effect, and renders one and infallible consequence of the 
other.”55 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
52 Recherche, 670 
53 Treatise, 247-8 
54 Enquiry, 66. McCracken claims that Malebranche also employs the example of a paralytic arm to the 
same end; however, he uncharacteristically only cites Eclaircissement XV of the Recherche without 
specifying any particular page. (1983, 260) Similarly, and perhaps under his authority, Kail makes the same 
claim in two articles, again only generally citing Eclaircissement XV, and even goes so far as to claim that 
“Both thinkers, in rejecting the thesis that we can observe efficacy in the operations of the will, centre their 
discussion on the example of a paralyzed man attempting to move his arm.” (2008, 321; cf. Kail 2007, 6) It 
is thus somewhat awkward to relate that I have been completely unable, even after a through reading of the 
chapter in question, to find any such reference. To be sure, Malebranche is certainly of the same mind as 
Hume, but nowhere does he offer the example of a paralytic impotently willing to move any appendage. 
The only Cartesian occasionalist I have found to employ such an example was Geulincx (See Ethica, 232) 
55 Enquiry, VIII.1 64-5. See also Recherche, 670-671 
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The second objection Hume considers concerns the question: ‘could we not infer 
the existence and operation of causal powers on the basis of the observation of regular 
relations between objects or events?’ Such an inference was propounded by Avicenna as 
the “hidden syllogism” underlying causal judgments, by which, after an observed sodality 
(sc. the consumption of scammony and the purgative effect) is “repeated many times, it 
stops being a case of something that occurs by chance…[but] is a characteristic of 
scammony to purge bile.”56 Hume holds no quarrel with Avicenna’s first claim,57 but 
rejects the latter insofar as such a judgment of the mind can be only psychological and 
habitual but never inferential. He is adamant that our experience of the conjunction of 
two objects or events, no matter how many times it be repeated, can never elucidate or 
inform us of anything beyond their recurring sequentiality: 
There is…nothing new either discover’d or produc’d in any object by their 
constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their 
relations of succession and contiguity. But ‘tis from this resemblance, that 
the ideas of necessity, or power, and of efficacy are deriv’d. These ideas, 
therefore, represent not any thing, that does or can belong to the objects, 
which are constantly conjoin’d.58 
Here Hume clearly understands “derive” in a psychological rather than logical sense: all 
of our ideas of causal powers, which we impute to things are a type of animistic or 
superstitious projection that converts past experience of conjunction into a conception of 
efficacy or power. While such a conception may possess practical utility, like any other 
conceptions the mind applies to experience, they are completely without rational or 
                                                
56 al-Burhan, 45 
57 Treatise, 4 
58 Treatise, 164 
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empirical warrant. Thus, “the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, 
can never give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt them.”59 
 
3) We cannot infer causal connections on the basis of past experience. 
Hume’s reasoning behind this principle is an extension of his aforementioned argument 
against Avicenna’s “hidden syllogism.” Suppose we follow Hume in requiring that causal 
explanations be premised on relations rather than capacities. The previous question 
concerning the inference of ‘causal power’ on the basis of regularity is then re-
instantiated in terms of ‘causal relation,’ namely: ‘could we not then infer the existence 
of such causal relations on the basis of prior experience?’ That is to say, even if we forgo 
claims of ontological insight into the real properties of objects by which they produce 
their effects, could we not infer causation as a relation between phenomena that have 
occurred with sequential regularly in our past experience? Hume first responds by noting 
that sequential regularity is insufficient for an adequate notion of causal relation, for “An 
object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being consider’d as its cause.”60 
On this basis, Hume insists that, “We must distinctly and particularly conceive the 
connexion betwixt the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simply view of 
the one, that it must be follow’d or preceded by the other.”61 Hume thus concludes that, 
                                                
59 Treatise, 166. To say that our conception of power is without rational warrant is not to say that it is 
irrational, for that would mean that the conception would imply some fallacy or contradiction. Rather such 
a notion is merely a-rational. 
60 Treatise, 77 
61 Treatise, 161 
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“There is a necessary connexion to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of 
much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention’d.”62 
 Hume’s definition of causation in terms of “necessary connexion” was 
undoubtedly influenced by Malebranche, who avers: “A true cause as I understand it is 
one such that the mind perceives a necessary connexion [une liaison nécessaire] between 
it and its effect.”63 While this debt has been noted in the literature,64 it should not be 
overstated, for the conception of causation in terms of necessary connection was not 
novel to Malebranche or even modern philosophy in general. In his enormously 
influential Consolatio Philosophae, Boethius—essentially and historically summarizing 
the tradition of ancient philosophy—claims that “causes are made to concur and flow 
together by that order which, proceeding with inevitable connexion [inevitabili 
conexione], and coming down from its source in providence, disposes all things in their 
proper places and times.”65 Similarly, al-Ghazali describes the neo-Platonic 
‘Philosopher’s’ conception of causation as “a necessary connexion [luzuman daruriyan] 
that God cannot be imagined to sever, and which is like the connexion between the 
                                                
62 Treatise, 77 
63 Recherche, 6.2.3, 450 
64 See McCracken 1983: “It is not in Locke, Berkeley, or even Descartes, that one finds emphasis placed on 
the indispensable role necessary connection plays in our idea of causation; of all the authors Hume urged 
Michael Ramsay to read, it is Malebranche alone who lays great stress on the doctrine that causality 
consists essentially in a necessary connection of things.” (262) 
65 Consolatio, 5.1. The reason Boethius uses the term “inevitable connexion” is likely due to his extensive 
arguments in the Consolatio in support of future contingents and against the doctrine that the future (or 
past) is existentially necessary. Boethius thus accepts that causes necessitate their effects, but denies that 
the existence of any particular cause is necessary se ipsum. Events in the past (e.g. Ceasar crossing the 
Rubicon) necessitate certain events in the present, but that causal necessity should not be mistaken for 
logical necessity: Caesar could have chosen to obey Roman law and keep his legions on the north bank of 
the river. 
  52 
shadow and the man.”66 I would argue that, while Malebranche’s emphasis on a liaison 
nécessaire was largely strategic,67 Hume seems to recognize “necessary connexion” as 
the implicit standard of the conception of efficient causality endemic to Western 
philosophy; particularly as it uniformly regarded causes to be causes insofar as they were 
(either alone or in plenary association) sufficient to produce their effects. The plain 
upshot of this, as was repeatedly expounded by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Galen, 
Avicenna, Averroes, Aquinas, Suarez, Molina, and a litany of other major and minor 
figures, is that, to quote Hobbes: 
An entire cause is always sufficient for the production of its effects, if the 
effect be at all possible. For let any effect whatsoever be propounded to be 
produced; if the same be produced, it is manifest that the cause which 
produced it was a sufficient cause…[and] the effect cannot but follow.68 
Such a standard of causation is clearly predicated on a necessary connection between 
cause and effect and the acceptance of this endemic standard is precisely what drives 
Hume to reject mere contiguity and succession as sufficient for a notion of causation; for 
what we mean when we claim that ‘Φ causes Ψ’ is not simply that ‘Φ is prior to and 
contiguous with Ψ,’ but rather ‘Φ → Ψ,’ which is to say: ‘given Φ, Ψ must follow, all 
else being equal.’69 
                                                
66 Averroes, Tahafut, 150 
67 He continues the aforementioned quote with: “Now the mind perceives a necessary connection only 
between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects. Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause 
and who truly has the power to move bodies.” (Op. cit., 6.2.3, 450) 
68 De corpore, 2.9.5 
69 Hume thus fully concurs with Cicero’s insistence that “‘cause’ is not to be understood in such a way as to 
make what precedes a thing the cause of that thing, but what precedes it effectively.” (De fato, xv. 34) 
Reid, however, cites this claim against Hume, arguing against his constant conjunction epistemological 
model of causation: “theory ought to stoop to fact, and not fact to theory. Every man who understands the 
language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency.” 
(Essays on the Active Powers of Man, iv. 2, 2:604) While Reid regards this as a refutation of Hume, he is 
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 Returning to the problem at hand, the question according to the above standard of 
causation is: can we not infer such a necessary connection between two objects or events 
from their sequential regularity in past experience? Hume’s negative answer to this 
question, viz. ‘the problem of induction,’ is famous and I shall not belabor it.70 Before 
turning to Hume’s analysis, though, a digression into the history of the problem is 
warranted.  In antiquity the problem of induction was first formulated by the Stoics and 
the dogmatici (a sect of rationalist physicians) and pressed in service of their rationalist 
epistemology;71 and was first revived in the early-modern period in support of the same 
ends. While this may be surprising to contemporary readers who strongly associate the 
problem with Hume and British empiricism, as in antiquity, the most strident and 
expansive elaborations of the problem of induction came from rationalist philosophers; 
and the British empiricists from Bacon to Berkeley had almost nothing to say about it.72 
For example, Arnauld and Nicole criticize empiricism by arguing that “philosophers who 
hold that all our ideas come from the senses” cannot account for necessary truths such as 
                                                                                                                                            
actually reinforcing Hume’s claim: we have no idea of causal efficacy.  If all our ideas our derived from 
impressions, and we have no impression of efficacy but only of temporal priority and constant conjunction 
between phenomena, then any idea of efficacy we might possess must needs be complex and derived from 
an analysis of these ideas themselves, i.e. be implied by them. Now, if temporal priority and constant 
conjunction did indeed “imply” causal efficacy, then, on the experience of the former, we would logically 
come to an idea of the latter, as well as the “necessary connexion” between the two, and thus could reason 
securely from the former to the latter à la Avicenna’s “hidden syllogism.” Yet, Hume is adamant that this is 
never the case. 
70 Ironically, as J. R. Milton notes, Hume uses the term “induction” only once in the Treatise and again in 
the Enquiry; and in neither case does it conform to its modern usage. (Milton, 1985, 50) 
71 Philodemus, On Methods of Inference, Col. 2-8; Galen, On Medical Experience, 96-97. 
72 Milton 1987, 60-61. Locke does offer the following: “whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough to 
discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be 
content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; not can we be assured about them any 
farther than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, 
we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies, and 
our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.” (Essays, Bk. IV, Ch. III, §25) 
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“the whole is greater than its part” other than “from the various observations we have 
made since childhood.”73 Yet, in this case: 
[W]e would be sure only of its probability, since induction is a certain 
means of knowing something only when we are sure that the induction is 
complete. Nothing is more common than discovering the falsity of 
something we thought was true based on inductions that appeared so 
general that we could no imagine finding any exception to them…this 
shows that mere inductions cannot give us complete certainty of any truth, 
unless we are sure that they are general, which is impossible.74 
The upshot for rationalists like Arnauld and Nicole is that “the consideration of singular 
things serves only as an occasion for the mind to pay attention to its natural ideas, by 
which it judges the truth of things in general.”75 
Similarly, in a 1702 letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia,76 Leibniz 
interprets the problem in a strict fashion, arguing that: 
There are in fact experiments which succeed countless times in ordinary 
circumstances, yet instances are found in some extraordinary cases in 
which the experiment does not succeed. For example, if we have shown a 
hundred thousand times that iron sinks to the bottom when placed in 
water, we are still not sure that this must always happen. Without 
appealing to the miracle of the prophet Elisha, who made iron float,77 we 
know that an iron pot can be made so hollow that it floats and can even 
carry a considerable load besides, as do boats made of copper and of 
tinplate.78 
                                                
73 Arnauld and Nicole 1662, 316. See previous footnote where Locke essentially concedes as much.  
74 Arnauld and Nicole 1662, 316-317 
75 Arnauld and Nicole 1662, 259 
76 Sophia Charlotte was the daughter of Princess Sophia of Hanover, another famous friend and 
correspondent of Leibniz, who herself was the younger sister of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Aside from 
being a famous correspondent of Descartes, Elizabeth also, in her later years, corresponded with and met a 
young Leibniz. 
77 2 Kings 6:6 
78 Leibniz 1969, 551; emphasis added 
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Leibniz compares this to induction in mathematics, noting that while “experience teaches 
us that the odd numbers when added together continuously in their order produce the 
square numbers in order,”79 this experience (i.e. calculation) does not constitute a 
mathematical proof—one which provides “the demonstrative reason for it” and assures 
that there can be no instances to the contrary.80 
Leibniz is quite candid about what he takes as the upshot of the problem of 
induction. The existence of “necessary truths” and our knowledge of them, combined 
with the logical inadequacy of inductive inferences, “shows that there is a light which is 
born with us,” as “it is universally true that we know them only by this natural light and 
not at all by sense experiences. For the senses can indeed help us after a fashion to know 
what is, but they cannot help us to know what must be or what cannot be otherwise.”81 
Thus, we cannot know that the principle “every heavy body falls toward the center of the 
earth…is necessary until we have grasped some reason for it;”82 and this reason cannot 
come simply from sufficient iterations in experience.83 In this way Leibniz is exploiting 
the problem of induction in the same way the Stoic rationalists of antiquity had. 
                                                
79 Leibniz 1969, 550 
80 Similarly, Leibniz notes the proposition “that two lines which approach each other continuously finally 
meet,” is so seemingly self-evident that “many people would be quick to swear that it could never happen 
otherwise.” Yet, asymptotes provide an exception to this rule.  (Ibid. 551) 
81 Leibniz 1969, 550 
82 Leibniz 1969, 550; emphasis added 
83 As a possible counterexample to the universal force of gravity, Leibniz offers the theory of Gassendi and 
his followers who held that gravity is or is equivalent to a form of magnetism, and “whose attractive force 
does not, they think, extend very far, any more than the ordinary magnet attracts a needle some distance 
away from it.” (Ibid.) In this case, given sufficient altitude above the earth, the force of gravity would cease 
to act. 
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Returning to Hume, he argues that the attempt to derive a necessary connection 
from past experience is no different than the attempt to derive a notion of power: “From 
the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new 
original idea, such as that of a necessary connection; and the number of impressions has 
in this case no more effect than if we confin’d ourselves to one only.”84 Nothing more is 
ever contained in our experience of any sequential regularity beyond that regularity—the 
congruence of two things posits no tertium quid.85 Moreover, no notion of necessity or 
any other supposed principle governing said regularity may ever be inferred from it for 
inferences are the purview of the understanding and involve a demonstration from 
premises to conclusion. No such demonstration is possible between the premise of 
sequential regularity and the conclusion of necessary connection as the two involve 
fundamentally distinct modalities (sc. the contingent and the necessary): and thus the 
inference from the former to the latter fails for want of any entailment. The only way 
such an entailment could be affected is by the addition of a minor premise that unites the 
two modalities by constricting the domain of the possible to that contained within the first 
premise, i.e. by supposing that nothing else could ever happen other than what we have 
observed to happen in the sequence under question. That is, this minor premise would 
suppose “that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of 
which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues uniformly the 
same.”86 Having drawn the problem in such a manner, Hume then springs the trap, 
                                                
84 Treatise, 88 
85 “These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such an object has always been 
attended with such an effect, and I forsee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be 
attended with similar effects.” (Enquiry, 34) 
86 Treatise, 89 
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insisting that all we can ever do is suppose as much, for: “there can be no demonstrative 
arguments to prove that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble 
those, of which we have had experience. We can at least conceive a change in the course 
of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible.”87 
 A common misconception of Hume’s reasoning regarding the problem of 
induction hinges on his demand for a “necessary connexion” as well as his insistence that 
“a change in the course of nature…is not absolutely impossible,” from which (by the 
italicized terms) it is interpreted that Hume is taken with the typical early-modern 
epistemological fixation on apodictic certainty—the implication being that, if one 
foregoes this epistemic requirement, Hume’s problem of induction likewise disappears. 
This interpretation (while largely accurate in terms of the aforementioned rationalist 
arguments concerning the problem), is mistaken in terms of Hume’s argument for two 
important reasons. First, of all early-modern philosophers, Hume is perhaps the least 
concerned with certainty, and indeed, prior to the above quote he had already accepted 
“algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of 
reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and 
certainty.”88 Second, as Hume makes clear, the problem does not concern certainty but 
rather circularity. Any positive epistemic claim concerning matters of fact that is true but 
not at the level of certainty, must therefore be true at some level of probability. Yet, the 
                                                
87 Treatise, 89.  
88 Treatise, 71. Hume even goes so far as to deny geometry the standard of certainty as he regards it as 
stemming from, and thus infected by inexactness of, experience. (Treatise, 39-53) This claim was later 
abandoned in the Enquiry. 
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reduced standard of probability does not offer an escape from the problem so much as it 
manifestly begs the question: 
[P]robability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt 
those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we 
have had none; and therefore ‘tis impossible this presumption can arise 
from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect 
of another; and this is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that 
relation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.89 
 
4) We cannot deduce causal connections on the basis of a ‘necessary connection.’ 
Hume’s real debt to occasionalism lies in his adamant insistence that no necessary 
connection holds between any two distinct things. This insistence follows from what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘distinctness principle,’ which posits that whatever is distinct 
is logically capable of independent existence and thus cannot existentially entail or be 
entailed by another distinct thing. Therefore, regarding the early-modern definition of 
‘substance’ as “something which may exist by itself,” Hume notes that: 
[T]his definition agrees to everything, that can possibly be 
conceiv’d…since all our perceptions are different from each other…they 
are also distinct and separable,90 and may be consider’d as separately 
existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to 
support their existence.91 They are, therefore, substances, as far as this 
definition explains a substance.92 
                                                
89 Treatise, 90. Thus, the claim that ‘we can we can know by probability that the course of nature will 
continue uniformly the same,’ resolves itself to: ‘we know that the course of nature will continue uniformly 
the same because, at every point of reference in the past, the course of nature has continued uniformly the 
same.’ 
90 As Montaigne notes in his essay Of Experience, “Nature has committed herself to make nothing separate 
that was not different.” (Selected Essays, 292) 
91 Hume here is clearly indebted to Berkeley, who, while famously denying that simple ideas are capable of 
dismemberment (e.g. separating extension from color—a point which Hume rejected), allows that 
“associated” ideas can be separated at will: “I may indeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from 
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This is as close to a logico-existential formulation of the ‘distinctness principle’ as is to 
be found in Hume. Such a formulation was common in medieval occasionalism and 
nominalism (sc. in al-Ghazali and Autrecourt), but was supplanted in the early-modern 
period by an epistemological derivation of the principle. This derivation was also 
common in the medieval period (sc. with al-Ghazali and Ockham, but not Autrecourt) 
and was known as the ‘maxim of admissibility’ (tajwiz) by which “whatever is possible 
in reason is possible for God.”93 This maxim entails that, as Maimonides (disparagingly) 
notes: “that which can be imagined is…something possible, whether something existent 
corresponds to it or not.”94 
 This epistemological formulation is famously repeated (almost ad nauseum) by 
Hume: “Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is 
separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, 
distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceiv’d as separately existent, and may 
exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.”95 Given that all ideas are 
derived from impressions, the independence of the latter entails the independence of the 
former; and the fact that our impressions are absolutely distinct entails that our ideas are 
                                                                                                                                            
each other those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a 
human body without limbs, or conceive a smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far I will 
not deny I can abstract…which extends only to conceiving separately such objects, as is possible may 
really exist or be actually perceived asunder.” (Principles, I, §5; 78) 
92 Treatise, 233; emphasis added. As will be seen in later chapters, particularly concerning the dispute 
between al-Ghazali and Averroes and between Malebranche and Fontenelle, the full acceptance of the logic 
of the critique of causation forces an annihilation of any notion of substance. 
93 Fakhry, 32 
94 Guide, 1.73, 207. Maimonides rejection of the maxim hinges on his acceptance of Aristotle’s ontological 
formulation of the law of non-contradiction, whereas the maxim hinges on a strictly modal formulation of 
the law. 
95 Treatise, 634 
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absolutely fungible. This principle accounts for “the liberty of the imagination to 
transpose and change its ideas,” which Hume insists will not “appear strange, when we 
consider, that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions, and that there are not any 
two impressions which are perfectly inseparable.”96 Thus Hume concludes, “Where-ever 
the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation.”97 
The liberty of the imagination to separate and transpose distinct ideas is the basis of the 
‘maxim of admissibility,’ which in the Treatise rapidly becomes Hume’s favorite 
shibboleth: the “establish’d maxim in metaphysics,” which proposes “That whatever the 
mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that 
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.”98 While the establishment of this 
‘establish’d maxim’ will be addressed in subsequent chapters, suffice it to say that, for 
Hume, it felicitously justifies the central claim of his epistemology, namely the 
discreteness of ideas: 
There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider 
these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we 
form of them. Such an inference wou’d amount to knowledge, and wou’d 
imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing 
different. But as all distinct ideas are separable, ‘tis evident there can be 
no impossibility of that kind.99 
                                                
96 Treatise, 10 
97 Ibid. 
98 Treatise, 32 
99 Treatise, 1.3.6, 86-87. It might be objected that, insofar as Hume defines impressions as intrinsically 
distinct from each other, he is thus caught in a circle when he claims that cause and effect are likewise 
distinct given the distinctness of their ideas. Yet this is only a seeming circularity. Impressions are distinct 
only insofar as any one can be broken asunder and recombined with any other without contradiction. I.e. 
any impression may be followed by any other. Similarly, we can rest assured that cause and effect are, in 
fact, perfectly distinct by surveying our minds and noting that, in any conceivable causal interaction, we 
can always conceive of an alternate outcome—indeed a veritable infinity of alternate outcomes—than what 
typically takes place. This possibility is, in itself, sufficient to establish the distinctness between cause and 
effect. 
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Thus, Hume’s appeal to the “established maxim” amounts to an epistemological criterion 
by which to posit the contingency of the world, insofar as the opposite of every matter of 
fact is possible (i.e. conceivable). Given that “every effect is a distinct event from its 
cause,”100 such a criterion has a direct bearing on the possibility of necessary connection, 
which Hume was eager to cash out: 
The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and 
indeed any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is 
possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever demonstration 
takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. There 
is no demonstration, therefore, for any conjunction of cause and effect.101 
 Before turning to Hume’s positive account of causation, it is worth relating that 
Hume’s ‘establish’d maxim’ was not entirely established. As noted, Maimonodies 
regarded it as metaphysically extravagant and, more importantly, identified the maxim as 
coextensive with its inversion, viz. “everything that cannot be imagined is impossible,”102 
which he rejects on the basis that creation ex nihilo dogma.103 This inverse formulation of 
the maxim had been opened by the Epicureans104 and even employed by al-Ghazali.105 
Descartes made use of the maxim’s underlying ‘distinctness principle,’ in the 
                                                
100 Enquiry, VI.1, 31 
101 Abstract, 130 
102 Guide, 1.73, 207 
103 Maimonides argues that “the bringing into being of a corporeal thing out of no matter whatever 
belongs—according to us—to the class of the possible, and to the class of the impossible—according to the 
philosophers.” (Guide, 3.15, 460) If God brining something into existence out of nothing is at least as 
inconceivable as “bring[ing] into being a square whose diagonal is equal to one of its sides,” (Ibid.) and if 
Maimonides accepts the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, as he says he does, then he is required to reject the 
inversion of the maxim. Yet, he refrains from this claim and bemoans: “Would that I know whether this 
gate is open and licit, so that everyone can claim and assert with regard to any notion whatever that he 
conceives: This is possible.” (Ibid.) 
104 See Philodemus, Col. 33 
105 Tahafut, 195 
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Meditations,106 but adamantly rejects its inverse as a kind of argumentum ad 
ignorantiam.107 Maimonodies and Descartes had good reason to be suspicious of this 
inverse formulation of the maxim insofar as it entails that conceivability is not merely 
indicative of possibility (in the positive sense), but coextensive with possibility (in both 
the positive and negative sense), a principle fundamentally incompatible with at least two 
points foundational to Abrahamic theology and one specific to Christian theology, all of 
which were regarded as blatantly inconceivable by human reason: 
1) The dogma of creation ex nihilo108 
2) The definition of God as causa sui109 
3) The doctrine of the Trinity110 
While acceptance of the inversion of the ‘establish’d maxim’ creates theological 
problems for al-Ghazali, it creates epistemological problems for Hume, who seems to 
appeal to the inverse as well: 
                                                
106 “[A] lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others, so that it 
does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now.” (CSM, 2 33) Descartes’ 
avoids using the maxim itself, as does Malebranche, somewhat surprisingly given its suitability for causal 
skepticism. This is likely due to epistemological tension between the modal logic of the ‘establish’d 
maxim’ and the classical logic of the Cartesian ‘clarity and distinctness’ principle. 
107 “I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by God…I merely 
say that He has given me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, or an aggregate 
of 1 and 2 which is not 3, and that such things involve a contradiction in my conception.” (29 July 1648, 
CSMK, III 358; emphasis added.) 
108 “The first principle of our study we will derive from this, that no thing is ever by divine power produced 
from noting…[for] nothing can be created from nothing.” (Lucretius, De rerum natura, 1.149-57) 
109 “The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and 
abomination.” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §21) 
110 “As the Trinitarian dogma of Nicaea had announced, the Christian ethic was to deify mystery and to 
chasten man’s presumptuous claim of rational knowledge…sovereignty supplants intelligence…The 
universe became the creation of an inscrutable and suprarational deity who desired not comprehension but 
worship.” (Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man, 172-73) 
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Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, 
contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; 
and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human 
knowledge…The plain consequence is, that whatever appears impossible 
and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really 
impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion.111 
This principle (the inverse of the ‘establish’d maxim) serves as the major premise of 
Hume’s argument for the finite disability of space and time. Hume’s arguments in this 
regard are unique because they are ontological and thus stand in strong tension (perhaps 
as a euphemism for ‘contradiction’) to a methodological claim he makes in the Appendix 
of the Treatise, which was intended to be inserted into the end of the section on space and 
time: 
As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to 
our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature 
and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be 
embarrass’d by any question…[However,] If we carry our enquiry beyond 
the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our 
conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty.”112 
In his most direct explication of the “establish’d maxim,” Hume only claims that, 
concerning something of which we “can form no idea,” we “therefore regard it as 
impossible.”113 This, I maintain, must be taken as Hume’s considered view, for—aside 
from the logical error of regarding the inversion of a proposition to correspond in truth 
value with its original which could not possibly have escaped a mind such as Hume’s—
nowhere else in the Treatise or the Enquiry does Hume make such a negative ontological 
                                                
111 Treatise, 29 
112 Treatise, 638-9 
113 Treatise, 32; emphasis added 
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asseveration.114 Moreover, such an asseveration is simply incompatible with Hume’s 
overall epistemology, which resolutely (but not without exception) refrains from 
ontological principles and denies any knowable relationship between our ideas and the 
real.115 That is, if the major premise of Hume’s rejection of the infinite divisibility of 
space and time is the inverse of the ‘establish’d maxim’ (“Wherever ideas are adequate 
representations of objects… whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the 
comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory”), the minor 
premise is precisely the supposition that ‘ideas are adequate representations of objects.’ 
                                                
114 While not noting the distinction between positive and inverse formulations of the ‘establish’d maxim,’ 
John Wright argues that, in his treatment of the paradox of absolute space, “Hume clearly rejects the 
‘establish’d maxim in metaphysics’ and allows for the possible existence of that which is conceived to be 
absolutely impossible—namely, absolute space.” (Wright, 103) To claim that Hume “rejects” a principle to 
which he appeals almost ad nauseum and upon which he bases a large part of his epistemology from a 
single interpretive difficulty strikes me as overly rigorous. First, there is only one instance in which Hume 
advances the inverse of the ‘establish’d maxim,’ and, in doing so, contradicts one of the most important 
principles of his epistemology. Second, Hume (following Leibniz) does not regard absolute space to be 
conceptually impossible but indeed argues, pace Bayle and the Cartesians, that the conceptual possibility of 
the void is “what results from the concurrence of…[the] possible ideas of rest and annihilation” and indeed 
defies the “metaphysicians to conceive [of] matter according to their hypothesis.” (Treatise, 54-5) Hume’s 
argument behind this position is problematic in that he fails to realize that the Cartesians regard a body as 
coextensive with its internal place; thus the annihilation of a body-B between bodies A & C, would alter 
their external place and bring them closer together, but would not change their internal place; and thus any 
movement resulting from this annihilation would be only relative rather than absolute as Hume assumes. 
Then again, if Hume’s argument here is problematic, so is Cartesian plenist mechanics, which has 
extraordinary difficulty explaining how movement is possible in the first place. (See Lennon 2007) 
Regardless, it is true, as Wright notes, that Hume sees “no very decisive arguments on either side” 
(Treatise, 639) of the plenum-vacuum debate, but that impasse is precisely the result of the fact that both 
can be independently conceived and are thus possible—which brings us back to the ‘establish’d maxim.’ 
115 In his Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion, Locke encourages the reader to “consider the 
weakness of our minds, and the narrowness of our capacities, and have but humility enough to allow, that 
there may be many things which we cannot fully comprehend, and that God is not bound in all he does to 
subject his ways of operation to the scrutiny of our thoughts, and confine himself to do nothing but what we 
must comprehend.” (§2) On these grounds he rejects the ontological conceit of the Cartesian clarity and 
distinctness principle, noting that: “To say there can be no other, because we conceive no other, does not, I 
confess, much instruct.” (§8) 
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Yet, as Hume himself (following Berkeley) is adamant, such an adequacy is something of 
which we can never know.116 
 
Hume’s Positive Account of Causation 
Before turning to Hume’s critique of occasionalism, I should like to briefly address 
Hume’s positive theory of causal explanation. Hume outlines four criteria he sees as 
essential to the relation of causation; 
1) The temporal priority of ‘cause’ to ‘effect’117 
2) The contiguity of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’118 
3) A constant conjunction between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’119 
4) A “necessary connexion” between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’120 
Criterion four is, as Hume acknowledges, the master of the group, but Hume has 
demonstrated that the assignment of a necessary connection between two events can 
never be justified, and thus that we have no reason for regarding anything to be the cause 
of anything else. Yet, the other three criteria remain and, pace Malebranche, Hume does 
not believe that we can simply will our judgments of causation away. Even though the 
relation of causation is fundamentally a-rational, we believe it all the same and: 
                                                
116 I would venture that this problem, more than anything else in Hume’s infamous ruminations on discrete 
geometry and time, is responsible for ‘Part II’ of the first book of the Treatise being left out of the Enquiry. 
117 Treatise, 76 
118 Treatise, 75. It’s worth noting that Hume ultimately rescinds this criterion. 
119 Treatise, 87 
120 Treatise, 77 
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Thus, we remember to have seen that species of object we call flame, and 
to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. We likewise call to 
mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any farther 
ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the 
existence of the one from that of the other.121 
This unstoppable propensity of the mind raises two questions: 
1) Why do we believe in such things? 
2) What exactly is this belief? 
For Hume, the answer is both simple and brutally deflationary. Belief is not a conceptual 
additament: it is not itself an idea that could be freely associated with other ideas since “if 
belief consisted in some idea, which we add to the simple conception, it would be in a 
man’s power, by adding this idea to it, to believe anything, which he can conceive”122 
Belief is in a certain sense synthetic since it “implies a conception,”123 and yet it “super-
adds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving it, and renders it 
more strong and lively.”124 Hume notes, as “a general maxim” of his epistemology, “that 
when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the ideas as are 
related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.”125 On 
this basis Hume concludes that: 
[A]s we call every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, 
without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain 
                                                
121 Treatise, 1.3.6, 87 
122 Abstract, 132 
123 Abstract, 132 
124 Treatise, 101. This would explain why it is difficult if not impossible to disbelieve the content of a direct 
impression. Such doubt is easier with ideas of the memory, and as these decay and lose their force and 
vivacity, may be mistaken for ideas of the imagination and disbelieved entirely. 
125 Treatise, 98 
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truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is 
deriv’d solely from that origin. When we are accustom’d to see two 
impressions conjoin’d together, the appearance or idea of the one 
immediately carries us to the idea of the other. 
Such is the nature of belief and of all our judgments of cause and effect, which, as “in all 
matters of fact arises only from custom.”126 
In spite of this deflationary and skeptical conclusion, Hume did, however, offer a 
half-hearted attempt to account for the association of ideas and the neurological 
mechanism by which repeated experience of conjunctions between impressions could 
induce the assignment of a connection between them. The model of early-modern 
neurological theory was hydraulic: nervous fluids or ‘animal spirits’ were excited by 
cognitive or volitional activity and rushed down nerve channels to produce their effects. 
In terms of cognition, sensory organs activated these spirits when impacted by objects of 
experience, which rushed down the nerve channel to the brain where they carve out a 
‘cerebral trace’ of the object in the soft cerebral tissue which occasions a perception in 
our mind.127 These cerebral traces offer, by something akin to riparian erosion, a 
hypothetical and mechanical explanation of the mind’s tendency to associate ideas “not 
allied by nature.” As Locke describes it: 
Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of 
determining the will, and of motions in the body; all which seem to be but 
trains of motion in the animal spirits, which, once set a-going, continue in 
the same steps they have been used to, which, by often treading, are worn 
into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were 
natural.128 
                                                
126 Abstract, 132 
127 It would be mistaken to assume that cerebral traces replicated the shape or form of the object of 
sensation in miniature, for Descartes and his followers held a symbolic conception of cognition. 
128 Essays, 2.33.6 
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For Locke, this channeling and inertia of the animal spirits between ideas accounts for 
why, when hearing the first few notes in a tune, the rest spring from our minds as if it 
were a music box.129 These smooth paths worn between associated ideas have a lasting 
effect on the brain itself such that, if two particular phenomena are constantly conjoined 
in our perception, such a repetition creates deep channels between each conjoined trace. 
Such channels provide the mechanism for the association of ideas in that, as Malebranche 
argues, “the brain traces are so well tied to one another that none can be aroused without 
all those which were imprinted at the same time being aroused.”130 Not only does 
Malebranche regard these channels as tending to connect ideas on the basis of their 
resemblance,131 but he sees in this neurological theory the perfect model by which to 
explain the foremost ‘natural judgment’ of human cognition: the assignment of cause and 
effect in instances of temporally contiguous phenomena: “The cause of this connection of 
many traces is the identity of the times at which they were imprinted in the brain. For it is 
enough that many traces were produced at the same time for them all to rise again 
                                                
129 Ibid. 
130 Recherche, 2.1.5, 105. Here Malebranche (almost) explicitly endorses a view that was to be a hallmark 
of Empiricism—meaning as the association of ideas: “the mutual connection of the traces and consequently 
of the ideas with one another is not only the basis for all rhetorical figures but also for an infinity of other 
things of greater importance in morality, politics, and generally in all the sciences having some relation to 
man…” (Ibid.) 
131 “[T]he animal spirits that were directed by the action of external objects…to produce certain traces in 
the brain often produce others that truly resemble them in some things, but that are not quite the traces of 
these same objects…because the animal spirits, finding some resistance in the parts of the brain whence 
they should pass, and being easily detoured crowd into the deep traces of the ideas that are more familiar to 
us.” (Recherche, 2.2.2, 134-5) 
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together.”132 That is, the logical criterion of identity required for necessary connection is 
simulated or effected neurologically.133 
This theory of Cartesian mental physiology Hume initially ridicules as an 
“imaginary dissection of the brain,”134 but such a mechanism for explaining the 
connection of ideas in terms of the effects of “resemblance,” “custom,” and “habits,” 
proved simply too illecebrous not to indulge in. Hume complains that “tho’ I have 
neglected any advantage, which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the 
relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the 
mistakes that arise from these relations.”135 He then proceeds to describe the exact same 
neurological account of causal judgments as Malebranche: 
I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow’d with a power of 
exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that 
region of the brain, in which the idea is plac’d; these spirits always excite 
the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that 
cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom and direct, 
and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the 
animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas 
in lieu of that, which the mind desir’d at first to survey…This is the cause 
of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy.136 
 
 
                                                
132 Ibid., 106 
133 While he makes no effort to account for it, this notion of psychological necessary connection between 
cause and effect had been noted by Avicenna in his discussion of causal priority, where he argues that “if 
the existence of either [cause or effect] has occurred in the mind, then the existence of the other must occur 
in the mind.” (al-Ilahiyyat, 4.1.13, 128) 
134 Treatise, 60 
135 Treatise, 1.2.5, 60 
136 Treatise, 1.2.5, 61 
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3. Hume’s Critique of Occasionalism 
Hume’s particular debts to occasionalism have been noted or alluded to repeatedly thus 
far in the chapter, and indeed the latter chapters of this dissertation serve as a large-scale 
continuation of that analysis. This being so, I shall not examine further inheritances or 
commonalities between the two further here, but shall at present turn to Hume’s criticism 
of occasionalism and the remarkable way in which he turns occasionalist principles, and 
indeed the very logic of occasionalism itself, against occasionalist metaphysics with 
profound results. Hume’s analysis and critique of occasionalism comes in two very 
distinct forms. In the Treatise Hume offers a charitable and appreciative analysis of 
occasionalism that lends itself to a devastating internal critique of its most sacred 
principles; but later in the Enquiry Hume’s analysis is mocking and his critique shallow 
and external. 
 
Hume’s critique of occasionalism in the Treatise. 
Malebranche offered two causal arguments in favor of occasionalism. The first is from 
the Cartesian doctrine of the essential inertness of body: 
It is clear that no body, large or small, has the power to move itself. A 
mountain, a house, a rock, a grain of sand, in short, the tiniest or largest 
body conceivable does not have the power to move itself. Thus, since the 
idea we have of all bodies makes us aware that they cannot move 
themselves, it must be concluded that…All natural forces are therefore 
nothing but the will of God, which is always efficacious.137 
                                                
137 Recherche, 448-9.  
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As we have seen, while Hume aligns himself with this occasionalist critique, he does so 
on the basis of very different reasoning and denies its ultimate conclusion. Malebranche 
and “the Cartesians” had rejected causal explanation grounded in, or even the existence 
of forces and powers, on the basis of our clear and distinct idea of the essence of body 
which a priori excludes such things: “As the essence of matter consists in extension, and 
extension implies not actual motion, but only mobility; [the Cartesians] conclude, that the 
energy, which produces motion, cannot lie in extension.”138 That is to say, nowhere 
contained in our clear and distinct idea of extended substance is there any idea of efficacy 
or motive force. Insofar as Hume refuses to commit to the Cartesian clarity and 
distinctness principle by denying the divine guarantee doctrine underlying it, he likewise 
rejects the ontological upshot of that principle, viz. “everything we clearly and distinctly 
understand is true in a way which corresponds exactly to our understanding of it.”139 For 
Hume, clear and distinct ideas tell us nothing about ontology, but only about possibility, 
such that “whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or 
in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolute impossible.”140 
 Thus Hume’s rejection of forces and powers is epistemic rather than ontological 
and is predicated not on veridical insight into the nature of body but rather on the lack of 
such insight: “the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us.”141 
This skeptical argument is based, as with so many others in Hume, on the empiricist 
                                                
138 Treatise, 159 
139 CSM, II 9 
140 Treatise, 32. For Hume, it is entirely unclear that we have knowledge of the essence of body sufficient 
for Descartes’ sweeping claims. 
141 Treatise, 159 
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claim that we lack an impression underlying the disputed idea (sc. of forces or powers).142 
On this basis Hume insists that: 
[W]hen we talk of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, as 
endow’d with a power or force, proportion’d to any effect; when we speak 
of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion 
depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are 
endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we have really no distinct 
meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and 
determinate ideas.143 
Hume’s argument here is almost identical to Malebranche’s, but superadded with the 
caveat: “whether of a superior or inferior nature.” That is, Hume regards talk of a divine 
power as equally vacuous to talk of corporeal powers, as follows from his insistence that 
we have no impression of any such things: 
[T]he principle of innate ideas being allow’d to be false, it follows, that 
the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that 
idea of agency…For if every idea be deriv’d from an impression, the idea 
of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and no impression, either of 
sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, ‘tis equally 
impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the 
deity.144 
Such fundamental differences on this point between Malebranche and Hume 
extend from their rationalist/empiricist disagreement as to the origination of concepts, 
particularly concerning ‘the divine’ and ‘the infinite.’ Malebranche accepted and 
elaborated on Descartes’ claim that the infinite has epistemic priority over the finite, by 
arguing, with Plato, that our perceptual acquaintance of finite beings was a via negativa 
derivative of our underlying acquaintance with the infinite through pure intellection, and 
                                                
142 Treatise, 157-8 
143 Treatise, 162 
144 Treatise, 160 
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thus that “the ideas of the senses and of the imagination are distinct only to the extent that 
they conform to the ideas of pure intellection.”145 That is to say, and central to his 
infamous thesis of vision in God, Malebranche maintained that our finite perceptual 
awareness was a confused but nonetheless real perception of the infinite.146 In this he 
followed Descartes, who likewise privileged the infinite and viewed the finite as 
derivative.147 Hume, by contrast, held to the empiricist view, extending from Locke and 
Gassendi, that we have no perceptual acquaintance with—and thus clear idea of—the 
infinite whatsoever, but only with discrete objects and their finite qualities.148 Therefore, 
our notion of the infinite being is but a theoretical abstraction by which we amplify and 
combine finite predicates and thus come to some metaphysical conception of an infinite 
being through a kind of theogonic differential summation.149 But, inherent to this 
calculus, we can never generate anything not contained in the original units. Hume thus 
concludes that the Cartesian principle that “nothing can be the cause of another, but 
                                                
145 Recherche, 3.2.3, 224. 
146 McCracken 1983, 267 
147 AT VII, 45-46; CSM II, 31 
148 As Locke caustically notes in his Examination of Malebranche: “we are told that we have ‘not only the 
idea of infinite, but before that of finite.’ This being a thing of experience, every one must examine himself; 
and it being my misfortune to find it otherwise in myself, this argument, of course, is like to have the less 
effect on me, who therefore cannot so easily admit the inference…And I cannot but believe many a child 
can tell twenty, have the idea of a square trencher, or a round plate, and have the distinct clear ideas of two 
and three, long before he has any idea of ‘infinite’ at all.” (§34) Similarly, in his Remarks Upon Some of 
Mr. Norris’s Books, Locke concedes the claim made by Norris (an English Malebranchean) that: “We have 
a ‘distinct idea of God,’ whereby we clearly enough distinguish him from the creatures; but I fear it would 
be presumption for us to say, we have a clear idea of him, as he is in himself.” (§5) 
149 “The idea of God, as meaning and infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on 
the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom.” 
(Enquiry, 19) On this point Hume is clearly indebted to Peter Browne. In The Procedure, Extent, and 
Limits of Human Understanding, published 1728 eleven years before Hume’s Treatise, Browne is adamant 
that “we have no Idea of God…but from the observation and reasoning of the Mind upon the Ideas of 
Sensation.” (I. iii. 81; cf. III. viii) This “reasoning” involves “removing from him all the Imperfections of 
the Creatures; and attributing to him all their Perfections, and more especially those of our own Minds.” 
(Ibid., 82) 
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where the mind can perceive the connexion in its idea of the objects” cannot but imply 
“that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or productive principle, not even the 
deity himself; since our idea of that supreme Being is deriv’d from particular 
impressions, none of which contain any efficacy, nor seem to have any connexion with 
any other existence.”150 
 If we follow Hume in dropping all talk of power of efficacy, even in the divine, 
what follows for necessary connection? As noted earlier, Malebranche denied that minds 
have the power to move bodies, for “when we examine our idea of finite minds, we do 
not see any necessary connection between their will and the motion of any body 
whatsoever. On the contrary, we see that there is not and that there can be none.”151 
Malebranche’s master argument for occasionalism was defining causation in terms of 
necessary connection and then insisting that only the will of an infinitely powerful and 
omnipotent being is capable of bestowing a necessary connection, for: 
[W]hen one thinks about the idea of God, i.e. of an infinitely perfect and 
consequently all-powerful being, one knows there is such a [necessary] 
connection between His will and the motion of all bodies, that it is 
                                                
150 Treatise, 248. This line of reasoning was anticipated by Averroes in his Kitab fasl al-amqual [On the 
Harmony of Religions and Philosophy], where he argues: “It should be known that [to deny] the effect of 
the causes on the results of them…is to deny the Creator, not seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must 
always be understood by a reference to the seen.” (Kitab fasl al-amqual, 16-17) That is to say, under the 
occasionalist denial of ‘natural causes,’ any inference from the visible to the invisible, or from the observed 
to the unobserved, cannot be substantiated. Averroes, as a fanatical defender of natural religion and the 
cosmological argument, considers this (i.e. the problem of induction) to be a patent absurdity and heresy, 
saying that: “if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains nothing to refute the arguments of 
those who believe in the creation of the universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no 
Creator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is the result of material causes.” (Ibid., 8-
9) From the other side of the looking glass Hume embraces such a conclusion in spite of, or perhaps, 
because of its atheistic implications. Indeed, he advances it a step further, arguing, most famously in the 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that there is nothing to refute the arguments of those who believe 
in the creation of the universe by no cause whatever. (Dialogues, viii; cf. Sextus, Adversus mathematicos, 
ix.197-199) 
151 Recherche, 448 
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impossible to conceive that He wills a body to be moved and that this 
body not be moved…because it is a contradiction that He should will and 
that what He wills should not happen.”152 
Thus, even granting that we lack any distinct idea of power, force, or efficacy, insofar as 
we have an idea of God and omnipotence (which Hume does not deny, he just does not 
believe it to be innate), we still analytically understand the necessary connection between 
the God’s will and its effect.153 
 Hume objects to the claim that whatever God wills is logically necessary by 
saying that we lack any notion of the means by which God can bring about such effects, 
and thus the concept of necessary connection remains ephemeral.154 Yet this criticism 
misses the point. While our ignorance of how our volitions bring about our bodily effects 
was central to Malebranche’s rejection of mind-body causation, Malebranche insisted 
that: “God needs no instruments to act; it suffices that He wills in order that a thing 
be.”155 Yet, as Hume notes, the occasionalist insistence on this point is deeply 
unsatisfying precisely in that the argument here is entirely analytic and thus 
definitional.156 Simply because we have the concept of omnipotence tells us nothing 
about the nature of reality and, in this sense, by demanding that the omnipotence of 
God’s will necessarily connects with its effects, occasionalism violates the deeper logic 
                                                
152 Recherche, 6.3, 450 
153 Radner 1978, 41 
154 Treatise, 249 
155 Recherche, 6.3, 450 
156 Treatise, 248-249 
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of the critique of causation regarding the separability of cause and effect;157 its founding 
conviction is little more than a circular asseveration, for, as Hume points out: “in saying 
that the idea of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every effect, which 
he wills, we really do no more than assert, that a being, whose volition is connected with 
every effect, is connected with every effect.”158 
 In isolating out the logical kernel of the occasionalist critique, namely the 
principle of separability between cause and effect, Hume offers the possibility of turning 
this maxim against occasionalism itself. As Charles McCracken argues in his seminal 
Malebranche and British Philosophy: 
To Hume, it is quite possible for us to imagine that God wills something, 
and also to imagine that that thing does not occur. God’s will and the 
event he wills are separate things, and if two things are separate, we can 
imagine one to exist or to occur without having to imagine that the other 
does, too. Thus we can imagine God’s decreeing that it rain today and at 
the same time imagine that all day the sky remains clear.159 
While this logical argument represents perhaps the most profound objection to 
occasionalism, puncturing the very core of occasionalism’s master argument with the 
stiletto of its own master principle, it does not, in fact, belong to Hume. McCracken does 
not quote or cite Hume in the above interpretation and I have been completely unable to 
locate such an argument, even after an intensive search of Hume’s philosophical works. It 
is nowhere in the Enquiry; and the sections of the Treatise where one would expect it to 
                                                
157 Indeed, it flirts with Spinozism as it requires, through the principle of identity inherent to all relations of 
necessity, that God must contain His creation. This problem Malebranche was never able to effectively 
resolve and is endemic to all Platonic metaphysical systems. 
158 Treatise, 1.4.5, 248-9 
159 McCracken, 267 
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come up,160 Hume at most reiterates the epistemological argument that our notion of God 
is derived from experience, we have no experience of power, efficacy, or connection, and 
therefore appeal to divine power is vacuous. While McCracken’s interpretation goes 
beyond the text, I would readily concede that such an argument may be facilely inferred 
from Hume’s foregoing claims, as well as his infamous rejection of the necessity of a 
cause for existence. Indeed, it would not be surprising that Hume was aware of the 
argument, but refrained from pursuing the argument in such terms given its inflammatory 
nature (i.e. insofar as it proposes that logical coherency of divine impotence) and his 
reputation as an acediast.161 Regardless, this extension of Hume’s argument is devastating 
to occasionalist metaphysics to an extent only matched by Fontenelle. Unless one accepts 
a pantheism, one is committed to the view that the divine, including the divine will, is 
ontologically distinct from the creation; and it is therefore possible to conceive of a 
divine volition not followed by its effect given the (onto)logical fact that the volition and 
the effect are distinct and non-identical. As such, one is forced to concede, pace 
                                                
160 Viz. 157-169, 248-250, and 632-3. 
161 Hume seems to have been decidedly concerned with charges of atheism and this concern crops up 
precisely in those sections of the Treatise where he is attacking occasionalism. Thus after his second and 
most strident set of arguments against occasionalism, Hume concedes: “There is only one occasion when 
philosophy will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself, and that is, when religion may 
seem to be in the least offended…If any one, therefore, shou’d imagine that the foregoing arguments are 
any ways dangerous to religion, I hope the following apology will remove his apprehensions…If my 
philosophy…makes not addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it 
takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before.” (250) Likewise, in the 
Appendix to the Treatise, Hume wished to add an elucidation to his first set of arguments against 
occasionalism (pg. 161) that explains his rejection that we can derive a notion of power from introspection 
on the minds control of the body, at the end of which he includes a footnote explaining that: “The same 
imperfection attends our ideas of the Deity; but this can have no effect either on religion or morals. The 
order of the universe proves and omnipotent mind…Nothing more is requisite to give a foundation to all 
the articles of religion, nor is it necessary we shou’d form a distinct idea of the force and energy of the 
supreme Being.” (633) The difference here between the timid young Hume eager for university 
employment and the older, perhaps bitter, Hume of the Dialogues is striking. Yet, even in that later work, 
Hume does not have Philo or Cleanthes expound McCracken’s argument, so perhaps he never saw it to 
begin with. 
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Malebranche, that it can be no logical contradiction to affirm the former and yet deny the 
latter. Here, then, we have reached something of a horizon in occasionalist metaphysics, 
for we are forced into the recognition that a metaphysical impossibility, namely the 
failure of the divine will (the impotence of omnipotence), is nonetheless logically 
possible. 
 
Hume’s critique of occasionalism in the Enquiry 
Aside from the not so minor fact that Malebranche (along with Bayle) went from being 
one of the most celebrated philosophers in Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth-
century, to a virtual unknown in the nineteenth, perhaps the main reason why Hume’s 
debt to occasionalism escaped notice for so long was as the result of his active attempt to 
suppress and downplay the debt later in life. He advised Michael Ramsay in 1737 
“read…over la Recherche de la Verite of Pere Malebranche” before reading his own 
Treatise,162 described occasionalism therein as an “opinion…well worth our attention,”163 
cited Malebranche favorably, and, a previously noted, even lifted entire passages from 
the work to make his own point.164 However, by the time we reach the Enquiry, Hume 
offers nothing but ridicule and aspersion when considering the doctrine of occasional 
causes, and derogates the advancements of occasionalism underlying his own project, as 
can be seen when he claims that: 
                                                
162 Popkin 1964, 774-775 
163 Treatise, 160 
164 Treatise, 158 
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[P]hilosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther [than the vulgar], 
immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of 
the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn 
by experience the Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to 
comprehend anything like Connexion between them.165 
This “scrutiny,” which Hume fatuously ascribes to the immediate perception of 
“Philosophers,” was, in fact, one of the major achievements of occasionalism in the 
history of philosophy, a point Hume had all but acknowledged in the Treatise.166 To be 
sure, in the Treatise Hume rejected the ultimate conceit of occasionalism as well its 
central “distinction betwixt cause and occasion,”167 a point he dutifully reiterates in the 
Enquiry;168 but what is different in the Enquiry is that these points are simply averred—
the insightful arguments behind them being almost entirely extirpated, as if Hume would 
not deign to provide occasionalism with the labor of refutation—and instead replaced 
with the sneering ridicule of occasionalism as a “fairy land.”169 In a footnote to the 
Section VII, Part I of the Enquiry, Hume also avers that occasionalism “had…no 
authority in England. Locke, Clarke, and Cudworth, never so much as take notice of 
it.”170 As Charles McCracken has exhaustively demonstrated, this is patently untrue; and 
to an extent that would have been impossible for Hume to remain unaware of.171 Indeed, 
                                                
165 Enquiry, 69-70 
166 Treatise, 158 
167 Treatise, 171. That is to say, occasionalists distinguish between the true “primary” cause (i.e. God) and 
illusory “secondary” causes which serve only as occasions for the efficacy of the latter. Hume rejects this 
distinction entirely. 
168 Enquiry, 70 
169 Enquiry, 72 
170 Ibid. Noticeably absent from this list is Berkeley, whom we now know Hume read, and who was 
profoundly indebted to Malebranche. (See Popkin 1964) 
171 See McCracken, Ch. 5 “English Malebrancheans,” 156-204. 
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such a harsh remark is ironic in light of Hume’s attempt to “reconcile” the views of 
“Father Malebranche” and “Mr. Locke” in his anonymous 1740 Abstract of A Treatise of 
Human Nature.172 After all, one generally would not attempt to reconcile views one finds 
absurd with those which form the basis of one’s own philosophy. Regardless, Locke had 
most certainly “taken notice” of occasionalism; his Remarks upon Some of Mr. Norris’s 
Books, wherein he asserts P. Malebranche’s opinion of our seeing all Things in God, as 
well as his more direct An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing all things 
in God, published p.m.a. in 1720 and 1706 respectively, were both available to Hume. 
What is revealing about these essays, though, is that Locke purposely withheld them from 
publication during his lifetime because “he looked upon [occasionalism] to be an opinion 
that would not spread, but was to die of itself, or at least do no great harm.”173 This 
contemptuous but prescient opinion seems to have been adopted by Hume in the years 
following the composition of the Treatise. 
 While he glosses over his arguments against occasionalism from the Treatise, 
Hume does offer two “new” arguments against it that are, nevertheless, rather familiar. 
As ironic as it might be, it seems likely that, at some point between 1739 and 1748, Hume 
had either been related or had opportunity to read Leibniz’s critiques of occasionalism,174 
                                                
172 As he never took credit for the work himself, there is scholarly disagreement over whether or not Hume 
is indeed the author of the Abstract, though the consensus is in the affirmative. 
173 Letter from Locke to Peter King, 25 October 1704; printed by King in the preface to the Examination in 
Locke’s Posthumous Works, 210. It should be noted that Locke opens the Examination with: “The acute 
and ingenious author of the Recherche de la Verité, among a great many very fine thoughts, judicious 
reasonings, and uncommon reflections…” (§1) This type of encomium was typical of seventeenth-century 
politesse, but it was also an admission on Locke’s part of the great stature Malebranche held at the time. 
Moreover, Locke was typically inclined to avoid controversy and public disputes with other philosophers, 
as evident in his “correspondence” with Thomas Burnet and Leibniz. 
174 Likely from Leibniz’s public disputes with Arnauld (particularly the 4/30/1687 letter) and Bayle 
(Clarification of Bayle's Difficulties," GP, IV, 522) 
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for in the Enquiry he advances two quintessentially Leibnizian arguments against 
occasionalism. Hume explains that “the generality of mankind” are wont to assume that 
they perceive forces and powers in the connection of ordinary events and that: 
It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena such as 
earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find 
themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in 
which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, 
to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate 
cause of that event which surprises them…[and] many philosophers think 
themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occasions, to the 
same principle, which the vulgar appeal to but in cases that appear 
miraculous and supernatural.175 
This argument essentially reiterates Leibniz’s deprecation of occasionalism as entailing a 
“perpetual miracle.”176 A page later he pushes the Leibnizian critique further, claiming 
that: 
[The occasionalists] rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in 
order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and 
immediate. They consider not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead 
of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much 
to celebrate. It argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain 
degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his 
own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the 
fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by its 
proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the 
great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate 
by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.177 
The Leibnizian nature of this argument is irrefragable, serving as it did as the primary 
claim made by him in favor of the pre-established harmony over occasionalism: namely 
that a system in which God must continually intervene to preserve the continued 
                                                
175 Enquiry, 70 
176 “Letter to Arnauld,” April 30, 1687 
177 Ibid., 71 
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progression of the world is the mark of an inferior craftsman compared to a system which 
is perfectly arraigned from the beginning and requires no intervention.178 Such an 
argument had previously been made by Aquinas179 and was reiterated by Locke in his 
polemics against occasionalism.180 While it would seem much more likely that Hume 
received this line of criticsm from Locke rather than Leibniz, evidence to the contrary can 
be gleaned from a footnote Hume appended to his above critique which notes that: 
“Descartes insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, 
without insisting on it.”181 Nowhere does Locke offer such an interpretation; rather, the 
most prominent philosopher to make such a perspicuous point—confirmed by modern 
scholarship—was Leibniz, a studious reader of Descartes’ oeuvre.182 
                                                
178 Letter to Arnauld,” April 30, 1687. 
179 Summa theologiae, 1a. 105, 7 
180 “The infinite eternal God is certainly the cause of all things, the fountain of all being and power. But, 
because all being was from him, can there be nothing but God himself? or, because all power was 
originally in him, can there be nothing of it communicated to his creatures? This is to set very narrow 
bounds to the power of God, and, by pretending to extend it, takes it away. For which (I beseech you, as we 
can comprehend) is the perfect power; to make a machine, a watch, for example, that when the watchmaker 
has withdrawn his hands, shall go and strike by the fit contrivance of the parts; or else requires that 
whenever the hand by pointing to the hours, minds him of it, he should strike twelve upon the bell?” 
(Remarks upon Mr. Norris’s Books, §15) 
181 Enquiry, 73 
182 See Système nouveau, 143. Leibniz was not, however, the first to point this out. In 1687, eight years 
before Leibniz, Pierre de Villemandy (a scholastic professor and critic of Cartesianism) noted that 
Descartes was responsible for initiating the development of skepticism concerning the efficacy of 
secondary causes—and occasionalism by extension—even though he himself did not deny the real activity 
of such causes. (Traité de l’efficace, 7-8. See Clarke’s “Introduction” to La Forge’s Treatise on the Human 
Mind, xx) 
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CHAPTER III 
 HELLENIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE GOD OF ABRAHAM 
 
With what is too much for you meddle not, and do not search out the things which are 
beyond you. 
—Solomon, (Sir. 3.22-23) 
 
There are fools who seek to understand the secrets of nature and the far more difficult 
secrets of God, with supercilious pride, instead of accepting them in humble faith. They 
cannot approach them, let alone reach them. These fools imagine they can grasp the 
heavens with their hands. Moreover, they are content with their erroneous opinion and 
actually imagine to have grasped truth. 
—Petrarch, Dell'ignoranza sua e d'altrui 
 
 
1. Reconciling Plato with Moses 
Intellectual golden ages are often identified as concurrent with political golden ages, yet 
the greatest fruits of Ancient Greek Philosophy were borne after the devastation of the 
Peloponnesian War, Byzantine scholasticism after Yarmouk, Italian natural philosophy 
after the Renaissance, and Venetian arts in the Settecento. So it was in the world of Islam, 
which produced its three greatest philosophers not at its political zenith in the eighth and 
ninth centuries, but rather in the eleventh and twelfth-centuries when the Caliphate had 
fractured in three, local emirs carved out essentially independent fiefdoms, and the armies 
of Christendom were on the advance in Iberia and the Levant. These philosophers hailed 
from the farthest flung corners of what was once the Islamic Empire: Avicenna and al-
Ghazali (along with al-Burundi and al-Farabi) from Khorasan and Transoxiana in the Far 
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East, and Averroes from al-Andalus in the far West.1 Yet, in spite of this, they were 
collectively the foremost representatives of a wide-ranging and remarkably conversant 
dispute that was to become the touchstone of Western philosophy for nearly six centuries. 
The dispute fundamentally centered on the deeply problematic relationship 
between rationalistic Greek philosophy and the dogmas of the Abrahamic religions that 
seemed incommensurable with this tradition, namely the doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
and the possibility of miracles. There was a pervasive tendency in later antiquity among 
those Jews, Christians, and Muslims educated in Greek philosophy to be embarrassed by 
the ‘abominations of reason’ latent in their religious creeds; and thus impelled to attempt 
a synthesis between their dissonant beliefs.2 Early representatives of this synthesis were 
Philo of Alexandria and Origen on behalf of Judaism and Christianity, and al-Kindi on 
behalf of Islam.3 These attempts to harmonize Abrahamic monotheism with the 
philosophy of the pagans invariably provoked a reaction from those who sought to 
uphold the dogmas of orthodoxy without philosophical equivocations and rationalizations 
they inevitably employed. 
The most notorious and recalcitrant of the ‘abominations’ was the creatio ex 
nihilo doctrine; and thus I shall endeavor to examine the history of the dispute 
                                                
1 A situation not unlike philosophy in classical and Hellenistic antiquity: the place-surnames of its 
luminaries trace the fringes of the Greek world, from Italy, Thrace, and the Euxine, to Alexandria and the 
far flung Hellenic settlements of the Selucid realm. 
2 Lovejoy colorfully describes this synthesis: “Perhaps the most extraordinary triumph of self-contradiction, 
among many such triumphs in the history of human thought, was the fusion of [the Platonic-Aristotelian] 
conception of a self-absorbed and self-contained Perfection...at once with the Jewish conception of a 
temporal Creator and busy interposing Power making for righteousness through the hurly-burly of history.” 
(157) 
3 It should be noted that all three of these figures remained orthodox in their views on the creation. 
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surrounding it as a particular instantiation and representative of the overall global tension 
between the systems of pagan philosophy and Abrahamic religion. In the opening 
centuries of the Common Era, the ex nihilo doctrine quickly hardened into a point of 
contention just below Christology in early-Christian debates, largely due, as in the case of 
Christology, to the lack of explicit scriptural testimony. Even though the Old Testament 
makes no explicit reference to God’s creation of the world out of nothing, such an 
occurrence was insisted upon by the earliest church Fathers, who cited the ambiguous 
passage in Maccabees 7:28 as justification: “I beg you, my child, to look at the heaven 
and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make 
them out of things that existed. And in the same way the human race came into being.” 
Now, prima facie, this appears like a fairly direct and explicit statement of the ex nihilo 
doctrine. Nonetheless, the notion of “existing things” could be interpreted expansively to 
include anything whatever, or (as it was by some Church Fathers) strictly in terms of 
material things, which thus excludes intelligible entities. More importantly, the 
comparison of the creation of the world to the creation of the human race is problematic, 
for in Genesis Adam is said to have been created out of earth4 while Eve was made from 
Adam’s rib.5 The New American Bible provides a footnote to this passage explaining: 
“God did not make them out of existing things: that is, God made all things solely by his 
omnipotent will and his creative word; cf. Hebrews 11:3.” Clearly, “solely” here is 
intended in the expansive sense, i.e. to exclude any matter or form external to the divine 
will, but Hebrews 11:3 says only that: “By faith we understand that the universe was 
                                                
4 2:7 
5 2:22 
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ordered by the word of God, so that what is visible came into being through the 
invisible.” If anything, this passage, speaking of an “invisible” through which God orders 
the universe, seems to suggest that creation was not ex nihilo but instead rendered from 
some pre-existent form, if not material.6 Lastly, the Apocryphal and thoroughly 
Hellenized “Book of Wisdom”7 explicitly describes God as creating the world out of 
“formless matter,”8 a point repeated by the Hellenized Jew, Philo of Alexandria.9 
Regardless, in the absence of direct scriptural support for the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo, it was justified by the second and third century Church Fathers as necessary for 
the coherence of other Christian dogmas, such as the equality of the three persons of the 
Trinity (a notion that also lacks scriptural support) which was interpreted to deny the 
existence of anything coeternal with triune.10 Thus, Tatian the Assyrian, one of the 
earliest Christian authors to definitively support the ex nihilo doctrine, argues that “matter 
is not, like God, without beginning, nor, as having no beginning, is of equal power with 
God; it is begotten, and not produced by any other being, but brought into existence by 
                                                
6 Other passages that have been quoted in support of the ex nihilo doctrine include Colossians 1:16, 1 
Corinthians 1:28, Hebrews 1:2, Isaiah 44:24, Jeremiah 32:17, John 1:3, Nehemiah 9:5-6, Psalm 33:6, 
Proverbs 3:19, Revelation 4:11, and Romans 4:17. All of these, in addition to the early “Apostles Creed,” 
are ambiguous in that they refer to God as the creator of the world, but are never explicit as to the 
metaphysics of the creation. Only the apocryphal Shepard of Hermas, which was bound with the New 
Testament in the Codex Sinaiticus, is definitive on this point, extolling “God, who dwells in the heavens, 
and made out of nothing the things that exist.” (Vision 1.1). This line was later cited by Origen, Athanasius, 
Methodius, and Irenaeus of Lugdunum in support of the ex nihilo doctrine. 
7 Also known as “The Wisdom of Solomon.” 
8 11:17 
9 See Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, 140; De specialibus legibus, 328. Whether Philo intended to deny the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, or was merely speaking in (Middle Platonic) terms likely to be appreciated 
by his Greek speaking audience is unclear. (See Wolfson, Philo, I. 300-309) 
10 Wolfson, “Twice-Revealed Averroes,” in Inquires into Medieval Philosophy, 217 
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the Framer of all things alone.”11 Likewise the Platonist convert to Christianity, 
Athenagoras of Athens, in his apologetic epistle to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, 
maintains that Christians: “distinguish God from matter, and teach that matter is one 
thing and God another, and that they are separated by a wide interval (for that the Deity is 
uncreated and eternal, to be beheld by the understanding and reason alone, while matter is 
created and perishable).”12 Or, as Augustine argued in the fifth century: if things were 
generated of or from God, rather than made by God, this would irrevocably undermine the 
divine transcendence for “they would be equal to Thine Only-begotten, and thereby even 
to Thee.”13 This principle then formed the ground of a distinction made by the Church 
Fathers (against the Gnostic and Arian heresies, who likewise rejected the ex nihilo 
dogma) between the creation of the world ex nihilo or “from things non-existent” (non fit 
ex aliquo) and the creation of the Word “from the true Father himself.”14 Thus, 
Tertullian, widely credited as the father of the Latin Church for his elaboration of the 
doctrine of the Trinity and other doctrines, denounced the Platonist doctrine of the first 
century bishop Hermagoras of Aquileia, which held God to have shaped the world out of 
preexistent matter.15 He insists on the ex nihilo doctrine as a regula fidei integral to the 
creed of all true believers: 
                                                
11 Oratio ad Graecos, §5 
12 Apologia pro Christianis, §4 
13 Confessions, Bk. XII, Ch. 7 
14 Alexander of Alexandria, To Alexander Bishop of the City of Constantinople, §11. Similar arguments 
were made by Athanasius of Alexandria, John Damascene, and Hippolytus of Rome. (Wolfson, “The 
Meaning of Ex Nihilo in the Church Father, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophy, and St. Thomas,” 208) 
15 Adversus Hermogenem, §33; see also De Resurrectione Carnis, §11 
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Now, with regard to this rule of faith—that we may from this point 
acknowledge what it is which we defend—it is, you must know, that 
which prescribes the belief that there is one only God, and that He is none 
other than the Creator of the world, who produced all things out of nothing 
through His own Word.16 
Similarly, Irenaeus of Lugdunum inveighs against the Gnostics: 
They do not believe that God…created matter itself, inasmuch as they 
know not how much a spiritual and divine essence can accomplish…For, 
to attribute the substance of created things to the power and will of Him 
who is God of all, is worthy both of credit and acceptance. It is also 
agreeable [to reason], and there may be well said regarding such a belief, 
that ‘the things which are impossible with men are possible with God.’ 
While men, indeed, cannot make anything out of nothing, but only out of 
matter already existing, yet God is in this point preeminently superior to 
men, that He Himself called into being the substance of His creation, when 
previously it had no existence.17 
Irenaeus, therefore, binds the doctrine of the divine omnipotence to the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo, a point that was to be of some importance in the development of 
occasionalist theology and metaphysics. 
However, all of these Church Fathers wrote during the second and early third 
centuries, while the major impetus of Christian neo-Platonism was provided by the 
Enneads of Plotinus in mid third century. Plotinian neo-Platonism proved uniquely 
compatible with Abrahamic theology insofar as it navigated a new metaphysics 
concerning the relation of Creator and creation. Unlike the Old Platonic doctrine in the 
Timaeus of an eternal matter that God provides form to,18 or the Aristotelian doctrine of 
                                                
16 De praescriptione haereticorum, §13; emphasis added 
17 Adversus Haereses, 2.10.3; emphasis added 
18 48-51b. Many Chirstians had been wont to interpret the story of creation in the Timaeus as ex nihilo, but 
the first philosopher to advance this position was the pagan neo-Platonist Hierocles of Alexandria, who, 
somewhat uniquely, attempted a synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christianity from the vantage of a 
pagan philosopher. (Photius, Bibliotheca, §251; cf. Grant, 39) 
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an ontologically complete world operating of its own accord with God only as its final 
cause,19 Plotinus conceived of the creation as an eternal emanation from the divine 
essence.20 This metaphysics of creation was appealing to early Christian and Islamic 
philosophers for two reasons. First, as Harry Wolfson notes: “With the appearance of this 
new conception of the origin of the world the question was raised whether…the 
traditional belief in creation ex nihilo could not be interpreted to mean the temporal 
generation of the world from the essence of God.”21 That is to say, Plotinus and his 
successors offered a sophisticated metaphysical model by which to understand the 
temporal generation of the world, which, while not perhaps strictly ex nihilo, still denied 
any preexistent eternal matter or the independence of the material world to God. Second, 
the Plotinian model also had the advantage of granting God the status of the continual 
efficient cause of creation, rather than merely its final cause. As will be seen, this 
conception of God as the continual efficient cause was to be an issue of considerable 
importance in the development of both Islamic neo-Platonism, as well as the rival 
Ash’arite tradition—not to mention the later Thomistic concurrentist and Cartesian 
occasionalist traditions. 
 The fourth century Cappadocian Father Gregory of Nyssa was the first true 
Christian neo-Platonist in that he was the first to identify creation ex nihilo with 
                                                
19 See Metaphysics 1072b1-13, Physics 258b10-15 
20 While Plotinus rejects the Platonist notion of matter external to and preexisting the One, he also follows 
them in identifying matter as non-being. (Enneads, iii. 6.6) This identification must have been an old one 
among the Platonists of the Academy insofar as it is related by Aristotle. (Physics, 192a5) It was also a 
fecund source of confusion when viewed in terms of the ex nihilo doctrine, particularly among early 
Islamic philosophers under the influence of Plotinus. (Wolfson, op. cit., 213) 
21 Wolfson, op. cit., 208 
  
90 
emanation.22 The groundwork of this logical contortion had been well prepared by 
Plotinus himself: In explaining “the origin and order of the beings which come after the 
First,” Plotinus avers: 
It is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it…the One is 
not being, but the generator of being. This, we may say, is the first act of 
generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and 
needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes 
something other than itself.23 
While this inversion of Parmenides’s dictum is clever, it must be admitted that it is 
metaphysical nonsense.24 Precisely how, much less why non-Being is impelled on the 
basis of its own nothingness to generate Being—and not just ‘Being’ but singular, 
distinctive, token beings—is left entirely unexplained by Plotinus, undoubtedly because 
such an existential transmutation is fundamentally inexplicable.25 From Gregory’s 
perspective, however, this was all the better: Not at liberty to identify God literally with 
‘nothing,’ Gregory creatively interpreted the concept of ‘nothing’ or ‘non-existence’ to 
signify rational incomprehensibility. Given the wide Christian acceptance of the 
inscrutability of the divine nature, Gregory presents his interpretation as one of orthodox 
                                                
22 This identification, along with his open (not tacit like Gregory of Nazianzus) embrace of the 
apocatastatic teachings of Origen, is likely what kept Gregory from being canonized or declared a Doctor 
of the Church in 1568 along with the other two Cappadocian Fathers; though he has been so elevated by the 
Eastern Chaldean and Syro-Malabar Catholic Churches. 
23 Enneads, v. 2.6-10; emphasis added 
24 This view, that the superabundance of the demiurge was responsible for the creation of the cosmos, is 
nonetheless inherited from Plato’s Timaeus, albeit with the notable exception of becoming out of nothing: 
“Now why did he who framed this whole universe of becoming frame it? Let us state the reason why: He 
was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so…he wanted everything to 
become as much like himself as was possible…this, more than anything else, was the most preeminent 
reason for the origin of the world’s coming to be. The god…brought [all that was visible] from a state of 
disorder to one of order, because he believe that order was in every way better than disorder.” (29e-30a) 
This conception of a god who orders a preexisting chaos is, it must be admitted, vastly more intelligible 
than Plotinus’ conception. However, by Plotinus’ day in the third-century, the ex nihilo requirement had 
taken hold. 
25 Cf. Filippenko and Pasachoff, (http://www.astrosociety.org/pubs/mercury/31_02/nothing.html) 
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piety, maintaining that creation ex nihilo is simply the way finite human minds 
understand emanation de essentia Dei.26  
Even though this interpretation allows Gregory to pay lip service to the ex nihilo 
doctrine, it was not merely rhetorical, but rather designed to resolve a central ambiguity 
in that doctrine pervading early Christian thought, as well as resolve a pernicious problem 
in neo-Platonist metaphysics. On the first point, as noted earlier, the Christian Fathers 
were almost universal in their rejection of God creating the world out of pre-existent 
matter co-eternal with Him; yet the question of what Plotinus called “intelligible matter” 
was more ambiguous. Justin the Martyr, in his letter to Antoninus Pius, maintained that 
the Platonic doctrine of creation in the Timaeus was taken from Moses, in which God 
“altered matter which was shapeless.”27 His student, Theophilius of Antioch, rejected the 
Middle-Platonic doctrine of pre-existent matter as violating the sovereignty of God, 
insofar as anything uncreated is immutable, and thus equal to God. He also argues that, 
were God to have created the universe out of pre-existent material rather than ex nihilo, 
his act of creation would have been no more remarkable than that of a human artisan.28 
Yet, Theophilius ambiguously defines the creatio ex nihilo thus: “all things God has 
made out of things that were not into things that are.”29 Assuming Justin’s “matter which 
was shapeless” refers not to actual physical matter, but rather to Forms or intelligible 
matter, these two statements are compatible; for the notion, common among the second-
century Church Fathers, that God created from ‘things non-existent’ left open the status 
                                                
26 Wolfson, “The Identification of Ex Nihilo with Emanation in Gregory of Nyssa,” 205.  
27 Apologia prima, 59 
28 Apologia ad Autolycum, ii. 4 
29 Apologia ad Autolycum, i. 4 
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of intelligible entities.30 Gregory exploits this ambiguity, rejecting those like Hermagoras 
who believe “matter is co-eternal with [i.e. outside] God,” and insists on the Plotinian 
interpretation of matter as an emanation from the divine essence. 
Moreover, Gregory wished to avoid the customary arguments against 
emanationism, such as those posed by his coeval Basil of Caesarea, that, even though the 
neo-Platonists believed that God was the cause of the world, they regarded Him as “but 
an involuntary cause, as a body is the cause of the shadow and flame is the cause of the 
brightness,” which entailed that “the world co-existed with God from eternity.”31 
Diverting from neo-Platonic doctrine, Gregory insisted that the divine emanation was 
both volitional and, unlike God Himself, had a temporal origin.32 More importantly, 
Gregory attempted to address the problem (which is intrinsic to all forms of rationalism) 
of, as Plotinus puts it: “How…do all things come from the One, which is simple and has 
in it no diverse variety?”33 In the Christian tradition this metaphysical quandary is 
theologically particular, insofar as it poses the question, as summarized by Gregory: “If 
                                                
30 Whether Theophilus or other authors in the second century understood any meaningful distinction 
between creation “from nothing” or “from non-existence” and creation from “things that were not” or 
“things non-existent” is unclear, though the former formulation was preferred by later writers following 
Tatian the Assyrian and Hippolytus of Rome. Indeed there appears to be something of a development in 
early Christian thought from the notion that God created the world out of a pre-existent matter, to creation 
from things non-existent, to a definitive doctrine of creation from no-thing. A definitive doctrinal rejection 
of creation from eternal forms or intelligible matter does not come until the second Ecumenical Council of 
381 and its revision of the Nicene Creed into the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, which declared that: 
“We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and 
invisible.” (Symbolum Nicaenum) 
31 Wolfson, op. cit., 200. 
32 Wolfson, op. cit., 201. Gregory’s reasoning, as well as the nebulous concept of emanation being temporal 
and volitional, is rejected by John of Damascus, who insists that emanation must be understood as “without 
beginning and everlasting, being the work of nature and produc[ed] out of His own essence…while 
creation in the case of God, being the work of will, is not co-eternal with God. For it is not natural that that 
which is brought into existence out of nothing should be co-eternal with what is without beginning and 
everlasting.” (De Fide Orthodoxa, 1.8) 
33 Enneads, v. 2.5 
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God is in His nature simple and immaterial…in what way can matter be born from the 
immaterial, or a nature which is dimensional from that which is non-dimensional?”34 
Gregory responds that the various material forms or “intelligible objects” emanated from 
the divine essence, while lacking corporeality themselves, are combined in particular 
ways to produce the material substratum undergirding corporeal existence. In this way 
God, while containing these material forms eminently as ‘intelligible matter,’ remains 
transcendent to the creation in terms of its ontic corporeality.35 
Regardless of its philosophical and theological difficulties, this identification of 
creatio ex nihilo with emanation de essentia Dei was to become the touchstone of all 
Abrahamic neo-Platonism. An extremely important transitional figure in this tradition 
was pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,36 who held that God “produces substances by an 
outgoing from essence.”37 While pseudo-Dionysius did not elaborate on the metaphysics 
of creation entailed by such a conception, his great commentator and expositor in the 
West, Johannes Scotus Eriugena, not only recapitulated Gregory’s identification of ex 
nihilo with emanation, but also his argument for it, namely the definition of nihil as that 
                                                
34 qtd. by Wolfson, op. cit., 202 
35 Wolfson, op. cit., 203. This obvious problem with this argument, of which Spinoza was particularly 
aware, is that it does not explain how the ontological gulf between the material and the immaterial can be 
bridged in such a fashion: How can a corporeal object be produced by an agglomeration of intelligible 
objects, none of which possess corporeality? As John Damascene notes, contradicting Plotinus: “generation 
means that the begetter produces out of his essence offspring similar in essence.” (De Fide Orthodoxa, 1.8) 
Baring such an explanation, any appeal to intelligible objects or matter represents an obscurum per 
obscurius. Gregory should not be faulted excessively: this problem, along with the wider issue of diversity 
within unity, proved utterly intractable and remained with the rationalist tradition down to Leibniz and 
Hegel. 
36 A sixth century philosopher and theologian—whose proposed identity represents a virtual who’s who list 
of late-antique luminaries—whose works were spuriously attributed to the first century Athenian disciple of 
the Apostle Paul. 
37 qtd. by Wolfson, “The Meaning of Ex Nihilo in the Church Father, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophy, and 
St. Thomas,” 209 
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which is beyond “all that can be said or thought.”38 This definition of nihil “necessarily 
means God…[a] being utterly beyond all that is.”39 In this way the square of Moses was 
constructed equal to the circle of Plato. 
Such was the development of Christian neo-Platonic theology in the early-middle 
ages. If the transmutation of pagan neo-Platonism into Christian neo-Platonism had been 
a protracted and rancorous project requiring centuries of creative interpretations and 
reinterpretations of Abrahamic dogma, the transmutation of Christian neo-Platonism into 
Islamic neo-Platonism was a ready-made affair: the system and its justifications had 
already been developed, the major doctrines and conception of God were largely the 
same, and the primary scholars of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates were Greek and 
Syrian Christians.40 Moreover, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo was never as 
dogmatically entrenched in Judaism or Islam as it was in Christianity. In Judaism and 
Islam the ex nihilo doctrine was certainly the position of orthodoxy, for example in the 
Fiqh al-Akhbar, but contrary views were also widespread and not considered specifically 
heretical.41 
 
 
                                                
38 De divisione naturae, 686. This was not the only doctrine of Gregory’s that Eriugena revived. He also 
promoted apocatastasis, which was the main reason for his eventual condemnation.. 
39 Ibid. Cf. Wolfson, 210 
40 Even though Islam, unlike Christianity, was united with political power from its inception, like 
Christianity, many of its cardinal doctrines, such as Islamic fatalism or the requirement of absolute 
submission to God were not fully adumbrated until three centuries after the Prophet’s death—largely as a 
result of the Kalam rejection of Mutazalite neo-Platonism. (Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism 14) 
41 The Qur’an is not entirely clear on the doctrine and seems to imply that that the world was made of 
smoke. (41:11. Cf. 2:117) 
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2. Islamic Rationalism and the Falsafa 
The thought of the Arab polymath and father of Islamic philosophy, al-Kindi (Alkindus), 
marks the tentative beginning of a syncretism of Islam and Greek philosophy. Indeed, al-
Kindi’s great contribution to Islamic history was cracking the seal of Arab religious and 
cultural chauvinism and aversion to foreign or pagan ideas,42 and his attempt to bridge 
the gulf between the dictates of reason and the dictates of faith, which laid the foundation 
of the rationalist Mu’tazilite school of Islamic philosophy and theology—collectively 
known as the falsafa [Philosophers].43 However, gulfs may be bridged in different ways 
and al-Kindi, like Philo and Origen, was resolved to bridge the gulf between reason and 
faith from the bank of reason—that is, it was the job of reason and philosophy to reach 
abreast the chasm and support revealed Truth—and thus stood at some distance from his 
Mu’tazalite successors. Far from the duplex veritas [two truths] doctrine of Averroes, al-
Kindi believed both that Islamic dogma could be demonstrated syllogistically and that the 
revealed truth of the prophets held a privileged but not incommensurable position over 
human reason.44 He also unreservedly defended the doctrine of creation ex nihilo against 
its ancient critics, but through appeal to (highly abstruse) rational arguments rather than 
revealed truth. In particular, al-Kindi rejected the existence of the “actually infinite” and 
formulated a barrage of arguments against it which served both to protect the creation of 
                                                
42 An attitude evident in the infamous reasoning of the Rashidun Caliph Umar, who, following the battle of 
Yarmouk and the conquest of Byzantine Egypt in 641, ordered the destruction of the ancient Library of 
Alexandria under the justification that the texts there would either support the Koran, in which case they 
were superfluous, or would contradict the Koran, in which case they were heretical. 
43 Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 83-85 
44 Ibid., 85-86 
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the world ex nihilo as well its prophesized destruction ab nihilo.45 While such arguments 
mark the genesis of Islamic rationalism (insofar as he advances rational/metaphysical 
arguments in support of theological dogma), al-Kindi upheld what was to be the major 
metaphysical doctrine of the later Kalam theologians: that God, through his ex nihilo 
creative action as the supreme author of the world, is the only real causal agent therein, 
and that all the supposed activity of creatures (or secondary causes) is merely “passion” 
by which they receive and transmit the divine efficacy.46 Such a principle was to become 
the metaphysical shibboleth of occasionalism all the way down to Malebranche in the 
early eighteenth-century. 
 In spite of his own pious orthodoxy, al-Kindi’s seemingly innocuous introduction 
of Greek philosophy into the Islamic intellectual scene was the spark that ignited a 
theological war similar to those within Judaism and Christianity, but far more intense and 
acrimonious. The Mu’tazalite successors of al-Kindi in the ninth and tenth centuries 
became far more enamored of classical learning and correspondingly far less willing to 
demand concessions from it in order to accord with the dictates of their faith. Indeed, 
they flirted openly with heresy at the very center of Muslim power. Al-Kindi’s disciple 
al-Sarakhi was the tutor of an Abbasid Caliph and was supposed to have espoused 
heretical views in his court and even inveighed against the prophets in written works.47 
                                                
45 Such arguments against the possibility of the actually infinite, or the universe as eternal eo ipso, 
conveniently open the door for a causal proof of God’s existence, for if there is something actual, “it must 
therefore be generated of necessity. Now what is generated is generated by a generator, since generator and 
generated are correlative terms. The world as a whole must be generated out of nothing.” (Ibid., 93) As 
Fakhry notes, the likely source of this argument was John Philoponus, the great philosophical defender of 
creation ex nihilo in late-Antiquity. (Ibid.) 
46 Ibid., 95 
47 Ibid., 114. This, in addition to his undue familiarity, ultimately led to al-Sarakhi’s downfall and 
execution on orders of the Caliph. 
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Ibn al-Rawandi was even more radical. One authority claims that he rejected miracles, 
prophesy and revelation, and upheld eternality of the world as well as Manichaeanism 
and the view that reason unaided was capable of comprehending God. Another claims 
that he rejected the very possibility of any understanding of God’s existence or nature.48 
Such views were taken to their extreme by the heterodox radical al-Razi, who upheld 
traditional neo-Pythagorean doctrines, such as metempsychosis, that were usually passed 
over by other Christian and Islamic neo-Platonists,.49 
 The tradition of Islamic rationalism was taken to its apogee in tenth and early 
eleventh century in the elaborate metaphysical systems of the “Baghdad Peripatetics,”50 
the premiere representatives of which were al-Farabi (Abunaser/Alpharabus) and Ibn 
Sina (Avicenna). While most of al-Farabi’s work was lost following the denunciation of 
the falsafa in the eleventh century, it seems likely that he upheld the identification of ex 
nihilo with emanation as the fountainhead of his neo-Platonic system—an idea he likely 
appropriated from the anonymous but influential Arabic exposition of Plotinian 
                                                
48 Ibid., 114. Clearly these two reports are conflicting: the former views (minus Manichaeanism) were 
common among of the Mu’tazalites, while the latter seem indicative of either a fideistic piety, or a position 
of general theological skepticism, or both. This contradiction would seem compatible with a common 
account of al-Rawandi as having begun his studies as a Mu’tazalite but having grown disenchanted with 
revealed religion later in life. Manicheanism has, after all, proven an attractive creed for other philosophers 
with similar intellectual biographies, such as Voltaire. 
49 Ibid., 119. Al-Razi pushed rationalism beyond neo-Platonism in other ways, regarding the world to be 
created and temporal but grounded on an eternal substratum that informs it, and expounded a curious 
argument against the doctrine of creation ex nihilo that amounted to an inversion of the principle of 
plentitude: “if God had been able to create anything out of nothing, He would have been bound in reason to 
create everything out of nothing.” (Ibid., 121) From what I can tell, this interpretation presumes that 
“everything” here refers to everything that is possible. 
50 The “Baghdad Peripatetics” were a philosophical school in the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate founded 
in the early tenth century by Abu Bishr Mattá, a Syriac Nestorian Christian who translated the Prior 
Analytics into Arabic and was the teacher of al-Farabi. See McGinnis, Classical Arabic Philosophy, 121-
122. 
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metaphysics known as the Theology of Aristotle.51 While al-Farabi is at pains to 
emphasize that “in that work it is made clear that God, be He exalted, has created matter 
from nothing,”52 Wolfson notes that this is simply not the case, and infers that al-Farabi’s 
ascription of the ex nihilo doctrine to a thoroughly Plotinian treatise “undoubtedly means 
that in his opinion creation ex nihilo meant the same as creation from the essence of 
God.”53 This creative interpretation of the ex nihilo dogma fits with al-Farabi’s defense of 
the eternality of the world, for if the world is an emanation from the essence of God, it 
necessarily emanates from him ab aeterno.54 While al-Farabi’s work was little known to 
the West in the Middle Ages, Latin translations of works of Avicenna were of 
considerable importance and the primary source of Aristotelian philosophy in the century 
prior to the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204). This is a point of some importance because 
while Avicenna and al-Farabi are typically regarded as neo-Platonist exemplars, their 
metaphysical work, particularly on causality and the nature of creatures, was emblematic 
of a synthesis of Aristotelainism and neo-Platonism beginning in late-antiquity and the 
early middle-ages.55 
                                                
51 This was an Arabic translation of extracts and paraphrases of Plotinus’ Enneads together with Porphyry’s 
commentary spuriously attributed to Aristotle. 
52 qtd., Wolfson 210 
53 Ibid., 211 
54 Plotinus himself is clear on this point: “Now if there was a time from which he began to be, ‘he has 
made’ would be used in the strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, 
this ‘he has made’ must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent; for the being is one 
with the making and what we may call the eternal generation.” (Enneads, vi. 8.21.23-27) 
55 Perhaps the most outstanding example of this attempted synthesis are the influential commentaries on 
Aristotle of Simplicius of Cilicia, the last of the pagan neo-Platonists, student of the last scholarch of the 
Academy, and thus likely the last philosopher of antiquity. Aside from the Theology of Aristotle, the is an 
Arabic translation/paraphrase of De Anima significantly altered along Plotinian lines, as well as al-Farabi’s 
treatise on the Agreement Between the Two Philosophers, in which he avers that any supposition of 
philosophical differences between Plato and Aristotle is due solely to ignorance. (Fakhry, 50) 
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The difficulty presented to Abrahamic monotheists by the classic Aristotelian 
model of causation was twofold: 
1) It held that the primum movens acted in the world only as a final cause, for the 
efficient cause of things comes solely from the internal principles of their natures, 
not from an external imposition. 
2) Aristotelian cosmology was thus a ‘bottom-up’ construction composed, regulated, 
and ordered by the individual natures of the things themselves. 
Both of these points had already been identified as problematic by pagan neo-Platonists 
who regarded them as incompatible with their hierarchical cosmology descending from 
the One. Proclus and Ammonius argued, pace Aristotle, that is was not enough to merely 
explain change in the order of existents, but one should also, at least in principle, be able 
to explain this order itself. Such a conceit they interpreted as to require God to be the 
efficient as well as the final cause of the universe; viz. an active intellect that impresses 
the specific forms of the celestial realm into terrestrial matter.56 This view was spuriously 
attributed by Ammonius to Aristotle himself and his “interpretation” was to be of 
significant importance in the development of Arab philosophy.57 The attraction of this 
neo-Platonic reconfiguration of Aristotle to the falsafa (as well as their Jewish and 
Christian predecessors) is not difficult to appreciate, for the understanding of God’s 
relation to the world purely in terms of final causation is a point at odds with the deepest 
                                                
56 McGinnis, 9. Such a view also requires, again pace Aristotle, that form and matter be actually distinct. 
57 Ibid. 
  
100 
tenets of Abrahamic deiology.58 Thus, while al-Farabi’s identification of creation ex 
nihilo with emanation irrevocably upheld the pagan doctrine of the world’s eternality 
(Gregory of Nyssa’s dissimulative claims not withstanding), the embrace of this 
emanationist metaphysic allowed him and the other falsafa to avoid what they saw as the 
only other philosophical alternative: the view, embraced by al-Razi, that the world was 
pre-existent rather than created, and thus in some sense beyond God’s control.59 
This metaphysical system was taken to its apogee in the early eleventh-century by 
Ibn Sina (Avicenna). Avicenna is also notable for providing the most systematic 
examinations of the causal model underlying it. Michael Marmura provides a terse 
description: 
God is the supreme efficient cause, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of the world, the effect. The causal conditions are ideal. 
There is and can be no impediment. Hence the effect follows necessarily. 
For, according to Avicenna…God necessitates the world’s existence. 
Since God, the necessitating cause, is eternal and changeless, the world, 
the necessitated effect, is eternal. Cause and effect coexist, God’s priority 
to the world being non-temporal.60 
This description is apposite, for it evinces clearly the metaphysical requirements under 
which causation is defined in terms of necessary connection: God and the world, as cause 
and effect, are necessarily connected. For Avicenna and the falsafa, this bond extends 
from the divine essence such that the existence of God necessitates the existence of the 
world—conceived in terms of series of successive emanations from the first intelligence 
                                                
58 Leibniz, who was otherwise attracted to the Aristotelian model, nonetheless felt compelled to deny that 
God was “the soul of the world.” He noted: “God is the continuous producer of the world, but the soul is 
not the producer of its own body.” (Akademie Edition, VI.4, 1643) 
59 Goodman, 204 
60 Marmura, 175 
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to the manifold species of the terrestrial realm. While the Aristotelian model was 
nebulous concerning (albeit ultimately committed to) the necessity of causal relations, the 
neo-Platonic system of the falsafa makes this requirement absolutely clear. As al-Ghazali 
explains: “according to the philosophers the world stands in relation to God as the effect 
to the cause, in a necessary connexion which God cannot be imagined to sever, and 
which is like the connexion between the shadow and the man, light and the sun.”61 While 
al-Ghazali and the Kalam occasionalist theologians agreed that God was the efficient 
cause of the existence of the world, for them it was the will of God that stood in a 
necessary connection with its effect, whereas for the falsafa, the world is an emanation of 
the divine essence or intellect. 
The Ash’arites regarded the latter emanative conception to entail, insofar as God 
is not only the necessary but sufficient condition for the existence of the world, that He is 
stripped of will and deliberation in any meaningful sense and the Creation is not a brute 
fact but as necessary of existence as God Himself. Moreover, it is not just ‘Creation’ in 
general that is necessary, but every token fact within it, insofar as they all emanate from 
the divine intellect; and for God to change the world in some way would require a change 
in his own essence, which was deemed absurd. This was standard neo-Platonic doctrine; 
as Plotinus reasoned: 
Could he then make himself anything else than he did?...[No,] for to be 
capable of the opposites belongs to incapacity to remain with the best.62 
But his making which we speak of must be once and for all…[and] all the 
                                                
61 Tahafut al-Tahafut, 150 
62 The inversion here of Aristotle’s reasoning concerning the rational principle and openness to the 
opposites describe in Chapter One is notable. (See Metaphysics, 1046b2-18) 
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other things that exist are held together by this; for they exist by some kind 
of participation in him.63 
The Islamic occasionalists responded to this unmistakable challenge to the divine liberty 
not by rejecting the necessary connection model of causation, or its metaphysical basis in 
the necessary connection of God and the world: Avicenna insisted “there is and can be no 
impediment to the divine creative act,”64 and six centuries later, Nicholas Malebranche 
concurred.65 The dispute instead centered on who was a causal agent in the first place as 
well as the nature of the “creative act.” 
Avicenna draws an important distinction between efficient causation understood 
metaphysically and efficient causation understood in terms of natural philosophy. While 
the latter concerns agents that produce change in terms of “one of the forms of motion,” 
the former concerns “the cause which bestows an existence that is other than itself.”66 
This power Avicenna interprets as divine, for “metaphysicians do not mean by agent only 
the principle of motion, as the naturalists do, but they mean the principle and bestower of 
existence as in the case of God with respect to the world.”67 This metaphysical notion of 
efficient causation in terms of divine creation represents a refinement of a point implicit 
to the emanationist system of neo-Platonism, insofar as the emanative infusion of the 
                                                
63 Enneads, vi. 8.21.1-20) 
64 Marmura, 176 
65 Recherche, 6.3, 450 
66 al-Ilahiyyat, 6.1.2, 194 
67 Ibid., 195 
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divine essence into the world and the generation of forms must be understood, at least in 
some sense, in terms of efficient causality and not just final causality.68  
Insofar as natural causes operate through the emanative infusion of the divine 
efficacy, the necessary connection inherent to divine causality permeates downstream 
into the domain of natural causality—which concerns not just the bestowal of existence, 
but the principles of motion and material change as well. Causes are sufficient to produce 
their effects once all causal conditions (i.e. necessary conditions) are fulfilled. Moreover, 
an axiom of the metaphysics of causation from Parmenedies to Hume, such sufficient 
causes must produce their effects at the moment such conditions are met and are thus 
coexistent and cotemporal with said effects.69 The ‘cotemporality requirement’ follows 
from the governing principle of sufficient agency: the principle of sufficient reason. 
Assuming a cause to be sufficient, in the logical or substantial sense, to produce its effect, 
it must do so immediately, for there can be no reason for it to refrain from Et-1 and 
instead produce Et-2, given that t-1 and t-2 are qualitatively identical. As the principle of 
sufficient reason notoriously cannot handle choices of qualitative identity, all sufficient 
causes must produce their effects immediately and thus are temporally coexistent with 
them. For Avicenna, causes are ‘prior’ to their effects, but this priority is not temporal but 
logical and metaphysical. The movement of the key is cotemporal with the hand that 
turns it, but we do not attribute the movement of the latter to the movement of the former 
                                                
68 A conception of divine causality purely in terms of final causation is compatible with a solely 
mechanistic natural causality, as in Leibnizian metaphysics, where the universe is constructed by God as an 
elaborate machine that operates unaided in accordance with its own principles, all of which are directed 
towards a final end. Insofar as neo-Platonism views divine confluence with the world as more substantial 
than this, its model of divine causality must be so as well. 
69 Treatise, 76; Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics, 145 
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on the basis of the distinction between of necessary and sufficient conditions. The 
movement of the hand (as cause) is sufficient for, and thus necessitates its effect, but the 
movement of the key (as effect) is not sufficient for the movement of the hand.70 
 This temporal continuity of causes with their effects informs Avicenna’s 
emanationist conception of ‘continuous creation,’ as is evident in his inference from 
God’s sufficiency for the existence of the world to the eternality of the world on the basis 
of the eternality of God. As Michael Marmura notes, the “supreme example” of the 
cotemporal coexistence of cause and effect is the eternality of the world entailed by 
emanationism.71 This model of causation postulates a continuous creation that is 
temporally continuous on the basis of its metaphysical continuity. Avicenna explains that, 
“if something by virtue of its essence is a cause for the existence of something else that is 
permanent, then it is its permanent cause as long as its essence exists. If [the cause] exists 
permanently, then its effect exists permanently.”72 That is to say, as required by an 
emanative-entailment model of causation where the consequent is contained within and 
thus substantially identical with part of the antecedent, if the antecedent exists 
continuously, then so must the consequent. Avicenna continues: 
Such a thing among causes would then have the higher claim to causality73 
because it prevents the absolute nonexistence of the thing. It is the one that 
gives complete existence to the thing. This, then, is the meaning that, for 
                                                
70 al-Ilahiyyat, 4.1.6, 126; cf. Marmura, 176. Avicenna allows that certain causes precede their effect in 
time, but insists that these are not “true causes,” but contribute to their effect “either accidentally or as 
helpers.” (al-Ilahiyyat, 6.2.5, 202) 
71 Marmura, “Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism,” 67 
72 al-Ilahiyyat, 6.2.9, 203 
73 I.e. a “true cause” as opposed to merely an “accidental” or “helper” cause 
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the philosophers, is termed “creation.” It is the giving of existence to a 
thing after absolute nonexistence.74 
Here it seems as if Avicenna is embracing an ex nihilo model of creation, insofar as the 
creature is brought into existence “after absolute non-existence.” Yet ‘after’ is not the 
same as ‘from’ or ‘out of,’ as Avicenna makes immediately clear:  
For it belongs to the effect in itself to be nonexistent and [then] to be, by 
its cause, existing. That which belongs in the thing intrinsically is more 
prior in essence for the mind ([though] not in time) than that which 
belongs to it from another. Hence, every effect constitutes an existence 
after nonexistence, in terms of essential posteriority.75 
The “absolute nonexistence” of the creature prior to its cause is thus not truly ‘absolute,’ 
but refers only to its ontic existence, i.e. to its status as an independent instantiated being 
within the emanative scheme. However, it receives its essence from its creator, to whom 
it is essentially/logically inchoate and thus essentially posterior. Its existence therefore 
cannot be understood as a creation ‘from’ or ‘out of’ nothing, but rather as an emanative 
instantiation out of a pre-existing essence.76 
 
 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., emphasis added 
76 Avicenna entertains an objection to his description of emanation as proper creation following absolute 
nonexistence: “There is the person [however] who would not make everything that has this description a 
created thing but would say: If we imagine that something has come into existence from a first cause 
through the mediation of an intermediary efficient cause, even if it does not come to be from matter…but 
its existence is from the first true cause after another existence to which it is led, then its coming into 
existence is not from absolute nonexistence but from an existence, even if not [a] material [one]. (al-
Ilahiyyat, 6.2.12, 204) This objection Avicenna downplays as a quibble over “names,” and insists that 
“everything not coming into existence from a previous matter [should be called] not ‘generated’ but 
‘created’…” (al-Ilahiyyat, 6.2.13, 204) This definition of “creation” serves Avicenna’s neo-Platonist 
ontology insofar as it regards the creation/emanation of the world actualized not through the corporeal 
mediation of a pre-existent matter (as in the classical Platonic scheme of the Timaeus), but rather through 
the formal mediation of the divine essence. 
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3. Al-Ghazali and the Ash’arite School 
The Ash’arite school, founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (874-936), was an 
extraordinarily influential fundamentalist and fideistic movement in Islamic philosophy 
and theology. It was an ardent enemy of the Mutazalite school of al-Farabi and Avicenna 
and its primary critical aim was attacking and undermining the Hellenizing of the Islamic 
Faith by the falsafa. As would be expected of an intellectual opposition to the neo-
Platonic rationalism of the Mutazalites, Ash’arite philosophy was deeply skeptical, 
insisting on the feebleness of human reason, the absolute transcendence of God, and thus 
the utter inability of the former to comprehend the latter. Aside from their inveterate 
skepticism, two Ash’arite doctrines are of central concern to this survey. First is their 
atomism, which will be discussed in detail at a later point. Second is their denial of 
efficacy to finite creatures, humans included, and their commensurate insistence that all 
causal activity is produced directly by God. This view has rightfully earned their school 
the sobriquet: ‘Islamic occasionalism.’ 
The Ash’arites’ fundamentalist ire was directed primarily against two of Avicenna’s 
causal principles: 
1) That causes are logically sufficient for the production of their effects and thus 
necessitate their existence. 
2) That causes (i.e. ‘real’ as opposed to ‘helper’ causes) must be cotemporal with 
their effects, such that the effect exists only so long as the cause continues to 
exist. 
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In the first case, the Ash’arites ire is not difficult to understand: a natural order that 
operates on the basis of causes that logically necessitate their effects is simply impossible 
to reconcile with the existence of miracles, which almost invariably imply a break in the 
natural causal order (e,g, the burning of the bush does not cause the consumption of its 
material); but, if causes necessitate their effects, this break would mark a formal logical 
contradiction. Likewise, such a conception of nature seems to fatally compromise the 
divine omnipotence: God is only free in the contemplation of the world prior to its 
creation; once He initiates the causal structures therein, His ability to intervene thereafter 
is rendered logically impossible. This latter problem is especially pernicious in 
Avicennan neo-Platonic theology where God is not merely the designer and final cause of 
the world, but is its continual efficient cause as an outpouring of His own essence. Under 
this conception, there is no contemplation prior to creation, for the world coexists with 
God from eternity, and thus the very notion of the divine will is stripped of meaning.77 
This point then leads to the Ash’arite criticism of the second principle; for, as previously 
noted, the eternality of the world heresy is the most fundamental instantiation of the 
requirement that cause and effect temporally coexist. 
 On the basis of these problematic entailments, the Ash’arites rejected both 
principles unequivocally. Against (1) they insisted that all causal relations are directly78 
                                                
77 Even Thomas Aquinas, who struggled mightly to avoid the heresy of emanationism (Eriugna’s De 
divisione naturae had been condemned by Honorius III in 1225) by insisting on a distinction between the 
divine intellect and the divine will, seems incapable of avoiding the force of neo-Platonic logic. In spite of 
this distinction, Aquinas was adamant that the divine will was absolutely constrained by the intellect. 
Moreover, he regarded the Aristotelian essences as internal to the divine intellect. This entails, as Aquins 
quite frankly admits, that “God in willing himself wills all the things which are in himself; but all things in 
a certain manner pre-exist in God by their types.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, 1.75) 
78 There is an ongoing dispute in the scholarly literature as to just how direct this dependence was (i.e. Does 
God employ causal intermediaries or are they just figments of our habituation?), particularly in the case of 
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dependent on the voluntary will of God, which acts utterly without constraint. God can 
produce effects without their causes, and causes without their subsequent effects; as al-
Ghazali maintains: “He has the power to create the satisfaction of hunger without eating, 
or death without the severance of the head, or even the survival of life when the head has 
been cut off, or any other thing from among the connected things (independently of what 
is supposed to be its cause).”79 As will be seen, this principle that God has the power to 
contravene and/or produce directly anything that is produced by secondary causes (or its 
very opposite), was to become a central axiom of nominalism and later occasionalist 
traditions. Against (2) the Ash’arites insisted that causes need not be cotemporal with 
their effects; a point precluded, for the most part,80 by their doctrine that God recreates 
the world and everything in it ex nihilo at every moment. This recursive metaphysics of 
creation entails an atomic conception of time that undermines the very possibility of 
causal necessitarianism, as well as a static punctiform ontology that undermines the 
existence of substantial agents. This ontological critique of causation will be examined in 
a later chapter. This section will focus on the Ash’arites’ logical and epistemological 
critique of causation against principle (1). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
al-Ghazali. Though this dispute requires mentioning, and will reappear in literature on later occasionalist 
philosophers, it is ultimately not relevant to the topic under consideration and will not be addressed here. 
79 Tahafut, 185.  
80 The acticvity of the human will being a notable exception. (Marmura, 81) 
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Al-Ghazali and the Ash’arites’ Empirical Critique 
The most rigorous attack on the rationalist conception of causation prior to Hume, and 
the most elaborate defense of an occasionalist metaphysic prior to Malebranche, was 
developed and expounded by the Persian Ash’arite philosopher-theologian al-Ghazali in 
his polemic Tahafut al-Falasifah [The Incoherence of the Philosophers]. Al-Ghazali is a 
unique and remarkable figure in the history of philosophy, in many ways close to Pierre 
Bayle: a devout believer in the omnipotence of God and the mystery of His ways—and 
thus an avowed skeptic of all metaphysical systems that seek to rationalize and explain 
said ways. Also like Bayle, al-Ghazali was no merrily ignorant fundamentalist who 
measured his critique by the force with which he pounded Holy Scripture, but rather an 
extraordinarily erudite scholar and critic who dissected and devastated the doctrines of 
his opponents by understanding them better than they did themselves. Indeed, one of al-
Ghazali’s major contributions to Islamic philosophy was his defense and legitimization of 
Aristotelian logic among his fellow Ash’arites.81 This point should be kept in mind, for 
while al-Ghazali’s polemic against the falsafa was motivated by theological 
considerations, the critique itself was of impeccable logical rigor—and thus easily 
transferable to other thinkers regardless of motive. 
Al-Ghazali’s critique of causal necessitarianism comes in chapter seventeen of the 
Tahafut, the title of which makes explicit what is at stake: “Refutation of their Belief in 
the Impossibility of a Departure from the Natural Course of Events.” This metaphysical 
principle of the falsafa was a major source of animus for the Ash’airtes insofar as it 
                                                
81 McGinnis, 23 
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placed untenable constraints on the divine omnipotence and was deemed to preclude the 
possibility of miracles. As adumbrated in the previous section, the falsafa understood 
causality in a hybrid Aristotelian/neo-Platonic scheme in which things possessed and 
were ontically defined by their substantial natures or dispositions, the activity of which 
was essentially causal, but the actualization of which required the infusion of the divine 
concursus. Now, insofar as this infusion was a given, the nature of the agent entailed its 
effect subject to the nature of the patient. While the nature of the patient allowed for 
effect diversity, what remained impossible was for a properly infused agent to have no 
effect whatever; if God wished for an agent to not produce its characteristic effect (i.e. 
that which characterizes its disposition) on the patient, he was required to either 
simultaneously activate an impediment to the agents efficacy, or change the nature of the 
patient such that it was no longer receptive to the agent’s activity.82 This requirement was 
understood by the Ash’arites as relegating the omnipotence of Creator to the constraints 
of His’ creation,83 which was deemed theologically unacceptable. Thus, a primary focus 
of the Kalam critique was on the existence of substantial natures and their supposed 
necessary connection with their productions or effects. 
This critique was an aim of the early Ash’arite theologian al-Baqillani, a 
contemporary of Avicenna.84 While most of the falsafa (all the way down to Averroes) 
regarded the existence of substantial natures as self-evident following the asseveration of 
                                                
82 Of course even speaking of God’s activity in this deliberate and volitional manner was to the falsafa and 
unintelligible anthropomorphism. 
83 Or His power de potentia absoluta to de potentia ordinata in the Latin scholastic terminology. 
84 McGinnis, 24 
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Aristotle,85 the irrepressible iconoclast al-Razi rejected this view, claiming that only the 
effects of natures are perceivable and that their existence did not follow from any first 
principle of the intellect.86 Avicenna conceded that while the existence of natures could 
be established by first principles, the particular features of natures as well as their effect 
on other natures could only be ascertained by experience.87 Al-Baqillani seized on this 
ambiguity, sneering: 
Concerning what [the philosophers] are in such a stir, namely that they 
know by sense perception and necessarily that burning occurs from fire’s 
heat and intoxication from excessive drink, it is tremendous ignorance. 
That is because that which we observe and perceive sensibly when one 
drinks and the fire comes into contact [with a body] is only a change of the 
body’s state from what it was, namely, one’s being intoxicated or burnt, 
no more. As for the knowledge that this newly occurring state is from the 
action of whatever, [such a causal relation] is not observed; rather it is 
something grasped through rigorous inquiry and examination.88 
That is to say: if (according to al-Razi) we only perceive the effects of natures, and if 
(according to Avicenna) we only know the nature of natures by the experience of their 
effects, then we are in something of an epistemic quandary in which experience is of no 
use at all, for all it is capable of providing is temporal congruence of events, but never 
epistemic access to natures as the principles of change.89 Thus, as it was with 
                                                
85 “That nature exists, it would be absurd to try to prove; for it is obvious that there are many things of this 
kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is 
self-evident from what is not.” (Physics, 193a) 
86 McGinnis, 35 
87 Ibid.; In this regard, Avicenna agrees with Hume when he points out that, “as the power, by which one 
object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their idea, ‘tis evident cause and effect are 
relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or 
reflexion.” (Treatise, 69) 
88 Tamhid, 43; qtd. By McGinnis, 35 
89 McGinnis, 26 
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nominalism and Cartesian occasionalism, Islamic occasionalism found its inception in the 
critiques of Aristotelian substantial natures and causal explanation. 
This point of al-Baqillani’s was developed to a much higher degree of rigor and 
became one of the touchstones of the systematic attack on Mu’tazalite metaphysics 
propounded a generation later by al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali begins his critique of 
Mu’tazalite necessitarianism in chapter seventeen of the Tahafut with the simple 
phenomenological observation that our acquaintance with objects (both perceptual and 
conceptual) is discrete and thus incapable of providing any notion of necessary 
connection: “In our view, the connection between what are believed to be the cause and 
the effect is not necessary. Take any two things. This is not That; nor can That be This.”90 
This remark may seem trivial, but it is actually a profound insight that forms the 
touchstone of the critique of causation. It is a point with two prongs: one empirical and 
the other logical and epistemological. Developing the empirical prong, al-Ghazali 
considers al-Baqillani’s example of “the burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its 
contact with fire,” making clear the distinction between his conception the world and that 
of the falsafa: “Firstly, the opponent may claim that fire alone is the agent of burning, and 
that being an agent by nature (not by choice), it cannot refrain from doing what it is its 
nature to do.”91 It is precisely this conception of an active physical universe operating of 
necessity according to set natures that al-Ghazali oppugns, insisting: 
Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has no action. How can one prove that it 
is an agent? The only argument is from the observation of the fact of 
                                                
90 Tahafut, 185 
91 Tahafut, 186, emphasis added 
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burning at the time of contact with fire. But observation only shows that 
one is with the other, not that it is by it and has no other cause than it.92 
If all we ever experience of objects is their discrete sensible qualities, then it is 
impossible that we could ever empirically account for causation as an activity or concept 
of relation. As noted, this limitation had been accepted by Avicenna, who acknowledges 
that, “As for sensation, it leads only to concomitance. And it is not the case that, if two 
things are concomitants, it then follows necessarily that one of them is the cause of the 
other.”93 However, Avicenna postulates an inductive94 “kind of demonstration” or 
“hidden syllogism” [qiyas khafiyy] tacit within causal judgments that allows for the 
inference of natures and necessary connection: 
[M]ethodic experience is like our judging that the scammony plant95 is 
purgative for bile; for since this is repeated many times, it stops being a 
case of something that occurs by chance, and the mind then judges and 
grants that it is characteristic of scammony to purge bile…Since it is 
verified that purging bile so happens to belong to scammony…Then one 
knows that this is something scammony necessarily brings about by 
nature, since there is no way it can be an act of choice.96 
                                                
92 Tahafut, 186 
93 al-Ilahiyyat, 1.1.16, 6 
94 Though Avicenna denies that it is inductive. (al-Burhan, 45) 
95 Scammony is a bindweed native to the eastern Mediterranean basin. An extract of its roots was 
commonly used in antiquity and the middle-ages as a purgative that also killed roundworms and tapeworms 
in the intestine. Along with fire and cotton, it is one of the most common examples of causal interaction 
employed in philosophical discussions of the period. 
96al-Burhan, 45-46; cf. Kogan, 87-88. Avicenna’s argument here seems to be an explication of a claim 
made tacitly by Aristotle in Physics 196b, where he notes that: “we observe that some things always come 
to pass in the same way, and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance, or the 
result of chance, is said to be the cause—neither of that which is by necessity and always, nor of that which 
is for the most part.” Rather, according to Aristotle, things in nature that happen always or for the most part 
are efficient causes “for the sake of something,” and not merely accidental. They are linked to the teleology 
of final causation which is the operating principle of nature. The distinction between what Avicenna 
extracts from congruence in repeated observation, and what Aristotle does, hinges on Avicenna’s 
inheritence of the neo-Platonic interpretation of Aristotle that insists that God is not just the final, but also 
the efficient cause of nature. 
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Avicenna’s ambiguity regarding the correct conclusion of this “kind of demonstration” 
and the source of necessity between scammony and its purgative effect (a power, or 
property, or relation?) is revealing. Regardless, Al-Ghazali is adamant that Avicenna’s 
‘demonstration’ underlying causal judgments is not a demonstration at all for it lacks any 
manner of entailment: “existence with a thing does not prove being by it.”97 In an 
analogue to Hume’s thought experiment concerning Adam,98 al-Ghazali hypothesizes: 
“Suppose there is a blind man whose eyes are diseased, and who has not heard from 
anyone of the difference between night and day. If one day his disease is cured, and he 
can consequently see colours, he will guess that the agent of the perception of the forms 
of colours which has now been acquired by his eyes is the opening of the eyes.”99 In his 
mistaken belief that his eyes have the power of generating colors, the blind man 
demonstrates the fallacy of Avicenna’s hidden syllogism: he can open and close his eyes 
as many times as he likes, but this repetition in no way renders his mistaken belief more 
secure. Rather, it is only with the setting of the sun (while his eyes remain open) that the 
blind man realizes his error.100 There is no epistemological alchemy by which the 
philosopher can transmute observed association—no matter how many times repeated—
into “a necessary accident,” for the setting of the sun (i.e. a change in the laws of nature) 
                                                
97 Tahafut, 186 
98 Enquiry, VI.2, 27 
99 Tahafut, 186 
100 And then procedes to make a new mistake, according to the occasionalists, assuming he concludes that 
the sun is the cause of his experience of color. 
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is an abyss that subtends all induction. Thus, Avicenna’s supposed “demonstration” or 
“hidden syllogism” is nothing but a vitium subreptionis.101 
 Avicenna gets into further trouble with his “hidden syllogism” insofar as he 
maintains that we come to know the activity of causes on their effects, and thus the 
distinction between the two, not through the analysis of concepts, but through empirical 
observation.102 That is to say, our knowledge that scammony purges bile is not an innate 
idea, but rather learned through repeated experience. However, for the reason discussed 
earlier, Avicenna is also adamant that causes are coexistent and cotemporal with their 
effects, which raises the question: how is the observer to separate out and identify the 
activity of the cause/agent from the receptivity of the effect/patient? As noted in the 
previous section, Avicenna regards causes and their effects to be distinguished logically 
on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions. In this way: 
The mind is not repelled at all by our saying, “When Zayd moved his 
hand, the key moved,” or, “Zayd moved his hand, then the key moved;”103 
but is repelled by our saying, “When the key moved, Zayd moved his 
hand,” even though [the mind rightly] says, “when the key moved, we 
knew that Zayd moved his hand.” The mind, with respect to the temporal 
coexistence of the two movements, assigns a priority to one and a 
posteriority to the other, since it is not the existence of the second 
movement that causes the existence of the first, but it is the first movement 
that is the cause of the existence of the second.”104 
                                                
101 A vitium subreptionis is a Wolffian term employed by Kant that refers to ideas of misleading empiricity, 
such as when I regard my will as having the power to effect bodily movements on the basis that, whenever 
I will to move a particular part, it indeed moves. However, all I actually experience is the conjunction of 
my will and the movement of the intended part. The supposed power by which my will effects such a 
movement is nowhere present in my experience. 
102 McGinnis, 35 
103 This second formulation seems to imply a temporal priority, but it has been established that Avicenna 
would reject such an interpretation. 
104 al-Ilahiyyat, 4.1.7, 126; emphasis added 
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Well and good; but what is left unexplained in this explication is how the mind makes 
this “assignment” in the first place. How do we know that the movement of the “first” 
causes the movement of the “second”? 
Along these lines, Avicenna entertains an objection from al-Baqillani which 
claims: “If each of the two things [is such that], if one exists, the other exists, and if one 
is removed from existence, the other is removed, then one is not the cause, nor the other 
the effect, since neither has a better claim than the other to be the cause of existence.”105 
Note that this objection concerns the ontology rather than the empiricity of causal 
priority. As such, Avicenna’s response is predictable: “it is [only] one of them—namely, 
the cause—which [is such] that, if it occurs, the occurrence of the other, after being 
possible, follows necessarily from it. Regarding the effect, its occurrence does not 
necessitate the occurrence of the cause; rather, the effect would occur only after the cause 
has occurred.”106 But “after” here does not signify a temporal, and thus empirically 
observable, posteriority, but rather and logical and ontological posteriority. If, as 
Avicenna maintains, we derive our knowledge of causal relations from experience, he 
must be able to explain how we are able to distinguish the movement of the hand and key 
into “first” and “second” on empirical grounds. That is, if a cause is a cause due to its 
priority, and an effect is an effect due to its posteriority in the relationship between the 
two, we must be able to see this hierarchy in order to have any notion of causation to 
begin with. Given their “temporal coexistence,” this is simply not possible, and thus any 
metaphysical distinctions in terms of bestowing of existence and existential dependence 
                                                
105 al-Ilahiyyat, 4.1.12, 128 
106 Ibid., 4.1.14, 128 
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is epistemologically unwarranted, for we see no such things. The “hidden syllogism,” 
even if one were to grant it arguendo, is otiose here, for repeated observation of causal 
phenomena would only be useful if one is able to distinguish the cause from the effect 
empirically in the phenomenon itself. But, such a distinction is only possible given a 
temporal diastem between the two.107 
 
Al-Ghazali’s Logico-Existential Critique 
Returning to al-Ghazali, this empirical critique leads to the epistemological prong of his 
argument—the insistence on necessary connection: supposing that we have a complete 
understanding of the quiddities of fire and pieces of cotton, which amount to subject-
predicate relations of identity, al-Ghazali asks: “how can we conceive that one of them 
should burn, and the other should not? There is no alternative for the other piece.”108 That 
is to say, the very fact that cause and effect are epistemologically distinct—and, for al-
Ghazali it is impossible to comprehend them otherwise—means that we can consider the 
one without the other; and subject to that mere possibility, no logically necessary relation 
can exist between the two. This psychological principle, which was to be employed 
almost ad nauseum by Hume, was known as the ‘maxim of admissibility’ (tajwiz) by the 
                                                
107 One should not be beguiled by the common sense response that: ‘Causes can be empirically 
distinguished from effects insofar as one may observe the cause without its effect, but never the effect 
without its cause.’ Even if this principle were true (it is not), an epistemological appeal to it would only 
undermine Avicenna’s model insofar as it would entail effects are sufficient for their causes. Aristotelian 
causal explanation is possible only because causes are specific even though effects are diverse. Herbicide 
will kill a plant, but a dead plant, in itself, does not entail herbicide as the cause of its condition. 
108 Tahafut, 188 
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Islamic occasionalists and posited “whatever is possible in reason is possible for God.”109 
This psycho-epistemological criterion for logical possibility (as well as its entailment that 
separable ideas are non-deducible) proved of remarkable recrudescence in the history of 
causal skepticism. 
Yet, unlike Hume, who only considers this point in terms of epistemology,110 al-
Ghazali and his successors (sc. Autrecourt) extended it further to the ontic independence 
of causes and their effects. This door had been conveniently opened by Avicenna, who 
insisted that the metaphysical hallmark of efficient causes is their ontological distinctness 
from their effects—a point he was almost harpingly adamant about, presumably to avoid 
the danger of pantheism implicit to neo-Platonism.111 Al-Ghazali follows Avicenna on 
this point, but then poses the question: what does this ontological distinctness entail? A 
necessary connection requires that one event is logically bound to another, such that the 
cause is sufficient to bring about the effect. Yet how is this logical connection possible? 
“This is not That” precisely because two distinct things, as distinct things, cannot be 
bound of themselves by any necessary connection: “The affirmation of one does not 
imply the affirmation of the other; nor does its denial imply the denial of the other. The 
existence of the one is not necessitated by the existence of the other; nor its non-existence 
by the non-existence of the other.”112 For example, it is impossible to conceive of a dog 
while not also conceiving of an animal precisely because there is a necessary relationship 
between the two—the antecedent entails the consequent as a modus ponens. This is the 
                                                
109 Fakhry, 32; cf. Wright, 136, Maimonides, Guide, 1.73, 207. 
110 A limitation implicit to his reification of the epistemological. 
111 Marmura, 173 
112 Tahafut, 185 
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type of standard that relations of necessity demand. Yet, the relationship between the 
concept ‘dog’ and the concept ‘animal’ is not causal but rather definitional, the subject 
being contained in the predicate. This is the fundamental principle of the analysis of 
concepts itself. Causation, on the other hand, is not a definitional relationship, but rather 
one that takes place between two otherwise discrete things, and thus cannot include under 
it any notion of necessity. It is thus apparent that al-Ghazali is extending the ‘difference 
principle’ from the domain of epistemology to the domain of ontology—with the upshot 
remaining the same. The occasionalist conclusion he draws from this is that, if two 
distinct events are to be necessarily conjoined, they can only be so “as the result of the 
Decree of God, which preceded their existence. If one follows the other, it is because He 
has created them in that fashion, not because the connection in itself is necessary and 
indissoluble.”113 Moreover, this “fashion” is not guaranteed or immutable, for God’s will 
is not constrained by the limits of His creation, and thus could be altered or rescinded at 
any moment. 
Given the complete lack of grounds for causal judgments, how exactly is one to 
account for their seeming effectiveness and hold over the mind? Conversely, if we are to 
forgo all judgments of cause and effect, how can we avoid ascribing equal intelligibility 
to endless flights of fancy such that, to use al-Ghazali’s colorful example: 
One who sees a man whom he had not seen until now might hesitate to 
guess whether that man was born at all. He might say: ‘Maybe this man 
was one of the fruits sold in the market. But now the fruit has been 
transformed into a man, because God has power over every thing, and all 
such transformations are therefore possible. Hence my hesitation.’114 
                                                
113 Tahafut, 185; emphasis added. 
114 Tahafut, 189 
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This objection is found in Sextus115 and hinges on the Peripatetic ‘like → like’ principle 
of natural generation. Al-Ghazali’s responds to this ancient objection against the denial of 
causality by first conceding what is at stake: “If you could prove that in regard to things 
which ‘can exist’ there cannot be created for man a knowledge that they ‘do not exist,’ 
then these absurdities would be inescapable.”116 That is to say, if, to assume the 
rationalist premise, judgments of causation are grounded in the modality of the possible, 
then the existence of an omnipotent God would indeed result in an acataleptic universe. 
Yet al-Ghazali rejects this in two ways. First, he rejects as incompatible with the divine 
omnipotence the rationalist principle of plentitude (that by which, to quote Spinoza: 
“Whatsoever is within God’s power…necessarily exists.”117), for it requires that the 
divine will be exhausted in the Creation; and declares: “God has created for us the 
knowledge that He would not do these things, although they are possible. We never 
asserted that they are necessary. They are only possible—i.e., they may, or may not, 
happen.”118 Second, he posits a non-metaphysical criterion for knowledge capable of 
sufficing for such judgments: “It is only when something possible is repeated over and 
over again (so as to form the Norm), that its pursuance of a uniform course in accordance 
with the Norm in the past is indelibly impressed upon our minds.”119 That is to say, 
causal episteme does not reference the modality of the possible, but rather that of the 
                                                
115 PH, iii. 18; cf. Adversus mathematicos, ix. 202 
116 Tahafut, 189 
117 Ethics, I, 35, pp. 238 
118 Tahafut, 189 
119 Tahafut, 189-196, emphasis added 
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actual, such that when possibilities are repeated in experience, their situation is 
‘impressed’ upon the mind in the form of a judgment. 
While al-Ghazali’s epistemological principle bears a certain resemblance to 
Avicenna’s hidden syllogism, the constant conjunction epistemology it is predicated on 
requires severe metaphysical concessions and a sharp limitation of the horizon of 
knowledge beyond anything Avicenna would have accepted. Al-Ghazali anticipates an 
objection to these concessions as entailing that: “all distinction between voluntary and 
spasmodic movement will disappear.”120 This notion (a bodily movement not preceded 
by a volition) is inversely identical to Hume’s hypothetical of the willful paralytic (a 
volition not followed by a bodily movement).121 His response to this objection is also 
identical: “we will say that we know such a [distinction] from ourselves. When, in our 
own case, we observe a distinction between the two states, we designate the cause of the 
distinction as power.”122 What is notable in this response is al-Ghazali’s concession that 
there can be no metaphysical difference between a voluntary and spasmodic movement, 
but rather only an empirical and subjective one.123 Lacking any innate intuition of power 
as the criterion for such a discrimination, we observe (as ‘a fact’ to use Humean 
                                                
120 Tahafut, 194 
121 Enquiry, VII.1, 66 
122 Ibid., 196 
123 Malebranche entertains a similar objection from Suaréz (DM, 18.1.6) in the Recherche: “If secondary 
causes did nothing…we could not distinguish [living] things from those not living, for neither of them 
would have an inner principle of their actions.” Malebranche accepts that there can be no metaphysical 
distinction between the living and the non-living (indeed he challenges “the Peripatetics to give…a clear 
idea of what they call bestial life…”) but insists that this is unnecessary: “I reply that men would still have 
the same sensible proofs that have convinced them of the distinction they make between living things and 
those not living. They would still see animals perform certain actions such as eating, growing, crying, 
running, jumping, and so forth, and they would see nothing similar in stones.” (661) That is to say, what 
makes a living thing a living thing is not some “inner principle,” but rather a set of empirically describable 
(e.g behavioral) qualities. 
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language) a distinction between willed—as an antecedent condition—and unwilled 
movements in our body and designate the presumed cause of the distinction as the power 
of our will. Yet, as al-Ghazali is quick to note, this type of causal designation is inductive 
and thus: “Knowledge of this kind can only tell us of the existence of one of the two 
possible things. But it does not prove the impossibility of the other alternative.” And thus, 
as the ultimate dénouement: “this knowledge is one of those cognitions…which depend 
upon the continuance of the regular course of events.”124 
This point requires clarification in order to avoid confusion with al-Ghazali’s 
emphasis on will as the determinant of causal potency—evident is his contention that: 
“Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has no action.”125 At the end of chapter seventeen of 
the Tahafut, al-Ghazali considers “the case in which God causes the hand of a dead man 
to move, and places him on the footing of a living man, so that he may sit up and write, 
till the movement of his hand results in coherent writing,” noting that “we must say that 
in itself it is not impossible.”126 However, al-Ghazali denies the claim of the falsafa that 
such a possibility is inimical to possibility of knowledge, arguing that “it is God who is 
the agent; He makes the adjustment, and performs the action—through the dead man.”127 
The problem here is that al-Ghazali also insists that the dead man’s writing is not 
impossible, “For we ascribe all temporal events to the will of One who acts by choice.”128 
This clearly seems to undermine any metaphysically real distinction between the writing 
                                                
124 Tahafut, 196 
125 Tahafut, 186 
126 Tahafut, 196 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid., emphasis added 
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of a living man and the writing of a dead man: in each case both serve as a marionette for 
the will of God. However, al-Ghazali does not himself make this latter point, thus leading 
some scholars to conclude that he himself did not accept it.129 Regardless, this contention 
was a common supposition of the Ash’arites as well as later occasionalist schools, who, 
insofar as they didn’t outright deny free-will altogether, maintained that while the will of 
man is free, it is also finite and thus impotent. Therefore, like any other finite “agent,” it 
could at most only be conjoined with its effect, serving only as an occasion for the will of 
God to accomplish its desired tasks.130 
Now al-Ghazali’s emphasis on divine “choice” or “will” is intended to undermine 
the sine qua non of rationalism: the principle of sufficient reason. It forms the basis of the 
“most clever”131 argument against the temporal origin of the world going back at least to 
Parmenides, who asks: 
[W]hat creation of [What Is] will you look for? How, whence (could it 
have) sprung? Nor shall I allow you to speak or think of it as springing 
from Not-Being; for…what necessity impelled it, if it did spring from 
Nothing, to be produced at a later time rather than an earlier?132 
                                                
129 See Frank 1994 and McGinnis (Unpublished). While al-Ghazali is unclear on this point, I find it difficult 
to make sense of his claim that “we ascribe all temporal events to the will of One who acts by choice” in 
any way other than an admission of complete occasionalism. 
130 The seeming subservience of an infinite will to the dictates of a finite will was a serious problem with a 
free-will model of occasionalism that was never resolved. 
131 Tahafut, 1.1 15. Recall that Aristotle had described an argument of Anaximander’s that made a similar 
appeal to the principle of sufficient reason as “ingenious.” (De caelo, 295b30) 
132 Frag. B8. Cf. Simplicus, Commentary on the Physics, 145. While I primarily use Freeman’s translation, 
the last italicized clause is taken from Kirk & Raven’s translation as it strikes me as more forcefully 
capturing the thrust of Parmenides’ question. (347) 
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As al-Ghazali summaries this coruscating argument: “if the origin of the world is 
ascribed to God’s action, the question remains: Why now, and why not before?”133 Al-
Ghazali’s response to this argument (“Problem 1: Refutation of Their Belief in the 
Eternity of the World”) is twofold, involving both a positive and a negative component. 
The latter takes the form of the reductio ad absurdum that would become known as 
“Buridan’s Ass”:134 
Let us suppose that there are two equal dates before a man who is fond of 
them, but who cannot take both of them at once. So he will only take one 
of them…As regards the causes of a special character being possessed by 
the object of actual choice—viz., the causes mention by [the 
philosophers], such as prettiness, or nearness, or handiness—we can 
suppose their absence; and still the possibility of one of the two dates 
being taken will remain. Here you will have to chose one of the two 
things: (1) Either you can say that the equal relation of a man’s purpose 
[i.e. his reason for preferring one to the other] to the two dates is 
inconceivable. But this is nonsense; for the equality can be supposed. (2) 
Or you might say that, the equality having been supposed, the excited man 
will keep fondly and helplessly gazing on forever, and will not be able to 
take either date by mere will or choice which is devoid of purpose. But 
this is also impossible; and the absurdity of such an assumption is self-
evident.135 
                                                
133 Tahafut, 1.1 15 
134 Somewhat mysteriously as, according to the testimony of such avid readers as Schopenhauer and Bayle, 
the example of an ass appears nowhere in any of Buridan’s extant works. (See Rescher 1960) 
135 Tahafut, 1.1 27. Al-Ghazali offers another argument in favor of this point that has the advantage of 
barring “special characters” by necessity rather than supposition: “As regards the poles…out of what they 
would call an infinite number of opposite points, any two could conceivably be the poles. Why, therefore, 
did the two points in north and south happen finally to be chosen as the poles? Why not did the elliptic pass 
through some other (two) points, so that as opposite points on the elliptic they should have been the poles? 
There may be a wisdom latent in the size or the shape of heaven. But what is it that distinguished the place 
of the pole from any other place? What caused one particular point, as set over against all other points and 
parts, to be chosen as the pole? Are not all the points similar; are not all the parts of a round body equal? 
The philosophers cannot find a way out of this difficulty.” (Tahafut, 1.1 29) Lest these philosophers attempt 
to respond by claiming that poles are equal only mathematically (i.e. ideally) but never in actuality, such 
that “the point of the poles is distinct from other points by virtue of a property which is suited to that 
point’s being the point of the pole [e.g. a center of gravity],” al-Ghazali points out that: “All the parts of the 
sphere are, qua body which receives forms, evidently similar. This property cannot be claimed by this 
position, merely because of the latter’s being body or heaven. For that character is shared in common by all 
the parts of heaven.” (Ibid., 30) That is to say, if the philosophers argue that the center of gravity of the 
mass of the sphere determines the points of the poles, even though—as points—they are mathematically 
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On the basis of this apagogic critique of the principle of sufficient reason, al-Ghazali 
advances his positive argument, viz.: “it follows that whoever discusses the nature of 
volitional action—whether with reference to empirical facts, or on theoretical grounds—
will have to affirm an attribute of which the function should be to distinguish something 
from its like.”136 That is to say, the metaphysics of Will—whether human, divine, or 
equine—involves a faculty capable of arbitrary choice sine ratione.137 Anything bereft of 
such a faculty is incapable of this discrimination, such “that fire [that] is so created that 
when it finds two pieces of cotton which are similar, it will burn both of them, as it 
cannot discriminate between two similar things.”138 On this basis he asks the falsafa: 
How will you disprove one who says that the world came into being 
because of the eternal will which demanded its existence at the time at 
which it actually came into existence, and which demanded the non-
existence (of the world) to last as long as it lasted, and (demanded) the 
                                                                                                                                            
identical, one could simply ask: ‘Why does the center of gravity align along these points rather than 
others?’ And finally: ‘Why is the matter that composes this sphere and determines the alignment of its 
center of gravity situated at this point rather than another?’ The only rationalist philosopher that ever took 
this problem (sc. ‘Why didn’t God create the world two feet to the right?’) seriously was Leibniz, who 
notoriously rejected the existence of absolute—or even ‘real’—space and regarded the concept as a 
hypostatization of the order or relation between individuals. (“Fourth Letter to Clarke,” 13)  
136 Tahafut, 1.1 27 
137 The freedom of the will to choose sine ratione was an old Epicurean justification for the existence of the 
swerve, as Plutarch relates: “Some philosophers, thinking to provide [our] impulses with release from the 
constraint of external causes, contrive within the ruling faculty a kind of adventitious motion which 
becomes manifest especially in the case of indistinguishable alternatives. They argue that, when it is 
necessary to accept one of two things that are alike and of equal import, there being no cause directing us to 
one of the two, since it is no different at all from the other, this adventitious force in the soul takes a swerve 
of itself and resolves the perplexity.” (De stoicorum repugnatiis, 1045b) This was also a concern of 
Aristotelians, such as Alexander, who concedes that, without the introduction of a “motion without a 
cause” it follows “that, when all the external circumstances are similar, either [i] someone will choose, or 
even do, the same things or [ii] something will be without a cause, and that of these [ii]…is impossible, 
while [i]…shows that external causes have control over the things that we do.” (De anima libri mantissa, 
xxiii. 174.3-7) 
138 Tahafut, 190. This is an old claim in the metaphysics of causation. As Aristotle insisted: “the same cause 
must necessarily have the same effect on the same things.” (De caelo, 295a) Similarly, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias argued: “nature itself has given to those things which are and come to be of necessity no 
fitness for the opposite…[since] they cannot be otherwise [than they are].” (De anima libri mantissa, xxiii. 
184.15-18) 
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existence to begin where it actually began...What can prevent us from 
believing such a thing, and what is the contradiction involved in it?139 
This voluntarism has an important upshot that became characteristic of occasionalist 
metaphysics: the abolition of “natures” and the hollowing out of the created world. 
 
Al-Ghazali’s Critique of ‘Natures’ and the Occasionalist The Rabbit Hole 
According to al-Ghazali, the falsafa believed that the disposition of substances informs or 
directs God’s infusion of them with specific forms that condition their activities: 
The capacity to receive the forms is derived from these causes which are 
observed, and which exists here. Emanation from the Principles 
themselves takes place by way of necessity and nature…And the receptive 
subjects are distinguished from one another by their different capacities.140 
Moreover, even though “the principle is one,” the falsafa account for the fact that “its 
effects are diverse”—i.e. “the Sun whitens one thing (e.g. the washerman’s clothes), but 
blackens another (e.g. the washerman’s face)”—by appeal to “different capacities in the 
receptive subjects.”141 Thus, any failure of a cause to produce its effect “must be 
attributed to the recipients.”142 Assuming that, in accordance with al-Ghazali’s above 
reasoning, any coherent notion of will (divine or finite) requires: 1) the possibility of 
choosing more than a single option, and 2) the possibility of choosing between identical 
                                                
139 Tahafut, 1.1 16 
140 Tahafut, 17 187 
141 Ibid., 17 187-88. Cf. Sextus, Adversus mathematicos, ix. 247 
142 Ibid. 
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options,143 if God can act creatively out of will, his action cannot be homogenous in the 
sense of the essential efficient cause.144 That is to say, God is not constrained to act 
merely out of His essence (as the active intellect continually endowing matter with the 
forms that fit its disposition) with the world as its necessitated product, and which He has 
no choice but to create (and continue to create so long as He Himself exists). On this 
point al-Ghazali is unequivocal: 
We do not agree that the Principles do not act by choice, or that God does 
not act by will…once it is proved that the Agent creates by His will the 
burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its contact with fire, Reason will 
consider it to be possible that He may not create the burning while the 
contact has taken place.145 
If God does act by will, such that He is not required to produce burning in the case of 
contact with fire, but is able to produce another reaction entirely, then what exactly does 
it mean to describe a thing such as fire in terms of its dispositional characteristics or 
capacities? If fire as an agent-cause does not inform or direct God’s production of 
burning as an effect, then what exactly is fire? What role does the ontic order play in its 
own productions and development? If any cause can produce—or, what is the same: be 
associated with—any effect, then the agents of these causes and the patients of these 
effects lack any meaningful or substantial ipesity and exist merely as fundamentally 
interchangeable instances for the operation of the divine omnipotence; their supposed 
dispositions are reduced solely to the disposition to act according to how God makes 
                                                
143 That is to say, a coherent notion of will requires the ability to choose arbitrarily without a governing 
purpose or reason. This is particularly true of the divine will, as al-Ghazali insists: “In the case of God, we 
cannot speak of a purpose.” (Tahafut, 1.1 26) 
144 See Marmura, 186-187 
145 Tahafut, 188 
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them act.146 As we shall see, this entailment (sc. the destruction of any meaningful 
concept of ‘Nature’) was central to the response to Islamic occasionalism propounded by 
Averroes and Aquinas, as well the final collapse of occasionalism in the eighteenth 
century. 
Another metaphysical upshot of al-Ghazali’s critique of causation concerns the 
very concept of “necessity.” Insofar as effects are distinct from their causes, they can 
never be necessitated by their causes, and thus nothing that is the effect of a cause or 
requires a cause can be necessary, leading al-Ghazali to conclude: “necessity has no other 
sense than that of being uncaused.”147 While the falsafa had rejected such a reductive 
notion of necessity in the sublunary realm, they had, following Aristotle, understood it as 
a necessary precondition of all eternal entities; and thus understood it as a metaphysical 
requirement of God’s definition as a being who is “necessary of existence,” [Wajib al-
Wujud].148 Taking up such a definition, al-Ghazali formulates his “Refutation of Their 
Thesis that God’s…Necessary Existence is to Him what Quiddity is to Any Other 
Being.”149 Supposing that “it is said: His reality is that He is necessary. So this is the 
quiddity [of God],” al-Ghazali retorts: “‘Necessary’ only means the denial of cause. And 
that is a negation which cannot constitute the reality of a being.”150 That is to say, a being 
                                                
146 Moad, “Al-Ghazali’s Occasionalism and the Nature of Creatures,” 6-7. 
147 Tahafut, 135. In antiquity this was a common understanding of the status of eternal objects, as well as 
the past in general. For example, Aristotle claims: “what is of necessity coincides with what is always, 
since that which must be cannot not be. Hence a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal, it is 
of necessity.” (De generatione et corrputione, 337b34-338a2) 
148 Ivry, 162 
149 Tahafut, Pr.8, 132 
150 Tahafut, Pr.8, 135 
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is necessary only insofar as it lacks a cause, but this alone is tantamount to mere 
“Existence, but no existent;”151 the latter possibility requires some quiddity as an essence 
capable of individuating a substance out of Being-qua-Being. On this point, and seven 
centuries prior to Kant, al-Ghazali adamantly declares: “Existence is not quiddity.”152 He 
thus concludes of the falsafa: 
They thought that they had arrived at a pure idea of God; but, in fact, the 
ultimate result of their investigations is pure negation. The denial of 
quiddity is the denial of reality. When reality is denied, nothing remains 
but the word ‘existence,’ to which no object corresponds.153 
In spite of the remarkable prescience of al-Ghazali’s reasoning, there is a dangerous tu 
quoque lurking beneath his claim that the “denial of quiddity is the denial of reality.” 
While he uses this principle to accuse the falsafa of denying the Creator, the falsafa, and 
particularly their final eminence, Averroes, appeal to it to accuse al-Ghazali and the 
Ash’arites of denying the Creation. Regardless of the typical employment of 
counterarguments of this type, this particular tu quoque was not a rhetorical manoeuver, 
but a profound accusation that would culminate six centuries later as the fundamental 
problem precipitating the collapse of occasionalist metaphysics. 
                                                
151 Ibid., 134 
152 Ibid., 135 
153 Tahafut, Pr.8, 134 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REVIVAL OF ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL METAPHYSICS 
 
Yes, Aristotle, dear Peripatetic! Yes indeed, the fundamental elements of reality are 
matter, form, and privation. All I ask is that, using these, you explain to me the essence of 
just one thing in nature, even the least little thing, and its true origin, and the cause of so 
many actions and properties observed in it. 
—Gassendi, Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos 
 
Nor should any god intervene unless a knot show up that is worthy of such a liberator. 
      —Horace, Ars poetica 
 
1. The Recovery of Western Europe 
During the High Middle Ages (c. 1000-1300), Latin European civilization developed 
from an insular backwater that had little changed since the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire five centuries earlier, to a burgeoning interlinked world; economic and 
technological advancements allowed it to go on the offensive against neighboring 
civilizations for the first time since Charlemagne’s conquest of Barcelona and 
establishment of the Spanish Marche in 795-7. These expansionist military campaigns 
against the Saracens1 and Byzantines2 shattered the cultural and intellectual insularity of 
                                                
1 These include not just the Crusades and Reconquista, but also the Norman conquest of Sicily (c. 1061-
1091) as well as the wresting of control of the Mediterranean from Arab pirates largely achieved by the 
navies of the various Italian republics. 
2 This most famously includes the Fourth Crusade and capture of Constantinople, but was presaged by the 
Norman conquest of Byzantine Southern Italy in the later eleventh century as well as their nearly successful 
invasion of the Empire proper in 1081. The Normans were also instrumental to the astonishing success of 
the First Crusade and were the primary foreign troops serving during the early years of the Reconquista. 
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Western Europe. The importation of Arab and Greek texts from southern Iberia and the 
conquered Byzantine Empire opened windows in philosophy that had remained shuttered 
since the execution of Boethius in 525, or, at the very latest, since the death of Isidore of 
Seville in 636 (whose Etymologiae was nearly the sole source of ancient knowledge 
available to the West in the Early Middle Ages).3 The incredible, rapid, and massive 
expansion in knowledge during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is all the more 
striking due to the depths of ignorance the preceded it. Aristotle had been completely 
lost4 and the available Platonic corpus was limited to Calcidius’ partial translation of the 
Timaeus.5 Such were the deprivations suffered by Latin philosophy following the 
collapse of antiquity, and yet, in a relatively short period during the late-twelfth and 
thirteenth century, ancient philosophy underwent a phoenix-like rebirth. Virtually the 
entire Aristotelian corpus became available to Western scholars under the excellent 
translations of William van Moerbeke,6 who also produced translations of scientific 
works by Archimedes and Hero of Alexandria. The effect of this rediscovery of Aristotle 
                                                
3 It should be noted that, unlike Boethius, Isidore was ignorant of Greek and his knowledge of ancient 
philosophy and science was almost entirely second hand. 
4 Even if fragments remained they would have been largely useless as Latin translations did not exist. 
Boethius had intended to translate the works of Plato and Aristotle into Latin, but this project was cut short 
by Theodoric. Moreover, no Western philosopher of note between the death of Eriugena (c. 877) and the 
Renaissance had any meaningful knowledge of Greek. 
5 Henry Aristippus, a Greek in the service of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, had produced Latin 
translations of the Meno, Phaedo, and part of Aristotle’s Meteorologica in the mid twelfth-century, but 
these were not widely disseminated. (Klibansky 1939, 27) 
6 See Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. 
Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 45-79. 
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on Latin philosophy was so profound that translations of Plato were largely neglected for 
a century and a half.7 
The veritable explosion of Western philosophical activity and advancement 
during the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries was a development in two 
movements essentially analogous to the development of Islamic philosophical activity 
during the tenth through the twelfth centuries. The first movement was an agog 
appropriation of ancient philosophy originating from the recovery of Aristotle (sc. Latin 
Averroism). The second was a sharp and sweeping counter-reaction against 
Aristotelianism (sc. nominalism). Aquinas, often considered as the seminal figure of 
Latin medieval philosophy, belonged to neither movement sensu stricto, but rather stood 
as a transitional figure between the two. The Averroists were as openly heretical as many 
of the falsafa; and, like their master, made recourse to the duplex veritas doctrine so as to 
not deign to render their philosophy (e.g. monopsychism, belief in the eternality of the 
world, etc.) compatible with Christian dogma. By contrast, the nominalists made little 
effort towards a systematic theology or philosophy and increasingly devoted their efforts 
to problems in logic and epistemology. Thus, this peculiar stance of Aquinas,’ perhaps 
                                                
7 Leonardo Bruni produced translations of the Aplology, Crito, Phaedo, and Phaedrus in the early fifteenth-
century, but it was at the Council of Ferrara in 1438 (transferred to Florence the next year), which was 
attended by several Byzantine scholars including Plethon, that the Western rediscovery of Plato began in 
earnest. Cosimo de ‘Medici attended Plethon’s lectures and shortly after founded the Accademia Platonica, 
which, aside from serving as the locus of the Florentine Renaissance, sponsored translations of all of 
Plato’s works into Latin (undertaken primarily by Ficino), as well as works of Plotinus and other neo-
Platonists. See Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages 
(London: Kraus International Publications, 1982), 27 
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more than anything else, explains his stature along with Augustine as the official 
philosopher-theologian of the Catholicism.8 
While the development and succession of intellectual traditions in Latin medieval 
philosophy are analogous to that of Islamic medieval philosophy, a key difference needs 
be emphasized. The attacks of al-Ghazali and the Ash’arite theologians were directed 
against the neo-Platonist falsafa and were followed by Averroes’ rehabilitation of classic 
Aristotelianism as a response to both (viz. Ash’airite skepticism as well as Mutazalite 
necessitarianism). In the West this later sequence was effectively reversed. The 
indigenous neo-Platonic tradition of Eriugena, Anslem, and Abelard was replaced with 
Averroism and Thomistic scholasticism influenced by the influx of Arabic treatises and 
commentaries imported from al-Andalus as a result of the capture of Islamic centers of 
learning during the Reconquista,9 as well as the recovery of the Greek Aristotelian corpus 
from Byzantine libraries following the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade 
in 1204. The more enthusiastic branch of Aristotelian scholasticism, Latin Averroism, 
was checked in a series of condemnations from 1270 to 1277, and only then, in the early 
fourteenth century, did recognizably Ghazalian ideas begin to be advanced. However, 
these Ghazalian ideas were cultivated through the quintessentially Latin 
realism/nominalism dispute10 and were thus directed not against the indigenous neo-
                                                
8 The Summa Thelogica was held in rank with the Bible and the Decretals at the Council of Trent (1545) as 
foundational to the Catholic confession and Thomism was codified as the philosophia perennis of the 
Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council (1965). (Optatam Totius, 15) 
9 The Reconquista was largely complete by the middle of the thirteenth century. Cordoba was taken in 
1236, Valencia in 1238, Seville in 1248, and the Islamic presence in Spain was reduced to the Emirate of 
Granada, a rump state and vassal of the Kingdom of Castile that was to survive, fittingly, until 1492. 
10 While philosophers of the Islamic world had access to Porphyry and were aware of the problem, their 
engagement with the it lacked the obsessive intensity characterisitic of their Latin brethren. 
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Platonic tradition, but rather against the insurgence of Aristotelian scholasticism. Thus, 
with the end of the Islamic golden age and the rapid decline of Islamic intellectual 
activity in the thirteenth century, it was Christian philosophers of the West who were to 
answer Averroes and take up al-Ghazali’s attack against his posthumous opponent. 
 
2. Averroes and Classical Aristotelianism 
While the revival of Aristotelianism gained significant impetus from al-Ghazali’s 
devastating attacks against Avicenna and the neo-Platonist falsafa, it was also organic to 
the philosophy of Moorish Spain. Unlike the aforementioned “Baghdad Peripatetics,” 
who were followers of the Proclean and Ammonian tradition which endeavored to 
synthesize the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions by regarding God as both the final and 
efficient cause of the world, the “Andalusian Peripatetics,” such as Ibn Bajja and Ibn 
Tufayl, had never particularly concerned themselves with such a mediative synthesis, and 
Averroes astutely denounced it as perversion of Aristotle’s position.11 Such a 
denunciation came at a price though, and Averroes well understood the attraction of this 
‘perversion’ to the falsafa: “it was an opinion very much like the account upon which the 
practitioners of kalam in our religion rely, namely that the agent of all [generated] things 
is one and that some of the [generated] things do not bring about an effect in others.”12 
The denial of this “opinion” likewise entailed a denial of a single agent who generates all 
                                                
11 McGinnis, “Arabic Impressions of Tabi’a (Nature),”17  
12 qtd., in McGinnis, 19 
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things, a point that Averroes explicitly concedes,13 and which provides the foundation for 
his non-emanationist, non-occasionalist model of natural efficient causality. 
Averroes criticizes al-Ghazali’s claim that only agents (i.e. those with choice and 
a will) can be causes and insists that “a person who throws a shadow [is not] an 
agent…because the shadow cannot be separated from the man.”14 What Averroes means 
by “separated” is unclear, but it seems apparent that he did not understand it in the 
logico-existential sense as did Avicenna and al-Ghazali. Kogan offers that “Averroes’ 
assertion that agents and acts are really separate means, at the very least, that they are 
detached or detachable from one another.”15 Given that “detached” and “separated” are 
effectively synonymous, this tautegorical explanation does little to clarify the matter.16 It 
seems to me that Averroes is insisting on separability as the distinguishing mark between 
‘natural efficient causes’ and ‘volitional agent causes.’ He regards the former as not 
detachable from their effects (e.g. “luminosity and the sun, and the downward rolling in 
relation to the stone”17) because they are bound to them essentially. By contrast, agents 
produce acts non-essentially but on the basis of choice, and thus their acts are 
metaphysically detachable from them insofar as they could have done otherwise while 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Tahafut al-Tahafut, 151 
15 Kogan, 36 
16 This ambiguity is further compounded by Averroes claim that “by common consent the agent can be 
separated from its object and the philosophers certainly believe that God is separated from the world.” 
(Tahafut al-Tahafut, 151) In accordance with the philosopher’s emanationist metaphysics, this is quite 
simply untrue. As van den Bergh reasons, Averroes must be using “separated” here equivocally in the sense 
of transcendence. (Tahafut al-Tahafut, II. 64; see Kogan, 37) That is to say, if the world is an emanation of 
the divine essence, then God cannot be ontologically “separated” from it, but He may be understood in such 
a manner insofar as He surpasses and transcends His particular emanations—in the same sense that I 
transcend my liver, even though I could not literally be separated from it (and live). 
17 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 150 
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remaining the same. This is a key point, for, in denying al-Ghazali’s concatenation of 
agents with causes, Averroes is attempting to stake out a domain of natural efficient 
causation wherein causes are not metaphysically detachable from their effects insofar as 
they cannot refrain from producing them, or produce their contraries, while remaining 
the same. Under this interpretation, Averroes regards Avicenna—on the basis of his 
emanationist overflowing/bestowal-of-existence model of causality—as having conceded 
something he should not have, viz. the ontic separability of cause and effect. It is 
precisely this new ‘concatenated’ conception of efficient causality that forms the basis of 
his response to al-Ghazali. 
 The crucial point to be kept in mind here is that both Avicenna and al-Ghazali 
share the same logico-existential entailment model of causation, i.e. logical relations and 
causal relations are, if not one and the same, at least structurally coextensive. Moreover, 
both regarded God as the primary (or only) agent and the Creation as his act. Yet, as 
previously noted, Averroes argues that agents are always separable from their acts. This 
point is not a problem for al-Ghazali, who agrees that God creates on the basis of will 
and, in doing so, remains ontologically transcendent from His Creation; yet, the point is 
devastating for Avicenna and the falsafa, whose God creates from an emanation of 
essence and is thus eternally and metaphysically coexistent with the Creation and cannot 
be separated from it, nor from any of its particular effects, on pain of contradiction. In 
order to avoid such a trap, Averroes rejects the Ammonian synthesis of the falsafa and 
reverts to the classically Aristotelian position whereby God provides only the formal and 
final causes in the world, which Averroes accepts as necessitating their effects.18 That is 
                                                
18 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 171 
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to say, Averroes rejects the fundamental posit of both neo-Platonism and occasionalism 
that God is the continual efficient cause of the world as well as its final cause; and instead 
insists on a domain of nature that operates on the basis of its own material causal powers 
and principles independent of the direct activity of God—though, of course, engineered 
and coordinated by God as its final cause.19 
This conception of God’s activity in, and God’s relation to, the creation leads 
Averroes to posit a new model of necessity distinct from logical necessity. Under this 
model, causes do not entail their effects in the way understood by al-Ghazali and the 
falsafa. Faithful to Aristotle, Averroes insists that an effect “does not necessarily follow 
from its efficient cause, for the efficient cause frequently exists without the effect’s 
existing.”20 On this basis, Kogan claims that Averroes is “distinguishing…between 
logical necessity on the one hand, and causal necessity, as applied to efficient causes, on 
the other…That is, [an efficient cause] may be fully in act and yet not produce its proper 
effect.”21 While this interpretation is most certainly correct, an examination of why 
Averroes believes this belies Kogan’s conclusion (in opposition to my own) that: “Cause 
and effect are, in principle, separable, and Averroes recognizes no less than al-Ghazali—
and Hume centuries later—that one may assert the ‘cause’ and deny the ‘effect’ without 
                                                
19 This extraordinary revival of a classically Hellenic cosmology and theology was not to last but died in 
the Muslim world with the death of Averroes himself and in the West a century later with the 
condemnation of the Latin Averroists. Aquinas and his legion followers never accepted it, but sought a 
conditional return to the Ammonian position under the notion of “divine concurrence.” It wasn’t until 
Leibniz that Averroes’ and Aristotle’s position would return to Western philosophy, though by then in 
starkly different terms. 
20 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 171; Physics, 196b10 
21 Kogan, 67 
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contradiction.”22 Moreover, this point serves to undermine any distinction, made by 
Averroes or others, between logical and so-called ‘causal necessity’ (i.e. what I refer to as 
‘material necessity,’ as it is quite different than the ‘causal necessity’ of Democritus and 
the Stoics). 
 Averroes’ response to al-Ghazali’s famous argument against necessary 
connection,23 is both dismissive and made with considerable scorn.24 Indeed, at first 
reading, his response seems decidedly asseverational as well as betraying an ignorance of 
the actual problem. Averroes first attempts to avoid the fate of the falsafa by, pace 
Avicenna, rejecting the claim of al-Baqillani and al-Ghazali that we lack any direct 
perception of efficient causation.25 Two points must always be made to assertions of this 
sort. First, if we do indeed have direct perception of causal relations (what I have referred 
to as ‘empirically veridical insight’), how then are we to account for effects whose cause 
is not perceived? While Averroes deems skepticism as to the empiricity of causation on 
this basis “illogical,” he provides no meaningful explanation but only insists that such 
things “are still unknown and must be investigated, precisely because their causes are not 
perceived.”26 But “investigated” how? By looking harder? One either sees the causation 
taking place, or one does not; and thus Averroes’ response is a kind of special pleading. 
                                                
22 Kogan, 67. It’s worth reiterating that, at least under my interpretation, the whole point of Averroes’ 
distinction between ‘agent’ and ‘natural’ efficient causes hinges on his belief that the former are separable 
from their effects while the latter are not. 
23 “Problem XVII: Refutation of their Belief in the Impossibility of a Departure from the Natural Course of 
Events,” 185-196. 
24 He declares: “everything Ghazali says in this passage is sophistical” (Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 520) 
25 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 519-20, 526, 528-9 
26 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 520 
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Second, this insistence on directly perceivable causality is, pace Kogan’s interpretation, 
sufficient to refute any claim to a separation between cause and effect for Averroes. 
Recall Hume’s argument that an empirically veridical insight into a causal interaction is 
tantamount to insight into the means, manner, or power by which the cause produces its 
effect. Given such an insight, it would be impossible to conceive of any alternative 
outcome without at the same time supposing a change in the ideas under consideration.27 
Indeed, this is precisely Averroes’ argument against al-Ghazali on necessary connection: 
a cause and its effect are not separable, for such a separation would amount to a privation 
of substance.28 
This latter point should be kept in mind when considering Averroes’ response to 
al-Ghazali; for Averroes argues that specific aspects of being (diversity, potential for 
change or constancy, mobility/immobility, etc) are simply self-evident and thus either 
understood or not, essentially asserting that power or activity is essential to being-as-such 
and that anything inert is therefore non-existent.29 Averroes’ efforts to explain how a 
supposedly necessary connection between cause and effect might not occur seem to 
amount to little more than a series of attempts to escape the conditions of al-Ghazali’s 
conceptual experiment.30 He poses the question: “are the acts which proceed from all 
things absolutely necessary for those in whose nature it lies to perform them, or are they 
                                                
27 Treatise, 111 
28 Cf. Aristotle: “For of the contraries…one is a privation—and a privation of substance; and privation is 
the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus.” (1011b17-20) 
29 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 520; See Kogan, 111 
30 Cf. Kogan, 129-132 
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only performed in most cases or in half the cases?”31 Now Avicenna had accepted the 
absolute necessity of causes producing their effects and al-Ghazali had accepted this 
definition of causation in terms of necessary connection as the object of his critique. 
While Averroes attempts to deny such a necessity between causes and their effects, it 
seems evident from his efforts to account for the “in most cases or in half the cases” 
effects that he tacitly accepts this model as well, for (like Aristotle) he can only explain 
such “cases” by introducing extraneous conditions (i.e. a change in the ideas under 
consideration): 
[S]ince one single action-and-passivity between two existent things occurs 
only through one relation out of an infinite number…it happens often that 
one relation hinders another. Therefore it is not absolutely certain that fire 
acts when it is brought near a sensitive body, for surely it is not 
improbable that there should be something which stands in such a relation 
to the sensitive thing as to hinder the action of the fire, as is asserted of 
talc and other things.”32 
That is to say, a cause might fail to produce its essential effect due to the presence of 
some impediment that interrupts their continuity and interaction. Surely this is not 
improbable, nor impossible, but al-Ghazali’s conceptual experiment assumed no such 
thing. Similarly, in his Long Commentary on the Physics, Averroes argues that causes 
might not always produce their effects due to some internal deficiency in the cause: 
[T]hat which occurs in the majority of cases [but not always] is something 
whose nature possesses a possibility for its action being deficient in the 
minority of cases, and therefore an external impediment exists in that case. 
But because that which occurs by necessity does not have this [deficiency] 
in its nature, it likewise [can have] no external impediment.33 
                                                
31 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 521 
32 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 521; emphasis added 
33 In II Physicorum, t.c. 48, 66; trans. by Kogan, 131 
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For example, scammony may fail to produce its abstersive effect due to its becoming (in 
a mot juste description) “de-natured.”34 Now this is, as Averroes himself concedes, really 
nothing more than an elucidation of the impediment objection: a sufficient cause cannot 
be impeded purely ab extra, but must be receptive to such an impediment ab intra, in 
terms of its own nature. Such a requirement is in keeping perfectly with a necessitarian 
model of causation—as Averroes again concedes—for any necessary relation, as a logical 
entailment, can only be negated if its components are open to, and thus dependent upon, 
some necessary conditions. That is to say, if Θ is necessary for Φ to produce Ψ, then ¬Θ 
presents an impediment to Ψ on the basis of Φ’s own haeccity. Under such a model any 
completely ab extra impediment, where Φ is completely sufficient to produce Ψ without 
condition (or with all the necessary conditions met), but is somehow impeded, can only 
take the form of a logical contradiction.35 
Now such a fully sufficient cause without any ab intra deficiency or ab extra 
impediment is precisely what al-Ghazali is assuming in his conceptual experiment; and 
thus Averroes’ ignoratio elenchi amounts to him attempting to deny the undeniable by 
conjuring up hypothetical complexities that are irrelevant to the problem under 
consideration: ‘All else being equal, can we conceive the fire coming in contact with the 
cotton and yet not igniting?’ The answer is yes, which is why Averroes simply cannot 
                                                
34 Kogan, 130 
35 Thus, when Averroes claims that an effect “does not necessarily follow from its efficient cause, for the 
efficient cause frequently exists without the effect’s existing,” (Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 171; emphasis added) 
he is equivocating between ‘efficient cause in potentiality’ (which is prior to its effect) and ‘efficient cause 
in actuality’ (which is simultaneous with its effect), and thus between temporal posteriority and causal 
implication, as is evident from the section of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1070a21-5) he bases this claim on: A 
father is an efficient cause of his son, but prior to the birth of his son, the cause exists without the effect. 
(cf. Physics, 194b31) This equivocation avoids the crux of al-Ghazali’s hypothetical and frankly seems 
designed to confuse the issue and inveigle the reader. 
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entertain the question. His objections therefore all reduce to the assertion that all else 
cannot possibly be equal in such a circumstance, thereby denying the conditions of al-
Ghazali’s hypothetical, and refusing to consider it on its own terms by instantiating 
impediments or unmet conditionals; for only such fetters—produced by a change in the 
terms under consideration—are capable of disrupting the necessity between cause and 
effect. This point is openly admitted by Suaréz who, in considering precisely the point at 
issue (sc. the necessary connection between fire and burning) says: 
To be sure, natural causes can…impede one another through resistance or 
through a contrary action…But once those things have been posited, 
natural causes cannot prevent the action of a necessary agent, since they 
do not have the power to change the nature of things or to remove wholly 
intrinsic properties…For how can a natural action be prevented if no 
impediment is posited?...once the presupposition [of no impediment]…has 
been made, the action arises with such a strong necessity that it cannot be 
impeded except by removing some part of what has been presupposed.36 
Averroes was not so open, but would only offer: “because of external causes the 
procession of acts from agents may not be necessary, and it is not impossible that for 
instance fire may sometimes be brought near cotton without burning it, when something 
is placed with the cotton that makes it non-inflammable.”37 The ‘and’ in the above quote 
should really be read: ‘as’; for al-Ghazali’s point, which he stubbornly refuses to 
consider, is: ‘It is not impossible that fire may be brought near cotton without burning it, 
even when there are no internal or external oppilations present which renders it non-
inflammable.’ 
                                                
36 DM, 19.1.14; emphasis added 
37 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 538 
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What such dialectical maneuvers betray is that, all of his assurances to the 
contrary, and pace Kogan and others who interpret Averroes as offering a distinction 
between ‘logical’ and ‘natural necessity,’38 like Aristotle himself, Averroes assumes the 
very logical necessitation model of causation that al-Ghazali is criticizing; viz. that a 
fully-sufficient cause, sans impediment, could ever fail to produce its effect. But, under 
al-Ghazali’s reasoning, if a cause must produce its effect in a given situation, then any 
failure—even if only a conceptual possibility—to do so immediately and completely 
falsifies its supposed sufficiency to do so, not merely in the particular token cause under 
consideration, but globally: all become implicated in the same deficiency. The distinction 
between ‘logical’ and ‘natural necessity’ is otiose here as there are only two available 
responses: Averroes and his contemporary defender must either declare it impossible that, 
upon removing every possible impediment to the activity of a cause, it still can fail to 
produce its effect—in which case they concede the necessity of the connection; or, they 
must admit the possibility—in which case the assumed link underlying the causal 
connection, ‘necessary’ or ‘natural,’ disintegrates in the literal sense of the term. 
 The diallelus in Averroes’ argument against al-Ghazali can be seen in his 
confident assertion, following Aristotle, that “it is self-evident that things have essences 
and attributes which determine the special functions of each thing and through which the 
essences and names of things are differentiated.”39 While Averroes is apparently unaware 
of the glaring question begging in the assumption that: ‘Things have essences which 
determine their productions, which in turn form the criterion by which we can identify 
                                                
38 See Madden, 1981 
39 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 520 
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and differentiate said essences,’40 this petitio principii would not escape the notice of the 
Latin nominalists, and would become an issue which early-modern anti-Aristotelians 
were almost malevolently fond of exposing. 
Yet, in spite of its circularity, Averroes’ reasoning also carries within it an 
ontological claim that, as intimated at the end of chapter three, was ultimately to lead to 
the destruction of occasionalist metaphysics. As Kogan summarizes this point: “If all 
things ceased to manifest their distinctive acts, they could no longer be said to have their 
specific natures. By subalternation, it follows that if any given particular fails to produce 
its characteristic effect, we have prima facie evidence for concluding that it does not have 
the specific nature to do so.”41 That is to say, under Averroes’ causal ontology, any 
substance that does not produce its characteristic effect must be either impeded in some 
way or is simply is not that substance. Two points need to be made here. First, this 
response is an instance of a formal logical fallacy sometimes referred to as the “no true 
Scotsman” fallacy,42 at least insofar as it subsumes the necessary connection between 
cause and effect into the definition of the causal entity itself; and thus the effect follows 
logically given the cause, but only by way of a stipulative definition. Second, this is 
                                                
40 On this point van den Bergh argues, in defense of Averroes: “All conceptual thought implies the idea of 
identity, and all identity in the real implies a conformity to law, a sameness of action under the same 
conditions, i.e. that in such-and-such conditions a certain entity will necessarily act in such-and-such a 
way.” (Notes, 177) However, this declaration assumes that we have such an idea of identity, that it is self-
evident, and that it is fundamentally connected with the real. Yet, such assumptions are precisely what the 
empiricist tradition calls into question, which is presumably why van den Bergh deprecates it as regarding 
“the only function of the mind [as] the registration of isolated sense-impressions,” under which “there 
could be no investigation, no search for explanation or causes, since nothing could be known but the 
experienced and the given.” (loc. cit.) Any philosopher with an adequate familiarity with Locke’s Essays or 
Hume’s Treatise (which were profoundly influential to the development of modern Science) will recognize 
just how asinine such a representation of empiricism is. 
41 Kogan, 129 
42 See Anthony Fley, Thinking about Thinking (London: Collins Fontana, 1975). 
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precisely what al-Ghazali denounced the falsafa for in their innovative account of 
miracles, such as Nebuchadnezzar’s fiery furnace: 
From this idea, they come to disbelieve the story that when Abraham was 
thrown into fire, burning did not happen, although fire continued to be 
fire. They assert that this cannot happen, unless fire should be devoid of 
heat (which would put an end to its being fire), or unless Abraham’s 
person or body should turn into stone or something else which might resist 
the influence of fire.43 
Al-Ghazali accuses the falsafa of taking interpretive liberties with the Koran, which 
speaks of no oppilations preventing the burning of the fire, nor of any anti-pyrotic quality 
impressed upon the youth.44 Moreover, in requiring God to employ one of these in 
accomplishing the miracle, the falsafa relegate his omnipotence to the use of instruments 
(i.e. secondary causes). Averroes attempts to avoid this problem by refusing to discuss 
it;45 yet he all but concedes the philosophers’ claim by accepting that the fire could only 
                                                
43 Tahafut al-Falsafa, 188; emphasis added. In a manner unsurprising given his naturalistic interpretation of 
miracles, Augustine seems to agree with the falsafa’s interpetation. In defense of the doctrine of eternal 
corporeal damnation, he was required to assert that the flesh of the damned is not consumed by the fires of 
Hell. According to Augustine, this is possible because “suitable properties will be communicated to the 
substance of the flesh by Him who has endowed the things we see with so marvelous and diverse 
properties.” (De civitate Dei, xxi. 4) Which is to say: teeth will be provided. 
44 Concerning the story in question, Josephus (a famously Hellenized Jew) seems to take the Aristotelian 
line, remarking that: “the fire did not touch them; and indeed it was, I believe, in consideration of their 
being thrown into it without having done any wrong that it did not touch them, and it was powerless to burn 
the youths when it held them, for God made their bodies too strong to be consumed by fire.” (Jewish 
Antiquities, x. 215) 
45 “As to the objection which Ghazali ascribes to the philosophers over the miracle of Abraham, such things 
are only asserted by heretical Muslims. The learned among the philosophers do not permit discussion or 
disputation about the principles of religion, and he who does such a thing needs, according to them, a 
severe lesson…Of religious principles it must be said that they are divine things which surpass human 
understanding, but must be acknowledged although their causes are unknown.” (Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 527) 
This claim might seem ironic in light of Averroes later accusation that al-Ghazali’s fideistic skepticism 
leads to the breakdown of knowledge, but it is really an expression of the double truth doctrine that was an 
attempt by Averroes and his Latin followers to liberate philosophy from the constraints of theology by 
bisecting the two at the most fundamental level possible. Averroes claim against al-Ghazali is thus rather 
disingenuous. He knows his philosophy cannot account for the miracle of Abraham on its own terms, so he 
thus refuses to consider or discuss it and, in doing so, presumes to avoid being identified as one of those 
“heretical Muslims.” 
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be prevented from burning the youths under the instantiation of an impediment.46 Indeed, 
after denouncing those who would constrain God’s miraculous activity as “heretics [who] 
must be killed,”47 Averroes essentially embraces their sentiment three pages later: 
When the theologians admit that the opposite of everything existing is 
equally possible,48 and that it is such in regard to the Agent [i.e. God], 
there is no fixed standard for His will either constantly or for most cases, 
according to which things must happen…For true knowledge is the 
knowledge of a thing as it is in reality. And if in reality there only existed, 
in regard both to the substratum and to the Agent, the possibility of the 
two opposites, there would no longer, even for the twinkling of an eye, be 
any permanent knowledge of anything, since we suppose such an agent to 
rule existents like a tyrannical prince who has the highest power…[and] 
for whom no standard or custom is known which reference might be 
made.49 
Averroes is being exceedingly careful in his wording here but is quite clearly accepting 
the premise that God’s freedom to act is constrained by the nature of the Creation, such 
that, in the performance of a miracle, God must work not arbitrarily but through the 
natural order. Indeed, this requirement is inherent to Aristotle’s onto-theological model 
under which the primum movens ‘moves’ only as a final cause (i.e. as the source of 
natural motion) and is not an efficient cause of anything in the world.50 
What Averroes wished to defend is the classically Aristotelian conception of 
nature as an active medium of ontologically distinct substances that nonetheless interact 
                                                
46 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 538 
47 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 527 
48 The italicized clause is startling close to Hume’s famous declaration: “The contrary of every matter of 
fact is still possible.” (Enquiry, 21) 
49 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 530-1; emphasis added 
50 While Averroes will not admit as much, such a view is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of 
miracles—a problem that later led Leibniz, who concurred with Averroes’ metaphysic, to redefine the very 
notion of ‘miracle’ itself. (See Théodicée, §207) 
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with each other and produce effects in regular patterns determined by the very ontic 
nature of the substances themselves—which in turn is what serves to ontologically 
distinguish them. He correctly identifies both the falsafa and the Ash’arites as opposed to 
this metaphysic and conception of creatures. The falsafa reject it on the basis of their 
overflowing/bestowal-of-existence model of causation which regards all causes as 
fundamentally synectic, i.e. a cause that must be continuously present for the continued 
existence of the effect. Recall the champagne glass pyramid model of emanative 
causation. If liquid stops overflowing from one glass in the pyramid, all of the glasses 
downstream from it (i.e. as effects) cease to overflow as well. Averroes rejects this model 
because, as Kogan puts it, “the only conclusion to be drawn…is that the world belongs to 
the category of relation, not to the category of substance.”51 That is to say, none of the 
glasses in the pyramid have their own substantial identity or can stand apart from each 
other as they are only empty vessels for the activity of the fluid, which, in fact, does 
everything. 
 The God of al-Ghazali and the Islamic occasionalists similarly does everything, 
but in a way even more devastating to the possibility of substance and nature, as even the 
notion of vessels becomes meaningless. As Averroes perspicuously notes: 
If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a special name nor 
a definition, and all things would be one—indeed, not even one;52 for it 
might be asked whether this one has one special act or one special 
passivity or not, and if it had a special act, then there would indeed exist 
special acts proceeding from special natures, but if it had no single special 
act, then the one would not be one. But if the nature of oneness is denied, 
                                                
51 Kogan, 61 
52 As will be recalled from Chapter 2, Aristotle’s conception of substantial natures was developed and 
propounded specifically to rebut Eleatism. 
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the nature of being is denied, and the consequence of the denial of being is 
nothingness.53 
Beyond occluding the possibility of a necessary connection, the ontic dehiscence of 
causes from their effects fundamentally destroys the very possibility of Aristotelian 
substantial natures as it properly requires that there can be no intrinsic connection 
between the nature of the cause and the nature of any effect that might be presumed 
follow from it. The ontic essence of substance is predicated unconditionally on such a 
connection and thus its denial entails that, as Averroes had warned and Hume famously 
expounded: “any thing may be the cause or effect of any thing.”54 Such an upshot was a 
favorite reductio of Aristotelians, such as the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina, 
who argued: 
Since God is just as able to make a given thing cold in the presence of fire 
and to make it hot in the presence of water as vice versa, fire could just as 
easily be a cause of cooling and water of heating…Indeed, since God 
could create an angel or some other thing in the presence of a rock, a rock 
could be a cause of creation—which…is obviously as absurd as can be.55 
It was precisely this metaphysical absurdity that informed Leibniz’s deprecation of 
occasionalism as the physics of a “perpetual miracle.”56 If there is really no intrinsic 
connection between a thing and its activities, then the very notion of things (i.e. 
conditionally stable identities) is nonsensical. This specific problem, and the devastating 
                                                
53 Tahafut al-Tahafut, I. 520-1 
54 Treatise, 249-250. The looking glass nature of the dispute is evident in Hume’s pronouncement that this 
absolute diffusion of causes and effects “evidently gives the advantage to the materialists above their 
[Scholastic] antagonists.” (Ibid.) 
55 Concordia, 161; qtd. by Freddoso, 8 
56 Système nouveau, §13 
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threat it posed to occasionalism, will be examined again in relation to Malebranche in 
Chapter 5. 
 
3. Aquinas on the Powers of God and Nature 
The outstanding feature of Aquinas’ thought on the problem of divine omnipotence and 
the metaphysics of causation is his attempt, following Averroes, to stake out a classically 
Aristotelian position, superadded with concepts of Abrahamic theology, that presents a 
naturalistic intermediary between neo-Platonism and occasionalism. 
 
Background: The Origins of Aristotelian Scholasticism 
While Aquinas is often interpreted as a prototypical intellectualist-rationalist, he was 
actually part of a critical reaction against the importation of neo-Platonic philosophy into 
Christian theology that had been ongoing since the condemnation of Origen.57 This 
critical reaction was significantly energized in the late twelfth-century by the definitive 
condemnation of Eriugena,58 as well as the fortuitious recovery of the Aristotelian corpus 
from Byzantium and Averroes’ commentaries from al-Andalus. The Thomistic critique of 
neo-Platonism was very different from the anti-philosophical fideistic stance taken by 
Gottschalk, al-Ghazali, and Peter Damian; for it was concerned not with striking down 
the pretentions of philosophy in favor of faith, but rather substituting an old ossified 
                                                
57 Origen was condemned by Mennas, the Patriarch of Constantinople in 543 and again by the Fifth 
Ecumenical Council in 553. 
58 Eriugena was condemned by Honorious III in 1225. 
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philosophy with a newly discovered one. Moreover, while neo-Platonism had, since 
Plotinus,59 been a hybrid of philosophy and theology that was readily amalgable with 
Abrahamic religion, classical Aristotelianism often stood so askance from the dogmas of 
the Abrahamic faith that the duplex veritas doctrine of the Averroists seemed an 
inevitable result. While this doctrine—which held that there were two incompatible sets 
of “Truths,” those concerning philosophy, and those concerning theology—was 
thoroughly denounced in the course of the thirteenth century, including by Aquinas, it 
nonetheless succeeded in its primary task: forcing a foundational and Church approved 
break between philosophy and theology for the first time since late-antiquity.60 
 This point is worth reiterating as it cuts directly against a prototypical 
interpretation of Thomism as embodying the pinnacle of medieval metaphysics, the most 
systematic union of philosophy with Christian theology ever produced, and the ultimate 
product of the rationalization of the Christian faith that stood as the raison d’etre of 
medieval Scholasticism.61 Such an interpretation is not incorrect so much as it is 
anachronistic in that in understands Thomism and Aristotelian scholasticism in terms of 
the “school metaphysics” of the early-modern scholastics (e.g. Suaréz and Molina), 
whose philosophy was indeed a revival of Thomism, but in response to an exceptionally 
different intellectual climate. 
                                                
59 As noted in the previous chapter, when Plotinus’ Enneads was translated into Arabic in the ninth century 
for the son of the Abbasid Caliph, it was spuriously identified as a work of Aristotle’s entitled Theologia. 
60 This break was quite clearly anticipated by Abelard in his Sic et non, which is a compendium of seeming 
contradictions on the topic of theology taken from various Church Fathers. 
61 For a prominent example of this interpretation see Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages, 365-6 
  151 
In 1210 the bishops of Paris and Sens declared: “Neither the books of Aristotle on 
natural philosophy nor their commentaries are to be read at Paris in public or secret, and 
this we forbid under penalty of excommunication.”62 Five years later, the University of 
Paris followed suit, decreeing that faculty “shall not lecture on the books of Aristotle on 
metaphysics and natural philosophy or on summaries of them.”63 These were, at least 
initially, no idle threats, but, in the case of one ‘Master Amaury,’ involved not only 
excommunication, but posthumous exhumation and reburial in unconsecrated ground.64 
Yet, these efforts at censorship were a typical failure and in 1231 a more flocculent edict 
was promulgated, this time by Pope Gregory IX, which conceded: 
Since, as we have learned, the books on nature which were prohibited at 
Paris…are said to contain both useful and useless matter, lest the useful be 
vitiated by the useless, we command your discretion…so that, what are 
suspect being removed, the rest may be studied without delay and without 
offense.65 
This Papal license granted, and in spite of lingering resistance,66 by 1255 most of the 
Aristotelian corpus had joined Porphyry and Boethius as part of the canon of instruction 
at the University of Paris.67 The most immediate beneficiaries of this liberal attitude were 
the Latin Averroists; yet, faced with their heretical teachings and virtual takeover of the 
                                                
62 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 70. See “The Condemnation of 1210” & “Rules of the 
University of Paris, 1215,” in University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, trans. Lynn Thorndike (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 26-30. 
63 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 78 
64 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 70 
65 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 144 
66 Notably by Humber de Romans, general of the Dominican order, who denounced such studies as 
“Seeking to know the incomprehensible, which cannot be clearly understood either by philosophical 
reasons or from holy scripture.” (See Thorndike, §34, 73) 
67 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 277-79 
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University of Paris, mainstream theologians undertook the mastery of Aristotle as well in 
order to establish themselves in a position to defend Christian dogma by refuting the 
metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers.68 
Such was the project of William of Auvergne, the first Western philosopher of the 
Middle Ages to systematically study and attempt to reconcile the works of Aristotle with 
Church Doctrine, who wrote in the first half of the thirteenth century before the 
ascendency of the Averroists. Towards the end of his De anima, William considers the 
doctrine of apocatastasis69 and concedes that “from the sacred and divine scriptures it is 
not completely clear how long [damnation70] is permitted.” 71 After rather tepidly 
rejecting the doctrine, William informs the reader that: 
You ought, however, to know that in the statements of the prophets you 
will find some that seem to intelligent people to be opposed to 
this72…[Thus] it will be necessary to pay attention to the explanations and 
statements of the sacred teachers and to depart in no way from their faith, 
nor should you ever prefer my statements to theirs, for you see that my 
                                                
68 By the early 1270’s the Averroists were apparently winning this contest, leading the suspension of 
classes in early 1272 and the attempted enforcement of orthodoxy by the theological faculty, who declared: 
“if any master or bachelor of our faculty reads or disputes any difficult passages or any questions which 
seem to undermine the faith, he shall refute the arguments or text so far as they are against the faith or 
concede that they are absolutely false and erroneous.” (Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 499-500) 
See also Moody, “Empiricism and Metaphysics,” 295 
69 Alluded to in the previous chapter, apocatastatis was a doctrine in early Christianity that affirmed 
universal salvation, i.e that damnation was temporal rather than eternal and that all free creatures would 
eventually be reconciled with God’s Grace. After much debate, apocatastasis was condemned (along with 
its earliest proponent) as Anathema at the Synod of Constantinople in 543 and again in 553 at the Second 
Council of Constantinople. 
70 William is specifically referring here to a particular psychological torment of damnation by which “the 
souls that are or are going to be in hell see the glory of the blessed souls,” (i.e. in heaven) which 
presumably serves to amplify the duress of their less than copacetic condition. 
71 De anima, II 225; Teske 485 
72 This is a bit of an understatement. Major early Church Fathers who affirmed the apocatastatic doctrine 
include Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and possibly Ambrose of Milan, as well as less 
know figures associated with the School of Antioch such as Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of 
Mopsuestia. 
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aim and intention is directed only to this, namely, to defend the truth of 
those statements by the paths of proofs and to destroy what is opposed to 
the same.73 
This had, it will be remembered, been both the aim and tactic of al-Ghazali, who was not 
content to merely denounce the falsafa as heretics, but cunningly employed his 
knowledge of philosophy to pick apart their doctrines from the inside. Following his lead, 
the task of medieval philosophy after the recovery of Aristotle was, as Ernest Moody 
argues: 
to set up a clear-cut line of demarcation between the proper domains of 
theology and philosophy in respect of purposes, methods, and type of 
evidence admitted. The doctrines proper to theology could not be proved 
philosophically but were matter of faith. On the other hand, these 
doctrines could not be refuted by philosophy. It thus became necessary to 
show that the metaphysical doctrines of the Greek and Arab philosophers, 
which conflicted with the teachings of Christian theology, were not 
philosophically demonstrable or logically valid.74 
This is a strikingly apposite description of Aquinas’ project in the Summa Theologiae, the 
dialectical stratagem of which consists in Aquinas presenting a particular question 
relevant to Christian theology, providing a synopsis of views from philosophers ancient 
or contemporary which conflict with Church teaching on the matter, and then providing 
his own responses, typically employing tools provided by Aristotle, Augustine, and the 
Church Fathers to reconcile this disagreement in favor of established Catholic doctrine. 
Such a project was intrinsically critical and, inspired by and conjoined with 
Aristotelian epistemology, served to revive philosophical empiricism for the first time 
since the decline of Epicureanism in late-antiquity. This tendency is evident (albeit 
                                                
73 De anima, II 225 
74 Moody, “Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy,” 296 
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nascent) in Aquinas’ agreement with Aristotle that all knowledge arises from the 
senses.75 This epistemological commitment was developed by Aquinas into several 
strikingly empiricist arguments, such as his claim, contra Platonism, that “however much 
our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at 
anything akin to immaterial substance.”76 This empiricist feature of Aquinas’ thought is 
often overlooked for several reasons: the subtlety (bordering on incoherence) of his own 
middle position; the fact that he himself became implicated in the nominalist reaction 
against theological metaphysics (which rejected any such middle position), as well as 
Aquinas’ deep influence on early-modern and neo-Scholasticism. While Aquinas had 
found Aristotelian epistemology useful in justifying theology, after the condemnations of 
Aristotelianism in 1270 and 1277, later philosophers took a harder stance and instead 
adopted a program of skeptical logical analysis of the claims of philosophy as the surest 
defense of the Christian faith—essentially inventing modern epistemology in the process. 
Thus the revival of Thomistic scholasticism in the sixteenth-century marked something of 
a reversal, for it was intended to rebut not the excesses of rationalist neo-Platonism and 
Averroism, but the excesses of anti-metaphysical nominalism and occasionalism. It was, 
as Moody argues, “concerned to show not that philosophy as such has no competence in 
the sphere occupied by theology, but that it does.”77 Later scholastic traditions stemmed 
from a very different intellectual background in which philosophy (the handmaiden) was 
no longer seen as a threat to theology (the queen of the sciences), but rather had 
                                                
75 see Summa Theologiae, 1a. 84, 7 
76 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 88, 2. This argument Aquinas extends to the nature of the soul, which Aquinas’ 
insists we can understand “through its own act of understanding,” but rejects, like al-Ghazali, Malebranche 
and Hume, that such acts grant insight into the nature of an immaterial soul. (Ibid.) 
77 Moody, “Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy,” 302-3 
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proclaimed itself as the new queen and threatened to leave theology behind with little 
more than its sacred texts and fideism. Thus early-modern scholasticism of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries was a reaction to the Protestant rejection of systematic and 
metaphysical theology in the same way the neo-Scholasticism of the nineteenth-century 
was a reaction to positivistic natural science. 
 
Aquinas’ on Causation and Divine Concurrence 
Aquinas’ use of the aforementioned dialectical strategy in the Summa Theologiae shows 
him, prima facie, to be a surprising and erudite defender of the occasionalist position. 
Aquinas consistently defends God’s capacity for immediate activity and production of 
effects in the nature without the necessity of intermediaries and, in the case of miracles, 
in opposition to the normal causal order. Given the evident scriptural basis for such 
divine powers, it might seem obvious that a theologian, particularly of Aquinas’ stature, 
would endeavor to buttress them on philosophical grounds. However, Aquinas’ position 
in this regard marks a turn, rebuke, and, in large part, an abandonment of the 
autochthonous neo-Platonic tradition endemic to the West from Boethius to Eriugena to 
Abelard. While the Ash’arite theologians delivered a similar rebuke to the Eastern neo-
Platonist school of al-Farabi and Avicenna, Aquinas was deeply indebted to “the 
Commentator” (sc. Averroes) and “Rabbi Moses” (sc. Maimonides), and thus distanced 
himself from the occasionalism and radical voluntarism of the Ash’arite school as well. 
Moreover, while he and Aristotle are inextricably bound together in the history of 
philosophy, Aquinas was a devout Christian who held concepts of Abrahamic theology 
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much more dearly than Averroes78 and thus would not rest content with a propaedeutic 
‘return to Aristotle’ contra Platonism or occasionalism. Rather, Aquinas was driven to 
pronounced theological and philosophical innovations to reconcile two fundamentally 
incompatible worlds: the autonomous, self-governing, and irrevocably ordered Nature of 
Aristotelian metaphysics, and the created, utterly dependent, and violable Nature of the 
Holy Scriptures. 
 Against the strictures of an autonomous Aristotelian natural order, Aquinas 
insisted that “God has the power to move matter towards form without an 
intermediary.”79 He defended this possibility from scriptural authority80 and regarded it as 
intrinsic to the nature of God as first cause: “having created matter, God’s power extends 
over it,”81 the upshot being that “as he appoints other causes for determinate effects, 
[God] has also the power to bring about these effects on his own.”82 What is notable here 
is Aquinas’ acceptance of what was the ultimate shibboleth of occasionalism and what 
was to become the key theological principle of nominalism: the ability of God to produce 
immediately any effect that could otherwise be brought about by secondary causes.83 
                                                
78 Averroes and his Latin followers (e.g. Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia) were implicated in several 
heresies (most famously their acceptance of the eternality of the world and monopsychism, as well as their 
rejection of individual salvation and corporeal ressurection), all of which were stridently denounced by 
Aquinas and officially condemned in 1270 and 1277. 
79 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1 
80 E.g. Genesis 2:7, Genesis 1:9, Isaiah 26:12. 
81 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1 
82 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1 
83 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1. The Avicennian position on God’s causal activity, which was never 
completely abrogated in the scholastic tradition, holds that God, as a simple being, produces but one simple 
effect; and through this effect all other causes, acting autonomously or under the divine conservation, 
produce their natural effects. Under this scheme it its quite impossible for God to intervene and produce 
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Aquinas pursues this principle into an examination of the mutability of the natural 
order and poses the question: “whether God has the power to do anything outside the 
order inherent in creation.”84 That is to say, ‘can God produce immediately any effect that 
could not otherwise be brought about by secondary causes?’ Rejecting neo-Platonic 
justifications for a negative answer (e.g. the insistence, integral to emanationist 
metaphysics, that a change in the natural order entails an impossible change in the divine 
essence itself), Aquinas seizes on the seemingly contradictory answers given by 
Augustine,85 and formulates his own response along these lines: 
[I]f we look to the world’s order as it depends on the first cause, God 
cannot act against it, because then he would be doing something contrary 
to his foreknowledge, his will or his goodness. But if we take the order in 
things as it depends on any of the secondary causes, then God can act 
apart from it; he is not subject to that order but rather it is subject to him, 
as issuing from him not out of a necessity of nature, but by a decision of 
his will.86 
This position, while presented by Aquinas as essentially Augustine’s, nonetheless 
advances well beyond him by basing itself on the seminal medieval distinction between 
God’s freedom potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. 
This distinction was to a large extent an attempt to theologically conceptualize the 
difference between ‘logical’ and ‘material’ necessity required by Peripatetic metaphysics. 
The distinction itself rests on a distinction between two types of necessity: 
                                                                                                                                            
diverse effects immediately, much less upset or gainsay the natural order and produce effects in declination 
from its customary inclination. (See Maurer, 247) 
84 Op. cit, 1a. 105, 6 
85 See Contra Faustum Manichaeum 26.3 
86 Loc. cit.,  
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1) Absolute necessity, or those truths which are necessary in any created world. 
2) Hypothetical necessity, or those truths which, having been willed into fact, 
“cannot be otherwise.”87 
These two levels of necessity relate diagonally to two levels of divine power: potentia 
Dei absoluta and potentia Dei ordinata.88 I say ‘diagonally’ because, given Aquinas’ 
acceptance that God cannot flaunt the law of non-contradiction, God’s potentia absoluta 
does not extend to absolute necessity, viz. truths which, as binding in all possible worlds, 
are part of God’s uncreated intellect and thus incapable of being changed or negated. 
Rather, God’s potentia absoluta represents His antemundane capacity to determine 
hypothetical necessity by creating the world in fact, thus impelling it with its own internal 
necessity relative to the determinations of His will. After the moment of Creation the 
freedom of God’s will becomes constrained by the hypothetical necessity of the Creation 
into potentia Dei ordinata: power within the ordained limits of the Creation. As Aquinas 
puts this distinction in the Summa theologiae: “Granted that God wills whatever he does 
from eternity the inference is not that he has to, except on a supposition that he does.”89 
Or perhaps more directly from the Summa contra gentiles: “God cannot do the contrary 
of what He has decreed to do.”90 That is to say, God’s will “in the divided sense” is 
unconstrained in contemplation of Creation (except by the inherencies of his essence), 
but once he wills to create, his own immutability (the necessity of his understanding) 
                                                
87 Summa theologiae, 1a. 19, 3 
88 See W. J. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence,” in Covenant and Causality in Medieval 
Thought (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 60-76 
89 Summa theologiae, 1a. 19, 3, emphasis added 
90 Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.25 
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constrains his will “in the composite sense,” preventing him from changing the 
hypothetical necessity of the world he has created, and thus his power can operate only 
within the ordained limits therein. 
On the basis of this distinction in the divine capacity, Aquinas concludes: 
“Because…order is established in nature by God, should he effect anything not in 
keeping with this order, it would not be contrary to nature.”91 While this argument seems 
uninspiringly definitional, it is really a structural restatement of the very notion of God’s 
potentia ordinata: should God intervene and produce effects in nature contrary to its 
usual order, he does so on the basis his establishment of the potentiality of such deviation 
from within his design of nature in the Creation.92 One remarkable feature of Aquinas’ 
interpretation is its striking anticipation93 of Leibniz’s later response to the same 
difficulties, viz. that all deviations from the established order are never spontaneous but 
always done for a reason (i.e. are derived from God’s intellect rather than mere will) and 
thus part of God’s providential plan and design of the universe ab origine.94 As Aquinas 
argues, “God so fixed the definite order in nature [de potentia absoluta] that he still 
reserved to himself what at times he was to do differently [de potentia ordinata] for good 
                                                
91 Loc. cit. 
92 As Leibniz says, faithful to Augustine: “since nothing can happen which is not in the order [sc. of God’s 
plan], one can say that miracles are as much within the order as are natural operations, operations which are 
called natural because they are in conformity with certain subordinate maxims that we call the nature of 
things.” (Discourse on Metaphysics, §7) 
93 ‘Anticipation’ is perhaps an anachronistic term as it seems to me quite probable that Leibniz was directly 
influenced by Aquinas on this matter. He was, after all, one of the moderns most willing to praise and 
embrace Scholastic ideas. (See DM, §11) 
94 As Aquinas says: “God does not change his will when he does anything contrary to natural causes: 
because from eternity he foresaw and decreed that he would do what he does in time. Wherefore he so 
ordered the course of nature, that by his eternal decree he preordained whatsoever he would at some time 
do independently of that course.” (De potentia, q.6 a.1) 
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reason. He is, then, not changed when he acts apart from that order.”95 This connection is 
more evident in Aquinas’ treatment of miracles, which is virtually identical to Leibniz’s. 
Aquinas argues that: 
A miracle is described as difficult not because of the worth of the matter 
about which it occurs, but because it surpasses the capabilities of nature. 
It is termed unusual, not because it may not occur repeatedly, but because 
it is outside the normal pattern. Something is said to surpass the capacities 
of nature not only on the basis of the kind of thing done, but also of the 
manner and order of its doing.96 
That is to say, “something is termed a miracle by reference to the capability of nature that 
it surpasses;”97 i.e. when a creature produces effects that go beyond the customary causal 
powers that substantially define it.98 The metaphysics by which creatures can “surpass” 
their own natures is not fully explicated in the Summa Theologiae, but rather in De 
potentia Dei, which will be examined shortly. 
Before turning to Aquinas’ views on occasionalism, I would like to touch on one 
intriguing question considered by him: “Can there be anything that is not created by 
God?” Aquinas provides an extraordinary argument for the affirmative response: 
“Since the cause is more powerful than its effect, that which is possible to 
our intellect which takes its knowledge from things would seem yet more 
possible to nature. Now our intellect can understand a thing apart from 
understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of 
a thing’s nature, so that the thing can be understood without it. Much more 
therefore can there be a real thing that is not from God.”99 
                                                
95 Loc. cit. This position is designed to provide a response to the neo-Platonic objection that God’s 
immutability precludes any change in the order he has created. 
96 Op. cit., 1a. 105, 7 
97 Ibid., 1a. 105, 7 
98 See Système nouveau, §13 
99 De potentia, q.3, a.5 
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Aquinas, of course, ultimately rejects this claim, but that is not relevant so much as the 
logic of the claim itself. Where Aquinas’ encountered this argument is unclear but a few 
points can be made about it. First, the premise is essentially a version of the ‘establish’d 
maxim’ (a.k.a. the ‘maxim of admissibility’) which Aquinas’ likely encountered via 
“Rabbi Moses.”100 Second, the main thrust of the argument clearly appeals to what 
became the Humean ‘difference principle,’101 whereby anything the fancy can clearly and 
distinctly conceive apart, is capable of independent existence. Indeed, not only does the 
argument appeal to Hume’s principle, but from it derives the very same conclusion: the 
logical possibility of a causeless existence.102 Third, Aquinas responds to this argument in 
the only way possible. He denies the distinctness of individuals:  
[I]f in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we 
must conclude that this something was the effect of some one 
cause…Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things, which 
are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that 
they must come into being not by themselves, but by the action of some 
cause. 
While this response, pace al-Ghazali, clearly regards existence as a predicate, the more 
obvious danger lies in the ready response: ‘Does this principle apply to God as well?’ 
Aquinas does not seem to have been aware of this problem when writing De potentia Dei, 
but by the Summa Theologiae he does attempt (albeit unconvincingly) to provide an 
                                                
100 Guide, 1.73, 207 
101 I say “Humean” because Hume’s ‘difference principle’ is, while formally identical to al-Ghazali’s, 
nonetheless distinct in terms of emphasis. That is, al-Ghazali emphasizes the lack of any entailment or 
necessary connection between two different things while Hume emphasizes the capacity for independent 
existence between different things. (See Treatise, 233) 
102 Treatise, 79-80 
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answer.103 Fourth, while he does not actually conflate the two, Aquinas presents this 
argument in the Summa Theologiae seriatim with its logical opposite: 
[A] thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore 
whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But 
no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily 
exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary 
things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.104 
This argument (which again Aquinas obviously rejects) predicates itself on the necessity 
rather than the contingency of matters of fact (i.e. “in existence) as its minor premise. 
This is particularly clear in Aquinas’ response, where he argues that: “This objection has 
led some to say that what is necessary has no cause.”105 While he cites Aristotle, the 
claim, it will be remembered, was also made much more forcefully by al-Ghazali against 
the supposition of a necessary connection between cause and effect. Indeed, al-Ghazali 
essentially presents the above argument as a reductio: Any necessary existence would be 
causeless and thus not created by God; yet, this is absurd and heretical and therefore there 
must not be anything (besides God Himself) who’s existence is necessary.106 While 
Aquinas likewise denounces the supposition of non-created existences, he rejects al-
Ghazali’ s (and Aristotle’s) identification of necessity with causelessness, claiming: “this 
is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the 
                                                
103 “Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a 
consequence, on what belongs to its essence: because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, 
it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be 
without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as 
such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.” (1a. 44, 1) Besides the rather odd and patently 
false analogy to laughing as metaphysically essential to “man,” Aquinas’ argument is clearly circular in 
that it is based on a distinction between “being by participation” and “being as such,” which define the very 
categories under consideration (i.e. between creatures and Creator). 
104 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 44, 1 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Tahafut, 135 
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causes of necessary conclusions…[and] the reason why an efficient cause is required is 
not merely because the effect is not necessary [i.e. necessary of existence se ipsum], but 
because the effect might not be if the cause were not.”107 
 Even though Aquinas is conflating two distinct modalities here (i.e. ‘nothing is 
necessary unless its opposite entails a contradiction,’ with ‘nothing is required (i.e. 
logically necessitated) by what “might” be the case otherwise’), it must be admitted that 
his general conclusion is correct. In defining necessity to imply the lack of a cause of 
existence, al-Ghazali commits himself by contraposition to the thesis that any causeless 
existence must be necessary.108 In doing so, al-Ghazali corrupts his own modal 
conception of possibility by essentially re-grafting it onto Aristotle’s ontological 
conception. That is to say, al-Ghazali defines existence (i.e. finite contingent existence) 
as requiring (i.e.positing) a cause, yet this is counter to his own reasoning concerning 
necessary connection and existential dependence, which fundamentally maintained that 
the existence of any one thing posits no secundum quid—such as a cause of its 
existence.109 It wasn’t until Hume that this upshot of al-Ghazali’s reasoning would be 
recognized and the old Epicurean ‘heresy’ of causeless effects or existences would be 
vindicated—logically anyway—after two millennia of ceaseless opprobrium. 
 
                                                
107 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 44, 1 
108 Apart from how it may seem prima facie, this is attribution is not an instance of affirming the 
consequent, for al-Ghazali is quite clear that ‘necessary’ is not merely a class of ‘causeless,’ but rather that 
the two are identical. Thus the contraposition is one of identity and a tautology. 
109 It might be responded that anything lacking a cause is causa sui, but then this begs the question of the 
requirement of a cause. 
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Aquinas’ Critique of Occasionalism 
Before examining Aquinas’ arguments against occasionalism, it is worth considering the 
extent to which Aquinas was aware of Islamic occasionalism outside of (critical) 
summaries provided by Maimonides. No definitive answer to this question has been 
settled, but textual evidence suggests that he had almost no awareness at all. The first 
definitive date at which sections of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut al-Falasifah appeared in the 
West was in 1328, in Kalonymus ben Kalonymus’ translation (from the Arabic) of 
Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut, which contains extensive block quotations from al-
Ghazali’s Tahafut along with Averroes’ refutations. It seems extremely unlikely that 
Aquinas had access to an earlier and currently unknown translation of this work. Not only 
does he appear to be ignorant of the stature of “Algazel” as the main philosophical 
defender of the views of the “Moselm theologians,” but he even attributes emanationist 
and necessitarian views to him, seemingly conflating his views with Avicenna’s.110 This 
was apparently a common conflation in the thirteenth century. Giles of Rome avers in his 
Errores philosophorum (c. 1270) that “Algazel, agreeing with Avicenna for the most part 
and being his summarizer,”111 upheld doctrines such as the eternality of the heavens and 
that “all things come into existence of necessity and that nothing other than what is 
actually produced can be produced by God in this sublunary world, because God, 
according to him, acts only in conformity with the predispositions of matter.”112 The 
reason for this confusion seems to be that the only work of al-Ghazali’s available to the 
                                                
110 E.g. De potentia, q.3, a.4 
111 Errores Philosophorum, VIII.1 
112 Ibid., VIII.7 
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West at this time was the 1150 Latin translation of his Maqasid al-Falasifa [Intentions of 
the Philosophers] which was written early in his life and, as Giles describes and the title 
implies, is essentially a summary of their views. 
However, Harry Wolfson has argued that knowledge of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut was 
“somehow available to Latin Schoolmen before the Latin translation of Averroes” on the 
basis of citation of Maimonides that Albertus Magnus (Aquinas’ teacher) makes in his 
Physicorum.113 In the cited passage Maimonides provides a summary (bordering on 
quotation) of an argument made by al-Ghazali in the Tahafut against the eternality of the 
world, yet credits it anonymously to “the intelligent latest Mutakallimun.”114 However, 
when Albertus introduces this argument from Maimonides, he explicitly credits it to 
“Algazelus,” leading Wolfson to conclude that he “could not have known that the 
anonymous Mutakallim referred to by Maimonides was Ghazali unless he had a 
knowledge of the Tahafut al-Falsifah.”115 If Wolfson is correct and Albertus had 
knowledge of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut, it must have been quite exiguous and limited to a few 
such arguments; otherwise he surely would have saved his great student from making 
such errors concerning al-Ghazali’s views. The point (as will be evident in Aquinas’ 
critique of occasionalist doctrines) is that he almost certainly lacked a clear and adequate 
comprehension of the arguments behind them—arguments that his nominalist successors 
almost certainly did possess. Thus, Aquinas was, by virtue of the texts available to him at 
                                                
113 Wolfson, “Nicholas of Autrecourt and Ghazali’s Argument Against Causality,” 234 
114 Ibid. Nowhere in the Guide does Maimonides ever specifically mention or reference al-Ghazali by 
name. 
115 Ibid., 235. It’s worth noting that the extent to which Maimonides was familiar with al-Ghazali’s Tahafut 
al-Falasifa is uncertain as well, though Schlomo Pines argues in his translator’s introduction to the Guide 
that Maimonides was familiar with the text. (cxxvii) 
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this time, stuck in the difficult position—well appreciated by modern scholars of ancient 
philosophy—of attempting to critique a philosophical position while knowing only its 
bare outline and conclusion, but almost none of the arguments or reasoning behind it. 
Even though he accepted, against “the Philosopher” and his “Commentator,” that 
God can produce effects immediately without intermediaries, Aquinas adamantly rejects 
that “God is active in every agent cause.”116 While in the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Summa Theologiae, and De potentia Dei, he is primarily concerned with rebutting the 
materialist or Aristotelian position that regards nature and the causal order as autonomous 
and divested of God’s continual involvement,117 Aquinas is careful to distance himself 
from the occasionalist position, as well. In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas unleashes 
a barrage of objections against “the opinion of those118 who withdraw from natural things 
their proper actions,”119 almost all of which can only be described as glancing blows and 
often beg the question by assuming the very Aristotelian metaphysic and doctrine of 
                                                
116 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 5 
117 As Aquinas summarizes this view: “Nature neither fails in necessary things nor abounds in the 
superfluous. Now the action of nature requires nothing more than an active force in the agent, and passivity 
in the recipient. Therefore there is no need for the divine power to operate in things.” (De potentia, q.3 a.7) 
The fact that Aquinas makes this his primary target of criticism with occasionalism coming as an 
afterthought stands as something of a marker in the history of ideas. There was, of course, considerable 
tradition behind this type of Christain apologia, from the sermons of the Church Fathers to Origen’s 
synthesis to Philoponus’ battles with Damascius and Simplicius during the final pagan counteroffensive in 
the sixth-century. Yet, Aquinas lived not in late-antiquity but the High Middle Ages, where paganism was a 
chthonic relic of the Baltic and most Christians had never met a heathen in their lives. Moreover, 
nominalism, which was profoundly indebted to Islamic occasionalism, was not to become a serious 
philosophical movement until after the condemnations of 1277, three years after Aquinas’ death. Therefore, 
it seems that Aquinas fixation on rebutting heretical Aristotelian views was in response to Averroes and 
particularly the Latin Averroists, who reached their acme during the thirteenth-century at the University of 
Paris, and indeed were the major impetus behind the 1277 condemnations there. 
118 Here Aquinas is referring to the Islamic theologians, as is made clear in De potentia Dei. (3.7) 
Occasionalist ideas did not take hold in the Latin West until the fourteenth-century, though Durandus of 
Saint-Pourçain is a possible exception. (See Iribarren, 275) 
119 Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.69 
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causal explanation that occasionalism calls into question. Aquinas’ strongest objections 
to occasionalism are those that impugn it for undermining the perfection of the creator. 
As with his positions on the metaphysics of miracles and divine intervention, Aquinas’ 
objections in this regard are strikingly Leibnizian in tenor and encompass three related 
arguments: 
1) Occasionalism contradicts the divine wisdom because, “if creatures did nothing at 
all towards the productions of effects, and God alone wrought everything 
immediately, other things would be employed by him in vain for the production of 
effects.”120 
2) A purely passive, inert, marionette world of occasionalism is inferior to an active 
world of substantial natures: “if no creature exercises an action for the production 
of an effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is 
due to the abundance of its perfection, that a thing is able to communicate to 
another the perfection that it has.”121 
3) Similarly, the elimination of efficient causality in re undermines and essentially 
negates “the order of the universe: for the whole is always better than the parts, 
and is their end. Now if we subtract action from things, the order among things is 
                                                
120 Loc. cit. It is worth noting that this objection assumes a real intrinsic connection between a thing and its 
effect, such that God could employ it “in vain,” yet such a connection is precisely what the occasionalist 
denies. 
121 Loc. cit. This argument likewise assumes Aristotelian principles of causal interaction that the 
occasionalist would reject. 
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withdrawn: because, things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity 
of order.”122 
In addition to the above, Aquinas’ includes an additional argument that is unique among 
criticisms of occasionalism: 
4) Given that God is simple and immutable, he is not changed in the production of 
effects. Therefore, in accordance with the principle that a diversity of effects 
requires a diversity of causes, there could be no diversity of effects were all 
causality strictly reduced to God. Aquinas regards the latter as “evidently false to 
the senses.”123 
Aquinas’ point here seems to be: If everything is produced by a single cause, how can 
there be such diversity in the natural order? This argument, as with the foregoing, 
assumes a natural order fundamentally defined by causal relationships, a conceit 
recognized by al-Ghazali, who appears to have been aware of the issue, noting that, 
according to the falsafa: “The capacity to receive the forms is derived from these causes 
which are observed, and which exist here. Emanation from the Principles themselves 
takes place by way of necessity and nature…So the principle is one; but its effects are 
diverse, because of different capacities in the receptive subjects.”124 Al-Ghazali’s 
response is to deny the assumption of the falsafa that “God does not act by will.”125 Even 
                                                
122 Loc. cit. Note that this argument assumes that unity among a multiplicity of things requires real ontic-
substantial interaction between them as part of a larger causal scheme. Contrast this with the modern notion 
of unity in nature as provided by essentially epistemic principles of law. 
123 Loc. cit. See Chapter 5 for Descartes’ use of this argument. 
124 Tahafut, 187-8 
125 Tahafut, 188 
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a completely simple being, if possessed of a will, can produce a diversity of effects 
insofar as al-Ghazali regards will as fundamentally arbitrary and not intrinsically 
connected to intellect and thus requiring a reason.126 Aquinas’ above argument is thus 
logically inconsistent insofar as he believes, pace neo-Platonic emanationism, that God 
(de potentia absoluta) could have willed to create any word that is logically possible.127 
The plain upshot of this view is that God, even though an absolutely simple Being (non 
variatur), could nonetheless, by his omnipotent will, produce an infinitely diverse 
number of potential creations/creatures. Even if there is indeed a single simple God who 
created the world, this principle cannot hold metaphysically in the way Aquinas uses it, 
for as he himself concedes, as he must: “every operation of a thing is reducible to [God] 
as its cause.”128 That said, even Hume, in his arguments in the Treatise against chance, 
makes use of Aquinas’ principle in its contrapositive, claiming that “a contrariety of 
effects always betrays a contrariety of causes.”129 It should be noted that Hume’s appeal 
to this principle likewise comes in an argument (alone in the entire Treatise) that bases 
itself on the supposition of real active causes governing the operations of nature.130  
 The above principle (sc. “every operation of a thing is reducible to [God] as its 
cause”), which is fundamentally an expression of Aquinas’ concurrentism, was the 
metaphysical grounds for his intermediary position between Averroes and al-Ghazali, but 
also, as intimated, stood at considerable tension with his general acceptance of 
                                                
126 Tahafut, 1.1 27 
127 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 25, 3 
128 Op. cit., 3.67; Cf. Summa Theologiae, Q. 44 
129 Treatie, 132 
130 Treatise, 132 
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Aristotelian metaphysics. This tension is evident in his examination of the doctrine of 
occasionalism in the Summa Theologiae, where he notes: “There are some who have 
taken God’s working in everything that acts to mean that no created power effects 
anything in the world, but that God alone does everything without intermediaries. For 
example, it would not be the fire giving heat, but God in the fire, and similarly in all other 
instances.”131 Aquinas rejects this view for two reasons therein: 
1) Such vertically immediate causation “would deprive creation of its pattern of 
cause and effect, which in turn would imply lack of power in the creator, since an 
agent’s power is the source of its giving an effect a causative capability.”132 
2) Similarly, it would abnegate the natural order, for “if the active powers that are 
observed in creatures accomplished nothing…Indeed if all creatures are utterly 
devoid of any activity of their own, then they themselves would seem to have a 
pointless existence, since everything exists for the sake of its operation.”133 
Now the second argument is incisive and essentially confirms Averroes’ argument 
against al-Ghazali which, as noted, was to become the central problem leading to the 
downfall of occasionalism in the early-modern period. The same cannot be said for the 
first argument, which is purely definitional insofar as it defines power as the ability to 
create further causes. This argument/definition, though unpersuasive on its own, does, 
however, raise an interesting conceptual question against occasionalism, viz. ‘Isn’t a God 
who can create creatures who have powers of their own superior to a God who cannot?’ 
                                                
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. This is basically an elaboration of objection one from the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
133 Ibid. 
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The problem with this argument is that if the conclusion is ‘yes,’ as Aquinas insists, then 
he must also be able to conclude ‘no’ in the case of God creating creatures independent of 
himself.134 That is to say, Aquinas must be able to provide tenable reason to refrain from 
going over to either full occasionalism or the Aristotelian metaphysic where God is only 
the final cause. 
This problem is emblematic of the middle ground Aquinas was attempting to 
navigate between Aristotelianiam and occasionalism, or between philosophy and 
theology in general. He endeavored to defend a concurrentist position that requires both 
that God be present in and concur with every agent cause, such that nature is not 
independent of him, and that God’s presence in and concurrence with the agent cause 
does not stand in place of its own activity, thereby depriving it of its being. The thinness 
of the Aquinas’ tightrope is evident in his deft deflection of an Aristotelian argument 
against his own concurrentism—sc. “if [God] is active in everything that acts, his action 
suffices. Accordingly it would be useless for any created cause to act at all”135—into an 
argument against occasionalism (sc. number two above). But how does Aquinas’ avoid 
this error as well? That is to say, how does God “act” in secondary causes while not 
replacing them? This question was never satisfactorly answered in Aquinas’ own writing 
and would become an issue of great concern among the early-modern scholastics; one 
which, I would claim, was never properly resolved.136 Moreover, the logic of Aquinas’ 
                                                
134 I.e. ‘Isn’t a God who can create fully independent creatures that he does not need to preserve in esse 
superior to a God that cannot?’ Aquinas’ concurrentist insistence that God is the continual efficient (as well 
as final) cause of all creature, as well as more basic theological concerns, requires him to deny this 
conservationist claim. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See Chapter 5 for my own argument against concurrentism. 
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premise in objection number one (sc. that the power of a creator is manifest in the power 
of his creatures) would seem to force the opposite conclusion, viz. the Leibnizian 
presumption that a God who has to constantly intervene and “preserve” his creation is 
inferior to a God who can establish a clockwork universe from which he can effectively 
step away. Indeed, the ultimate logical conclusion would seem to entail that the greatest 
God is one who can create other gods.137 
 
Aquinas on the Power of God  
Aquinas’ only definitive answer to the foregoing dilemma is found in his treatise 
Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, a middle work composed between the two 
Summae, which contains his most in-depth and sustained examination of the nature and 
limits of the divine power and the metaphysics of causation. In this treatise Aquinas 
considers the questions: “Are those things possible to God which are impossible to 
nature?” and “Can God do anything in creatures that is beyond nature, against nature, or 
contrary to the course of nature?”138 These questions are rather uncomfortable for 
Aquinas because the logic of Aristotelian causal metaphysics (as evident in the previous 
section on Averroes) would seem to require a negative answer, viz. that “things that are 
contrary to the course of nature are impossible in nature, for instance that a blind man be 
                                                
137 Aquinas (predictably) rejects this, arguing that as “being and non-being are infinitely apart…an infinite 
power is required to create: so that the creative power cannot be communicated to a creature.” (De potentia 
Dei, q.3, a. 4) This avoids the question of why an infinitely powerful God could not communicate infinite 
power to a creature. Given that, in the Abrahamic tradition, God did in fact render being out of non-being, 
the possibility is not self-evidently absurd as Aquinas seems to believe. Regardless, among the articles 
condemned by Bishop Tempier in 1277 was the proposition: “the first cause would be able to produce an 
effect equal to itself if it did not limit its power.” (§26) 
138 De potentia, q.6, a.1 
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made to see, or a dead man to live.”139 Aquinas is aware that this is clearly contradicted 
in scripture, citing Matt 11:5,140 and he accepts that sometimes “God does something 
contrary to the order of nature.”141 
As is typical when he is pitted against ‘the Philosopher,’ Aquinas’ strategy for 
resolving this contradiction is intriguing and innovative. He first examines three positions 
that deny the possibility of God producing an event contrary to the course of nature: an 
Anaxagorean position in which the universe exists uncreated and operates beyond the 
influence of the gods, a neo-Platonic position in which every event is a necessary 
emanation from the divine essence, and an Averroist position of autonomous natural 
necessity. Aquinas proceeds to reject each of these conceptions of Nature and, of the 
three, his criticism of the latter is the most interesting as it is the position closest to his 
own. Recall that, for Averroes, if a cause is not followed by its necessary effect (i.e. the 
effect which it is sufficient to produce), it must have either met with an impediment that 
blocked its efficacy, or is simply not the cause we took it for. The problem with this 
response is that it inherently either allegorizes or makes unsupported assumptions 
concerning Scriptural testimony of miracles central to the Faith. Aquinas rejects such 
interpretations, insisting: “Although God produces an effect without the action of its 
natural cause, he does not destroy the relation between cause and effect. Thus the fiery 
                                                
139 De Potentia Dei, q.6, a.1 
140 “The blind see, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have 
good news proclaimed to them.” 
141 De Potentia Dei, q.6, a.1 
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furnace retained its relation to burning, although it burned not the three children in the 
furnace.”142 
Aquinas’ response to these questions hinges on “The (ordinary) gloss on Romans 
xi, 24143 [which] says that since God is the author of nature he cannot do what is contrary 
to nature. Now things that nature cannot do are contrary to nature. Therefore God cannot 
do them.”144 This gloss comes from Augustine in his Contra Faustum Manichaeum.145 
Aquinas’ responds by (correctly) noting that such a conclusion is contrary to Augustine’s 
intention: “Augustine’s words quoted in the gloss mean, not that God is unable to do 
otherwise than nature does, since his works are often contrary to the wonted course of 
nature; but that whatever he does in things is not contrary to nature, but is nature in them, 
forasmuch as he is the author and controller of nature.”146 Thus, in cases where events 
proceed contrary to the usual course of nature, this contravention does not imply a break 
with nature itself, but rather that another cause has produced the effect contrary to said 
typical course. Effects produced by this alternate cause (sc. the divine will) are not 
contrary to the operations of nature itself since “God can work in creatures independently 
of created causes…and by working independently of created causes he can produce the 
same effects in the same order as he produces them by their means: or even other effects 
in a different order: so he is able to do something contrary to the common and customary 
                                                
142 De Potentia Dei, q.6, a.1 
143 “For if you were cut off from what is by nature a wild olive tree, and grafted, contrary to nature, into a 
cultivated olive tree, how much more will these natural branches be grafted back into their own olive tree?” 
144 De potentia, q.1, a.3. This gloss also appears in the first objection and response to q.6, a.1 
145 26.3 
146 De Potentia Dei, q.1, a.3 
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course of nature.”147 Therefore, “in all creatures, what God does in them is quasi-natural 
to them.”148  
This position requires that a distinction be made in things between “a natural 
potentiality in respect of their proper operations and movements, and another, which we 
call obediential, in respect of what is done in them by God.”149 While Aquinas fudges the 
distinction with poor word choice, the point is that both potentialities are “natural” 
insofar as they relate to a specific inbuilt receptivity of the agent to act in a specific 
manner provided specific causal conditions. This was precisely the Stoic-cum-
Neoplatonic solution advanced by Augustine, who argued that “causal reasons have a 
double potentiality” such that: 
[They] exercise their causality in either one way or the other: by providing 
for the ordinary development of new creatures in appropriate periods of 
time, or by providing for the rare occurrence of a miraculous production of 
a creature, in accordance with what God wills as proper for the 
occasion.150 
The problem with Aquinas’ (and Augustine’s) solution here is that, though it attempts to 
preserve the integrity of substantial natures required by Aristotelian metaphysics and 
causal explanation when reconciled with Abrahamic requirement of divine intervention 
and the miraculous, it fails insofar its innovation (sc. “obediential potentiality”) is a 
vitiating distinction that abases that which it is proposed to safeguard. That is to say, for 
Aquinas, the regular course of nature is determined by the natural potentialities of causal 
                                                
147 De Potentia Dei, q.6, a.1 
148 De Potentia Dei, q.1, a.3 
149 De Potentia Dei, q.1, a.3 
150 De genesi ad litteram, VI.14 
  176 
agents therein, but exceptions to this regular course are also determined by obediential 
potentialities within said agents that allow their usual tendencies to be superceded and 
directed to producing an unusual effect. However, Aristotelian causal explanation (indeed 
substance metaphysics itself) is only meaningful given effect specificity, i.e. the ability of 
agents to produce specific effects on the basis of specific potentialities they possess; but 
this effect specificity is precisely what “obediential potentiality” forgoes insofar as it 
imagines a capacity of agents to “independently” do whatever God wills them to do (i.e. 
to produce any effect He wishes contrary to their natural potentialities). 
While such an innovation seems well designed to rebut the Ghazalian claim that 
God can suspend the natural order at any time by insisting that such suspensions are, in 
fact, perfectly natural, the introduction of an “obediential potentiality” by Aquinas only 
reveals just how incompatible the Aristotelian notion of substantial natures are in any 
metaphysic that must account for miracles. If any agent can produce any effect 
(regardless of its supposedly natural potential) solely on the basis of its natural obedience 
to God’s will, then not only is effect specificity occluded, but the very notion of natural 
potentiality is rendered otiose: why make a distinction at all between “natural” and 
“obediential potentiality?” There is no metaphysical difference between the two, only an 
empirical difference that is reified (by Aristotelianism) as metaphysical. Natural 
potentiality refers to nothing more than the regularly observed causal order, a point that 
was understood by Augustine in the gloss itself: “Contrary to nature [means] contrary to 
human experience of the course of nature.”151 For Aquinas, this natural potentiality itself 
belongs to the larger set of obediential potentiality that also includes exceptions to this 
                                                
151 Contra Faustum Manichaeum, 26.3 
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regular order as attested to in scripture.152 If one simply reduces these two sets (i.e. 
refuses to reify the regular order metaphysically on the basis of its regularity), one is then 
left with the far more parsimonious occasionalist position that the regularity of nature is 
not a ‘bottom-up’ metaphysical product of substantial natures, but rather a ‘top-down’ 
function of the regularity of the divine will. That is to say, given the power of God to 
produce directly any effect from any agent on the basis of its “obediential potentiality,” 
the raison d’être of Aristotelian substantial natures (sc. the function they provide in 
explaining the regularity of nature and causal interactions) is superfluous. One need not 
posit an active and consistent natural order, but only an active and consistent Sovereign. 
As Lady Philosophy instructs Boethius: “The generation of all things, and the whole 
development of changeable natures, and whatever moves in any manner, are given their 
causes, order and forms from the stability of the divine mind.”153 
                                                
152 Aquinas’ commitment to this hierarchical containment can be seen in the following passage, so long as 
it is understood that “particular nature” corresponds to “natural potentiality” while “universal nature” 
corresponds to “obediential potentiality,” as seems apparent: “particular nature denotes the relation of a 
particular cause to a particular effect, while universal nature denotes the relation of the first agent in nature, 
which is the heavens, to all agents in the lower world. And seeing that none of the lower bodies acts save 
by virtue of the heavenly body, it is impossible for any natural body to act against universal nature: while 
the very fact that anything acts against a particular nature, is in accord with universal nature. Now just as 
the heaven is the universal cause in respect of lower bodies, so God is the universal cause in respect of all 
beings, and in comparison with him even the heaven is a particular cause…Accordingly just as by the 
power of the heavens something can happen that is contrary to this or that particular nature, and yet not 
contrary to nature simply, since it is in accord with universal nature: even so by the power of God 
something can occur that is contrary to universal nature which is dependent on the power of the heavens; 
without being contrary to nature simply, since it will be in accord with the supremely universal nature, 
dependent on God in relation to all creatures. It is in this sense that Augustine in the gloss quoted says that 
God does nothing contrary to nature.” (De potentia, q.6, a.1) 
153 Consolatio, 4.6 
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CHAPTER V 
NOMINALISM AND THE BARREN WORLD 
 
[W]e say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what is 
warm becomes cold, and what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft 
hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all 
those things are changes, and that what they were and what they are now are in no way 
alike. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the finger; and so 
with gold and stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, and that earth and stone 
are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. 
—Melissus of Samos, Frag. B8 
 
1. Introduction 
Before considering the impetus and development of nominalism in late-medieval 
philosophy, it is propaedeutically necessary to note that the accepted epistemic relation of 
reason and experience to religious dogma was very different in this period than as 
typically stands today. As Julius Weinberg explains: 
In the Middle Ages, reason, revelation, and experience were regarded as 
reliable sources of knowledge, and while revelation took precedence over 
the others, no fundamental conflict among them was considered possible. 
Accordingly, any challenge of the claims of reason or experience or any 
genuine conflict among them would have been sternly rejected and 
suppressed.1 
The Latin Averroists thus challenged Christian theology not only by arguing for manifest 
heresies (e.g. the eternality of the world), but also by attempting to bracket and back 
away from such heresies by recourse to the duplex veritas doctrine, whereby such 
heretical contentions were deemed irrefragable from the philosophical vantage of reason 
                                                
1 Weinberg, 6 
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and experience, but explicitly contradicted from the theological vantage of revelation and 
faith. This doctrine was explicitly condemned in 1277 when Étienne Tempier, the bishop 
of Paris, declared: “They say that things are true according to philosophy but not 
according to the Catholic faith; as if there could be two contrary truths.”2 
As noted in the last chapter, the primary project of Peripatetic scholasticism from 
William of Auvergne onwards was to correct the errors of Aristotle and his enthusiasts, 
thereby demonstrating that the dogmas of the Christian faith were not incompatible with 
the lessons of experience or reason. This project was of itself something of a retreat, for 
the preceding neo-Platonic tradition had endeavored to create a complete system of 
philosophy-cum-theology in which reason and faith were coextensive (rather than merely 
‘not contradictory’) in their truths. By the time of Aquinas, this project had been 
completely abandoned and the notion that systems of reason and faith stood askance, but 
not inherently at odds, had become the orthodox paradigm. However, the critical stance 
and skeptical analysis (even in modicum) that was intrinsic to the establishment of the 
paradigm proved its own undoing. In seeking to cordon Faith from the incursions of 
reason and experience, Aquinas’ fourteenth-century successors pursued increasingly 
skeptical investigations into the nature of epistemology itself, thus unraveling that 
tenuous synthesis between Aristotle and the Church Fathers, which had been so 
extensively and resolutely negotiated in the course of the thirteenth-century. Indeed, they 
ended up turning full circle. The best example of this is Nicholas of Autrecourt, who not 
only defended the eternality of the world doctrine (albeit on different terms than the 
Averroists), but defended himself at his trial for heresy in 1347 by echoing the Averroist 
                                                
2 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I 543 
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duplex veritas doctrine, insisting “that all his assertions were made disputatively rather 
than definitively and that, whatever he said, his readers or hearers should adhere strictly 
to the Catholic Faith.”3 The breaking of this assumed epistemic synchronicity between 
reason/experience and faith—and thus the founding of the modern antagonistic 
relationship between the two—was perhaps the chief dénouement of late-medieval 
nominalism. 
 
2. Peter Damian on Divine Omnipotence and Natural Necessity 
Such cordial relations had not always existed between philosophy and theology. As has 
already been recounted, the two stood in considerable tension in late-antiquity and in the 
Islamic medieval tradition, where philosophical appeals to the mandates of reason were 
seen as almost intrinsically opposed to dogmas of Faith.4 Such was the state of affairs in 
Christendom even at the beginning of the High Middle Ages (1000-1300), as can be seen 
clearly in Manegold of Lautenbach’s5 (c.1030-c.1103) anti-philosophical polemic against 
the Platonist Wolfhelm of Brauweiler.6 But, the exemplar of this eleventh-century anti-
                                                
3 Weinberg, 6. While Cardinal Curti, who was in charge of Autrecourt’s trial and condemnation at 
Avignon, dismissed this appeal as a “foxy excuse,” it was in large part a reiteration of the intention and 
methodology of William of Auvergne. Yet, in the intervening years, matters had changed considerably and 
William’s project had borne fruit that the Church was not keen to let spoil. 
4 Indeed, in late antiquity “philosophy” was viewed as effectively synonymous with paganism, and not 
without reason. When Justinian I finally shuttered the Platonic Academy at Athens in 529, it was due to its 
reputation (like the Roman Senate) as an enclave of paganism in a now exclusively Christian Empire. 
5 Manegold was an Augustinian master of theology from the Alsace who was a strident opponent of any 
Christian deference to pagan philosophical ideas. 
6 Wolfhelm (†1091) was a Benedictine abbot from Brauweiler Abbey outside of Cologne. His dalliances in 
philosophy did not prevent him from being canonized. 
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philosophical attitude was Peter Damian’s epistolary treatise De divina omnipotentia.7 
Damian, a senior contemporary of Manegold, was an Italian monk who spent his earlier 
years studying and teaching at the proto-universities of Parma and Ravenna before, 
around 1035, abandoning his post to become a hermit at the Fonte Avellana in the 
Marche of Anacona. Due to his reforming zeal, Damian became the prior of the 
hermitage and was later appointed as a Papal legate in 1059, a position he held until his 
death in 1072.8 
De divina omnipotentia concerns the issue of whether or not God has the power to 
alter or undo events in the past and, by extension, the essence and place of necessity in 
the natural order. The rejection of the mutability of the past, by God or otherwise, has a 
prominent lineage in the history of philosophy. In particular, Aristotle extended Plato’s 
rather prosaic claim in the Laws (justifying punishment for the sake of future deterrence) 
that “what’s done can’t be undone”9 into a causal and metaphysical axiom.10 In his 
treatment of Diodorus Chronus’ paradox of future contingents, Aristotle concedes the 
necessity of past events,11 and thus declares in the Nichomachean Ethics that “what has 
happened cannot be made to not have happened,” and approvingly cites Agathon’s claim 
that “For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things that have once been 
                                                
7 Damian notoriously denounced philosophy by declaring that the Devil was the frist grammarian, who 
taught Adam to decline “deus” in the plural. 
8 Damian was later canonized and made a Doctor of the Church. 
9 934a 
10 Averroes followed Aristotle in this, arguing that causes must be either prior to or coexist with their 
effects, for, if effects could precede their causes, this would entail the mutability of the past. (Kogan, 3) 
11 De interpretatione, 19a23-4: “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when 
it is not.” 
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done.”12 Agathon’s point was codified in the Christian tradition by Jerome, who famously 
lamented in his epistle to Eustochium, on the occasion of the Visigoth sack of Rome in 
410, that “although God can do all things, he cannot raise up a virgin when once she has 
fallen.”13 
The apparent contradiction in Jerome’s remark was noted by Damian in a 
discussion with Desiderius (the future Pope Victor III) at the abbey of Monte Cassino 
sometime in the 1060’s. During this discussion, Damian demurred from Jerome’s claim, 
confessing “that this opinion has never satisfied me…[for] It seems altogether 
unbecoming that impotence be so lightly ascribed to him who can do all things.”14 As 
evidence of this claim, Damian reports the story of two friars from Bologna who carved 
up a chicken for dinner. Apparently impressed by his carving skills, one of them declared 
that “if Christ himself should order it, this bird would never rise again;” at which point 
“the cock suddenly came alive, jumped up completely covered in feathers, beat its wings 
and crowed, shook its feathers and splattered all the gravy over those who were at the 
table.”15 While this colorful story may seem fanciful, it was actually a very specific 
reproach against neo-Platonist philosophers of the day (e.g. Berengar of Tours) who 
denied the possibility of corporeal resurrection as violating the established laws of 
                                                
12 1139b7 
13 “Cum omnia Deus possit, suscitare virginem non potest post ruinam.” (Epistula 22.5) 
14 De divina omnipotentia, §3 
15 De divina omnipotentia, §70. If this display were not enough of a divine reproach, Damian reports that 
both men were also struck with leprosy, supposedly from the pepper that had been sprinkled on the 
chicken. (Ibid.) 
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nature.16 As Manegold describes this view: “judging that the body is composed of the 
elements, [the philosophers] were of the opinion that the heavy part of it would return to 
the earth by an inevitable necessity,” from which they concluded “that the restoration of 
bodies to eternal life is impossible.”17 Manegold responds by denouncing “the doctrine 
that ‘all heavy bodies shall be dragged into the earth by their own inclination,’” and 
reiterates the Augustinian argument (re-appropriated by Aquinas) that such notions of 
natural necessity are “offensive to the creator of the elements, who did whatever He 
willed, and who most certainly finds it as easy to place an element above its natural 
position as He found it easy at the first moment of creation to stabilize the jostling chaos 
by separating the elements.”18 
For his own part, in letter to Desiderius following their discussion, Damian 
attempted to justify his disagreement with Jerome over the much more radical (and 
Scripturally ambiguous) issue of the mutability of the past; and in the process provided 
one of the most notorious arguments in favor of the divine omnipotence. As Damian 
presents the position of his opponents: 
If God is omnipotent in all things, can he act so that things that were made 
become things that were not made? He can certainly destroy all things so 
                                                
16 Such a concern was not novel to eleventh century, but extended back to antiquity. The early Christian 
author Marcarius Magnes considers the possible ressurection of men who have met grizzly fates and whose 
body parts have been scattered and consumed by wild animals, and relates the view of the philosopher that: 
“You will tell me that this is possible with God, but this is not true. For all things are not possible with 
Him…even if He could easily make them rise in a comely form, it would be impossible for the earth to 
hold all those who had died from the beginning of the world, if they were to rise again.” (Apocritius, 4.24) 
This view apparently resurfaced among the Latin Averroists of the mid-thirteenth century, at least as can be 
inferred from the one of the thirteen errors condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1270, viz. “That God 
cannot give immortality or incorruptibility to a corruptible or mortal thing.” (Chartularium §13) This 
specific condemnation was reiterated in 1277. (§25) 
17 Liber contra Wolfelmum, XXII, 62 
18 Liber contra Wolfelmum, XXII, 62 
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that they no longer exist, but it is impossible to understand how he can 
cause things that were made to become unmade. One might grant that it is 
possible that from this moment on and thereafter, Rome does not exist, 
since it can be destroyed; but there is no way to explain how it is possible 
that it was not founded in antiquity.19 
Damian’s response20 to this attack on the divine omnipotence was twofold: 
1) God is an atemporal being21 who apprehends the entire history of His creation 
totum simul.22 The division of time into past, present, and future is perspectival 
and binding only to temporal beings such as us.23 Therefore, there can be no 
meaningful difference between God changing the present or future and changing 
the past.24 
2) Notions of necessity, possibility, and impossibility hinge either upon the structure 
of language or the nature of things. The former is an arbitrary and artificial human 
                                                
19 De divina omnipotentia, §21 
20 It should be noted that Damian dismisses scriptural passages that seem to suggest divine impotence (such 
as Genesis 19:22) as having only an “allegorical significance” that should not be interpreted “boldly and 
freely in a literal sense.” (De divina omnipotentia, §6) 
21 The conception of God as atemporal was first propounded in the fourth by Ambrose, who declares in his 
De fide “that with God nothing is impossible, [and] that God exists not in time.” (1.2.14) This position was 
adopted by Boethius by and the pagan neo-Platonist Ammonius Hermiae in their sixth-century 
commentaries on De interpretatione (ix. 136,18). It seems likely that Damian would have had Boethius as 
his source, either through his commentary, or, more likely, via his reiteration of this thesis in the 
Consolatio. (v. 6). 
22 “[A]lmighty God possesses neither a yesterday nor a tomorrow but an everlasting today, from whom 
nothing is added, from whom nothing is at variance, and with whom nothing is in confict.” (De divina 
omnipotentia, §37) 
23 “Time, that for us moves along outside in relation to external things, for him is something internal and 
does not pass.” (Ibid.) 
24 “[I]n respect to his eternity, whatever God could do, he also can do, because his present never turns into 
the past, his today does not change into tomorrow or into some other alteration of time.” (De divina 
omnipotentia, §77) 
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construct,25 while the latter are wholly dependent upon the will of their Creator.26 
Therefore, the majesty of God can be constrained neither by the artifices of 
human language, nor the nature of the creation he created by pure will out of 
nothing.27 
These two arguments are linked together by Damian’s interpretation of the problem of 
future contingents.28 Unlike Diodorus Cronus and the Stoics, Damian regards the 
problem and its necessitarian upshot as binding only to “the logic of words” and not in 
any way to ontology.29 However, its secondary upshot, viz. the annihilation of time as a 
                                                
25 Damian’s interpretation of dialectic arguments as concerning on the relation of words was previously 
advanced by Carneades against Stoic necessitarianism. It is exceedingly unlikely that Damian had 
Carneades (through Cicero) as his source, and the issue at hand concerned the Stoic and Megarian doctrine 
of the necessity of the future, rather than the necessity of the past, but Cleanthes response is nonetheless 
identical or Damian’s: “those who say that things that are going to be are immutable and that a true future 
event cannot be changed into a false one, are not asserting the necessity of fate but explaining the meaning 
of terms.” (Cicero, De fato, ix. 20) 
26 De divina omnipotentia, §49, §50, §56-7 
27 Damian is sometimes interpreted as advancing a Wittgensteinian position that logical possibility and 
impossibility (and even the problems of philosophy itself) are relative only to the structure of language, and 
he does seem to suggest as much. However, Damian later warns the philosophers to “air their questions 
according to the manner and rules of dialectic, so long as by their circumlocutions and the trifling song of 
their school days they do not outrage the Creator, and let them know that the impossibility of which they 
speak lies in the very nature of things and in the logical consequence of words resulting from this art, that it 
does not belong to divine power and that nothing can escape the capacity of divine majesty. (De divina 
omnipotentia, §67) “Here Damain clearly regards “impossibility” as binding to “the very nature of things,” 
as well as to language. Yet this ultimately makes no difference, for both are equally arbitrary and utterly 
dependent upon the divine will. 
28 “[A]ccording to the natural order of inconstant phenomena, it can happen that today it may rain, and it 
can also happen that it may not rain; but by the logic of words, if it is going to rain, it is absolutely 
necessary that it ran, and consequently, altogether impossible not to rain. Likewise, what is said of past 
events may be applied with equal cogency to present and to future things; in this sense, that, just as 
everything that happened, necessarily had to happen, so also everything that exists must exist so long as it 
exists, and everything that will happen, must happen in the future. And so, in relation to the logical order of 
speech, for whatever was, it is impossible not to have been; for whatever is, it is impossible not to be; and 
for whatever will be, it is impossible that it will not be.” (De divina omnipotentia, §24) 
29 It’s worth noting that Damian did not have access to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, and thus his 
claims concerning the immutability of the past therein, but instead cited De interpretatione (probably 
through Boethius’ commentary), which was available in the West prior to the sack of Constantinople. 
(Oakley, 133-4) This fact is evident in his treatment of the problem, for the paradox of future contingents is 
nowhere addressed in the Ethics, but plays a major and influential role in De interpretatione. By contrast, 
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determinant of possibility, remains the same. Damian’s argument thus functions as a 
reductio of those “pseudo-intellectuals” who seek to apply the entailments of dialectical 
argument to the divine, “boldly attributing to God those things that refer to the art of 
rhetoric,” and thereby causing “him to become completely impotent and deprived of 
strength, not only regarding things past, but also relating to things present and to come.”30 
 Like his contemporary al-Ghazali, Damian extensively documents how the 
necessity of nature assumed by the “dialecticians” is incompatible with scripture: 
So it is that divine power often destroys the armored syllogism of the 
dialecticians and their subtleties and confounds the arguments of all the 
philosophers that are judged by them to be so necessary and inevitable. 
Listen to this syllogism: If wood burns it is surely consumed; but it is 
burning, therefore it is consumed. But notice that Moses saw the burning 
bush that was not consumed.31 And to this other: if wood is cut from the 
tree it does not bear fruit; but it was cut off, therefore it does not bear fruit, 
Yet notice that the rod of Aaron is found in the meeting tent, having borne 
almonds32 contrary to the order of nature.33 
In addition to these examples Damian notes: the miracles of Exodus,34 the flowing of 
water from an arid rock,35 the destruction of the walls of Jericho by trumpets,36 the sun 
                                                                                                                                            
Ockham, writing two and a half centuries later, had access to the Ethics and thus cites Aristotle’s argument 
against the mutability of the past therein. (Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de 
Futuris Contingentibus, Q.1.A) 
30 De divina omnipotentia, §25 
31 Exodus, 3:2 
32 Num, 17:23 
33 De divina omnipotentia, §50; emphasis added 
34 Exodus, 14 & 17 
35 Josh, 6 
36 Josh 10:12-13 
  
187 
standing still at Joshua’s command,37 its reversal at Hezekia’s,38 Nebuchenezzer’s fiery 
furnace that could not burn the three youths,39 Daniel’s deliverance from the lion’s den,40 
the corporeal ascension to heaven by Enoch and Elijah,41 the resurrection of Lazarus,42 as 
well as the creation of Adam and Eve43 from inert matter.44 Also like al-Ghazali, Damian 
argues that the lack of predictable regularity and symmetry between causes and their 
effects undermines any inference that bases itself on the supposition of natural powers or 
forces. Notably, the examples Damian uses are taken directly from De civitate Dei: 
How is it that straw is so cold that it preserves for the longest time snow 
that is covered by it, and so warm that it matures unripened fruit?” 
[And] for lime to expel the force of its latent fire, one must douse it with 
water, and while before it was cold, it now begins to boil by the same 
agent that causes all other boiling things to cool. But if in place of water, 
one should use oil, which is obviously an incentive to fire, not the least bit 
of heat is generated when it is used.45 
Given such a radical diversity of effects produced from similar causal powers, or similar 
effects produced by what appear to be antipodal causal powers, the conception of 
causation in terms of internal powers necessitating external effects seems ambiguous at 
best. 
                                                
37 Josh 10:13 
38 2 Kings 20:8-11; Isa 38:8 
39 Dan 3:46-50 
40 Dan 6:17-25 
41 Sir 44:6; 2 Kings 2; Heb 11:5 
42 John 11 
43 Gen 1-2 
44 De divina omnipotentia, §51, §58, §64 
45 De divina omnipotentia, §60-61. Cf. De civitate Dei, xxi. 4 
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Yet, what is remarkable about Damian’s position (as opposed to al-Ghazali, 
Ockham, Autrecourt, and Malebranche) is that he accepts natural necessity: that is, 
necessary relations within the nature of things.46 This can be seen in his reiteration of 
Aristotle’s ontological derivation of the law of non-contradiction: 
In respect to nature this is certainly true…it is impossible for one and the 
same thing to have happened and not to have happened; for, indeed, they 
are mutually contrary in the sense that, given the one, the other cannot 
exist. For assuredly what was, cannot in truth be considered not to have 
been, and antithetically, what was not cannot rightly be said to have been: 
for things that are contrary cannot coincide in the same subject.47 
Damian is able to square this circle and accept necessity in Nature while maintaining that 
it does not affect the supreme liberty of the divine will because, unlike al-Ghazali and 
virtually every other philosopher of note before or after, Damian maintains the radically 
voluntarist position that God can flaunt and violate relations of necessity.48 Thus, 
immediately after granting the above impossibility, Damian argues that: 
This impossibility, moreover, is properly maintained in reference to the 
needs of nature. But God forbid that is be applied to divine majesty; for he 
who brought nature into being, at will easily abrogates the necessity of 
nature. For the need that governs created things, by law is subject to the 
creator; but he who created nature has power to change the natural order at 
his pleasure; and while ordaining that all created things should be subject 
                                                
46 See De divina omnipotentia, §49, §50, §56-7 
47 De divina omnipotentia, §56; emphasis added 
48 While other medieval philosophers, such as Pierre d’Ailly, Gregory of Rimini, and John of Mirecourt 
agreed with Damian that God could alter or annul the past, (See Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and 
Gregory of Rimini on Whether God and Undo the Past,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 
39 (1972): 224-253; 40 (1973): 147-174) the only other Western philosophers of whom I am aware that 
explicitly maintained that God’s omnipotence allowed him to violate even logical or mathematical truths 
were Gottschalk of Orbais and, quite infamously, Descartes. Like Damian, Descartes’ doctrine of the 
created eternal truths was deemed scandalous by his successors (and even by modern scholars) and 
stridently rejected by all other philosophers of the modern period. Even Hume, who is typically reticent to 
proffer any manner of theological asseveration, declares uncharacteristically in the concluding paragraph of 
his Enquiry that: “The standard of [reason], being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, 
even by the will of the Supreme Being.” (Enquiry, 294) 
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to the dominion of nature, reserved to the dominion of his power the 
obedience of a compliant nature.49 
This position, justifying God’s capacity to contravene the natural order on the basis of his 
status as its creator, is very close to the Augustinian doctrine that was adopted and 
developed by Aquinas into the natural/obediential potentiality distinction. Like Augustine 
and Aquinas, Damian accepts the existence of real secondary causes and natural 
necessity, yet avoids the problem of miracles not via distinction, but by insisting that such 
natural necessity can be flaunted or disbanded at will by the divine omnipotence. In this 
way Damian is able to grant God the capacity to effect works (e.g. altering the past) that 
Augustine and Aquinas cannot allow even under the accommodations of nature’s 
obediential potentiality.50 
Inchoate to Damian’s reasoning is the tension that would be developed by his 
successors into the seminal medieval distinction between potentia Dei absoluta and 
potentia Dei ordinata, as discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, it is clear that Damian 
himself would accept no such distinction, for he is adamant that “it is quite apparent that 
                                                
49 De divina omnipotentia, §57; emphasis added 
50 Damian’s position is closer to that advanced by Tertullian in the early third century, who argued that 
God’s ability to recreate and restore nature (e.g. in the incarnation and resurrection of the flesh) is 
dependent on his omnipotence and ability to change and remake the natural order. (De resurrectione carnis, 
11) While the resurrection clearly involves a violation of the established order of nature, Tertullian notes 
that the incarnation involves a deeper violation concerning the metaphysics of change, and thus a more 
profound proof of God’s omnipotence. (Resnick, 28) Tertullian summarizes the reasoning of the 
Marcionites who rejected the incarnation because “a being who is without end is also of necessity incapable 
of change. For being changed into something else puts an end to the former state. Change, therefore, is not 
possible to a Being who cannot come to an end.” (De carne Christi, 3) That is to say, contrary to the dual 
nature dogma that would be codified at the Council of Nicaea, if God changes to become man, he can no 
longer remain at the same time God. Tertullian responds by accepting the metaphysical principle of the 
argument, but only insofar as it applies to natural creatures and exempts God: “Without doubt, the nature of 
things which are subject to change is regulated by this law, that they have no permanence in the state which 
is undergoing change in them, and that they come to an end from thus wanting permanence, while they lose 
that in the process of change which they previously were. But nothing is equal with God; His nature is 
different from the condition of all things.” (Ibid.) While this may seem to be little more than special 
pleading, to place the divine nature under the same laws as that of natural things would be, as Tertullian 
insists, to place God “on the same level” ontologically with such things, which is tantamount to pantheism. 
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from the very moment the world was born, the Creator of things changed the laws of 
nature in any way he pleased, and even, I might say, made nature itself to a certain extent 
against nature.”51 In this way Damian anticipates Ockham and Autrecourt by rejecting 
the Thomistic supposition of a domain of divine power de potentia ordinata; God is 
always and continually free to contravene the laws of nature: 
What should one wonder, therefore, if he who prescribed for nature its law 
and order should exercise his right of decision over nature herself, without 
natural necessity rebelling against him, but instead serving in the role of 
handmaid submissive to his laws. Indeed, the very nature of this has its 
own nature, namely, the will of God, in the sense that, just as any created 
things observe her laws, so also she, upon command and forgetting her 
own rights, reverently obeys the divine will.52 
Again, Damian here appears to be appealing to and effectively reiterating the Augustinian 
position, perhaps even anticipating the Thomistic notion of obediential potentiality. Yet, 
such an appearance is misleading, for Damian, the divine will is both supreme and 
completely autonomous. Under Aristotelian causal metaphysics, for an agent to act upon 
a patient, said patient must be se ipsum receptive to the agent’s causal influence. Hence 
the need for Aquinas to posit an ‘obediential potentiality’ in re as the condition of the 
possibility for God’s effecting miracles. Damian recognized no such need and instead 
appeals directly and immediately to the will of God as self-sufficient to accomplish (as 
agent) anything it wishes regardless of any supposed receptivity or potentiality in the 
substrate (as patient). 
 In the above quote Damian appears close to an occasionalist position 
(“nature…has its own nature, namely, the will of God”); but, insofar as Damian allows 
                                                
51 De divina omnipotentia, §58; emphasis added 
52 De divina omnipotentia, §59 
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for a domain of natural causality and even natural necessity, he must reject the ultimate 
metaphysical concatenation of “nature” with “the will of God” foundational to 
occasionalism. The ambiguity of Damian’s position lies in his failure to follow the logic 
behind his reasoning to its inevitable conclusion—namely by rejecting the very notion of 
natural necessity and secondary causality as such, and subsuming all of Creation 
immediately to the will of God. Regardless of the similarities between Damian and the 
nominalists or occasionalists, all of the latter followed al-Ghazali in restricting the divine 
omnipotence to the logically possible, i.e. they denied that God could do that which is 
impossible. As discussed in Chapter 4, this rejection of radical voluntarism was an 
extremely important conceit that effectively stood as the sine qua non of any 
theologically inspired attack on causal determinism. If such attacks were impelled by a 
general voluntarist commitment to the divine omnipotence, the freedom of the divine 
will, and the possibility and Scriptural testimony of the existence of miracles, it was the 
concession that God could not do the impossible that drove al-Ghazali and his intellectual 
heirs to reject that natural relations are ever necessary, for, in that case, God could not 
interrupt or violate them, as that would engender or be tantamount to a logical 
contradiction. Such was simply not considered a problem by Damian. What is noteworthy 
here, then, is that Damian’s radical voluntarism actually stunts his critique of causal 
determinism as, in the place of a rigorous epistemological examination of supposed 
necessary relations in nature (as was provided by the aforementioned figures), Damian 
instead denounces dialectical investigation itself and appeals to the ineluctable mystery of 
the divine majesty as subtending all relations.53 The upshot here is very similar to 
                                                
53 “Truly, who is wise enough to enumerate the mighty deeds of divine power that occur contrary to the 
universal order of nature and which, surely, are not to be explained away by human arguments, but should 
  
192 
Aquinas and his deus ex machina54 appeal to an ‘obediential potentiality’ to resolve the 
problem of miracles, while still maintaining the system of Aristotelian causal 
metaphysics otherwise unchanged, which protected this overall system, but did so by 
obfuscating the problem and thus the possibility for further critical innovations. More 
immediately, though, was the reaction of Damian’s successors against his radical 
voluntarist interpretation of the divine omnipotence, which formed the primary impetus 
behind the development of distinction between potentia Dei absoluta and potentia Dei 
ordinata. 
 
3. The Condemnations of 1277 and the Development of Nominalism 
By the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the indigenous neo-Platonic tradition 
of the West was dead and largely forgotten. Moreover, the intellectual scene had evolved 
to such an extent that Damian’s theological hostility to philosophy was not just quaint, 
but borderline heretical. Western philosophy and theology had been effectively merged 
for the second time, this time under the auspices of “the Philosopher,” “the 
Commentator,” and the man who endowed them with such epithets.55 Late-medieval 
nominalism thus emerged in the century following Aquinas as a reaction to this 
Aristotelian takeover of philosophy and theology, and its critical lens was, much like 
early-modern philosophy, directed resolutely at Aquinas and his legion followers, as well 
as against Aristotelian metaphysics in general. 
                                                                                                                                            
rather be left to the power of the Creator?” (De divina omnipotentia, §63) 
54 Given that occasionalism is perhaps the ultimate deus ex machina, the irony here is difficult to escape. 
55 Viz. Aristotole, Averroes, and Aquinas. 
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This critical offensive was aided and perhaps impelled by a series of 
condemnations promulgated in 1270, 1272, and most definitively in 1277, when the 
bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, condemned 219 propositions of theological faculty at 
the University of Paris. While these condemnations were largely directed at Averroism,56 
many of Aquinas’ own teachings were implicated as well, although not by name.57 They 
also came not three years after the death of Aquinas and at the institution where he was 
active for much of his life. Moreover, the majority of the condemnations concerned 
rationalistic interpretations of Aristotle that placed restrictions on God’s free will and 
implied elements of necessity in the Creation—thus implicitly calling into question many 
more of Aquinas’ teachings. This slight did not go unnoticed and a year later the 
Dominican order defended its illustrious member and publically upheld his philosophical 
views.58 Moreover, in 1323 Aquinas was canonized by John XXII and, in 1325, perhaps 
out of filiality with (now Saint) Aquinas, or as a reaction to the burgeoning nominalist 
school, the 1277 condemnations were officially revoked.59 
In his introduction to the condemned propositions, Tempier fittingly quotes Paul’s 
first epistle to the Corinthians where he cites Isaiah describing the miracles of God: “I 
                                                
56 Particularly Averroes’ doctrine of the eternality of the world and espousal of monopsychism, the latter of 
which was at odds with the Christian doctrine of individual salvation and was heavily criticized by 
Aquinas. (See De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas) 
57 Specifically, propositions §44, 87, and 217 (among others and to the extent of my own familiarity and 
recollection) are strikingly close to claims made by Aquinas. 
58 Ironically, it was the Dominicans who, a century earlier, had been the most strident opponents of Gregory 
IX’s decision to allow the study of Aristotle. (See Thorndike, §34, 73) 
59 Grant, 47. It is worth noting that Fortin and O’Neill (the original English translators of the 1277 
condemnation) argue that Tempier’s sweeping condemnation “exceeded the mandate he received from 
Rome.” (336) 
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will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and I will thwart the cleverness of the intelligent.”60 
Among the propositions thereafter condemned are:61 
§21) That nothing happens by chance, but everything comes about by 
necessity… 
§46) That just as nothing can come from matter without an agent, so also 
nothing can come from an agent without matter, and that God is not an 
efficient cause except with respect to that which has its existence in the 
potency of matter. 
§48) That God cannot be the cause of a newly-made thing and cannot 
produce anything new. 
§147) That what is impossible absolutely speaking cannot be brought 
about by God or by another agent.—This is erroneous if we mean what is 
impossible according to nature. 
§185) That it is not true that something comes from nothing or was made 
in a first creation. 
§198) That, among the efficient causes, the secondary cause has an action 
that it did not receive from the first cause. 
§199) That, among the efficient causes, if the first cause were to cease to 
act, the secondary cause would not, as long as the secondary cause 
operates according to its own nature. 
As is evident from the above, the thrust of the condemnations were against the 
philosophical constraints of a deterministic causal metaphysics (sc. Aristotelianism), that 
was regarded as degrading the divine omnipotence, denying established Church dogma, 
and hypostatizing God’s causal agency to the extent that it effectively exceeded His will 
and required Him to work through these very hypostatizations in order to be efficacious. 
The hypostatization of God’s causal activity was not considered as problematic in itself 
or impossible by Tempier and his compilers (as it was by the occasionalists)—God did 
create a natural world after all. Rather, the objection was to the Aristotelian presumption 
                                                
60 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 544; I Cor 1:19, Isa 29:14 
61 I have used the original article numbers as opposed to Mandonnet’s regrouping. 
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that, having done so, God was thereafter constrained to work exclusively through and 
within the capacities and limitations of the natural world He had created. 
 Such was the origin of nominalism, which, as Ockham himself acknowledges, 
was fundamentally “based [on] the famous maxim of the theologians: ‘Whatever God can 
produce by means of secondary causes, He can directly produce and preserve without 
them.’”62 Whom exactly these “theologians” Ockham cites are is unclear, but as was 
noted in the last chapter, such a capacity had been accepted by Aquinas, who argued: 
“The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; 
wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain 
effects by Himself without any other cause.”63 For his part, Ockham ascribes this 
capacity more directly and logically to the divine omnipotence, citing the Apostles’ 
Creed: “I prove this by the article of faith ‘I believe in God the Father almighty,’ which I 
understand in the following sense: Anything is to be attributed to the divine power, when 
it does not contain a manifest contradiction.”64 The historical providence of these new, 
more radical appeals to faith is not difficult to see. As Edward Grant describes the 
aftermath of the 1277 condemnations: 
[U]nder penalty of excommunication, many deterministic arguments 
drawn from, or based on, Aristotle’s philosophy had of necessity to be 
modified and qualified. Alternatives, previously thought to be silly or 
absurd, had now to be entertained as at least possible—even if only by 
virtue of God’s infinite and absolute power.65 
                                                
62 OTh 9: 604.17-20; Philosophical Writings, 25 
63 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1 
64 Ibid. 
65 Grant, §13, 46 
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In this way, and with no small dose of irony, nominalism was a development and 
continuation of the project of Aristotelian scholasticism. As explained in the last chapter, 
the original goal of Scholasticism was to integrate Aristotle with the Faith, part of which 
required proving that Christian dogmas that Aristotle deemed impossible (e.g. creation ex 
nihilo, miracles) were not, in fact, impossible. While nominalism remained deeply 
concerned with this latter requirement, in the process it largely gave up on integrating 
Aristotle into a Christian philosophy. 
 
Ockham on Causation 
While the project of nominalism was, both in motive and doctrine, clearly aligned with, if 
not indebted to, al-Ghazali and Ash’arite occasionalism, it was also much more 
epistemologically oriented (even proto-idealist/phenomenalist) in a way that quite 
pronouncedly resembles Humean empiricism, as has been remarked on by several 
commentators.66 It was the Aristotelian conception of ontology as an active, pluralistic, 
and substantial structure composed of both things as well as real principles internal to 
them—principles that define the natural order in a deep, interwoven, and rational way, 
which serve to provide philosophy direct access to this order as well as the possibility of 
offering a systematic and all-encompassing explanation of its operations—that was the 
primary object of the nominalists’ ire. By contrast, the nominalists regarded the real as 
composed of discrete individual singulars. On this basis, Armand Maurer, in his 
                                                
66 See Gilson 1938, and Moody 1958 
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monograph on Ockham,67 notes that: “in Ockham’s world of radically individual beings 
there is no communication in form between any of them. Each is an essence of its own, 
sharing with no other an intelligible form or essence.”68 He thus concludes: “In breaking 
[the Aristotelian] ontological bond between cause and effect, Ockham began a new 
concept of cause whose influence would be pervasive in modern empiricism.”69 
Ockham defines an efficient cause in his Summula philosophiae naturalis as “that 
at whose real existence something has a new different being completely distinct from that 
cause.”70 While this definition of causation and the nominalist ontology of discrete 
singulars rather strongly harkens back to al-Ghazali’s (and towards Autrecourt’s) logical 
rejection of any necessary connection between the two merely on the basis of their 
logico-existential non-identity, such an upshot seems, pace Maurer’s claim, not to have 
particularly impressed Ockham, for he restricts his skepticism over efficient causation to 
epistemological concerns, viz. over inductive inference and the disruptive potential of 
divine intervention.71 Likewise, Ockham does not demure from describing efficient 
causality in terms of internal powers [virtute propria] by which the nature of a cause is 
connected with the natural effect that follows it in being.72 Thus he concludes that cause 
                                                
67 Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute 
of Mediaeval Studies, 1999). 
68 Ibid., 407 
69 Ibid. 
70 OPh 6: 218.26 
71 I obviously do not demure from Maurer’s general conclusion, but I haven’t found any passage in 
Ockham were he specifically makes the Ghazalian ontological point concerning the distinctness of cause 
and effect. Indeed, not even Autrecourt would take the matter this far. 
72 OTh 7: 17.14-16: “Ad aliud de causa et effectu dico quod de ratione causae est quod possit virtute propria 
ad eam sequi effectus sic esse.” 
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and effect are bound by a necessary connection insofar as “every naturally producible 
effect by its very nature is determined to be produced by one efficient cause and not by 
another.”73 Why did Ockham follow Aristotle in this way and fail to consider the 
ontological conclusions reached by al-Ghazali, as did Hume? First of all, it is worth 
noting that Hume—who, like Ockham, was primarily concerned with epistemology—
failed to completely grasp al-Ghazali’s “This is not That” point as well. Second, even 
though Ockham defines causes in terms of internal powers, in denying (like Hume) the 
ontological status of causal relations as distinct from the singular terms related,74 he 
implicitly abrogates the Aristotelian model of the metaphysics of causation whereby the 
causal relation amounts to a transference of form, and effectively replaces it with a sine 
qua non model of causality whereby the causal relation is “nothing else than that the 
effect exists at the presence of the [cause].”75 Thus, Ockham’s theory of efficient 
causation is a confusing intermediary between Aquinas and a full-blown skepticism. He 
still conceives of causality (sc. what it is to be a cause or an effect) in Aristotelian terms, 
but had completely abandoned the Aristotelian substance metaphysic under which such a 
conception is intelligible.76 
                                                
73 OTh 9: 629 
74 Maurer, 47-9, 406 
75 OTh 9: 156.148-50 
76 This is evident from Aquinas’ eminently Aristotelian reasoning: “[S]ince the nature of a thing is termed 
its form and matter, if a power of a thing should not be derived from them [i.e. from the transference of 
form from cause to effect], it will not be a power natural to the thing, and consequently no activity or 
passion proceeding from such a power will be natural. Now such activities which go beyond nature are not 
abiding—for example, that water when heated heats; but secret [i.e. private or defining] activities of which 
we are now speaking are always the same, or as often as possible. Hence the conclusion that powers which 
are the principles of these actions are essential and proceed from a form according as it exists in such 
matter.” (De operationibus occultis; emphasis added) 
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In spite of this failure to appreciate the entailments of his metaphysics and 
conception of causation, Ockham paved new ground in the epistemology of causal 
explanation due to his almost obsessive concern with the divine omnipotence and the 
possibility of divine interference in any particular instance of cause and effect. If, as 
Ockham and the “theologians” declared: “Whatever God can produce by means of 
secondary causes, He can directly produce and preserve without them,”77 then it follows 
that:  
Every absolute thing [res absoluta] distinct in place and subject from 
another absolute thing can exist without that latter in virtue of divine 
power…[and] since sensitive as well as intellective intuitive vision is an 
absolute thing distinct in place and subject from the object…vision [of any 
one] can remain in existence, [despite any other] having been destroyed.78 
While this argument contains the germ of later occasionalist theories of perceptual 
acquaintance, its implications for causal explanation are explicit: if God can create an 
effect without any antecedent cause and, more importantly, an antecedent ‘cause’ without 
any consequent effect, then the standard of necessary connection, by which the effect 
must follow from its cause, collapses; and thus any inference from one to the other lacks 
demonstrative warrant: 
Between a cause and its effect is a particularly essential order and 
dependence;79 nevertheless, the simple knowledge of some one thing does 
not entail the simple knowledge of some other thing. This is also 
something that everyone experiences within himself: however perfectly he 
may know a particular thing, he will never be able to know, with simple 
                                                
77 OTh 9: 604.17-20; Philosophical Writings, 25 
78 OTh 11: 605; trans. by Weinberg, 88. Just as with al-Ghazali, while this argument appeals to divine 
potency, its logical basis (on which such an appeal is predicated) concerns the separability and 
independence of ‘sensitive’ or empirical ‘visions’ as well as ‘intellective’ or logical ‘visions.’ 
79 Here Ockham is being faithful to Aristotle, not realizing that what he claims following the “nevertheless” 
renders such fidelity otiose. 
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and proper knowledge, another thing which he has never previously 
experienced, either by sensation or intellect.80 
Moreover, it is impossible to know, logically or empirically, if God produces any 
particular effect directly or through secondary causes. That is to say, using occasionalist 
terminology, if β may be produced by God directly without α, we can never know in any 
given instance of α followed by β if α actually caused β, if α was merely the occasion for 
β, or even if the two are connected at all: 
[I]t cannot be demonstrated that any effect is produced by a secondary 
cause, because even though fire always follows when fire is brought close 
to combustible material, it is possible that the fire is not the cause. For 
God could have ordained that he alone caused combustion whenever fire 
is present to a patient close by, just as he has ordained with the Church 
that when certain words are spoken grace is cause in the soul.81 
Given such an epistemological lacuna, the positive metaphysical concept of causation 
collapses and all we are left with is a phenomenal account resting on repeated observation 
and the continuity of nature.82 
 
4. Nicholas of Autrecourt 
Nicolaus of Autrecourt83 was a junior contemporary of Ockham and fellow nominalist 
who spent most of his scholarly life at the University of Paris (c. 1327-1340). While not 
                                                
80 OTh 1: 241.15-21; trans. is my own. Quia, sicut prius argutum est, inter causam et effecendum est ordo et 
dependentia maxime essentialis, et tamen ibi notitia incomplexa unius rei non continet notitiam 
incomplexam alterius rei. Hoc etiam quilibet in se experitur quod quantumcumque perfecte cognoscat 
aliquam rem quod numquam cogitabit cogitatione simplici et propria de alia re quam nunquam prius 
apprehendit nec pre sensum nec per intellectum. 
81 OTh 5:72.21 
82 It’s worth noting that Ockham did not develop or even understand this issue in terms of the problem of 
induction. He is confident that repeated experience of two conjoined events, if examined in such a way as 
to exclude extrinsic natural influences, can form the basis of causal knowledge. (See Maurer, 410)  
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strictly an Ockhamist, Nicholas nevertheless developed many of Ockham’s arguments 
and insights into a systematic skepticism and powerful critique of causation that would 
earn him the moniker: “the fourteenth-century Hume.”84 Like Ockham, Autrecourt 
aroused the wrath of captious Papal authorities at Avignon, was divested of his post at the 
University of Paris in 1340, and became the subject of an official investigation under 
Cardinal Curti in 1342. A 1343 manuscript reports that Nicholas had absconded to 
Munich and the court of Louis IV of Bavaria (the current Holy Roman Emperor and 
ardent enemy of the Avignon Pope Clement VI), who had gathered a remarkable coterie 
of intellectuals at his court (including Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, John of Jandun, and 
Michael of Cesena) that had fled similar Papal persecution.85 Regardless, Autrecourt was 
officially condemned and stripped of his honor magistralis in 1346 and forced to 
formally recant and publically burn his writings at the Papal Curia in Avignon in 
November of 1347.86 In contrast to Ockham, Autrecourt’s pliability and willingness to 
retract virtually his entire philosophy did not go unrewarded. By 1350 he was again Dean 
of Metz, where he was to remain until his death in 1369. 
The motivation underlying Autrecourt’s condemnation is unclear, as is the 
particular theological ideology behind them. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the 
“theological establishment” of the Late Middle Ages (i.e. post Aquinas) regarded the 
                                                                                                                                            
83 Autrecourt, German Ultricuria and contemporary Autrécourt-sur-Aire, was a village in the diocese of 
Verdun, one of the three Bishoprics of the Lorraine that were independent States of the Holy Roman 
Empire until their annexation to France by Henri II in 1552. 
84 See Hastings 1907 
85 Rashdall, 5. Rashdall suggest that, if accurate, this flight might account for the long delay in Nicholas’ 
trial. 
86 Rijk, “Introduction,” 2 
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truths of experience, reason, and Scripture to be structurally covalent and therefore any 
agitations of discord or disagreement between them were in need of either refutation or 
suppression. The Latin Averroists were condemned for promulgating a philosophy that 
gainsaid Scripture. Aquinas had been spared—and indeed celebrated—as he had attacked 
only those aspects of philosophy that stood against revealed truths of the Faith, and 
endeavored to provide the complete synthesis of philosophy and theology that was the 
Church establishment’s desideratum. Ockham and Autrecourt, however, took a much 
broader critical stance against philosophy (sc. Aristotelianism) and a much more fideistic 
stance in favor of religion. Yet, much had changed in the two and a half centuries since 
Damian had ploughed a similar line. While Damian was canonized, Ockham and 
Autrecourt’s skepticism concerning reason, experience, and ancient philosophy ran afoul 
of the hard won synthesis of the High Middle Ages, and, by attacking the former, they 
were seen as attacking Christian religion in the same breath. 
This perhaps explains why, as seems apparent from the records of the Avignon 
trial and his signed recantations, the condemnation of Autrecourt was a blanket 
condemnation.87 Obviously Nicholas was a caustic anti-Aristotelian and thus Aristotelian 
scholasticism stood to receive at least tacit support from many of the recantations. That 
this benefit was more than tacit and coincidental can be seen in two of the theses he was 
forced to recant from the Exigit ad ordo [“The Universial Treatise”] which are in explicit 
criticism of Aristotle (and his myrmidions appeal to the magister dixit): 
                                                
87 Autrecourt was required to recant even seemingly innocuous doctrines that had been openly accepted 
even by Aquinas. (See Quattor articuli confessati, §2, §5, §20) 
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1) Autrecourt argues that Aristotle’s asseverations in various subjects are only 
probable while “contrary conclusions could be held with equal probability.”88 
2) Autrecourt expresses surprise “to see that some people study Aristotle and the 
Commentator until they are worn out with age, and because of the logical 
discourses of these men abandon moral matters and the concern for the common 
good.”89 
Regardless of whether or not a defense of Aristotelian scholasticism was the motive 
behind Autrecourt’s condemnation, such coerced recantations clearly amount to an 
implicit Papal defense and are a compelling testament to just how far the pendulum had 
swung from 1210 (when the reading of Aristotle and Averroes was forbidden) to 1346 
(when criticism of the reading of Aristotle and Averroes was forbidden).90 
 
Sources of Autrecourt’s Critique 
As discussed in the last chapter, it seems decidedly unlikely that Aquinas or Giles of 
Rome, writing in the second half of the thirteenth century, would have had access to or 
even any specific knowledge of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut al-Falasifah. Their information 
                                                
88 §37 
89 §38. This is a somewhat telling reversal of the old concession from anti-philosophical Church Fathers 
and theologians that held, to quote Manegold: “in matters of moral discretion…there is no discrepancy 
between philosophical reasoning and the understanding of orthodox opinion. (Liber contra Wolfelmum, 
XXII, 61) For his own part, Autrecourt goes on to note the harsh reaction he received from such scholars 
(“went for him like people armed for mortal combat”) when he criticized Aristotle. 
90 This remained the case into the early-modern period when many of the central works of Cartesian 
occasionalism were—in spite of their piety and extreme theocentrism—officially condemned by the Roman 
Church. For example, Malebranche’s Recherche de la vérité as placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum 
in 1709. 
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concerning the Ash’arites and their skeptical views on causation appears to be extracted 
entirely from Maimonides, who does not specifically list al-Ghazali among the members 
of this sect, nor include any of his specific arguments from the Tahafut. The first certain 
date at which sections of this work appeared in the West was in 1328. This date was a 
year after Autrecourt began lecturing at the University of Paris and thus questions have 
been raised as to whether or not Kalonymus’ translation of Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut 
was indeed a source used by Autrecourt in developing his epistemology and views on 
causation.91 
Weinberg, in his seminal treatise on Autrecourt, expresses doubt that the causal 
skepticism of the nominalists was ultimately derived from either ancient skepticism or 
Islamic occasionalism, but rather offers that the “fourteenth century criticism in 
Christendom was an almost self-contained growth…the sources of [which] are to be 
found in Christian scholasticism itself.”92 This is certainly a possibility for, as I have 
previously argued, the particular doctrines of fourteenth century nominalism were a 
development and radicalization of doctrines propounded by Aquinas, who almost 
certainly had no first-hand knowledge of Islamic occasionalism. Moreover, Weinberg 
notes that Maimonides’ description of the occasionalist doctrines of the Mutakallim are 
largely metaphysical in nature and make no mention of the particular epistemological 
arguments employed (sc. by al-Ghazali) against causal necessitarianism.93 However, 
                                                
91 As Weinberg notes: “Here, then, we have a source [sc. al-Ghazali] which provides the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of Nicholas’ argument. Unfortunately, however, the date of its Latin translation is too 
close to that of the introductory lectures of Nicholaus as a Licentiate in Theology at Paris. (86) 
92 Weinberg, 87 
93 Weinberg, 85 
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Autrecourt adopted essentially wholesale Ash’arite atomism, particularly temporal 
atomism and the discontinuous account of motion and differential velocity that follows 
from it, which are described in detail by Maimonides.94 On this basis it seems possible, as 
Weinberg concedes,95 that if Autrecourt had read the Guide carefully enough to 
understand and defend this heterodox piece of physics, he might well have been able to 
extrapolate certain epistemological principles of al-Ghazali’s critique from Maimonides’ 
general summaries. 
The strongest evidence of an inheritence from al-Ghazali to Autrecourt is found in 
a letter (the second) from him to Bernard of Arezzo (a Franciscan theologian active in 
Paris) where Nicholas denies that “It follows evidently, with evidentness reduced to the 
certitude of the first principle…[that] ‘Fire is brought into contact with hemp; and there is 
no impediment; therefore there will be heat.’”96 This has stuck some commentators as 
being too close to al-Ghazali’s famous example of the fire and cotton97 to be mere 
coincidence. Indeed, in addition to the arguments related in the last chapter for an earlier 
Western avalibility of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut than 1328, Wolfson provides an interesting 
and compelling etymological analysis explaining how the substitution of flax (bombax) 
for cotton in Kalonymus’ translation makes sense as a Latin translation of al-kutun 
(‘cotton’) given certain background information about terms used by Westerners to 
describe cotton, which was not grown in Europe and was thus an expensive and 
                                                
94 Guide, I. 73 
95 Weinberg, 93 
96 Secunda epistola ad Bernardum, §20 
97 Tahafut, 186 
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mysterious98 import that would never be used for the purposes of burning. However, 
Wolfson’s explanation is complicated by the fact that the example is first put forward by 
Bernard, not Nicholas, the term used by Bernard is stuppe (“tow” or “hemp”) instead of 
bombax, and instead of “burning” (ardens), the causal consequent is only “heat” (calor), 
something that fire already possesses on its own and which thus makes the example 
nugatory.99 Moreover, as previously quoted, Ockham uses the example as well, but with 
out any mention of cotton or flax but only “combustible material.”100 
 
Epistolae ad Bernardum 
The primary source of Autrecourt’s thought concerning efficient causation is a series of 
nine letters he exchanged with Bernard sometime between 1335 to 1337,101 only the first 
two of which are still extant. The correspondence was initiated by Autrecourt after 
reading a lecture Bernard gave to the Friars Minor102 that was disseminated as a pamphlet 
in the University. While Bernard was an anti-Aristotelian and something of a skeptic, 
Autrecourt took issue with the tepidity of his skepticism and to particular claims to 
knowledge he accepted as legitimate. The first letter mostly involves Autrecourt 
criticizing certain claims propounded by Bernard and probing him for further 
                                                
98 Illustrated depictions of the time imagined cotton as a plant that produced sheep as fruit. 
99 However, Nicholas does not, as might otherwise be expected, point out that the example is otiose as it 
involves only one of the two terms, but rather reiterates his earlier claims, perhaps not wishing to quibble 
and aware that what Bernard meant by calor was ardens. 
100 OTh 5:72.21 
101 See Rijk, 5 
102 The “Friars Minor” is another name for the Franciscans, of whom Bernard was a member. 
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explanation, while the second letter contains the heart of his thought on efficient 
causation. 
Autrecourt opens his second letter to Bernard by immediately appealing to the lowest 
possible level of consensus: “The first thing that presents itself for discussion is this 
principle: ‘Contradictories cannot be simultaneously true’ [Contradictoria non possunt 
simul esse vera].”103 This Autrecourt deems “the first principle”104 and insists that “Every 
certitude we possess is resolved into this principle.”105 After establishing these axioms, 
Autrecourt defines contradiction itself by essentially reiterating the established 
Aristotelian definition:106 “a contradiction is the affirmation and negation of one and the 
same <attribute>…as the common formula runs.”107 However, even though Autrecourt 
envisions himself as grounding his epistemology on this “common formula” of the law of 
non-contradiction, like Aquinas, he is developing the law into something quite distinct 
without realizing it. This is evident in three corrolaries Nicholas “infer[s]” from the above 
axioms: 
                                                
103 Letter to Bernard, §2 
104 Ibid. “[T]his is the first principle, expounding ‘first’ negatively as ‘than which nothing is prior’…[but 
also] this principle is first in the affirmative or positive sense as ‘that which is prior to any other.’” 
105 Letter to Bernard, §3. Nicholas overstates his contention here, for he also holds that truths of faith as 
well as that of immediate appearance provide certitude, but are not reducible to the law of non-
contradiction. Regardless, this position was not unique to Autrecourt, but was common to medieval 
philosophy. For example, Aquinas argues: “Among [the] principles there is a certain order, so that some are 
contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: ‘The 
same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,’ as the Philosopher states.” (Summa theologiae, 
2b. 1, 7) 
106 See De interpretatione, 17a33-5, Metaphysics, 1019b22 
107 Letter to Bernard, §4. Presumably the ellipsis means: “in a substance,” though it is impossible to be 
sure. 
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1) “[J]ust as there is no power which can make contradictories simultaneously true, 
so there is no power by which it can happen that the opposite of the consequent 
simultaneously obtains with the antecedent.”108 That is to say, if an antecedent is 
necessarily connected to its consequent, then the existence of the antecedent along 
with the opposite of the consequent must imply a violation of the first principle 
and thus impossible. 
2) “Every syllogistic scheme is immediately reduced to the first principle.”109 That is 
to say, every demonstration is of a necessary connection between antecedent and 
consequent and this necessity can only come from the first principle as its 
grounds. 
3) “‘In every inference that is reduced immediately to the first principle, the 
consequent, and the antecedent either as a whole or in part, are factually 
identical,’ because, if this were not so, then it would not be immediately evident 
that the antecedent and the opposite of the consequent cannot simultaneously be 
true, without contradiction.”110 That is to say, necessary connection is a relation of 
identity, in whole or in part, and thus any two distinct things can never share such 
a relation. One may always affirm one (as antecedent) while not affirming the 
other (as consequent) without contradiction. 
Autrecourt thus concludes that: 
                                                
108 Letter to Bernard, §5 
109 Letter to Bernard, §8 
110 Letter to Bernard, §9 
  
209 
In accordance with these statements, I have laid down…this thesis: ‘From 
the fact that some thing is known to be, it cannot be inferred evidently, by 
evidentness reduced to the first principle, or to the certitude of the first 
principle, that there is some other thing’…[for] ‘In such an inference…the 
consequent would not be factually identical with the antecedent.’111 
Two points need be made regarding Autrecourt’s premises and their startling conclusion. 
First, though he believes he is basing his argument on the common (i.e. Aristotelian) 
formula of the law of non-contradiction, he is clearly, like al-Ghazali, understanding the 
law strictly logically (e.g. “Contradictories cannot be simultaneously true”112) without 
any reference to the nature or category constraints of Aristotelian ontology. Nowhere in 
Autrecourt’s argument is there any appeal to privations of substance or the like that 
provided the basis of Aristotle’s ontological formulation of the law of non-
contradiction.113 Indeed, Autrecourt implicitly rejects—though not apparently to his own 
understanding—Aristotle’s definition of contradiction in his rejection of Bernard’s claim 
that “‘There is whiteness; therefore there is something else,’ because there can only be 
whiteness if some substrate sustains it in being.”114 As Weinberg puts this point: “Since a 
contradiction is the affirmation and denial of one and the same thing, the assertion of a 
and the denial of b can never be a contradiction if a and b are not really the same. Thus, if 
                                                
111 Letter to Bernard, §11 
112 Letter to Bernard, §2 
113 Weinberg claims that Autrecourt’s definition of the law of non-contradiction “is verbally identical with 
Aristotle’s dictum in Metaphysics Γ,” yet he later concedes that “the metaphysical statement of the 
principle as we find it in Aristotle is in terms of a substance-accident ontology and is only intelligible in 
such terms in its Aristotelian context. But the principle, although it was perhaps first explicitly stated as 
such by Aristotle, is universally valid. Hence we may disengage it from the philosophy in which it first 
made its appearance under its right name, and so apply it without any restriction.” (Weinberg, 13) 
Weinberg is correct, of course, yet the identity and universal validity of these different formulations of the 
law of non-contradiction is not self-evident but rather was the product of the historical development of 
logic and epistemology (as distinct from ontology) during the Middle Ages from Damian to the 
nominalists. 
114 Letter to Bernard, §20 
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substance and accident are really distinct, inference from one to the other is out of the 
question.”115 By advancing this critique, Autrecourt goes beyond even al-Ghazali who 
argues that “not even God can turn blackness into a cooking pot; for there is no common 
matter to underlie the transistion from one genus to the other.”116 
Second, his logical understanding of the nature of contradiction allows Autrecourt 
to understand, like al-Ghazali before and Hume after him, the fundamental distinctness of 
every existence or matter of fact, and by extension that the existence of one does not and 
can never imply the existence of any other. That is, in any type of inference along the 
lines of: “‘A is; therefore B is’…[such that] these consequents differ from their 
antecedents, then…the implication is not evidently known…because the opposite of the 
consequent would be compatible with whatever is signified by the antecedent, without 
contradiction.”117 In this way the logical construction of the law of non-contradiction 
engenders a logical criterion of relations of necessity, the determination of which all the 
various systems of ancient metaphysics may be subjected to. Such was the project of al-
Ghazali and Autrecourt, and the result was devastating. When Autrecourt insists that, in 
accordance with the law of non-contradiction, “there is no power by which it can happen 
that the opposite of the consequent simultaneously obtains with the antecedent,” he is, 
like every other major figure linked to occasionalism, clearly rejecting Damian’s 
dialethetic voluntarism by which God could effect the impossible. This is integral to the 
                                                
115 Weinberg, 31. While Weinberg disagrees, it seems to me that the upshot of this dehiscence between 
substance and accident is inherently phenomenalistic, for we have no warrant, basis, or reason to assert 
some substantial ontology underlying perceptual accidents. Given that this substantial ontology is not 
granted in our experience, phenomenalism (or, at the very least, an intense agnosticism concerning 
ontology) seems to be the only possible conclusion. 
116 qtd. by McGinnis, 13 
117 Letter to Bernard, §15 
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critique of causation because it requires that, if something can happen (i.e. a miracle), it 
must be in itself possible (i.e. does not contain a contradiction). If miracles amount to 
God suspending the rules of nature to the extent of producing a contradiction, then the 
miraculous does not pose an issue to the Aristotelian causal scheme or the existence of 
natural necessity as such. However, the insistence that God cannot produce a 
contradiction, combined with the acceptance of scripturally attested miracles, is the drop 
of poison that destroys Aristotelianism or any other necessitarian causal ontology. 
 
The Problem of Induction 
While in the letters to Bernard, Autrecourt is concerned primarily with logical matters, he 
does seem to have been aware of the problem of induction, and indeed the logic of his 
critique is only one step removed. The veritable totem of Autrecourt’s philosophy is the 
maxim that a singular distinct thing posits no secundum quid; while the problem of 
induction is basically the claim that the congruence of two things posits no tertium quid. 
Indeed, as Weinberg argues, according to strictures of Autrecourt’s reasoning, “any 
distinction between the known and the unknown makes any connection between the 
known and the unknown open to question,” and thus “precludes an inference from one to 
the other.”118 Yet, this is only the opening gambit of the problem of induction, which 
fundamentally concerns the possibility of a non-deductive method of inference between 
the known and the unknown. 
                                                
118 Weinberg, 32. This claim is interpretive for Nicholas never—at least in works still extant—makes 
precisely that point. Yet it seems highly likely that a logician of Nicholas’ caliber would have grasped this 
point, for, in reducing demonstration to identity relations, Nicholas surely must have been aware that all 
demonstrations are thereby tautologies and can arrive at no new, previously unknown, information. 
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Along these lines, in his Exigit ad ordo, Autrecourt takes issue with Duns Scotus’ 
account of induction and causal explanation. Scotus had argued: 
Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but 
only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only 
frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and hold for 
all instances. He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his 
soul: “Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not 
free, is the natural effect of that cause.” This proposition is known to the 
intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause 
that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is 
the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce.119 
That is to say, natural causes are governed by the principle of sufficient reason and thus, 
ceteris paribus, cannot be denied their customary effects because these effects extend 
from their very nature. Following this metaphysical principle, Scotus maintains (in what 
is effectively a reiteration of Avicenna’ “hidden syllogism”) that the constants of 
experience allow us to infer with certitude that the “effect is not the result of what is 
merely incidental to such a nature but is rather the effect of this nature as such.”120 Scotus 
defends such inferences on the basis of Aristotelian epistemology: knowledge of “the 
species abstracted from the thing” is “a concurrent factor in all knowledge” concerning 
it.121 In knowledge of species, the particular is subsumed into the universal, part into the 
whole, such that, “from the very fact that [the intellect] grasps these terms, [it] has 
present to itself the necessary cause…of the conformity of this proposition with the terms 
that compose it.”122 While the conformity of terms to the proposition is synthetic, the 
proposition itself is analytic, for if the intellect were to affirm the terms, yet deny their 
                                                
119 Exigit, 109 
120 Exigit, 110 
121 Exigit, 104 
122 Exigit, 106-107 
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(definitional) implication, the result would be the coexistence of “two mutually repugnant 
acts of knowledge.”123 Scotus concedes that the “opposition” between these two mutually 
repugnant cognitions “is not precisely formal” (i.e. not strictly an instantiation of: 
‘A ¬A’), but insists: 
The one act of knowledge would be co-present with the other even though 
the first is the necessary cause of the very opposite of the second, which is 
impossible. For just as it is impossible for white to be at the same time 
black because the two are formally contraries, so it is also impossible to 
have the white where you have the precise cause of blackness. The 
necessity in this case is of such a kind that it would be a contradiction to 
have the one without the other.124 
Scotus here seems to confuse the logic of contraries with that of contradictories, which 
was a systemic problem in Aristotelian epistemology. Regardless, we can see the solution 
to the problem of induction this epistemology provides, for the apprehension of the 
species attaching to particulars provides “the simple expedient of discovering the 
definition of the thing known by way of division.”125 Scotus insists that our knowledge 
“seems to be complete with this” division of that which is accidental to that which is of 
the nature of the thing itself, “so that no further knowledge of truth over and above the 
aformentioned truths seems necessary.”126 That is to say, we can know that β is a ‘natural 
effect’ of α without any further suppositions concerning the conformity of future-α to 
past-α or unobserved-α to observed-α in regards to β. 
                                                
123 Exigit, 107 
124 Exigit, 108 
125 Exigit, 121 
126 Ibid. 
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 Scotus was not entirely satisfied with this solution and quickly backed away from 
his unadvised claim that causes producing contrary effects represents a “contradiction.” 
The criterion of such a contradiction in causal inferences lies in the epistemic abstraction 
of observed phenomena into general “self-evident principles,” such as when, from the 
observation of the moon’s eclipse, we reason “that when an opaque body is placed 
between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such object is 
prevented.”127 In such a scenario, the intermedial presence of an opaque body along with 
the continued illumination of the far surface would, to Scotus’ mind, represent a formal 
contradiction. Yet, Scotus concedes that often our experience does not afford us access to 
such self-evident principles, as in the case of our knowledge “that a certain species of 
herb is hot.”128 This fact is “a first principle known from experience,” yet we are 
completely unable to determine “why this attribute belongs to this particular subject;” or, 
as Locke has it, the necessary or internal connection of this attribute to any other 
possessed by the subject.129 Scotus remains convinced that “the uncertainty and 
fallibility” of our species knowledge of the hotness of the herb still follows from the ‘not-
free-cause’ epistemic criterion, but he admits that this case “is the very lowest degree of 
scientific knowledge.”130 The reason is that, barring a self-evident principle governing the 
explanation: 
[W]e have here no knowledge of the actual union of the terms but only a 
knowledge of what is apt to be the case. For if an attribute is an absolute 
entity other than the subject, it could be separated from its subject without 
                                                
127 Exigit, 110 
128 Exigit, 111 
129 Essay, IV, vi, §10, 500 
130 Exigit, 111 
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involving any contradiction. Hence, the person whose knowledge is based 
on experience would not know whether such a thing is actually so or not, 
but only that by its nature is it apt to be so [ita aptum natum est esse].131 
How Scotus believes we can have certain and infallible knowledge of what is only “apt to 
be the case” is entirely unclear, as is how we have any insight into the “nature” of the 
subject without a self-evident understanding of it. 
The confusion in Scotus’ reasoning, as well as his concession that experienced 
accidents are not always in accord with their customary subject and moreover can be 
separated from said subject “without contradiction,” was the open door through which 
Autrecourt drove his critique. The logical aspect of his critique, based on the principle of 
separability, had already been addressed. Yet, Autrecourt also takes issue with the claim 
that repeated and infallible experience of a conjunction between two things is 
demonstrative of the fact that one is the natural effect of the other. Autrecourt is adamant: 
[O]nly conjecturative habit132 [habitus conjecturativus], not certainty, is 
had concerning things known by experience, in the way in which it is said 
that rhubarb cures cholera, or that a magnet attracts iron. When it is 
proven [sc. by Scotus] that certitude [comes] from the proposition existing 
in the mind which states that what is usually produced by a non-free cause 
is its natural effect, I ask what you call a natural cause. A cause which has 
produced what has happened usually, and which will still produce in the 
future if [the cause] lasts and is applied? Then the minor premise is not 
known. Even if something has been produced usually, it is still not certain 
whether it must be produced in the future.133 
                                                
131 Exigit, 111 
132 The English translators of the Exigit (Kennedy, Arnold, and Milward) render ‘habitus conjecturativus’ 
as ‘opinion,’ a vague term that fails to fully capture Autrecourt’s meaning as well as its startling similarity 
to Hume’s later conclusion regarding the problem of induction. I have thus reproduced their translation for 
the rest of this passage, but replaced this term with a more appropriate metaphrase. 
133 Exigit, 237 
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This seems to be the basis of Autrecourt’s claim to Bernard that we do not even know if 
natural agents exist, for we can form no sound argument, either deductive or inductive, 
that anything is the cause of anything. Thus Autrecourt concludes, “one cannot infer one 
thing from another thing, or from the non-being of one thing the non-being of another, in 
an evident way, with the evidentness of the first principle.”134 That is to say, Scotus’ 
argument begins with the assumption that x is a natural (i.e. “not free”) cause and then 
argues that if, out of “a great many things” that could occur from α, some particular β is 
always observed to follow α, we may thus infer that the nature of α is the cause of β. Now 
Autrecourt rejects such an inference, at least at the level of certainty that Scotus proposes 
it to possess; yet the deeper question he is driving at is: ‘On what basis should we assume 
that x is a natural cause to begin with?’ Neither reason nor experience is sufficient to 
establish this designation. 
In “a certain disputation at the Black Friars,”135 Bernard had conceded the 
Ockhamist point that a sensation caused directly by God can never allow inference of the 
existence of the object seen, yet he nonetheless insisted that when a sensation is caused 
naturally by the object itself without the direct influence of God, such an inference is 
possible; and thus that natural causal knowledge can be attained by supposing the 
common course of nature [ex suppositione communis cursus naturae]. Weinberg 
interprets Autrecourt’s response in the first letter to Bernard on this point as invoking the 
rather obvious epistemological point made by Ockham that “we can never know when 
                                                
134 Quattor atriculi confessati, §3 
135 Prima epistola ad Bernardum, §5. The “Black Friars” was a common name for friars of the Dominican 
Order due to their black cappa. 
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the presupposition is justified,”136 and thus Bernard’s principle of causal explanation is 
otiose as it is predicated on a criterion the truth-value of which is unknowable. This is 
certainly a valid criticism; yet, in his first letter to Bernard where he addresses this 
argument, Autrecourt does not take issue with its untenable epistemic foundation, but 
rather proceeds straight to the logical heart of the matter, arguing: 
When from some antecedent, if produced by some agent, a certain 
consequent could not be inferred by a formal and evident implication, then 
from that antecedent, no matter by what other <agent> it be produced, 
that consequent could not be inferred either…if whiteness had been 
produced by some agent A and it could not be formally inferred ‘There is 
whiteness; therefore there is colour’—likewise this inference could not be 
made even if it had been produced by another, no matter which, agent.137 
Autrecourt’s argument here seems to be: if it cannot be inferred that antecedent α 
produces consequent β for the reason that God may intercede and produce β immediately 
without the presence of α (or γ instead of β even in the presence of α), then such an 
inference cannot be made in totum, regardless of conditional suppositions. This argument 
concerns the logic of inference rather than assumptions of induction. For Autrecourt, 
either β may be inferred from α or it may not be. If God (or any agent) is able to produce 
β without α, this is only because the two are logically independent of each other, and thus 
their disjunction logically possible. Therefore, the inferential gap between α and β is 
grounded not in God’s supervenient will, but vice versa. This perspicuous argument 
reinforces the fact that Autrecourt’s critique of causation, even more so than al-Ghazali’s, 
is at root logical rather than theological; religious concerns may have motivated his 
critique, but they are most certainly not its basis. 
                                                
136 Weinberg, 36. L.M. de Rijk, the translator of the letters to Bernard, seems to concur with Weinberg’s 
interpretation in his “Explanatory Notes.” 
137 Prima epistola ad Bernardum, §6 
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Epistola Nicholai ad Egidium 
A certain Egidius138 was given copies by Autrecourt of his first two letters to Bernard, 
and wrote a response to Autrecourt defending the philosophy of Aristotle (tanto 
philosopho) from his skeptical attacks. Egidius’ counter to Autrecourt’s arguments is 
based on two points: 
1) An epistemological distinction between “precisive” vs. “coacceptive 
apprehension.” Precisive apprehension is: “that by which some thing is 
apprehended with the exclusion of all that which is not this thing; the other is 
coacceptive, which is more complete than the first one, viz. that by which some 
thing is apprehended by a simple apprehension and is grasped while some other 
thing is grasped simultaneously, by the same simple apprehension, which occurs 
due to some dependence of one thing upon the other…For example, anyone who 
completely apprehends a relation, by necessity simultaneously grasps the 
correlate, and there must not be one intellection of the relation and another of the 
correlate.”139 
2) A metaphysical claim that: “A natural transmutation implies a substrate, for in the 
complete significate ‘natural transmutation’ ‘substrate’ is implied…’On this 
                                                
138 Egidius (also known as “Master Giles,” though not to be confused with Giles of Rome) is virtually 
unknown outside his appearance as a correspondent with Autrecourt, though it is possible that he is Giles 
de Feno. 
139 De epistola Nicholai ad Egidium, §3. This is Autrecourt’s summary of Egidius’ position which I have 
used because it is clearer and more concise that Egidius’ own extended and rather arcane account of the 
distinction. 
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argument, agents and patients, in the required circumstances, imply their actions 
to be,’ for the same reason.”140 
The first (epistemological) point is directed at Ockham and Autrecourt’s nominalism (to 
be taken up by Hume), which regards all perception as involving discrete particulars and 
thus, under Egidius’ division, to be precisive; whereas Egidius is convinced that there is 
another modality of perception that cognizes relations between particulars as well as the 
particulars themselves. This notion of “coacceptive apprehension” was later advanced 
(though not under such a nomen and almost certainly without knowledge of Egidius’ 
distinction) by William James and John Dewey as central to their doctrine of radical 
empiricism. While Autrecourt doesn’t specifically take issue with this distinction, as he is 
more concerned with logico-metaphysical issues, the problem with the notion of 
“coacceptive apprehension” has been already addressed in reference to Hume and 
Averroes in the previous chapter. For his own part, Autrecourt anticipates Hume’s 
criticism of such a notion: “It is not obvious that one thing is grasped more completely 
due to the fact that some other thing is grasped together with it, since it is not the case 
either that one thing is cognized due to the fact that some other is cognized. For if they 
are diverse things, it is not contradictory that one is cognized and the other is not.”141 
That is to say, given an empirically veridical insight into the “complete significate” of a 
thing that is relationally connected to another thing, the two terms connected would be 
both contained within the significate and thus and cognition of one would require, on 
                                                
140 Epistola Egidii ad Nicholaum, §§19-20 
141 De epistola Nicholai ad Egidium, §10 
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pain of contradiction, cognition of the other. Yet, as Hume and Autrecourt are adamant, 
this is never the case. 
 This point established, Autrecourt’s response to Egidius is directed primarily at 
the second (metaphysical) point. If the line of reasoning behind Egidius’ claim here 
seems familiar, that’s because it was the basis of Averroes’ response to al-Ghazali: viz. 
contained in the “complete significate” [significato perfecto] of a thing is its causal 
productions, and thus agents “imply their actions to be” in the same way that an accident 
implies a substrate. That is to say, what it is to be a particular agent, what demarcates that 
agent in the order of Being contains within it the effects it produces and thus the 
existence of that agent implies said effects analytically. In response, Nicholas tells 
Egidius: 
[I]t is patently clear that your [distinction is] not to the point. For…when a 
relation implies a correlate, this occurs when it is signified 
completely…[and] you say that when a relation is completely signified, it, 
then, implies its correlate to be, because in such an inference, the 
consequent is identical with the antecedent, or with part of what is 
signified by the antecedent.142 
That is to say, Egidius’ own reasoning conforms to Autrecourt’s logic: any implication 
between two terms is predicated on a relation of identity. Yet, Autrecourt is not satisfied 
with extracting this meager concession. He notes that, by including multiple terms or 
predications within the complete significate of a thing, such as “describing ‘accident’ in 
such a way as to take ‘accident’ to signify something that is in a substrate,”143 Egidius is 
effectively converting synthetic propositions/knowledge into analytic propositions-
                                                
142 De epistola Nicholai ad Egidium, §§4-5 
143 De epistola Nicholai ad Egidium, §12 
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knowledge. In doing so he safeguards the coherence and certitude of the inference from 
one to the other, but at the expense of rendering the conclusion tautological.144 Autrecourt 
impresses this point on Egidius with a less-than-subtle charientism: “using such a 
method, I think, one could easily prove anything at all. For if one supposes the word 
‘man’ to signify man as inseparable from ass, it is plain that it follows, then ‘There is a 
man; therefore there is an ass.’”145 
 As noted, this response of Egidius’ (a committed Aristotelian) to Autrecourt’s 
devastating employment of the ‘distinctness principle’ is structurally identical to the 
response offered by Averroes to al-Ghazali’s similar appeal to the principle described in 
the previous chapter. As Weinberg notes: “This is an important doctrine. But it seems that 
almost every generation of philosophers has to learn it all over again, not as a valid and 
important part of settled philosophical teaching, but as something new.”146 
 
Motivations and Conclusions of Autrecourt’s Critique 
The motivations behind Autrecourt’s acerbic anti-Aristotelianism are not entirely clear, 
though he does pointedly note in the first letter to Bernard that “Aristotle and others, did 
not…believe that God could impede the effects of natural causes.”147 As has been 
previously argued, even if Autrecourt based his skeptical investigations on such 
                                                
144 C.f. the ‘No true Scotsman’ fallacy discussed in Chapter 3, as well as the conclusion. 
145 De epistola Nicholai ad Egidium, §13 
146 Weinberg, 35 
147 Prima epistola ad Bernardum, §8 
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theological concerns and principles, like al-Ghazali, he did not end there but instead 
attempted to develop an epistemology compatible with such theological requirements, i.e. 
under the supposition that such requirements are not impossible. Thus, as Weinberg 
perspicuously notes: “Nicholaus draws the quite general conclusion that if theological 
dogmas render natural knowledge suspect, there are basic logical reasons for this. He 
goes on the elucidate these logical reasons and, by so doing, puts the discussion into the 
setting of pure philosophy.”148 
Regardless, John of Mirecourt, a sympathetic contemporary of Autrecourt, 
claimed that: 
Autrecourt satisfactorily deduces this: that no demonstration or 
investigation concerning any effects whatever, whence they come, or 
concerning natural causes or what kind of effect they produce or will 
produce, is in any way evident or certain; and to assert the opposite would 
contradict the divine liberty.149 
If Mirecourt is correct, it would seem that the theological motivations underpinning 
Autrecourt’s critique were identical to the Mutakallim and many of the Cartesian 
occasionalists. So what, then, is the relationship of Autrecourt to occasionalism? Was he 
brought, under the force of his rigorous skepticism, to the denial of secondary (i.e. 
natural) causation and the conclusion that God is the sole cause in the world? Among the 
articles condemned by Cardinal Curti in 1346, and which Autrecourt was forced to 
recant, are the following fragments from the fifth letter to Bernard (which has otherwise 
been lost): 
                                                
148 Weinberg, 12; emphasis added. This is precisely the epistemological insight that Damian was denied 
due to his voluntarist commitments. 
149 Qtd. by Weinberg, 92; cf. Rijk, “Explanatory Notes,” I,8, 115 
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I have claimed in the above-mentioned letter that we do not evidently 
know that anything other than God can be the cause of some effect. 
I have claimed in the above-mentioned letter that we do not evidently 
know that any cause which is not God to act as an efficient cause. 
I have claimed in the above-mentioned letter that we do not evidently 
know that any efficient cause is, or can be, natural. 
I have claimed in the above-mentioned letter that we do not evidently 
know whether there is, or can be, any efficient cause that is produced in a 
natural way.150 
Though these articles are ambiguously suggestive of an occasionalist position and, 
according to Mirecourt, Autrecourt shared some of the theological motivations 
underpinning occasionalism, all that can be strictly inferred from the above is that, pace 
Aquinas, Autrecourt is willing to concede occasionalism as a metaphysical and 
theological possibility. Perhaps he went further; or perhaps, like Hume, his inveterate 
skepticism and metaphysical reticence restrained him from doing so. The point remains 
that, in his extant works, Autrecourt developed these points strictly on the basis of an 
inquiry into matters of epistemology, never pushing their conclusions into a positive 
metaphysics.151 However, what is somewhat strange in the above articles is that, in spite 
of Autrecourt’s adamancy that, to quote another of the condemned articles, “nobody 
evidently knows that one thing is the end, or the cause, of some other thing;”152 
nonetheless, the first two articles above seem to quite flatly accept that God could be a 
cause and that we can know this evidently. But what justifies this assertion? As we shall 
see in the next chapter, an occasionalist argument that was most forcefully propounded 
by Malebranche goes: only the will of an omnipotent being is capable of forging a 
                                                
150 Quattor atriculi confessati, §§15-18 
151 See Weinberg, 66-7 
152 Quattor atriculi confessati, §26 
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necessary connection with that which it wills (and thus being a true cause), for it would 
be a contradiction that an omnipotent will should be impotent in any of its productions. 
Yet, not only does Autrecourt nowhere (among his extant works) make such an 
argument, but indeed seems to reject it. 
Recall Autrecourt’s argument against Bernard: “When from some antecedent, if 
produced by some agent, a certain consequent could not be inferred by a formal and 
evident implication, then from that antecedent, no matter by what other <agent> it be 
produced, that consequent could not be inferred either.”153 As seems evident from the 
italicized clause, this inferential deficiency would have to implicate the divine agency as 
well. That is to say, according to the above reasoning, the seemingly unavoidable 
conclusion would be: not only do we “not evidently know whether there is, or can be, any 
efficient cause that is produced in a natural way,” but we don’t know evidently if there is, 
or can be, any efficient cause at all. If we can’t infer from fire to burning flax, given their 
mutual independence, then we can’t infer from God’s will to burning flax either. The 
only way to knowledge of God’s efficacy is not, then, from evidence reducible to the first 
principle, but rather only through revelation. This conclusion, which, it will be 
remembered from chapter one, was only partially grasped by Hume,154 seems to have 
also eluded Autrecourt, even though, and even more so than with Hume, it is implicit 
within his own reasoning. 
                                                
153 Prima epistola ad Bernardum, §6; emphasis added 
154 Hume notoriously denied that we have any idea of causal efficacy and, in typical empiricist fashion, 
extended this claim to the divine as well; yet, as I argued in the first chapter, nowhere does he argue, or 
even seem to understand, that the distinctness between God’s will and its effect occludes any supposed 
necessary connection between them. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CARTESIAN MECHANISM AND OCCASIONALISM 
 
Does [matter] have its own active force? Several philosophers have thought so. Are those 
who deny it right to deny it? You can’t imagine that matter should be anything in itself. 
But how can you assert that in itself it does not have all the properties it needs? You don’t 
know what its nature is, and yet you deny it modes which are in its nature; for, after all, 
once it exists, it must be of a certain kind, it must have shape; and, if it necessarily has 
shape, could not other modes enter in its configuration? Matter exists; you know that only 
by your sensations. Alas! What good have all these intellectual subtleties been since man 
began to think? Geometry teaches us a great many truths, metaphysics very few. We 
weigh matter, we measure it, we decompose it; and if we want to take one step beyond 
these crude operations, we find impotence within us, and an abyss before us. 
     —Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophque 
 
All activity regarding things of the world is withheld from us; speculation alone is left. 
     —Geulincx, Ethica 
 
1. The Cartesian Inclination Towards Occasionalism 
When Etienne Gilson wrote the lectures that were later published as The Unity of 
Philosophical Experience in 1938, lectures devoted to documenting and tracing the 
permanence and continuity of particular ideas in this history of philosophy, the 
occasionalist tradition figured prominently in his presentation. This should come as no 
surprise, for if ever there was metaphysic suitable as an example of the astonishing 
longevity and mutability of philosophic ideas, it is occasionalism. Nowhere is this 
recrudescence more evident than in the possession of Cartesianism (a philosophy which 
sought to provide a rationalistic foundation for a New Science) by the ghost of 
occasionalism (a philosophy which sought to defend the miracles of Faith against the 
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rationalism of Science). Yet, by the time of Descartes, the nature of the occasionalist 
impulse had changed dramatically. Nowhere among the Cartesian occasionalists does one 
encounter the hand-wringing concern over the divine omnipotence or of reconciling 
philosophy with the testimony of Scripture emblematic of medieval philosophers. Even 
Malebranche, who, alone among his cohort, offered a few (weak) theological arguments 
in favor of occasionalism, never seemed bothered by the particular theological concerns 
of his medieval predecessors. Doubtless there were intellectual links between Cartesian 
occasionalism and its earlier brethren: Malebranche, for example, was aware of “certain 
theologians” criticized by Averroes who were skeptical of secondary causes;1 and 
explicitly cited “Biel and Cardinal d’Ailly” as “possible exceptions” to the general 
agreement among the “Scholastics” that “the efficacy that produces effects comes from 
the secondary cause as well as the primary.”2 Yet, Malebranche was the final rather than 
the seminal Cartesian occasionalist, and his familiarity with such predecessors was 
likewise singular among his cohort. 
Thus, and as with the origination of Latin nominalism, Cartesian occasionalism 
was a tendency and development largely organic to Cartesianism itself, which the 
successors of Descartes were driven to pursue exclusively under the pressure of severe 
problems in the Cartesian systems of physics and metaphysics, and not from any 
particular religious motivation. Moreover, and more importantly, the particular systems 
of physics and metaphysics they sought to defend placed them notably at odds with the 
concerns of their nominalist-occasionalist ancestors, for Cartesian metaphysics was 
                                                
1 Recherche, 660 
2 Recherche, 680 
  227 
rationalist rather than empiricist, and Cartesian physics was mechanistic, deterministic, 
and based on a deductive model of explanation. While Descartes had exhaustively 
extirpated the foibles of Aristotelian scholasticism from his ‘new philosophy,’ the school 
he founded was, at least in its underlying metaphysical structure, a kind of 
Democriteanism sans atoms.3 Democritus advocated a mechanistic and deterministic 
physics grounded on a strong epistemological distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities4 and famously claimed that he would “rather discover one cause than gain the 
kingdom of Persia.”5 Descartes advocated likewise and, in a youthful letter to Mersenne, 
confides: 
I have become so rash as to seek the cause of the position of each fixed 
star. For although they seem very irregularly distributed in various places 
in the heavens, I do not doubt that there is a natural order among them 
which is regular and determinate. The discovery of this order is the key 
and foundation of the highest and most perfect science of material things 
which men can ever attain. For if we possessed it, we could discover a 
priori [sc. by reasoning from cause to effect] all the different forms and 
essences of terrestrial bodies, whereas without it we have to content 
ourselves with guessing them a posteriori and from their effects.6 
                                                
3 This link was obvious to Descartes himself; or at least obvious enough to provoke a defensive reaction 
typical of him when faced with possible progenitors of his own views. In the Principia he insists: “The 
philosophy of Democritus differs from my own just as much as it does from the standard view <of Aristotle 
and others>.” (CSM I, 287) Yet, this claim seems greatly exaggerated, for, by his own admission, Descartes 
only really demurs from Democritus on the predictable issues of atomic indivisibility and the vacuum, as 
well as his vortical theory of gravity—which is nonetheless rather akin to the Democritean ‘whirl.’ (Ibid.) 
In his rebuttal of such a similarity, Descartes notably neither mentions nor credits Democritus with 
inventing the primary-secondary quality distinction. (See next footnote) 
4 “There are two sorts of knowledge, one genuine, one bastard. To the latter belong all the following: sight, 
hearing, smell, taste, touch. The real is separated from this.” (Frag. B11) 
5 Frag. B118 
6 CSMK III, 38. Even Locke, the arch anti-Cartesian, accepts Descartes’ conviction here: “I doubt not but if 
we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, 
we should know without trial several of their operations one upon the another, as we do now the properties 
of a square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, 
opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch…we should be able to tell beforehand that 
rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep, as well as a watchmaker can.” (Essays, Bk. 
IV, Ch. III, §25) 
  228 
Such rationalist-determinist commitments are particularly evident in Descartes’ frankly 
neo-Platonic conviction that the laws of nature could be deduced from the nature of God.7 
While Descartes’ successors cautiously backed away from such a presumption, they 
remained irrevocably bound to his deterministic physics and rationalist metaphysics, both 
of which were the veritable bête noir of medieval occasionalists from al-Ghazali to 
Autrecourt. 
 Given the friction generated by such contrary commitments, what were those 
particular features of Cartesianism that drove it nonetheless to the same metaphysical 
conclusion? What formed the seeds of the renascent burst of occasionalist philosophy in 
the seventeenth century after having disappeared almost entirely from the European 
intellectual scene during the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? 
 
1) The Mind-Body Problem 
As Descartes remarks in the Principia philosophae: 
[W]e understand very well how the different size, shape and motion of the 
particles of one body can produce various local motions in another body. 
But there is no way of understanding how these same attributes (size, 
shape and motion) can produce something else whose nature is quite 
different from their own…all this [is] unintelligible, but we know 
[nevertheless] that the nature of our soul is such that different local 
motions are quite sufficient to produce all the sensations in the soul. What 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 CSM I, 240. This conviction stands in direct and rather obvious contradiction to Descartes’ notorious 
modal voluntarism and doctrine of the created eternal truths, viz. that God freely and arbitrarily determined 
the eternal truths governing the Creation. (See CSM II, 291; CSMK III, 23-5) His nature might determine 
that he does not change them, having so determined their nature and instantiated their governance, but to 
claim that God’s nature determines their content itself is manifestly impossible to reconcile with any notion 
of their being freely chosen. 
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is more, we actually experience the various sensations as they are 
produced in the soul, and we do not find that anything reaches the brain 
from the external sense organs except for motions of this kind.8 
Such is the paradox of mind-body interaction that, while hardly unique to Descartes,9 was 
nonetheless forced by Cartesian dualism into a more radical and metaphysical framework 
than had been the case previously.10 Moreover, the problem was reinforced and 
exacerbated by Descartes’ causal principle that “there must at least be as much <reality> 
in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.”11 Descartes’ appeal to this 
principle, while propounded in Meditationes as the basis of his causal proof for the 
                                                
8 CSM I, 285. N.B., I have altered the meaning of this quote somewhat. Descartes’ directs the argument 
before the ellipsis against the notion of “substantial forms and real qualities” (i.e. how could purely 
quantitative features and local motions produce qualitative forms or dispositions?), but, in spite of 
Descartes’ reticence to draw such an inference, his argument clearly applies to the qualia of the mind as 
well. 
9 While not addressing the issue specifically in terms of mind-body causal interaction, Sextus anticipated 
the fundamental problem therein: “either…body is the cause of the incorporeal, or conversely that the 
incorporeal is the cause of body. But this…is impossible; for that which acts must touch the passive matter 
in order to act, and the passive matter must be touched, in order to be acted on, but the incorporeal is not of 
such a nature as either to touch or be touched. So then neither is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the 
incorporeal of body.” (Adversus mathematicos, ix. 216-217) 
 
10 While Descartes is often harshly criticized for this commitment—per impossible—to interactionism, I 
find his refusal to countenance the complete physiological separation of mind and body to be a refreshing 
and unfortunately rare piece of philosophical modesty. Descartes regarded the activity of the mind on the 
body to be manifestly evident—even though he could not explain it—and refused to deny something so 
manifestly evident simply out of deference to his own metaphysics; as he told Arnauld in 1648: “That the 
mind, which is incorporeal, can set the body in motion is something which is shown to us not by any 
reasoning or comparison with other matters, but by the surest and plainest everyday experience. It is one of 
those self-evident things which we only make obscure when we try to explain them in terms of other 
things.” (CSMK III, 358) Surely the history of philosophy is replete with enough figures who denied the 
obvious and upheld the absurd by allowing themselves to become beholden to the entailments of their own 
speculative reasoning without regard to the dictates of sense. For his own part, Descartes—correctly, at 
least as the matter currently remains—deemed the nature of the mind and its union with the body to be a 
deep mystery that had never been adequately explained. In the Avertissement de l'auteur touchant les 
cinquièmes objections, included with the Méditations metaphysiques (the 1647 French edition of the 
Meditations), Descartes complains acrimoniously to Clerselier about Gassendi’s captiousness, specifically 
concerning his questions: “how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it 
receive the forms of corporeal objects.” (CSM II, 275; See CSM II, 238-9 for Gassendi’s formulation) 
Regarding such inscrutables as the fodder for cheap criticism, he claims: “The most ignorant people could, 
in a quarter of an hour, raise more questions of this kind than the wisest men could deal with in a lifetime; 
and this is why I have not bothered to answer any of them.” (CSM II, 275) 
11 CSM II, 28 
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existence, is nonetheless required by his mechanistic physics, which demanded a new 
conception of the activity of the efficient cause distinct from the received Scholastic 
view—under which the efficient cause is that which directs the modulation of forms from 
one substance to another.12 The difficulty arises insofar as Descartes’ “containment” 
principle requires (pace the Scholastic13) that a cause and its effect share common (if not 
tautoousious) properties such that there is an ‘essential likeness’ between the two; but 
there can be no such likeness between res cogitans and res extensa.14 
Now, as noted in the Introduction, the classic ‘textbook view’ of occasionalism as 
an ad hoc solution to Descartes’ mind-body problem is almost entirely without warrant—
a point that, I trust, has by now been firmly established. Nonetheless, the mind-body 
problem was a particular area of concern for Descartes’ successors and occasionalism 
provided such a convenient solution that this ‘textbook’ interpretation was advanced 
early on, most notably by Leibniz and Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle. In a letter to 
Arnauld from 1687,15 Leibniz says: 
We are now concerned with knowing how the soul perceives the motions 
of its body, since we do not see any means of explaining through what 
channels the action of an extended mass is transmitted to an indivisible 
being. The common run of Cartesians admit that they cannot give a reason 
for this union; the authors of the hypothesis of occasional causes consider 
it a nodus vindice dingus, cui Deus ex machina intervenire debeat. [knot 
worthy for God to intervene ‘ex machina’].16 
                                                
12 Clatterbaugh 1999, 19; Physics, 194b30 
13 See Suaréz, Disputationes metaphysicae, 18. 9 
14 Clatterbaugh 199, 22-27 
15 I.e. shortly after the publication of his Discours de métaphysique (1686), which grew out of their earlier 
correspondence. 
16 “Letter to Arnauld, 9 Oct. 1687,” Philosophical Papers, 522. Leibniz is paraphrasing a claim made by 
Horace in the Ars poetica. It should be noted that Leibniz’s interpretation was not innocent, but designed to 
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2) The Winnowing of the Peripatetic Model of Causation 
Classical metaphysics followed Aristotle’s quadripartite division of causality in 
Metaphysics Δ between material, formal, efficient, and final causes; indeed, this division 
was multiplied extensively in medieval philosophy—with the obvious exception of the 
nominalist tradition. By the time of Bacon and Descartes, however, ancient and medieval 
doctrines of causal explanation were suffering considerable critical scrutiny, and this 
scrutiny naturally extended to the metaphysics of causation itself. Even though the major 
figures of the early seventeenth century still spoke of and ruminated under the working 
assumption of the Aristotelian causal division, a transformation was clearly unfolding. 
 This transformation is most evident in Descartes’ embrace of the Democritean 
mechanistic position that all of the operations of nature can be explained strictly in terms 
of the local motions of bodies operating under discernable laws of collision. Mechanism 
is thus bound, on the basis of its own founding shibboleth, to an epistemology of causal 
explanation focused exclusively on efficient causality, viz. what Aristotle had defined as 
the “moving cause.”17 While the other three causes remained metaphysically viable for 
Descartes and his immediate contemporaries, insofar as metaphysics must needs follow 
epistemology, they were exposed to continual atrophy in philosophical discussions during 
the course of the early modern period. This was true even early on: Descartes had almost 
                                                                                                                                            
emphasize the virtues of the pre-estalished harmony over those of occasionalism, as well as downplay the 
similarities between them, as Leibniz was routinely—and to his evident irritation at times—pressed to 
distinguish his system of pre-established harmony from the system of occasional causes. For Fontenelle’s 
interpretation, see Schmaltz, 9. 
17 De generatione animalium, 732a3 
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nothing to say about material causes, which was unsurprising given his conception of 
bodies, all of which are materially identical as rei extensa, and thereby materially 
incapable of serving as instigators—much less explanations—of effect diversity. 
Moreover, in the Fourth Set of Replies to Arnauld, Descartes explains his general 
conception of causation as the bestowal of existence from cause to effect and, just like 
Avicenna, maintains that “what derives its existence ‘from another’ will be taken to 
derive its existence from that thing as an efficient cause.”18 When, in the Fifth Set of 
Objections, Gassendi (characteristically) sought to extend this principle to the material 
cause as well,19 Descartes flatly responded: “it is unintelligible that perfection of form 
should ever pre-exist in a material cause; it can do so only in a formal cause.”20 Yet, as 
will be seen shortly, Descartes was also notoriously hostile to the notion of formal 
causality and in particular to its instantiation in ‘substantial forms.’ 
Of the four Peripatetic causes, Descartes’ greatest aspersion was reserved for final 
causality. In the Meditationes, he concedes that there are “many instances where I do not 
grasp why or how certain things were made by [God].”21 On this basis Descartes 
concludes: 
For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, 
whereas the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I 
also know without more ado that he is capable of countless things whose 
causes are beyond my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the 
customary search for final causes to be totally useless in physics; there is 
                                                
18 CSM II, 252, al-Ilahiyyat, 6.1.2, 194 
19 CSM II, 201 
20 CSM II, 252 
21 CSM II, 38-9 
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considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating the 
impenetrable purposes of God.22 
It is God’s freedom to act and create beyond that which the finite mind can conceive or 
ever hope to discern a sufficient reason for that consigns teleology to the domain of 
meaningless speculation.23 This point Descartes reiterated three years later in the 
Principia: “When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations 
from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them…For 
we should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans.”24 In the 
Replies to Gassendi, Descartes argues that the claims he makes in support of final causes 
(sc. causation in biology),25 “should [instead] be applied to efficient causation.” He 
concludes: 
In ethics...where we may often legitimately employ conjectures, it may 
admittedly be pious on occasion to try to guess what purpose God may 
have had in mind in his direction of the universe;26 but in physics…such 
                                                
22 CSM II, 39; emphasis added. In his explanation of this passage in the “Conversation with Burman,” 
Descartes notes: “This rule—that we must never argue from ends—should be carefully heeded. For, firstly, 
the knowledge of a thing’s purpose never leads us to knowledge of the thing itself; its nature remains just as 
obscure to us. Indeed, this constant practice of arguing from ends is Aristotle’s greatest fault. Secondly, all 
the purposes of God are hidden from us, and it is rash to want to plunge into them…It is here that we go 
completely astray. We think of God as a sort of superman, who thinks up such-and-such a scheme, and tries 
to realize it by such-and-such a means. This is clearly unworthy of God.” (CSMK III, 314) 
23 This voluntarist maxim is the font of the scission in early modern rationalism between the Cartesians and 
the Leibnizians. All of Leibniz’s efforts to preserve particular insights from the Scholastics (sc. the 
existence of entelechies) and the notion of final causality to which they are bound) hinged on his rejection 
of Cartesian voluntarism and his intellectualist insistence that the ways of God are metaphysically 
intelligible and—at least in theory—epistemologically discernable. (DM, §2-3, 6) 
24 CSM I, 202 
25 CSM II, 216 
26 This claim contradicts Descartes’ moral voluntarism, as expressed in the Sixth Set of Replies, where he 
sides with Euthyphro against Socrates by insisting that morality itself is posterior to and determined by 
God’s will: “If some reason for something’s being good had existed prior to his preordination, this would 
have determined God to prefer those things which it was best to do. But on the contrary, just because he 
resolved to prefer those things which are now to be done, for this very reason, in the words of Genesis, 
‘they are good’; in other words, the reason for their goodness depends on the fact that he exercised his will 
to make them so.” (CSM, II 294) If this is the case, then any ethical speculations about “what purpose God 
may have had in mind in his direction of the universe” necessarily beg the question. 
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conjectures are futile. We cannot pretend that some of God’s purposes are 
more out in the open than others; all are equally hidden in the inscrutable 
abyss of his wisdom.27 
By restricting causality to efficient causality, and defining such in terms of the bestowal 
or deriving of existence, the stage has clearly been set for an occasionalist synthesis—for 
there is only one being who is obviously capable of such feats. 
 
3) The Rejection of ‘Scholastic Forms’ and ‘Causal Powers’ 
Descartes’ notorious hostility to the ‘substantial forms’ of the Scholastics stemmed from 
several considerations. In a letter to Regius, he incisively describes such forms as having 
been “introduced by philosophers solely to account for the proper actions of natural 
things, of which they were supposed to be the principles and bases.”28 Yet, Descartes is 
adamant that “no natural action at all can be explained by these substantial forms,” 
insofar as they “account” for the “proper actions of natural things” by metaphysical 
reification rather than epistemological explanation; and are thus “occult” and 
inscrutable,29 and moreover otiose and redundant as explanations of phenomena, which, 
as Descartes is adamant, may be entirely accounted for strictly in terms of local 
movements: 
For you may posit ‘fire’ and ‘heat’ in the wood, and make it burn as much 
as you please: but if you do not suppose in addition that some of its parts 
                                                
27 CSM II, 258. This claim quite plainly contradicts Descartes’ notion in the Principia that the laws of 
nature may be derived from God’s nature. (CSM I, 240) 
28 CSMK III, 208 
29 “If they [sc. the Scholastics] say that some action proceeds from a substantial form, it is as if they said 
that it proceeds from something they do not understand; which explains nothing.” (CSMK III, 208-9) 
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move about and detach themselves from their neighbors, I cannot imagine 
it undergoing any alteration or change. On the other hand, if you take 
away the ‘fire,’ take away the ‘heat,’ and keep the wood from ‘burning’; 
then, provided only that you grant me there is some power which puts its 
finer parts into violent motion and separates them from the coarser parts, I 
consider that this power alone will be able to bring about all the same 
changes that we observe in the wood when it burns.30 
What is notable here is that this “some power” which induces such violent motion is 
treated entirely in the abstract by Descartes: he certainly does not posit it as inhering 
intrinsically in the wood itself. Where and by what means such a movement of parts is 
generated is—pace Scholasticism—not of particular consequence to explaining a 
particular causal interaction in the Cartesian scheme. 
The scheme of Cartesian mechanistic physics allowed for (or perhaps even 
entailed) a novel argument against the possibility of corporeal efficacy: the so-called 
“inertness argument.” This followed from Descartes’ rejection of Scholastic substantial 
forms, combined with his insistence that the qualities of body are exhausted by their mere 
geometric extension and whatever minimal features may be directly derived from as 
much.31 The point is, for Descartes, we have a clear and distinct idea of the essence of 
body as res extensa.32 Nowhere contained in this purely quantitative idea is there any 
notion of qualitative powers, forms, disposition, potentialities, and the like.33 From this 
minimalist and quantitative conception of matter, Descartes concluded that matter was 
                                                
30 CSM I, 83 
31 CSM II, 20-21; CSM I, 89. The identification of body with bare extension was not novel to Descartes. 
Sextus Empiricus had pointed out: “while some properties are inseparable from the things [to] which they 
belong—as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to 
conceive Body,—others are separated from the thing [to] which they belong, and it still remains when they 
are removed.” (Adversus mathematicos, vii. 270-271) 
32 CSM I, 227 
33 CSM I, 224 
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existentially passive and inert and derided Scholastic-Aristotelian epistemology of causal 
explanation as fundamentally animistic.34 
In the Sixth Replies, Descartes discusses his youthful conception of gravity or 
“heaviness,” noting that it was based on a (typically Scholastic) equivocation between 
notions of mind and notions of body: 
[W]hat makes it especially clear that my idea of gravity was taken largely 
from the idea I have of the mind is the fact that I thought that gravity 
carried bodies towards the centre of the earth as if it had some knowledge 
of the centre within itself. For this surely could not happen without 
knowledge, and there can be no knowledge except in a mind.35 
While this animistic tendency of Aristotelian causal metaphysics might be assumed to 
derive from the application of final causality, it is actually just as apparent in discussions 
of efficient causality as well. As Aquinas says: 
[Real relations exist in] those things which by their own very nature are 
ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination…as in a heavy body 
is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in 
the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same 
applies to other things.36 
If anything, this sort of reasoning makes clear that, within the Peripatetic framework, 
efficient and final causality cannot be definitively severed; yet, such was possible in the 
Cartesian framework and indeed was required for the coherency of a strictly mechanistic 
explanation of gravity. Moreover, this rejection of Aristotelian-Scholastic ‘animism’ was 
seen to entail occasionalism early on: as Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole pointed out 
as early as 1662 in the Logique de Port-Royal: 
                                                
34 CSM I, 247; Ott 2008, 178 
35 CSM II, 298. See also CSMK III, 216 and CSMK III, 358. 
36 Summa theologica, 1, q. 28, a. 1 
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[I]t is clear and certain that no body can cause its own motion, because 
matter is in itself indifferent to motion and rest, so it can be determined to 
one or the other state only by an external cause. Since this cannot go on to 
infinity, it is absolutely necessary that God imparted motion to matter, and 
that he conserves it there.”37 
That is, unlike conservationism or Thomistic concurrentism, an extended body’s essential 
indifference to motion or rest—which, for the Cartesians, was the sole mode of 
causality—required that God impart motion to matter both continuously (pace 
conservationism) and alone, without aid of the body itself (pace concurrentism). 
 
4) Cartesian Nominalism 
In one of their most marked contrasts with the Scholastics, Descartes and his followers 
regarded motion to be a mode of body, a view forced by, as Thomas Lennon notes, “their 
negative response to the first of Porphyry’s famous questions concerning universals.”38 
That is, “whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone.”39 
The Cartesians chose door number two, denying the Scholastic presumption of a 
metaphysically real distinction between a thing and its qualities, and instead insisting that 
there was no ontic difference between the “modes of being” [façons d’ être] of a thing 
and the thing itself.40 Given this reduction, it would be impossible to conceive of 
motion—a mode—as being transferred from one body to another body in the Scholastic 
conception of an accidental property being lost by one substance and absorbed or 
                                                
37 Burkoer, 128 
38 Lennon, 1974, 33-4 
39 Isagoge VI.3.1; trans. Bosley 1997, p. 358 
40 Lennon, 1974, 34 
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reinstantiated by another; and hence motion was incapable of communication between 
bodies. 
The precise reasoning behind this claim is typically unclear in explication and 
most Cartesians simply asserted rather than argued for it. One way of understanding the 
issue is: were a mode to be detached from a substance in which it inheres and transferred 
to another substance, it would necessarily—during the moment of transfer—exist without 
any subject of inhesion: a metaphysical impossibility. Yet, this rejection of “free 
properties” was the view of the Aristotelians (in terms of accidents) as much as the 
Cartesians (in terms of modes).41 Antione Le Grand offers the best explanation I have 
found for the docrtine: 
Motion is not a Real Quality, as the Peripateticks suppose, but only a 
Mode which is not distinct from the Body. For we cannot conceive it to be 
any thing else, but the change whereby a Body is translated, or withdraws 
from some other Bodies that immediately touch it….As we cannot 
conceive an Application to be made to different Parts, without conceiving 
a Body that applies it self to them; therefore we are to judge that Motion is 
not an Absolute Entity, as has been said before, but only a Modification of 
a Body that is moved…Whence it appears, that Motion and Quiet superadd 
nothing more to a Body moved or Resting, that Figure superadds to a Body 
figured.42 
Thus, the Cartesian quantitative conception of motion entails that motion cannot involve 
any transumptive exchange of some accident or property, but rather involves only the 
                                                
41 As Aquinas says: “it is laughable to say that a body does not act because an accident does not pass from 
subject to subject. For a hot body is not said to give off heat in this sense, that numerically the same heat 
which is in the beating body passes over into the heated body. Rather, by the power of the heat which is in 
the heating body, a numerically different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was 
previously in it in potency. For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it 
reduces the passive subject from potency to act.” (Summa contra gentiles, 3.69) The notable exception here 
was the case of the Sacrament, which required some special pleading: “even though the common order of 
nature requires an accident to be in a subject, the order of grace has a special reason for requiring accidents 
to be without a subject in this sacrament.” (Summa theologiae, 3a, q.77 a.1) 
42 LG, I, IV, 14, 116 
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relational change of position relative to ambient bodies.43 It is thus no different from the 
body itself; that is, as a position in the plenum of extension. 
 
5) Continual Creation 
Lastly, there is Descartes’ acceptance and advancement of the doctrine that God 
preserves the world via continual creation44—a customary supposition of occasionalism 
since the Ash’arites. While this line of argument has and will not be considered in this 
dissertation, it is worth noting at this juncture that Descartes’ commitment to it is—like 
so many of his metaphysical views—tepid and insufficiently distinct from what might be 
maintained by a Thomistic concurrentist to qualify incontrovertibly as occasionalism. His 
successors, however, would interpret the matter rather differently. 
 
2. Descartes’ Position on Occasionalism 
I do not intend to belabor the question of Descartes’s own views on occasionalism. The 
debate is of considerable age,45 has been discussed almost ad nauseum in the scholarly 
literature, and it seems apparent at this point in the debate (at least to me) that the only 
position capable of being coherently defended with regard to Descartes’ often cryptic and 
                                                
43 See CSM I, 252 
44 See Meditationes CSM II, 33, as well as the Principia philosophiae, CSM I, 200. 
45 Rochon—the scholastic critic of occasionalism quoted in the Introduction—claims that “all Cartesians 
agree that God alone is able to cause motion.” (Lettre d’un philosophe à un cartésienne, Art. 32; trans, by 
Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 213) But, Leibniz and Villemandy pointed out that this had 
not been the considered opinion of Descartes himself. (Système nouveau, 143; Traité de l’efficace, 7-8) 
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contradictory remarks is that his own views on the metaphysics of causation were deeply 
internally incoherent.46 Leibniz’s famous complaint in the Système nouveau about 
Descartes’ interactionism is (as Leibniz himself notes) apropos of his causal views tout 
court: 
[W]hen I began to meditate about the union of soul and body, I felt as if I 
were thrown…into the open sea. For I could not find any way of 
explaining how the body makes anything happen in the soul, or vice versa, 
or how one substance can communicate with another created substance. 
Descartes had given up the game at this point, as far as we can determine 
from his writings.47 
It was this very incoherence and ‘giving up the game’ that inspired Descartes followers—
like in the schools of classical antiquity—to “correct” his interactionist corrigenda, render 
his philosophy more internally coherent, and thus establishing the rules of a new game.48 
Leibniz explains: 
But his disciples, seeing that the common opinion [sc. interactionism] is 
inconceivable, judged that we sense the qualities of bodies because God 
                                                
46 See Clatterbaugh 1999, 26 
47 Système nouveau, 142-3 
48 Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in the psudeo-expositional writings of Louis de La Forge 
and Antoine Le Grand, who actively interpret Descartes as an occasionalist and either ignore or attempt to 
allegorize and explain away his views to the contrary. Like some Pythagorean, Le Grand even claimed that 
his “whole work contains nothing else, but [Descartes's] opinions, or what may clearly and distinctly be 
deduced from them.” Even Malebranche interprets Descartes as an occasionalist noting that: “It is 
ordinarily supposed that bodies can move each other, and this opinion is even attributed to Descartes, 
contrary to what he expressly says in articles 36 and 37 of the second part of his Principles of Philosophy.” 
(Recherche, 677) Malebranche, however, at least seems aware of passages from Descartes that suggest 
otherwise and retorts that “Descartes was not given to us by God to teach us everything that can possibly be 
known, as Averroes says of Aristotle.” (463) Malebranche further notes: “If we believed [Descartes] to be 
infallible, we would read him without studying him; we would believe what he said without understanding 
it; we would learn his views as we learn histories, which would not form the mind. He himself warns that in 
reading his works we must take care that he is not mistaken, and we must believe nothing he says unless we 
are obliged to do so by the evidence. For he bears no resemblance to those false scholars who, usurping an 
unjustified domination over minds, want everyone to take them at their world, and who, instead of making 
men into disciples of internal truth by proposing only clear ideas to them, subject them to the authority of 
pagans and, through arguments they do not understand, force them into views they cannot comprehend.” 
(Ibid.) 
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causes thoughts to arise in the soul on the occasions of motions of matter, 
and that when our soul, in turn, wishes to move the body, it is God who 
moves the body for it. And since the communication of motions also 
seemed inconceivable to them, they believed that God imparts motion to a 
body on the occasion of the motion of another body. This is what they call 
the system of occasional causes.49 
This tendency of Descartes’ “disciples” will not be examined in this dissertation. Rather, 
I shall limit myself to considering Descartes’ own views on the metaphysics of causation. 
Though scattered throughout his oeuvre, Descartes does clearly commit himself to 
two primary metaphysical principles of causality: 
1) A cause must be greater than its effect, or, what is the same, a cause cannot give 
what it does not possess, for otherwise the effect would come from nothing.50 
2) God is the total efficient cause of the world and all secondary causes are 
dependent on his primary causal activity.51 
While both of these principles (particularly the latter) are vaguely occasionalist, neither 
were in any way novel to Descartes.52 Moreover, from my own reading of his various 
explanations of causal phenomena, both finite and divine, it seems frankly impossible to 
systematically defend the claim (as routinely made by his “disciples”) that Descartes 
himself was an occasionalist. Indeed, it seems evident that, while he had little but 
contempt for the Thomistic model of causal explanation, Descartes fundamentally 
accepted Aquinas’ concurrentist model of causal metaphysics. On this point I am in 
                                                
49 Système nouveau, 143 
50 CSM II, 28 
51 CSMK III, 25 
52 Concerning the intellectual history of the first, see: Llody, A. C. “The Principle that the Cause is Greater 
than its Effect.” Phronesis 21 (1976): 146.-156. 
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agreement with Kenneth Clatterbaugh, who points out that: “Many of Aquinas’s remarks 
on causation bear a striking parallel to those of Descartes; the issues that Aquinas raises 
are so similar to those which concern Descartes that even their examples overlap.”53 
Indeed, when Gassendi objects to Descartes’ doctrine of continual creation, Descartes 
retorts that the matter is chose jugée: 
When you deny that in order to be kept in existence we need the continual 
action of the original cause, you are disputing something which all 
metaphysicians affirm as a manifest truth—although the uneducated often 
fail to think of it because they pay attention only to the causes of coming 
into being and not the causes of being itself.54 
That the “metaphysicians” Descartes has in mind here are Aquinas and his legion 
followers is evidenced in his latter explanation, which trades on the seminal Thomistic 
distinction between a causa secundum fieri [cause of becoming] and a causa secundum 
esse [cause of being].55 Now, in the Thomistic framework, this distinction serves not only 
to define the need for God’s preservation of the world in esse, but also of the real activity 
of a secondary causes in fieri—a point on which Descartes seems to concur. 
                                                
53 59. This is also true in Descartes’ discussion of the divine omnipotence and his doctrine of the created 
eternal truths, though he is clearly opposing Aquinas on this point. Cf. CSM, II 291 and CSMK, III 235 to 
Summa contra Gentiles, 2.25. 
54 CSM II, 254. Garber clams that, in rebutting Gassendi’s claims, “he seems to have turned directly to his 
copy of St. Thomas.” (Descartes Metaphysical Physics, 265) Gassendi wasn’t always so dissonant with St. 
Thomas. In the Syntagma philosophicum, he reiterates several of Aquinas’ arguments against 
occasionalism, such as the principle that God’s immediate causal interference in all of Nature would detract 
from his greatness and power. (1.239a) 
55 Summa theologiae, 1a, q.104 a.1 
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For example, in his Notae in programma quoddam [Comments on a Certain 
Broadsheet], a polemic against his prodigal student Regius (an enthusiastic Cartesian 
turned empiricist56), Descartes appeals to this distinction, noting: 
[S]omething can be said to derive its being from something else for two 
different reasons: either the other thing is its proximate and primary cause, 
without which it cannot exist, or it is a remote and merely accidental 
cause, which gives the primary cause occasion to produce its effect at one 
moment rather than another.57 
While Descartes is specifically speaking of our idea of God here, this claim has been 
interpreted to include all of our ideas, for, as the Meditationes make clear: we can have 
ideas of bodies without their actual existence (e.g. when dreaming),58 but we can have no 
ideas at all without God;59 thus God must be considered as the “proximate and primary 
cause” of our ideas, while bodies can only serve as the “occasion” for the primary cause 
to produce its respective ideas. Yet, not but a page earlier, Descartes had averred: 
There is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind or the faculty 
of thinking, with the sole exception of those circumstances which relate to 
experience, such as the fact that we judge that this or that idea which we 
now have immediately before our mind refers to a certain thing situated 
outside us. We make such a judgment not because these things transmit 
the ideas to our mind through the sense organs, but because they transmit 
something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind occasion to form 
these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it.60 
                                                
56 At an earlier point, during the intense controversy between himself of Voetius, Descartes had appealed to 
through Huygens to the Dutch Stadtholder, Frederik Hendrik, for protection for himself and his student 
Regius. (Israel, 585) Regius was not the only Cartesian to attempt a reconciliation with empiricism. See 
Lennon and Easton, The Cartesian Empiricism of François Bayle (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992). 
Notably, neither Regius nor F. Bayle were occasionalists. 
57 CSM I, 305 
58 CSM II, 13-14 
59 CSM II, 48-49  
60 CSM I, 304; emphasis added. 
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This passage clearly commits Descartes to the opinion that, even if bodies are a “merely 
accidental cause” and “occasion” for the activity of a higher cause (either God or the 
mind itself), the existence of such a transmission means that they must play some 
metaphysically real (sc. causal) role in the production of their associated ideas. That is to 
say, while corporeal motions impacting the organs of sense are occasions for the 
autochthonous production of ideas in the mind, they are not mere occasions. 
 Such a confusion is typical of Descartes’ reasoning and of his repeated failure to 
follow the premises of his own metaphysics to their logical conclusion. I would argue 
that the ambiguity and incoherence of Descartes’ position is the result of his ignorance of 
or unwillingness to distinguish between thoroughgoing occasionalism and the traditional 
theological bromide concerning God’s status as the total cause of everything—both of 
which may be understood to entail divine preservation of the world through continual 
creation. While Descartes made many asseverations on the nature of causality that struck 
his occasionalist successors as fundamentally aligned with their metaphysic, I think it 
likely that Descartes either lacked any real awareness of occasionalism as a metaphysical 
option, or did not consider his belief in God “as the efficient cause of all things” to be 
incompatible with real causality in nature. As will be recalled from Chapter 3, Aquinas 
was himself often in agreement with certain fundamental principles of occasionalism, 
even conceding that “every operation of a thing is reducible to [God] as its cause;”61 yet, 
like Descartes, he did not view such a concession as incompatible with an order of 
substantial causality distinct from God’s. This position was reiterated by early-modern 
                                                
61 Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.67 
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Scholastics such as Suaréz in his writings on efficient causation and divine concurrence,62 
and although Descartes caustically attacked this conception of causal explanation, it 
seems evident that he did not consider the need to extend this attack into matters of 
theological metaphysics, but merely sought to replace an ancient ossified model of 
natural causation with a modern mechanistic one.63 Under this interpretaton, the 
ambiguity and incoherence of Descartes’ pseudo-occasionalism can be understood as an 
extension of the ambiguity and incoherence of Thomistic concurrentism, albeit rendered 
more obvious and glaring due to Descartes’ new metaphysics of causation, which was 
irresolvably inclined towards occasionalism. While this upshot—like its most famous 
instantiation: the mind/body problem—was either lost on Descartes or intentionally 
ignored, it was most certainly apparent to his immediate successors. 
That said, I must avoid oversimplifying this matter and it needs be noted that 
Descartes frequently makes claims or uses terminology suggestive of occasionalism; but, 
under close examination, none of these instances pass muster as being unequivocally 
advanced beyond Thomistic concurrentism. For example, in the Principia, he proposes 
that “We should…consider [God] as the efficient cause of all things.”64 Yet, the specific 
nature of this divine efficient causality is most unclear: 
[The cause of the nature of motion] is in fact twofold: first, there is the 
universal and primary cause—the general cause of all the motions in the 
world; and second there is the particular cause which produces in an 
individual piece of matter some motion which it previously lacked. Now 
                                                
62 See Disputationes metaphysicae, 20-22 
63 This is perhaps unsurprising given Descartes well attested aversion to becoming bogged down in 
theological disputes. 
64 CSM I, 202 
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as far as the general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me that this is 
no other than God himself.65 
Shortly after, Descartes claims that the laws of nature are grounded not in any supposed 
‘powers’ and ‘natures’ of creatures, but in the immutable regularity of the divine will: 
God’s perfection involves not only his being immutable in himself, but 
also his operating in a manner that is always utterly constant and 
immutable…Thus, God imparted various motions to the parts of matter 
when he first created them, and he now preserves all this matter in the 
same way, and by the same process by which he originally created it.66 
This was, of course, a fundamental principle of occasionalist physics from al-Ghazali to 
Malebranche. But what about the “particular cause” Descartes speaks of? In the Traité de 
la lumière, while attempting to explain the nature of curvilinear motion, Descartes claims 
that: 
God alone is the author of all the motions in the world in so far as they 
exist and in so far as they are rectilinear; but it is the various dispositions 
of matter which render them irregular and curved.67 Likewise, the 
theologians teach us that God is also the author of all our actions, in so far 
as they exist and in so far as they have some goodness, but it is the various 
dispositions of our wills that can render them evil.68 
                                                
65 CSM I, 240; emphasis added. This passage was later cited by Louis de La Forge in support of body-body 
occasionalism and he directs his reader to “pay particular attention” to the section I have italicized. See 
Traité, 149. 
66 Principa philosophae, CSM I, 240. Descartes’ allows for the possibility of miracles under such 
immutability by claiming that “there are some changes whose occurrence is guaranteed either by our own 
plain experience or by divine revelation, and either our perception or our faith shows us that these take 
place without any change in the creator; but apart from these we should not suppose that any other changes 
occur in God’s works, in case this suggest some inconstancy in God.” (Ibid.) 
67 Descartes argues that the motion God imparts to the world is simple due to the fact that it is produced at 
every instant in His preservation of the world: “This rule [sc. the rectilinear composition of curvilinear 
motion] is based on the same foundation as the other two: it depends solely on God’s preserving each thing 
by a continuous action, and consequently on his preserving it not as it may have been some time earlier but 
precisely as it is at the very instant that he preserves it. So it is that of all motions, only motion in a straight 
line is entirely simple and has a nature which may be wholly grasped in an instant…By contrast, in order to 
conceive circular motion, or any other possible motion, it is necessary to consider at least two of its 
instants, or rather two of its parts, and the relation between them.” (CSM I, 96-7) 
68 CSM I, 97 
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While most occasionalists might otherwise agree with the second sentence of the above,69 
they would never concede anything like the first, as it seems to quite patently ascribe 
causal activity to created material things. Indeed, such a position seems decidedly 
concurrentist, as is evident in Descartes claim: 
[I]t follows of necessity, from the mere fact that he continues thus to 
preserve [matter], that there must be many changes in its parts which 
cannot, it seems to me, properly be attributed to the action of God 
(because that action never changes), and which therefore I attribute to 
nature. The rules by which these changes take place I call the ‘laws of 
nature.’70 
This is virtually identical to an argument made against occasionalism by Aquinas; viz. 
God’s simplicity and immutability would not allow for the diversity of effects observed 
in the world if it is shorn of natural secondary causes.71 Thus, it seems that, for Descartes, 
the immutable will of God serves to establish the bare universal laws of nature, while the 
arraignments and interactions of the material units therein serve as real causes of 
particular changes and activities observed therein.72 He abandons Aquinas’ potency-
activity model of causation and reduces the notion entirely to local motions and 
collisions, but it is these local motions and collisions that are the real cause of the 
complex (sc. curvilinear) motions seen in the world, even though they are operant only 
upon the underlying contribution of simple rectilinear motion provided by God. 
                                                
69 With the exception of Le Grand. 
70 CSM I, 92-3 
71 “[I]f no lower cause, and especially no bodily one, performs any operation, but, instead, God operates 
alone in all things, and if God is not changed by the fact that He operates in different things, then different 
effects would not follow from the diversity of things in which God operates…Therefore, the causality of 
the lower type of effects is not to be attributed to divine power in such a way as to take away the causality 
of lower agents.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.69) 
72 This point is all but confirmed in Descartes’ claim: “From God’s immutability we can also know certain 
rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary and particular causes of the various motions we see in 
particular bodies.” (CSM I, 240) This is essentially an inversion of the occasionalist position. 
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 Yet, as always with Descartes, this interpretation is complicated by other 
passages. The place at which Descartes seems most clearly to commit himself to 
occasionalism is in his famous October 6th, 1645 letter to Princess Elizabeth, where he 
considers the problem of substance dualism that Elizabeth had raised: 
I must say at once that all the reasons73 that prove that God exists and is 
the first and immutable cause of all effects that do not depend on human 
free will prove similarly, I think, that he is also the cause of all the effects 
that do so depend. For the only way to prove that he exists is to consider 
him as a supremely perfect being; and he would not be supremely perfect 
if anything could happen in the world without coming entirely from 
him…[thus] philosophy by itself is able to discover that the slightest 
thought could not enter into a person’s mind without God’s willing, and 
having willed from all eternity, that it should enter. The scholastic 
distinction between universal and particular causes is out of place here. 
The sun, although the universal cause of all flowers, is not the cause of the 
difference between tulips and roses; but that is because their production 
depends also on some other particular causes which are not subordinated 
to the sun. But God is the universal cause of everything in such a way as 
to be also the total cause of everything; and so nothing can happen 
without his will.74 
In this complex passage, Descartes’ use of the terms “entirely” and “total cause” seem 
quite clearly of an occasionalist mindset; yet, even such strong language is not sufficient 
to settle the matter as Aquinas and the Scholastic concurrentists employed similar 
terms.75 Indeed, when Descartes explains his reasons for holding God in such high terms, 
he does so not by arguing against the efficacy of finite secondary causes, as did all of his 
occasionalist successors, but rather by distinguishing between the unique natures of 
divine and created powers: “God is quite different from finite powers. They can be used 
                                                
73 Presumably Descartes is referring here to his previously discussed statements that are ambiguous in 
upshot. That he links the conclusion of God’s status as first cause to the proof of His existence implies that 
the causal containment argument from Meditatio III is what he has in mind for the latter claim. 
74 CSMK III, 272 
75 See Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.67 
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up; so when we see that they are employed in many great effects, we have reason to judge 
is unlikely that they also extend to lesser ones.”76 Thus, Descartes deems God as the total 
or entire cause of changes in the world due to his infinite capacity for causal influx, but 
this was a common supposition of both the concurrentists and the occasionalists; 
moreover, Descartes’ un-critical talk of “finite powers” in the above seems to suggest the 
former metaphysic. 
For sure, Descartes thinks he can overcome mind-body dualism by granting God 
the role of causal intermediary, but his insistence that such activity is “willed from all 
eternity” is troubling. Descartes justifies this appeal in terms of God’s immutablity,77 and 
indeed such a principle was routinely employed by occasionalists to explain the regularity 
of the natural order without the supposition of natural causes. Nonetheless, the primary 
shibboleth of occasionalism regarded God’s causality as immediately and distinctively 
present at the moment of the production of the effect, not merely as the result of some 
“general will” advanced from eternity. In offering this caveat, Descartes actually seems 
closer to the pre-established harmonics of Leibniz (and Aquinas) than to the 
occasionalists. 
 
 
                                                
76 CSMK III, 273 
77 “From God’s immutability we can also know certain rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary and 
particular causes of the various motions we see in particular bodies.” (CSM I, 240) And also: ““from the 
mere fact that God is immutable and that, acting always in the same way, he always produces the same 
effect.” (CSM I, 96) Malebranche thus correctly claims: “Descartes…recognized, as do all those who 
follow the light of reason, that no body can move itself by its own forces, and that all the natural laws of the 
communication of motion are but the consequences of the immutable volitions of God, who always acts in 
the same way.” (Recherche, 466) 
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3. The History of Cartesian Occasionalism Prior to Malebranche 
While fervently enthusiastic about the general thrust and themes of Cartesian philosophy, 
the reaction of Descartes’ successors to his nascent occasionalism was decidedly 
multivolent. Otherwise ‘orthodox Cartesians’ such as Robert Desgabets (1610-1678), 
Jacques Rohault (1618-1672), and Pierre Sylvain Régis (1632-1707) never accepted 
occasionalism and, like Descartes himself, quite flatly insisted on the efficacy of both 
minds and bodies regardless of the metaphysical difficulties involved.78 Others, such as 
Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), restricted occasionalism to only the causal relationship 
between minds and bodies and rejected body-body occasionalism as extravagant.79 
Nonetheless, the majority of Descartes’ followers recognized early on that the system of 
Cartesian metaphysics simply could not account for certain phenomena on their own 
terms (i.e. in terms of real causal relationships) and thus turned to the deus ex machina of 
occasionalism. 
Whether this “turn” owed any significant debt to late-medieval nominalist-
occasionalism is, like the debt of the latter to earlier Islamic occasionalism, very much 
uncertain. While, from his own remarks, it seems likely that Malebranche had a passing 
familiarity with some medieval figures who had denied secondary causality, the same 
cannot be said for his predecessors. As will be seen, while they at times offer arguments 
for occasionalism that share a similitude with those of earlier traditions, they begin from 
very different starting points (sc. scientific rather than theological concerns) and display 
                                                
78 Des Chene 2002, 184; Easton 2002, 204 
79 See Nadler, “Occasionalism and the Question of Arnauld’s Cartesianism,” In Descartes and His 
Contemporaries, ed. Roger Ariew and Marjorie Green (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 129-
44. 
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very different reasoning behind their claims, even if the conclusion ends the same. 
Therefore, as again like the relation of nominalism to Islamic occasionalism, independent 
invention seems both possible and likely. Indeed, the early history of Cartesian 
occasionalism and issues of priority and influence are quite unclear to contemporary 
scholars. Descartes died in 1650 and, a little over a decade later, a plethora of books and 
essays in Cartesian philosophy sprung up seemingly independently from a multitude of 
authors, many expounding some form of occasionalism. This rapid development of 
occasionalist ideas following the death of Descartes, as well as the great difficulty in 
determining lines of influence among early proponents, speaks quite directly to the 
unique compatibility of Cartesianism and occasionalism. 
In the rest of this section I shall examine the lineage and arguments of the major 
figures of the Cartesian occasionalist tradition prior to Malebranche.80 
 
Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) 
Clauberg was a German philosopher and—unlike most important figures in the new 
philosophy—an academic, teaching at the University of Duisburg in the Duchy of Cleves. 
Following a Scholastic education, Clauberg came into contact with Cartesian ideas, likely 
through his teacher, Tobias Andrae, who had personally corresponded with Descartes. 
Clauberg is a chimerical figure whose work is not only a hybrid of scholasticism and 
Cartesianism, but also of orthodox Cartesianism and occasionalism. 
                                                
80 For the sake of parsimony, I will not address followers of Malebranche, such a François Lamy, or 
English Malebrancheans such as John Norris and Arthur Collier. See McCracken 1983, 156-204 
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 Like Descartes before him, Clauberg makes statements concerning the 
metaphysics of causation (specifically body-body causation) that seem faintly 
occasionalist, but are also in line with concurrentism. For example, in his Disputatione 
physicae, he claims that God’s creative activity does not cease with the moment of 
creation but rather that his continual activity is required to conserve the word in being,81 
and moreover that “The universal cause and the particular cause [of motion] are 
distinguished in that the effect of the first is the totality of motion in the universe, while 
the effect of the second is a determinate motion in such and such a part of the universe.”82 
Both of these claims are standard concurrentism: God is responsible for the continued 
existential conservation of the world and is also, through the laws/natures he has 
established in creation, the total cause of all motion and change therein. Regarding the 
efficacy of “the particular cause,” Clauberg says that “By [this] should be understood a 
certain thing that causes motion, or the rule or law and reason according to which motion 
occurs.”83 While this seems to confirm Clauberg as a non-occasionalist,84 the type of 
“cause” Clauberg has in mind here is unclear. It is possible he means real substantial 
natures, or it is possible that he understands a particular cause as only determining the 
total cause on the basis of an established “rule or law…according to which motion 
occurs,” an idea much closer to Cartesian occasionalism than Thomistic concurrentism. 
 Clauberg’s views on mind-body causality are similarly nebulous. In his Corporis 
et animae in homine conjunctio [The Union of Body and Mind in Man], Clauberg notes: 
                                                
81 Disputatione physicae, §14 
82 Disputatione physicae, §7; trans. by Nadler 
83 Disputatione physicae, §6; trans. by Nadler 
84 Bardout 2002, 135 
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“There cannot be found in all the universe two things more dissimilar and more 
generically different joined together than soul and body.”85 On this basis he insists: “The 
conjunction of body and mind is not grounded in the similitude and agreement of their 
actions and passions, but in their mutual relations,” such that “it is not at all necessary 
that the one be the cause or the effect of the other. It is enough if the one produces a 
change, or changes something in the other, such that the two substances refer mutually to 
each other in their actions and passions.”86 While this explanation of mind-body 
“interaction” is not strikingly different from that given by Descartes, Clauberg’s 
titivations suggest a stronger occasionalist reading. Descartes had grounded this mutual 
reference on a “transmission” from the sense organs to the mind, while Clauberg appears 
to drop such a pretense entirely, claiming: 
God has willed that these acts of such different kinds be united in a human 
being, such that the one refers to the other, without there being any 
similitude between them…This is why the motions of out body are only 
procatarctic causes that give occasion to the mind, the principle cause, to 
produce on its own such and such an idea, at the particular moment.87 
What Clauberg seems to be claiming here is that bodily motions/sensations are involved 
in no real transference to the mind, but rather serve as impetus for the independent 
generation of reciprocal ideas in the mind. The grounds of this reciprocity is unclear, but 
it appears that Clauberg endorses the view—sometimes mistakenly identified with 
Malebranche88—that God is directly responsible for such reciprocity, but not directly 
                                                
85 Corporis, IV, §2 
86 Corporis, IV, §10-11 
87 Corporis, IV, §9-10 
88 For the correction of this misinterpretation, see “Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche.” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 31-47. For Clarke’s response, see “Malebranche and 
Occasionalism: A Reply to Steven Nadler.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995): 499-504. 
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causally involved with every such interaction; instead He only wills a ‘general law’ under 
which such independent activities are conjoined “in their exchange and reciprocality.”89 
 
Louis de La Forge (1632-1666) 
La Forge was an influential (if short lived) early commentator on and proponent of 
Cartesian philosophy. A physician by trade and hailing from Saumur in the Loire Valley, 
he was recruited in 1659 by Claude Clerselier (the editor behind most of the editions of 
Descartes’ works published in the decades after his death) who was preparing the 
posthumus first edition of Descartes’ Traité de l’homme [Treatise on Man]. Unimpressed 
by Descartes’ own crude and un-illuminating sketches, Clerselier recruited La Forge on 
the basis of his extensive knowledge of anatomy and skill as an illustrator. The young La 
Forge quickly imbibed the new philosophy and, at Clerselier’s encouragement, wrote an 
extensive commentary on Descartes’ Traité, which in turn served as the basis and 
inspiration of his own Traité de l’esprit de l’homme [Treatise on the Human Mind].90 
La Forge corresponded with Clauberg and cites him on several occasions in the 
Traité, but rejected Clauberg’s occasionalism as a solution to the mind-body problem. 
Nonetheless, he was the first of Descartes’ successors to systematically expound body-
body occasionalism—his Traité being published in 166591—and the first to specifically 
                                                
89 Corporis, IV, §11 
90 Clarke, “Introduction,” xii-xiv 
91 According to La Forge’s friend, Jacob Gousset, the ideas expressed therein were advanced by La Forge 
as early as 1658. (Nadler, “The Occasionalism of Louis de La Forge,” 58) Moreover, de Villemandy 
explicitly singles out La Forge as “the first of them [sc. followers of Descartes] that I am aware of who 
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use the term “occasional cause [causes occasionnelle].”92 The precise extent of La 
Forge’s occasionalism is difficult to interpret given that he, like Descartes, employs the 
language of both occasionalism and interactionism, often when discussing the same 
problem. This has led to scholarly disagreement with the majority (including myself) 
maintaining that La Forge restricts occasionalism to body-body causality and (like 
Desgabets, Rohault, and Régis) adheres to Descartes in flatly attributing real causal 
powers to the mind capable of producing effects in the body.93 I would speculate that the 
reason La Forge refused to commit to full occasionalism was due to his medical training 
and interest in neuro-anatomy. La Forge wrote the Traité out of his dissatisfaction with 
Descartes’ meager ‘pineal explanation’ of mind-body interaction and clearly seemed 
enamored with the notion of uncovering the secret relation between the soul and the 
structure of the brain.94 An application of occasionalism to this relation would effectively 
pull the rug out from under such a project. 
 While I will not examine the specifics of La Forge’s account of how mind and 
body interact,95 La Forge does offer a remarkable global argument to justify 
                                                                                                                                            
developed [occasionalism] and openly espoused it…” (Traité de l’efficace, 21; qtd. by Clarke, 
“Introduction,” xx) 
92 Bardout 2002, 142  
93 Richard Watson argues that “La Forge takes the hard Cartesian line that the animal spirits of the body 
(somehow) influence the mind and are influenced by the mind in the pineal gland.” (The Breakdown of 
Cartesian Metaphysics, 174) See also Kemp-Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1902), 87. For an account of the scholarly controversy, see Nadler, “The 
Occasionalism of Louis de La Forge,” In Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler 
(University Park, Penn State Press, 1993), 57-73. 
94 Indeed, La Forge was the first to carefully distinguish between ‘spirits’ [esprits] and ‘ideas’ [idée], 
defining the former as fundamentally physical and the latter as fundamentally mental. (Traité, 77) This 
distinction became standard in subsequent early-modern philosophy. 
95 His views are essentially developments and elaborations of claims made by Descartes in the Notae in 
programma quoddam. 
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interactionism in the face of the seemingly insurmountable metaphysical difficulty 
engendered by Cartesian dualism. Descartes himself was of no help as he flatly insisted 
upon the reality of such interaction: je sais pas comment.96 Instead of repeating this 
asseveration, La Forge made a direct appeal to ‘Bayle’s maxim,’ noting that “Holy 
Scripture teaches us that an angel carried a prophet from one province to another.”97 This 
is a reference to a story in the second of the “Additions to the Book of Daniel”98 in which 
an angel appears to Habakuk, who is in Judea, and carries him by the hair to Babylon, in 
Mesopotamia, and the lion’s den where Daniel is imprisoned. After Habakuk gives 
Daniel the food he had with him, the angel carries him back to his home.99 Given that 
angels were canonically regarded as strictly spiritual and immaterial creatures,100 the 
unavoidable conclusion here would seem to be that, regardless of any philosophical 
                                                
96 In the Avertissement to the French edition of the Meditationes, Descartes’ notes that Gassendi’s questions 
concerning the causal efficacy of the mind on the body and vice versa “presuppose amongst other things an 
explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all.” (CSM II, 
275) Regardless, Descartes avers: “the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a 
supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the body are two 
substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other.” (Ibid.) 
Descartes is so convinced of the reality of mind-body interaction that he goes so far as to retract his clarity 
and distinctness principle in this instance, conceding that “we are not sure that there is nothing corporeal in 
the soul, even though we do not recognize anything corporeal in it.” (CSM II, 276) Indeed, the whole 
notion of ‘eminent reality’ is designed to permit a loophole in Descartes’ causal principle by which “there 
is nothing in the effect which was not previously present in he cause,” (CSM II, 97) for this directly entails 
that “Nothing comes from nothing.” (Ibid.) Yet, God’s activity provides the exception to this and moreover 
he is the cause the world without being formally or materially identical with it (as in Spinozism), for 
“[s]omething is said to exist eminently in an object when, although it does not exactly correspond to our 
perception of it, its greatness is such that it can fill the role of that which does so correspond.” (CSM II, 
114) Given his notion of eminent causation, it seems that Descartes has at least a metaphysical criterion by 
which to insist that mind-body interaction is possible, for it is possible the body could be related to the 
mind eminently, which would allow for causal interchange without any actual formal or material 
commensurability between the two. This, of course, leaves out any explanation of body-mind interchange. 
97 Traité, 144 
98 These are the additional three chapters at the end of the Book of Daniel which are included in the 
Septuagint, but not in the Hebrew Bible. They are considered canonical by the Roman Catholic, Greek 
Orthodox, and Oriental Churches, but apocryphal by most Protestant denominations. 
99 Daniel 14:33-39 
100 See Luke 24:39 and the Catechism of the Catholic Church, §328-330. 
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reasoning that deems interaction between the material and immaterial to be 
metaphysically impossible,101 such an interaction did, in fact, occur, and must therefore 
be possible regardless.102 For La Forge, this appeal to “Holy Scripture” serves as the 
justification for his interactionism and refusal to countenance mind-body occasionalism. 
In spite of this intriguing ipse dixit appeal to “Holy Scripture,” La Forge’s Cartesian 
psychology ultimately went nowhere and virtually all of Descartes successors—and 
early-modern philosophers in general—accepted the fundamental impossibility of mind-
body interaction. 
 However, La Forge’s views on body-body causality, even though occupying less 
than a single chapter of the Traité, were highly influential to the later course of early-
modern philosophy. While La Forge, following Descartes, still speaks of powers and 
forces in bodies, he understands such things in a manner very different from the 
“Schoolmen.”103 This is evident in his reiteration of the nominalist-occasionalist 
insistence that causation cannot be empirically grounded: 
I will be told, is it not clear and evident that heavy things move 
downwards, that light things rise upwards, and that bodies communicate 
their motion to one another? I agree, but there is a big difference between 
the obviousness of the effect and that of the cause. The effect is very clear 
                                                
101 La Forge cites Lucretius’ materialist claim: “we smell the various odours of things and yet we never see 
them approaching our nostrils, not do we behold scorching heat, nor can we set eyes on cold, nor are we 
accustomed to see sounds; yet all these must of necessity consist of bodily structure [corporea constare], 
since they can act upon our senses. For nothing can touch or be touched, except body.” (De rerum natura, 
I. 298-304) 
102 This seems to be the reasoning behind Descartes distinction between “extension of substance” and 
“extension of power.” In a later letter to More, he says: “For my part, in God and angels and in our mind I 
can conceive there to be no extension of substance, but only extension of power.” (CSMK III, 372) 
103 La Forge, employing a particularly lovely metaphor, rhetorically asks: “is it a genuine explanation of an 
attack of diarrhea, for example, to say that it results either from the fact that the expulsive faculty is irritated 
or that the retentive faculty of the intestines is weakened? Is that not to say, in good French, that I know 
nothing about it?” (L’homme (1664), qtd. by Clarke, “Introduction,” xvi-xvii) 
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here, for what do our senses show us more clearly than the various 
movements of bodies? But do they show us the force which carries heavy 
things downwards, light things upwards, and how one body has the power 
to make another body move?104 
As Ovid said: causa latet, vis est notissima.105 La Forge’s familiarity with previous 
philosophers who made this claim is completely unknown; yet, the above is virtually the 
exact same argument as first advanced by al-Baquillani and al-Ghazali; viz., all we are 
ever capable of perceiving is a succession of effects, but not the causal forces and 
principles underlying said effects. As was the case with al-Ghazali, this seemingly 
innocous empirical argument is of considerable importance, because, by pointing out the 
empirical vacuum underlying the epistemology of causation, La Forge grants himself 
license to expound a radically counterintuitive and counter-experiential set of arguments 
that were to become shibboleths of Cartesian occasionalist physics. 
 La Forge’s attack on inter-corporeal causality is based on two such shibboleths 
that hark back to al-Ghazali and became standards of Cartesian occasionalism down to 
Malebranche: 
1) Bodies are intrinsically inert and passive in nature. 
2) Even if bodies did possess intrinsic causal powers, they would be otiose given the 
existentially disjointed nature by which God preserves the world in being. 
As the second argument is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, I will focus here 
on La Forge’s first argument. He opens his chapter on “how one Body moves another” by 
noting: 
                                                
104 Traité, 143; emphasis added. 
105 ‘The cause is hidden, but the result well known.’ (Metamorphoses, iv. 287) 
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I think most people would not believe me if I said that it is no more 
difficult to conceive how the human mind, without being extended, can 
move the body and how the body without being a spiritual thing can act on 
the mind, and to conceive how a body has the power to move itself and to 
communicate motion to another body. Yet there is nothing more true.106 
The reason for this is that it impossible to account for an active force or power inhering in 
a body defined only in terms of its spatial geometry. The notion is completely exterior 
and allochthonous to the very idea of extension, for “if the force which transfers and 
which thereby applies bodies to each other could belong to them in such a way that the 
thing which is moved were itself the principle of its motion and this force were identical 
with it, then the notion of this force would have to include in its concept the idea of 
extension;” yet, as La Forge is adamant, “This is not the case.”107 
 From the foregoing, La Forge concludes: “If a body cannot move itself, it is 
obvious in my opinion that it cannot move another body.”108 In spite of La Forge’s 
“opinion,” this conclusion is not obvious at all: simply because a body lacks the power of 
self-movement does not entail that it cannot, once set in motion, transfer its motion to 
another body by established laws of impact;109 though Clatterbaugh suggests that this is 
in keeping with the Cartesian causation principle that “a cause cannot give what it does 
not have.”110 Two additional arguments are offered by La Forge in support of this 
conclusion: the first, which will be examined in the next chapter, concerns the peculiar 
                                                
106 Traité, 143 
107 Traité, 145 
108 Traité, 145 
109 Plato allows this type of motion (Laws 894b); but nonetheless reasons that “Self-generating motion…is 
the source of all motions, and the primary force in both stationay and moving objects.” (Laws 895b) 
110 Clatterbaugh, 106 
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nature of motion in Cartesian plenist physics, while the second appeals to Descartes’ 
identification of motion as a mode of body, from which La Forge concludes that “motion 
is only a mode which is not distinct from the body to which it belongs and which can no 
more pass from one subject to another than the other modes of matter.”111 The point here 
is: If, as under the Thomistic framework, bodies were capable of such modal 
transmission, it would make just as much sense to speak of a body transferring its shape 
or divisibility as its motion, but clearly this is absurd. Therefore, given that bodies cannot 
move themselves nor cause motion in other bodies, if motion is possible, it would have to 
be an entirely extrinsic property by which a body is “pushed by something which is not 
itself a body and which is completely distinct from it.”112 Here, presumably, is where La 
Forge thinks he has grounds to maintain body-body occasionalism, yet deny mind-body 
causation.113  
 
Géraud de Cordemoy (1624-1684) 
Cordemoy, a lawyer by trade and the son of a professor at the University of Paris, was an 
active and influential figure in Cartesian circles of the mid-seventeenth century. While La 
Forge contributed commentary to the 1664 publication of the second part of Descartes’ 
Le Monde (the Traité de l’homme); Cordemoy contributed an essay, entitled Discours de 
                                                
111 Traité, 145 
112 Ibid. 
113 This does, however, seem to leave as an open question just how bodies could affect minds. Interestingly, 
Arnauld appealed to occasionalism to account for how causes in the body (e.g. the prick of a needle) can 
produce effects in the mind (e.g. the sensation of pain), but not vice versa, possibly under the same 
reasoning. (See Ouvres, vol. 38, 146-8) 
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l’action des corps, to the publication of the first part of Le Monde in the same year. This 
essay was developed into Cordemoy’s primary philosophical work, Le discernment de 
l’âme et du corps [The Discrimination Between Soul and Body], two years later. While 
Cordemoy is best known for his work on linguistics,114 he is also notable as a defender of 
atomism115—a veritable Cartesian heresy—and was described by Boullier as the “first 
occasionalist in France.”116 The veracity of this claim largely depends on the definition of 
“occasionalist” one takes. Cordemoy’s Discernment was first published in 1666, a year 
after La Forge’s Traité, though it seems unlikely that either had met or had any influence 
on the other.117 Like La Forge, Cordemoy equated the inconceivability of mind-body 
causation to body-body causation, noting that “when we will have closely examined what 
is found in the action of a body on a body, we will not find it to be any more conceivable 
than that of minds on bodies.”118 However, he was unmoved by La Forge’s physician’s 
concern to conceive the inconceivable (sc. account for the union of mind and body) and 
freed himself of this acclivitous task by extending the occasionalist denial of secondary 
causality to minds as well as to bodies. He is thus sometimes counted as the first 
“thoroughgoing occasionalist,” at least in the Cartesian tradition.119 Even this designation 
                                                
114 See Chomsky, Noam. Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966, 
115 Leibniz explains that “what forced Cordemoy to abandon Descartes and to embrace the Democritean 
doctrine of atoms” was the unity of the self which could not be accounted for in terms mechanistic. What 
was required was “true substantial unities,” but Leibniz notes, effectively setting up his own monadic 
metaphysic: “atoms of matter are contrary to reason.” (Système nouveau, 142) 
116 Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, I, 516 
117 See Clair, Pierre. “Louis de la Forge et les origins de l’occasionalisme,” In Reserches sur le XVII siècle 
1 (1976): 63-72. 
118 Discernement, 150, trans. by Albondi. 
119 See Nadler, “Cordemoy and Occasionalism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (2005): 37-54. 
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is a definitional matter; I would suggest that “thoroughgoing” occasionalism requires the 
additional rejection of both volitional and intra-mental causality120 which would make 
Malebranche the first. 
Heeding the traditional opening gambit of occasionalism, Cordemoy denied the 
empiricity of causation in an argument modified from the classic example of fire and 
burning (still in use by La Forge) to the modern and eminently Cartesian example of 
colliding bodies: 
When we say, for example, that body B drives body C away from its 
place, if we examine well what is acknowledged for certain in this case, 
we will only see that body B was moved, that it encountered C, which was 
at rest, and that since this encounter, the first ceased to be moved [and] the 
second commenced to be. But if we recognize that B gave some of its 
motion to C, that is truly only a prejudice which comes from what we do 
not see when these two bodies [encounter each other]; and that we are in 
the habit of attributing all the effects which are known to us to the things 
we perceive, without being aware that often these things are incapable of 
producing such effects, and without considering that there could be a 
thousand causes which, completely imperceptible as they are, can produce 
sensible effects.121 
Unlike La Forge, Cordemoy extended this reasoning to mind-body causality, noting that 
“many, seeing that as soon as they will a part of their body to be moved in a certain 
direction it immediately goes there, imagine themselves [the cause], because of what they 
do not perceive.”122 
In his positive metaphysical argument for occasionalism, Cordemoy attempts a 
geometric demonstration of the occasionalist thesis following a series of definitions and 
                                                
120 I.e. the view the our minds are possessed of causal powers sufficient for their own operation or that 
thoughts can be the efficient cause of other succeeding thoughts. 
121 Discernement, 137 
122 Discernement, 140 
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axioms implicit to Cartesianism. It is long, but sufficiently illuminating to warrant the 
following abridgment: 
Axioms 
1. One does not have of oneself that which could be lost without ceasing 
to be that which one is. 
2. All bodies are able to lose their motion, up to the point of not having 
any, without ceasing to be bodies. 
3. We are only able to conceive of two sorts of substances, Minds (which 
think) and Bodies. That is why one ought to think of them as the causes of 
all that happens; and that which does not come from one comes from the 
other. 
4. To move, or to cause motion, is an action. 
5. An action cannot be continued except by the agent who initiated it. 
 
Conclusions 
1. No bodies have motion of themselves. 
 Proof: By the first axiom, one does not have of oneself what one is able to 
lose without ceasing to be what one is. 
 Now, by the second, all bodies are able to lose their motion without 
ceasing to be bodies. 
 Thus not body has motion of itself. 
2. The first mover of bodies is not a body. 
 Proof: If the first mover of Bodies were a body, it would follow that one 
body had motion of itself… 
3.It can only be a mind which is the first mover 
 Proof: By the third axiom… 
4. It can only be the same Mind which initiates the motion of Bodies 
which continues their motion.123 
                                                
123 Discernement, 135-6; trans. by Albondi, 56-7. 
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Cordemoy’s (and La Forge’s) classically Cartesian rejection of the possibility of 
corporeal self-movement was the primary source of later Cartesian (both occasionalist 
and non-occasionalist) hostility towards Newtonian attractionism—since such a notion 
seems to inherently posit a capacity in bodies to move themselves, a requirement that was 
disconcerting even to Newton himself.124 Moreover, lest one wish to advance the 
conservationist thesis that bodies, though not producing their movements de soy, could 
nonetheless perpetuate movements (under fixed laws of collision) that had previously 
been produced in them by a first mover, Cordemoy appeals to the Cartesian doctrine that 
such motion, as a mode, is incapable of transference between bodies.125 
Cordemoy’s demonstration is not of itself sufficient to establish God as the sole 
author of the movement of bodies, for the possibility that human minds could still be 
capable of acting as first movers has yet to be excluded.126 Even though he has shown 
that we cannot account for such a capability empirically, he still needs to produce a 
metaphysical argument against the corporeal efficacy of finite minds. Cordemoy does so 
not by the obvious appeal to substance dualism or to a theology of continual creation,127 
but in an altogether novel manner, proposing that the Cartesian principle of the 
conservation of motion—viz. that the aggregate quantity of motion in the universe is not 
subject to increase or diminution, but remains always equal—requires a rejection of the 
mind’s efficacy over the body, for a free decision by a mind to initiate a motion would 
                                                
124 See his famous letter to Bentley, 11 February 1692/3; 2004, 102. 
125 Discernement, 138 
126 Nadler concurs, see “Cordemoy and Occasionalism,” 43 
127 While axiom five seems to imply continual creation, this was nowhere cashed out by Cordemoy, who, 
alone among the Cartesian occasionalists, made no attempt to justify his view in terms of a such an onto-
theology. Albondi makes this case persuasively pace Gouhier. (See Gerauld de Cordemoy, 66-57) 
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represent an superinduction sufficient to produce a “disturbance in the order of nature,”128 
by increasing the overall quantity of movement in the universe.129 Thus, Cordemoy 
concludes in his later Traité de métaphysique: “The only thing that God does to unite this 
body and this mind is to make the body move, not only on the occasion of other 
bodies…but also on the occasion of the mind’s volitions; and to give sensations and 
inclinations to this mind on the occasion of motions in this body.”130 How this solves the 
conservation of motion problem is rather unclear; nonetheless, Cordemoy offers a fully 
developed account of mind-body occasionalism: there is no talk of any nebulous 
“transmission” between the two,131 nor of any “general will” governing the occasional 
relations; instead Cordemoy appeals to God’s direct causal activity as the source of the 
human union. 
 
Antoine Le Grand (1629-1699) 
Le Grand, known as l’abréviateur de Descartes, was an Anglo-French Franciscian friar 
from Douai in the Spanish Netherlands.132 In spite of his Scholastic training at the 
                                                
128 Discernement, 143 
129 Cf. Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, §IX, v. 346. 
130 Traité de métaphysique, CG 279; trans. by Nadler. 
131 On this point Cordemoy is unequivocal: “If there remains any legitimacy to the claim that the soul 
moves the body, it is in the same sense that it can be said that a body moves another body. For just as when 
we say that one body move another when, because of their collision, it happens that the mover of the first 
now moves the second; so likewise can we say that a soul moves a body when, because it so wishes, it 
happens that whatever was already moving the body comes to move it in the direction in which the soul 
wants it to be moved. It is admittedly a more common way to ordinarily explain things by saying that a soul 
move a body and that a body moves another. Because we do not always seek the origin of things, it is often 
more reasonable…to cite the occasion rather than the cause of some effect.” (Discernement, 142) 
132 Douai was annexed by France in 1668—along with Lille and the remaining cities of the Artois not ceded 
in the Treaty of the Pyrenees nine years earlier—under the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. 
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Catholic university there, Le Grand eagerly took to Cartesian philosophy and even 
attempted to reformulate it along Scholastic lines in order to win converts from the 
Schools.133 The University of Douai housed an English college that was closely 
associated with Oxford and this is where Le Grand ended up teaching after being 
dispatched to England as a missionary.134 He quickly became a key figure in the English 
intellectual scene of the time and established a reputation as a staunch defender of 
Cartesianism against Scholasticism, Newtonianism, and British empiricism. Le Grand’s 
philosophy is contained in two treatises: Philosophia Veterum e mente Renati Descartes 
more scholastico breviter digesta, and Institutio Philosophiae, secundum principia Renati 
Descartes, published in 1671 and 1672 respectively and translated into English under Le 
Grand’s own supervision in 1694 as An Entire Body of Philosophy, According to the 
Principles of the Famous Renate Des Cartes.135 
 Like La Forge and Cordemoy, Le Grand interprets Descartes as himself an 
occasionalist in matter of physics. He was, however, the only Cartesian occasionalist to 
attempt to rebut—or explain away—Descartes’ semi-concurrentism, insisting that what 
Descartes refers to as the activity of: 
The Second of Particular Cause is the meeting of Bodies, by which means 
it happens, that this Divine Action, which preserves Motion, exerts it self 
sometimes in these, sometimes in other Bodies: Whence the difficulty 
which ariseth, from the Communication of Motion may be easily solved; 
                                                
133 Nowhere is this more evident that in his section on “Daemonology” and the nature and capacities of 
angles in the Institutio Philosophiae. (III. iv.) Such topics were central to the Thomists but were not 
regarded as worthy of philosophic discussion by Descartes and most of his successors. 
134 England at the time was recovering from the Puritan dictatorship of Cromwell and was ruled by the 
crypto-Catholic, Charles II, who tolerated Catholics and Catholic missionaries in his realm. 
135 This work was responsible for the introduction of Cartesianism and occasionalism to England in the 
years prior to the publication of Malebranche’s Recherche. 
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for tho’ Motion, as being only the Mode of a Body, cannot remove from 
one Subject to another, which Regius unwarily asserts; yet the agitating 
force, being no Mode of a Body, may by removing shew it self sometimes 
in this, sometimes in the other Body. 
Wheresoever…DES CARTES speaks of the Communication of 
Motion, he is to be understood of that Power, which preserves the Natural 
Things in the same condition where they were constituted at first, and all 
effects order’d accordingly to the Laws appointed for them, and suiting to 
their Natures.136 
That is to say, when Descartes speaks in causally realist terms of bodies colliding and 
causing each other to move, we are to take this as metaphorical façon de parler, when in 
reality—as Le Grand is convinced that Descartes himself was undoubtedly aware—all is 
God as the “First and Universal Cause.”137 Following this interpretation, Le Grand 
buttresses his own occasionalism on the basis of the customary identification of motion 
as a mode of body and insistence on the non-transitivity of modes, as was more 
extensively quoted earlier. Le Grand extends his unique claims in this regard with a novel 
epistemological argument: 
[I]f Accidents be Real, we shall never be able to know what Accidents 
belong to a Body, and what to a Spirit. For if Accidents have not Affinity 
with their Subjects, and yet are really distinct from them, we shall not be 
able to gather from the Perception of an Accident, whether the Substance 
in which it is, be Material or Spiritual; that is, from the Color, Figure and 
Magnitude we shall not be able to conclude that it is a Body rather than a 
Spirit.138 
That is to say, interpreting Le Grand in terms less mystical: if perceptual accidents are 
distinct and separable from their subjects, we would not be able to distinguish between 
                                                
136 LG, I, IV, 15, 117 
137 LG, I, IV, 15, 116 
138 LG, I, IV, 10 105 
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perceptions (grounded in matter) and phantasms of the imagination (grounded in 
‘spirit’).139  
 Le Grand also argues that bodies have not the power to move themselves for, in 
such a case: “this Power would be Essential to it, and consequently the Body would move 
always, and with the same force, which is contrary to experience, which teaches us that a 
Body sometimes moves more, and sometimes less, and sometimes not at all: Wherefore it 
receives its force to move from something without it.”140 Le Grand does not waste time 
explicating who this mover is: 
Now there is nothing without or external to matter but Spirit; it is Spirit 
therefore that moves the Body, that is to say, God, who makes the parts 
of matter apply themselves successively, as to their outsides, to other 
parts that immediately touch them. Wherefore, since God cannot produce 
motion without acting, nor act otherwise than by his Will; we must own 
that the moving Power is nothing else, but the Will God had to move the 
matter.141 
                                                
139 The problem with such an argument is its glaring susceptibility to a tu quoque: How is one to 
empirically distinguish between a corporeal body and an incorporeal spirit or idea anyway, supposing their 
perceptual accidents are identical? This question has nothing to do with the nature of substance-accident 
inhesion, but the limitations of experience as such. Such limitations not only form the basis of the dreaming 
argument from the Meditationes, but were a primary postulate of nominalism, as seen in Ockham’s famous 
claim: “Every effect which God can produce by means of a secondary cause He can produce directly on 
His own account. God can produce intuitive sense cognition by means of an object; hence He can produce 
it directly on His own account.” This was precisely the difficulty that led Hume to conclude that sensory 
impressions and ideas of memory and the imagination differ and can be distinguished only in terms of “the 
degrees of force and liveliness with which the strike upon the mind.” (Treatise, 1) In spite of the 
rationalist/empiricist scission, Malebranche actually concurred with Hume on this point. Malebranche 
explains “that persons whose animal spirits are highly agitated by fasting, a high fever, or some violent 
passion have the internal fibers of their brain set in motion as forcefully as by external objects.” Given that, 
in such cases, “sense” and “imagination” have the same cognitive force: “they think they see objects before 
their eyes, which are only in their imaginations. This shows with regard to what occurs in the body, the 
senses and the imagination differ only in degree.” (Recherche, 2.1.1, 88) 
140 LG, I, IV, 16, 119. This conclusion likewise does not follow, for it is perfectly possible for a body to be 
possessed of its own motive force, yet not carry on with the ease of a comet traversing empty space, due 
simply to the presence and motions of intervening bodies. Consider a box containing several wind up toys, 
all of which have the power to move themselves in a fixed direction and under a fixed force, but this 
internally produced and propelled movement will undoubtedly be impeded by the presence or opposing 
movements of the other toys, thereby producing the observed diversity Le Grand describes. 
141 LG, I, IV, 16, 119 
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Three points need be made here. First, Le Grand concludes this train of thought by 
insisting, like La Forge and Cordemoy, that “no Body can move another. For how shall it 
move another Body, seeing it cannot move itself.”142 Second, the above quotation 
provides a fine lens through which to distinguish occasionalism from the neo-Platonic 
emanationist tradition, for occasionalism upholds a Creation ontologically distinct from 
Creator who acts on the basis of will, while neo-Platonism concatenates Creation and 
Creator and holds that all the emanations of the sublunary sphere extend from the divine 
intellect.143 Third, unique among the Cartesian occasionalists, but rather like the neo-
Platonists,144 Le Grand makes no attempt to reconcile his occasionalism with the freedom 
of the will, admitting: 
[W]e must say that the Will also is conserved by the Divine Concourse, so 
that it is not in the Power of Man to Will or Act any thing, which is not 
preordained by God. But how these two things may be reconciled, that 
God hath decreed all the Acts or our Will from Eternity, and yet our Will 
remains undetermin’d, is I confess more than I do clearly perceive.145 
 
 
 
                                                
142 LG, I, IV, 16, 119 
143 It must be admitted that by Malebranche this distinction had somewhat collapsed. See Cook, Monte. 
“Malebranche’s Criticism of Descartes’s Proof that there are Bodies.” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 15 (2007): 641-657. 
144 Plotinus maintained that God “alone is free in truth.” (Enneads, vi. 8.21.30) 
145 LG, I, II, 14, 72. Le Grand does offer something of a response, asking: “Yet cannot this consideration 
make us doubtful of the Freedom of our Will, since in all our actions we experience our selves to be free, 
and that it is in our Power to give or withhold our Assent.” This response to the problem was to be taken up 
by Malebranche most famously; (See Recherche, 5) though it had also been advanced by Cordemoy in his 
Traité de métaphysique. (See CG 284) 
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Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669) 
Geulincx was a Flemish philosopher and student of the early Cartesian Guillaume 
Philippe at the University of Louvain. Geulincx himself held a professorship there until 
1658 when—ostensibly as a result of his taking a bride (professors at the Catholic 
university were expected to remain celibate), but also under persecution for his 
Cartesianism—he, like so many of his contemporaries, fled north to the Dutch Republic, 
taking up a position at the University of Leiden and converting to Calvinism. While this 
conversion may have been partly political in nature (academic immigrants from the 
Spanish Netherlands were eagerly received and granted teaching positions on the 
condition that they join the Reformed Church), Louvain was a prominent Jansenist 
institution during Geulincx’s tenure.146 Moreover, Geulincx’s philosophical ruminations 
on the powerlessness of the human condition are strongly Calvinist in spirit and tenor. 
Geulincx’s writing is jarringly dissonant in style: he alternates from precise and logic 
chopping analyses of complex problems in epistemology, physics, and metaphysics 
(which are indicative of his scholastic training), to profound and achingly melancholic 
musings on the barren and depersonalized state of human existence and subjectivity. 
Among Calvinist philosophers of the period, Geulincx was the poet to Bayle the 
doxographer. 
Geulincx’s two primary works, the Metaphysica vera and the Ethica, went mostly 
unpublished in his own lifetime, presumably due to his tenuous relationship with the 
                                                
146 Cornelius Jansen was himself a professor at Louvain. The theological school he founded was widely 
regarded as a crypto-Calvinist (particularly by the Jesuits) and ultimately condemned by Innocent X in 
1653. 
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predominantly Aristotelian faculty at Leiden.147 The exact dates of their composition is 
unclear, but the first half of the Ethica appeared in 1665 and Geulincx died of a plague 
that swept Leiden in 1669, so they were likely contemporaneous with the work of La 
Forge and Cordemoy. In these works Geulincx elaborated familiar as well as new and 
radical arguments for occasionalism; arguments that came to fruition not with 
Malebranche—though he did make extensive use of them—but far beyond.148 While 
some of Geulincx’s arguments for occasionalism are similar (or identical) to those made 
by La Forge and Cordemoy, it is unlikely they had any influence on him.149 
In place of the now totemic argument against the empiricity of causation, 
Geulincx argues for occasionalism in an altogether novel method along the lines of 
Descartes’ Meditationes. The “Christian Ethics” Geulincx advances is quintessentially 
Stoic and elevates acceptance as its highest virtue.150 Geulincx arrives at this ethic 
through what he terms “autology” or the introspective analysis of consciousness by the 
thinking subject itself. One of the primary realizations uncovered by this half-Cartesian 
and half-Kierkegaardian self-inspection is the powerlessness of the mind to control 
                                                
147 Both at Louvain and at Leiden, Geulincx proved to be a lightning rod of controversy and ill will. The 
title of the work itself, Metaphysica vera, is in contrast to another of his works, Metaphysica ad mentem 
Peripateticam—the implication of which is evident. 
148 Here I refer not only to Hume, but more importantly to the existentialist tradition, of whom Geulincx 
can tenably be regarded as the earliest representative. This aspect of Geulincx’s thought was deeply 
influential on Samuel Beckett, who refers to Geulincx in his novels Murphy and Molloy, and wrote 
extensive notes on Geulincx’s Ethica. For example, consider this passage, which surely must have 
impressed Beckett: “I merely experience the World. I am a spectator of the scene, not an actor…I have 
diagnosed my condition; it only remains to enquire how I came to it. But I cannot get beyond I do not 
know, there is nothing I can add to this I do not know. I do not know how I came to this condition…I did 
not come into it of my own accord, nor did He who so miraculously brought me to this condition ever ask 
me whether I wished to be in it. God brought me to it without my even knowing about it, let alone willing 
it.” (Opera philosophica, III, 33-35; 2006, 34-36) 
149 Clatterbaugh 1999, 99 
150 “I have come to acknowledge that my actions do not affect things in the world, and that neither do the 
action of the world affect me. (Opera philosophica, III, 35; 2006, 35.) 
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anything external to it—hence the Stoic conclusion. Thus, in the Ethica, Geulincx’s 
primary arguments in favor of occasionalism concern the mind-body union and the 
impotence of the will to serve as an efficient cause of its desired effects. Towards this 
end, Geulincx provides several vivid and influential metaphors to illustrate the prejudice 
of the human mind concerning judgments of causation. He compares belief in the 
efficacy of the will to the infantile belief that crying, or even desiring the rocking of its 
cradle, causes the cradle to be rocked: 
I cannot cause motion in my body (honest Inspection of Myself makes that 
transparently clear). I can only will it, and when I will it, God usually 
imparts the motion that I will; not because I will it, but because He wills 
that the motion that I will should be imparted. For example, if a baby 
wants the cradle in which he has been laid to be rocked, it is usually 
rocked; though not because he wants it, but because his mother or 
nursemaid, who is sitting by the cradle and who can actually rock it, also 
wants what he wants.151 
Geulincx concludes in an annotation to this passage: “our baby who has his cradle rocked 
when he wants it to be rocked might conclude (because he desperately wants it to 
happen) that it is he who has rocked his cradle.”152 Thus we fallaciously and subreptively 
reason from the constant conjunction of our will with its desired end to the conclusion 
that our will has the power to affect such an end. To explain why were are so easily 
deceived by such reasonings, Geulincx provides another metaphorical example that 
illustrates the remarkable means by which God creates the illusion of real causality: 
He who imparts motion to matter and has given laws to it is the same one 
who has formed my will, and yoked together these diverse things (the 
motion of matter and the decision of my will) in such a way that when he 
wishes, such motion as it wishes appears; and on the other hand when 
                                                
151 Opera philosophica, III, 39; 2006, 39. 
152 Opera philosophica, III, 227; 2006, 249. 
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motion appears my will wishes it,153 without either causing of influencing 
the other. It is the same as if two clocks agree precisely with each other 
and with the daily course of the Sun: when one chimes and tells the hours, 
the other also chimes and likewise indicates the hour; and all that without 
any causality in the sense of one having a causal effect on the other, but 
rather on account of mere dependence, inasmuch as both of them have 
been constructed with the same art and similar industry.154 
This particular argument is much more famously identified with Leibniz as the signature 
analogy in favor of his harmonie pré-établie.155 For Geulincx, though, the point is that, in 
particular instances when the constant conjunction underlying these syncopated machines 
breaks down, we learn the error of our suppositions: 
Suppose, for example, someone has retired to bed in the evening in the 
best of health. During the night, as he sleeps, a catarrh affects a nerve of 
his arms, which is thereby rendered paralysed. When he wakes up in the 
morning…to his astonishment and stupefaction, his hand…lies simply on 
the bed, and cannot be moved from one position to another except by his 
other hand. This paralytic quite clearly feels, and is conscious that, when 
he wanted to pick up his shirt he was doing the same as at other times 
when he would indeed pick up his shirt; and in consequence realises that 
the picking up of the shirt itself, that is, the motion of his hand, has never 
proceeded from him, but from someone else, who has executed that 
motion in response to his will.156 
This example of a paralytic’s arm would later be repeated by Hume to more memorable 
effect.157 
In addition, Geulincx picks up on a claim made by Descartes in letter to Regis, 
viz. “understanding is the passivity of the mind and willing is its activity; [therefore] we 
                                                
153 Here Geulincx—unwilling to commit to either side in a chicken and egg problem—seems to flirt with 
determinism. This, perhaps, gave credence to his later critics lumping him in with Spinoza. 
154 Opera philosophica, III, 212; 2006, 232. 
155 See “Postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval (1696),” Philosophical Essays, 147. 
156 Opera philosophica, III, 209; 2006, 229; emphasis added. 
157 Enquiry, VII.1, 66 
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cannot will anything without understanding what we will.”158 Geulincx develops this 
principle, viz. Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis [“What you do not know how to 
do, is not your action”],159 into a creative—and typically introspective—epistemic 
argument against volitional efficacy: 
Now it is indeed the case that my body moves in accordance with my will. 
When I want to speak, my tongue flaps about in my mouth; when I want to 
swim, my arms splash about; when I want to walk, my feet are flung 
forward. But I do not make that motion. I do not know how such a thing is 
brought about, and it would be impudent of me to say that I do what I do 
not know how to do. I do not know how, and through which nerves and 
other channels, motion is directed from my brain into my limbs; nor do I 
know how motion reaches the brain, or even whether it reaches the brain 
at all. With the aid of Physics and Anatomy I may be able to trace this 
motion for some distance, but I still feel sure that in moving my organs I 
am not directed by that knowledge. 160 
This new ‘epistemic argument’ proved quite popular among later Cartesian 
occasionalists, such as Malebranche161 and François Lamy,162 and was even appealed to 
by Hume.163 Geulincx concludes this line of reasoning in a deep skepticism over the 
nature of the self: “I am a mere spectator of this machine, whose workings I can neither 
                                                
158 CSMK III, 182 
159 Opera philosophica, II, 150; 1999, 35. 
160 See Opera philosophica, III, 32; 2006, 33. 
161 See Recherche, 669; Meditations Ch 
162 In his De la connaissance de soi-même, Lamy argues: “It is true (and this is what creates the illusion) 
that as soon as the soul wills that the arm should move, the arm is moved. But a sure sign that the soul 
cannot produce this movement as a true cause is that it does not know exactly what is necessary for its 
execution. To do this, it is necessary to control the antagonistic muscles to which the arm is attached; for 
the action of these muscles, it is necessary to release a certain quantity of spirits from the brain. From 
among a great number to tubes that end at the brain like a common reservoir, it is necessary to chose those 
that lead to the muscles of the arm that one wants to move, to then make the spirits flow through the tubes, 
and to give [the muscles] different pulls in the direction of the different agitations that one wants to produce 
in the arm. Of all those who move their arms with the utmost ease, who among them knows the soul and 
knows all these things?” (215-16; Ablondi 2008, 626) 
163 Enquiry, VII.1 66-67 
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adjust nor readjust; wherein I neither devise nor destroy anything: the whole thing is 
someone else’s affair.”164 This skeptical and depersonalized view of the self was taken up 
by Malebranche before likewise reaching its famous dénouement with Hume.165 
In matters of occasionalist physics Geulincx is considerably less profound, 
offering much the same arguments as the other Cartesian occasionalists of his generation. 
He argues that: “A body cannot derive motion from itself” by appealing to the essence of 
extension; however, his claims are somewhat different: 
A particular body derives from its nature divisibility and mobility, but not 
actual division and motion. For Body consists in nothing more than 
Extension, which in turn is nothing more than the juxtaposition of parts. 
But Motion involves something more, namely, the separation of 
parts…But such separation is not in the nature of Body, which begins and 
ends in the juxtaposition of parts.166 
Geulincx’s reasoning could stand to be more pellucid, but the point seems to be that 
bodies are nothing more than hypostatizations of Euclidian geometry, the essence of 
which is a succession of points extended in three dimensions. Movement is nowhere a 
part of such a succession (i.e. a magnitude), but rather involves the separation and 
transposition of such points across a magnitude of other points (i.e. from one vicinity to 
another), something which is necessarily transcendent to said points themselves. 
Geulincx also applies his epistemic argument: “Body, as an irrational thing [utpote res 
bruta], does not know how to cause motion: therefore, the cause of its motion cannot be 
                                                
164 Opera philosophica, III, 33; 2006, 34. 
165 See Kail, “On Hume’s Appropriation of Malebranche: Causation and Self,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 15 (2007): 1-26. 
166 Opera philosophica, II, 176; 1999, 76. 
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within itself.”167 The upshot of both of these arguments is the same as with the arguments 
of La Forge and Cordemoy: “since a body cannot derive motion from itself, it must, if it 
is to have motion, derive it from something else…it must have it from a mind.”168 
Yet, on the basis of introspection and the epistemic argument, Geulincx has 
established that finite human minds and wills are incapable of providing such motion. 
While this deficit would seem by elimination to implicate God as responsible for their 
movements, Geulincx goes further and offers a positive (but enthymematic) argument to 
prove that only an infinite Mind and Will are capable of producing motion. He first 
establishes that, in a Cartesian plenum: 
Division and Motion are not really distinct: they differ only in 
consideration…For a whole is said to be divided when its parts separate 
without any other part of the same whole interposing itself between the 
parts as they separate…So to be divided and to be moved, though in 
themselves the same, are not said to be the same: we say instead that the 
whole is divided, while its parts move.169 
Again, the exact physics of this identification is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but 
at this juncture it need only be noted that Geulincx declares: “Bodies have infinite power 
to resist division [infinitam vim…qua resistunt divisioni]; therefore, power superior to 
                                                
167 Opera philosophica, II, 280; 1999, 77. 
168 Opera philosophica, II, 176; 1999, 76-77. 
169 Opera philosophica, II, 279; 1999, 75..Geulincx fudges the matter by distinguishing between “solid” 
and “porous bodies,” but recovers by insisting that such a distinction is irrelevant because poration “implies 
the movement of corpuscles within the pores; so that if at some time everything within a pore were at rest, 
it would be filled up, closed, and hardly a pore at all, but a continuous and intact body.” (Opera 
philosophica, II, 290; 1999, 104) Here Geulincx clearly accepts the Cartesian criterion for corporeal 
individuation. 
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infinite power is required to endow bodies with motion.”170 The nature of bodies is 
opposed sectility because: 
[I]n the first place, each part of a body, however small, contains infinitely 
many parts, which must be separated by division, and disjoined (bearing in 
mind that division of even the smallest body entails and infinite 
regression)…and in the second place, each of these parts has a tendency to 
cohere with others, and to persist in that state…accordingly, He who 
divides bodies, He who moves them...must overcome this power with 
superior power.171 
That is to say, the infinite divisibility of extension entails an infinite “tendency to cohere” 
within in that resists such division, thereby requiring a vis major capable of breaking up 
the plenum. This argument is very intriguing, but is undercut by a rather apparent saltus 
in demonstrando, viz. Geulincx does not explain why bodies resist division in the first 
place. Indeed, given that Cartesian bodies are geometric hypostatizations, the mechanics 
by which they could display such recalcitrant antitypy is mysterious. Surely there is 
nothing in our clear and distinct idea of the plane geometry in any shear bisecting a body 
that would indicate that the purely quantitative points therein possess an adsorbent 
quality to them. Indeed, such bodies should be perfectly scissile as any section of a 
Cartesian plane is separable from any other section by simple feat of the imagination, 
which stands contrary to Geulincx’s claim that “nothing can be thought or imagined 
harder or more persistent in itself than a body that is to be divided and broken up.”172 In 
making such an asseveration, Geulincx betrays that he is including more in his notion of 
body that the mere “juxtaposition of parts;” for any supposition of a body’s recalcitrance 
                                                
170 Opera philosophica, II, 191; 1999, 102-103. 
171 Opera philosophica, II, 191; 1999, 103. 
172 Opera philosophica, II, 191; 1999, 103. 
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in resisting division must inherently be a supposition of a force or power (i.e. a “tendency 
to cohere”) within it, something that flies in the face of Geulincx’s earlier reasoning 
concerning their essential passivity.173 Regardless, what Geulincx himself takes to follow 
this antilogous reasoning is the occasionalist conclusion that “it is not we who move 
anything, or break up bodies, but the motion that the Begetter of the World furnishes, and 
continues to furnish, in accordance with our will.”174 
 
4. Malebranche and the Summa Occasionis 
Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) was a philosopher, ordained priest, member of the 
French Oratory, and the figure most commonly associated with occasionalism in histories 
of philosophy.175 In line with his customary perspicuity as a reader, Leibniz noted in 1698 
that: “Although Cordemoy, de la Forge, and other Cartesians had proposed this doctrine, 
Malebranche, above all, adorned it with a certain rhetorical luster, commensurate with his 
acumen.”176 While it was Malebranche who brought occasionalist metaphysics to its 
apogee, he proved to be largely commorient with it. Yet, while he has sunk into obscurity 
                                                
173 The more obvious argument for Geulincx’s position is external rather than internal, i.e. motion in a 
plenum is infinitely complex insofar as the movement of any one piece of the extensional grid entails a 
rearraingment of the entire whole. Yet, this old Democritean argument had been effectively occluded by 
Descartes’ theory of the vortices. 
174 Opera philosophica, II, 191; 1999, 103. 
175 Malebranche was famous in his day for his Catholic piety. This is somewhat amusing given that “The 
Malebranche” most non-philosophers are familiar with are the troop of nefarious demons from Dante’s 
Divine Comedy who are tasked with guarding the pool of boiling pitch in which grafters are submerged. 
176 De ipsa natura, §10, 160. 
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today, Malebranche was intra vitam perhaps the most famous philosopher in the world,177 
with admirers travelling to Paris from across Europe to make his acquaintance,178 
including a young Berkeley who was erroneously credited as being the occasional cause 
of Malebranche’s death.179 
 Born with a severely deformed spine that affected his ability to breathe, 
Malebranche turned his attentions to intellectual matters, attending the Collège de la 
Marche in Paris before enrolling as a theology student at the Sorbonne. Like many 
Cartesian philosophers of his time, Malebranche did not excel at his studies and 
developed the deep disdain for Scholasticism that was to become so manifest in his later 
writings. He left the Sorbonne in 1660, entered the Société de l'Oratoire de Jésus, and 
was ordained as a priest in 1664. That same year Malebranche—apparently by chance—
came across the newly published edition (by Clerslier and La Forge) of Descartes’ Traité 
de l’homme; and while reading it, he was overcome by “such violent palpitations of the 
heart that he was obliged to leave his book at frequent intervals, and to interrupt his 
reading of it in order to breath more easily.”180 He had found his calling and spent the 
                                                
177 Malebranche was notably hailed by Bayle as “the premier philosopher of our age.” (Nouvelles de la 
république des lettres, August 1683, 23) 
178 See McCracken 1983, 1-10 
179 This story was related by Joseph Stock in his 1777 The Life of Bishop Berkeley. He reports: “At Paris, 
having now more leisure than when he first passed through that city, Mr. Berkeley took care to pay his 
respects to his great rival in metaphysical sagacity, the illustrious Père Malebranche. He found this 
ingenious father in his cell, cooking in a small pipkin a medicine for a disorder with which he was then 
troubled, an inflammation on the lungs. The conversation naturally turned on our author's system of which 
the other had received some knowledge from a translation just published. But the issue of this debate 
proved tragical to poor Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he raised his voice so high, and gave way so 
freely to the natural impetuosity of a man of parts and a Frenchman, that he brought on himself a violent 
increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after.” The tale is almost certainly false as 
Berkeley’s visit to Paris was almost two years prior to the death of Malebranche. (Luce 1967, 208-209) 
180 This is according this his biographer, Father Yves André. (Schmaltz 2002, 152) 
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next decade studying Cartesian philosophy and formulating his own ideas before 
publishing the first edition (of five in his lifetime) of his magnum opus: De la recherché 
de la vérité [The Search After Truth].181 
 In this section, I shall examine Malebranche’s arguments against secondary 
causality, his positive arguments in favor of occasionalism, and the advances he made 
beyond his predecessors that were to prove of long-lasting influence.182 
 
 
 
                                                
181 The full title was: De la recherché de la verite. Où l'on traitte de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme, et de 
l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour eviter l'erreur dans les sciences [The Search After Truth. In which is treated 
the nature of the human mind and the use that must be made of it to avoid error in the sciences]. 
182 Malebranche was not significantly younger than any of the figures previously discussed—being only six 
year junior to La Forge. However, something of a generational gap was created between him and the 
Cartesian vanguard insofar as they died relatively young (mostly in the 1660’s) while Malebranche took to 
philosophy relatively late (he discovered Descartes in 1664 at age 26), did not publish until 1674 (the same 
year Cordemoy—one of the last of the vanguard—died), and, in spite of his poor health, was remarkably 
long lived for the time, developing and promulgating Cartesian occasionalism well into the eighteenth 
century. In terms of influence, the matter is typically unclear. Prost is convinced that Malebranche read La 
Forge’s Traité intensively and Nadler also offers that, “it is highly likely that Malebranche, in his own 
arguments for occasionalism, was influenced by La Forge.” (Prost 1907, 187-188; Nadler 1998, 218) This 
seems all the more obvious if one considers that the edition of Descartes’ Traité de l’homme was 
Clerselier’s 1664 edition that included La Forge’s illustrations and commentary. It is certain that 
Malebranche was familiar with Cordemoy’s work for, in a section of the Recherche devoted to “The 
distinction between soul and body,” he advises the reader to consult the Discernment should Malebranche’s 
own ruminations prove inadequate. (Recherche, 49) Due to the remarkable similarities in their ‘epistemic 
argument’ against volition efficacy, I am convinced he read Geulincx. (See Recherche, 669) However, 
Ablondi suggests he got this argument from Cordemoy. (Ablondi 2008, 626) However, in the passage he 
cites from the Discernement in support of this claim, Cordemoy says only that “our souls know the changes 
in matter only when they occur, and they [our souls] can receive new thoughts by bodily movements 
according to the relation and the dependence God has established between them [nos ames ne connoissent 
les changemens de la matiere, que quand ils arrivent; & elles peuvent recevoir de nouvelles pensées par les 
mouvemens du corps, suivant le rapport & la dépendence que Dieu a mis entr'eux].” (Discernement,148; 
trans. is my own) While one can see a germ of Malebranche’s argument herein, Geulincx’s argument, with 
its reference to animal spirits flowing down nerve channels to actuate bodily movements, is clearly a much 
better match. Indeed the similarity is striking enough as to strongly suggest that Malebranche read 
Geulincx’s Ethica. 
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Experience and the Essence of Body 
The first set of arguments Malebranche advances against the efficacy of secondary causes 
and in favor of occasionalism are very much along the same lines as his fellow Cartesian 
occasionalists; yet infused with notable historical context. Malebranche remarks that “the 
great Averroes” denounced “certain theologians who have written against secondary 
causes” as “out of their minds.”183 He objurgates the Peripatetic “demonstration” that the 
senses convince us of their efficacy deictically184 as “pitiful” and retorts: 
When I see one ball strike another, my eyes tell me, or seem to tell me, 
that the one is truly cause of the motion it impresses on the other, for the 
true cause that moves bodies does not appear to my eyes. But when I 
consult my reason I clearly see that since bodies cannot move themselves, 
and since their motor force is but the will of God that conserves them 
successively in different places, they cannot communicate a power they do 
not have and could not communicate even if it were in their possession. 
For the mind will never conceive that one body, a purely passive 
substance, can in any way whatsoever transmit to another body the power 
transporting it.185 
Regardless of the circularity underlying Malebranche’s argument here,186 the above quote 
is useful as it shows Malebranche reiterating the two classic arguments for occasionalism: 
                                                
183 Recherche, 680 
184 Suaréz is the best example here: “For what is better known to the senses than that the sun gives light, 
fire produces heat, water cools? And if they reply that we do, to be sure, experience that these effects are 
brought about when the things in question are present but that we do not experience that the effect are 
brought about by those things, then they are clearly destroying the whole force of philosophical 
argumentation. For there is no other way in which we can experience the emanation of effects from causes 
or in which we can infer causes from effects.” (DM, 18.1.6) Of course, for the critics of secondary 
causation, this is precisely the point. 
185 Recherche, 660 
186 That is, Malebranche cannot legitimately claim that “bodies could not communicate [a power] even if it 
were in their possession,” based on the insight that body is a “purely passive substance.” If a body were 
indeed possessed of a power, it would not be purely passive, and thus the argument begs the question. The 
better justification for this claim, as Malebranche intimates, lies in his theory of continual creation, which 
will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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1) The lack of empiricity in causal judgments. 
2) The Cartesian appeal to our clear and distinct idea of body as purely passive. 
As we have seen, Malebranche’s argument for (1) was de rigeur among occasionalists, 
but he notably follows Cordemoy’s new mechanistic example of colliding bodies. 
Regarding the latter claim, Malebranche declares: “By a true cause I understand a cause 
which acts by its own force;”187 and beseeches the reader to: 
Consult the idea of extension and judge by that idea, which represents 
bodies if anything does, whether they can have some property other than 
the passive faculty of receiving various shapes and various motions. Is it 
not evident to the last degree that properties of extension can consist only 
in relations of distance?”188  
Relations of distance, as the “essence of matter,” include the ideas of “figure, divisibility, 
[and] impenetrability,”189 as well of the very three-dimensional matrix in which these 
properties inhere. This list exhausts the set of ideas that can be clearly and distinctly 
derived from our idea of extension, and thus of body itself. 
Following this reductive analysis of the essential qualities of body, Malebranche’s 
mouthpiece in the Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion [Dialogues on 
Metaphysics and on Religion] instructs: 
Contemplate the archetype of bodies, intelligible extension. This 
represents them since it is in accordance with it that they all have been 
made. This idea is entirely luminous…Do you not see clearly that bodies 
can be moved but they cannot move themselves? You hesitate. Well then, 
let us suppose that this chair can move itself: Which way will it go? With 
what velocity? At what time will it take it into its head to move? You 
                                                
187 Traité de la nature et de la grace, OCM V. 66 
188 Dialouges, VII.2 147 
189 Recherche, 243 
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would have to give the chair an intellect and a will capable of determining 
itself…Otherwise, a power of moving itself would be of no use at all to 
it.190 
Three points need to be made regarding this passage. First, the above argument is, in fact, 
an extension of Geulincx’s ‘epistemic argument’ to the domain of body-body causality, 
which had been opened by Geulincx himself.191 Second, Malebranche’s claim is 
essentially: To ascribe active powers to something that is defined only in terms of 
geometric relations of distance is like ascribing ‘jealousy’ to a cardboard box. This claim 
is in line with the standard Cartesian accusation against Aristotelianism, viz. that, even 
when stripped of any supposition of final causality, Aristotelian causal explanation 
employs a kind of prosopopoeia that projects what are effectively intentional states onto 
otherwise inanimate objects.192 Third, the particular innovation to Geulincx’s argument 
advanced by Malebranche—while novel amongst the Cartesians—is very old, even older 
than its eponym: Buridan’s ass. 
Recall al-Ghazali’s response to Parmenides’ famous argument against the 
possibility of creation, in which he insists that only inanimate creatures not possessed of a 
                                                
190 Dialogues, VII, 151 
191 Geulincx says: “for a long time I was persuaded that beings which I knew to be irrational and mindless 
may nevertheless work and act on other beings. I believed that (for example) fire, because its presence 
produces in me a sensation of heat, make me hot…But after my understanding was informed by the 
principle What you do not know how to do, is not your action, I could not fail to see that I had been 
deluded…I never supposed that I myself could cause heat, light, or vertical motion, because I do not know 
how to do such things. Why, then, should I have supposed the same of fire…when it is equally clear that [it 
does] not know either.” (Opera philosophica, II, 150; 1999, 35) This claim is repeated almost verbatim by 
Malebranche in his Conversations Chrétiennes: “Can fire act upon you? Can it cause in you pleasure that it 
does not possess, that it does not feel, pleasure of which it has no knowledge?” (OC 4:15-16; trans. by 
Nadler 1999, 268) 
192 See Nadler 1999, 270. Malebranche also follows Descartes and La Forge in maintaining that “if moving 
force belonged to bodies, it would be a mode of their substance, and it is a contradiction that modes go 
from substance to substance.” (Réponse à une dissertation de Mr Arnauld contre un Éclaircissement du 
Traité de la Nature et de la Grace, VII.6, OC 7:515-6; qtd. by Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation,” 120) 
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will are strictly subject to the principle of sufficient reason, such “that fire is so created 
that when it finds two pieces of cotton which are similar, it will burn both of them, as it 
cannot discriminate between two similar things.”193 Given their enslavement to the 
principle of sufficient reason, creatures lacking a will are incapable of self-initiated 
movement for it would be impossible for them to decide to move in one direction rather 
than another, or do so at one moment rather than another, given that all points in space 
and time are qualitatively identical, and thus—in terms of the order of possible reasons—
indifferent. Following this sequence of reasoning, Malebranche’s argument is: Not only 
can bodies not produce movement proprio vigore, but, even supposing they could, they 
would still be incapable of producing it proprio motu. From this consideration al-Ghazali 
concluded: 
[T]he will…is an attribute of which the function…is to distinguish 
something from its like…[and] it follows that whoever discusses the 
nature of volitional action—whether with reference to empirical facts, or 
on theoretical grounds—will have to affirm an attribute of which the 
function should be to distinguish something from its like.194 
That is to say, al-Ghazali asserts that the only creatures capable of such choice are those 
possessed of a will, insofar as the notion of will defines precisely that metaphysical 
capacity to choose and act arbitrarily, thereby distinguishing and picking between 
identicals differing only by number. This voluntarist conception of the will Malebranche 
weaves into the Cartesian rubric, concluding:  
It is clear that no body, large or small, has the power to move itself…We 
have only two sorts of ideas, ideas of minds and ideas of bodies; and as we 
should speak only of what we conceive, we should only reason according 
                                                
193 Tahafut, 190 
194 Tahafut, 1.1 24-7 
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to these two kinds of ideas. Thus, since the idea we have of all bodies 
makes us aware that they cannot move themselves, it must be concluded 
that it is minds which move them.195 
Recall, though, that La Forge also made such a claim and from it concluded that 
mind-body occasionalism was unnecessary as real causal interaction between mind and 
body was thus conceptually possible—even necessary. This conclusion Malebranche 
flatly denies, insisting that we “have no clear idea of this power soul has over the 
body.”196 Like our lack of any clear idea of how bodies could act on other bodies, he 
justifies this claim first on empirical grounds, arguing that, were one to claim: 
I know through the inner sensation of my action that I truly have this 
power…I [would] reply that when they move their arm they have an inner 
sensation of the actual volition by which they move it; and they are not 
mistaken in believing that they have this volition…I grant that they have 
an inner sensation that the arm is moved during the effort; and on this 
assumption I also agree…that the movement of the arm occurs at the 
instant we feel this effort…But I deny that this effort, which is only a 
modification or sensation of the soul…is by itself able to impart motion to 
the animal spirits, or to determine them.197 
The reason behind this leads to Malebranche’s chief innovation among the Cartesian 
occasionalists and what Leibniz deemed his “strongest argument for why God alone 
acts.”198 
 
 
 
                                                
195 Recherche, 448 
196 Recherche, 670 
197 Recherche, 670 
198 Malebranche et Leibniz, 412; trans. by Sleigh, 171 
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Necessary Connection 
As noted above, in the Traité de la nature et de la grace, Malebranche defines a “true 
cause” as one “which acts by its own force.”199 In the Recherche, however, Malebranche 
offers a different definition of true causality by returning to the logical standard of al-
Ghazali and Autrecourt: “A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind 
perceives a necessary connection [liaison necessaire] between it and its effect.”200 This 
‘return’ is incomplete for, in the case of body-body causation, Malebranche fails to drive 
the no necessary connection argument home, instead conflating it with the critique of 
‘force’ and ‘power.’ It’s only when he examines the efficacy of minds that he makes a 
direct appeal to the lack of necessary connection: 
It is clear that no body, large or small, has the power to move 
itself…Thus, since the idea we have of all bodies makes us aware that they 
cannot move themselves, it must be concluded that it is minds which move 
them. But when we examine our idea of all finite minds, we do not see any 
necessary connection between their will and the motion of any body 
whatsoever. On the contrary, we see that there is none and that there can 
be none.”201 
I would venture that the reason Malebranche failed to apply the argument from necessary 
connection to intra-corporeal causality is because, as a good Cartesian, he deemed the 
incapacity for bodies to produce or transfer motion as so well established and manifestly 
obvious as to make additional arguments pointless. Pursuing the issue in terms of will 
and mind-body causation, however, is quite useful. Agreeing with La Forge that, if 
bodies move they must be moved by a mind, he applies the no necessary connection 
                                                
199 Traité de la nature et de la grace, OCM V. 66 
200 Recherche, 450 
201 Recherche, 670; emphasis added. 
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principle to prove what La Forge had denied (and Cordemoy failed to establish), viz. that 
this mind that moves bodies cannot possibly be a finite human mind. Rather, there is only 
one mind that has the power to forge a necessary connection between that which it wills 
and the effect thereby produced: 
[W]hen one thinks about the idea of God, i.e., of an infinitely perfect and 
consequently all-powerful being, one knows there is such a connection 
between His will and the motion of all bodies, that it is impossible to 
conceive that He wills a body to be moved and that this body not be 
moved. We must therefore say that only His will can move bodies if we 
wish to state things as we conceive them and not as we sense them.202 
This argument, while basing itself on the inverse of the ‘establish’d maxim,’ was entirely 
novel to Malebranche in the long history of occasionalism.203 
This, then, raises the question of how Malebranche arrived at such a novel 
argument. It should be noted that Augustine—whom Malebranche was profoundly 
indebted to—had himself had declared: “what He wills is of necessity going to be”204 and 
that God’s will “constitutes the necessity of things.”205 Yet, Augustine did not intend 
such a declaration to exclude the necessity of secondary causes,206 much less deny their 
                                                
202 Recherche, 448 
203 Perhaps ‘entirely novel’ is an exaggeration. Malebranche’s argument had been anticipated to a certain 
degree by al-Razi who, in spite of his avowals of deeply heretical doctrines such as the pre-existence of 
matter, seems to have flirted with occasionalism. Although there is some dispute as to the actual author, 
McGinnis quotes al-Razi as asking the Aristotelians: “Why do you deny that God, great and mighty, in 
Himself is what necessitates [and so makes exist] the powers of all other actions and the natures of things.” 
(Arabic Impression of Tabi’a,” 7) Similarly, al-Ghazali insisted that, if two distinct events are to be 
necessarily conjoined, they can only be so “as the result of the Decree of God, which preceded their 
existence. If one follows the other, it is because He has created them in that fashion, not because the 
connection in itself is necessary and indissoluble.” (Tahafut, 185; emphasis added) Neither of these, 
however, drove home the argument in the strict logical sense offered by Malebranche. 
204 De genesi ad litteram, vi. 28 
205 Ibid., vi. 26 
206 See De genesi ad litteram, vi. 29 
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existence as such. Was Malebranche’s argument an absolutely independent invention 
then, or might he have had some exposure to the arguments of Autrecourt or al-Ghazali? 
While Malebranche cites “Biel and Cardinal d’Ailly” instead of Autrecourt and al-
Ghazali as progenitors of his own position, the passage he cites from d’Ailly’s 
commentary on the Libri quattuor sententiarum of Peter Lombard is the precise point207 
at which d’Ailly presents an almost exact—but uncredited—version of Autrecourt’s 
argument for the logical distinctness of cause and effect and our resultant inability to 
logically infer from the one to the other.208 While this reference by Malebranche clearly 
demonstrates an intellectual inheritance, however polyphyletic, from late-medieval 
nominalism to Cartesian occasionalism, it also demonstrates that Malebranche had 
encountered the logico-existential formulation of the ‘no necessary connection’ argument 
stemming from Autrecourt and ultimately al-Ghazali. Now, unlike Hume, Malebranche 
does push this argument to metaphysical conclusions, as is evident in his occasionalist 
denial of secondary causation, but does so only through his more general critique of 
‘efficacy’ and ‘power,’ which are rejected on the basis of the epistemological ‘clarity and 
distinctness’ principle. Yet, like Hume, nowhere does Malebranche advance Autrecourt’s 
strictly logical argument against necessary connection, even though he had clearly been 
exposed to it. As will be recalled from the conclusion of the forgoing chapter, he may 
have had good reasons for this reticence. 
Given the inherent separability of causes and effects of the secondary order, it is 
impossible that there could be any necessary connection between them; yet, while the 
                                                
207 Quaestio 1, liber iv 
208 See William Courtenay, “Covenant and Causality in Pierre d’Ailly,” Speculum 46 (1971): 113 
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liaison necessaire required for our understanding of causation cannot be justified either 
experientially or rationally between such finite things, we nonetheless feel that such a 
connection exists, and this “natural judgment” of causation is host to other principles. As 
Malebranche explains: 
The cause of their error is that men never fail to judge that a thing is the 
cause of a given effect when the two are conjoined…This is why everyone 
concludes that a moving ball which strikes another is the true and principal 
cause of the motion it communicates to the other…because it always 
happens that a ball moves when struck by another…and we do not 
sensibly perceive what else could be the cause of the movements.209 
That is to say, Malebranche deems the source of our judgments of causation to be nothing 
more than the constant conjunction of phenomena.210 For Malebranche, such a mistaken 
inference—the judgment of necessary connection and thus causal efficacy in conjoined 
events—is the source of all of our errors concerning secondary causes; he warns: “you 
should never judge with regards to things in nature that one is the effect of another just 
because experience teaches you that one never fails to follow the other; for of all false 
principles, it is this one that is the most dangerous and the most fecund source of 
error.”211 
 
The Epistemic Argument 
Malebranche also advances an elaboration of Geulincx’s epistemic argument against 
secondary causation (sc. in order for any thing to cause an effect, it must know how to 
                                                
209 Recherche, 3.2.3, 224 
210 McCracken, 264 
211 Méditations chrétiennes, VI.5, qtd. in McCracken, 264 
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bring the effect about). While this argument is specifically directed against mind-body 
causation, it relates directly back to Malebranche’s argument against body-body 
causation, namely that volition and intelligence is required for self-motivated causality—
something which bodies manifestly lack. He asks: 
For how could we move our arms? To move them, it is necessary to have 
animal spirits, to send them through certain nerves toward certain muscles 
in order to inflate and contract them, for it is thus that the arm attached to 
them is moved…And we see that men who do not know that they have 
spirits, nerves, and muscles move their arms, and even move them with 
more skill and ease than those who know anatomy best.212 
Malebranche expands on this point in Eclaircissement XV, declaring: 
I even see clearly that there can be no relation between the volition I have 
to move my arm and the agitation of the animal spirits, i.e., of certain tiny 
bodies whose motion and figure I do not know and which choose certain 
nerve canals from a million others I do not know in order to cause in me 
the motion I desire through and infinity of movements I do not desire…my 
will, which is unable to act or will without knowledge, presupposes my 
ideas and does not produce them.213 
                                                
212 Recherche, 6.2, 449; cf. Méditations Chrétiennes, VI. 11, OC 10:61. 
213 Recherche, 669; cf. Méditations Chrétiennes, VI. 11, OC 10:62. While Malebranche’s argument here 
clearly depends on the Cartesian commitment to the transparency of the self, it also curiously similar to 
Leibniz’s thesis of the little perceptions, but from the active (and thus transparent) epistemic demands of 
the will rather than the passive (and thus unconscious) logical entailment of monadic perception. This 
similarity becomes even more stark in his final argument where he offers a metaphysical objection 
concerning the virtual infinitude contained in any effect: “Now, in order for the motion that the soul 
impresses on the spirits in the brain to be communicable to those in the nerves…the soul’s volitions must 
multiply or change proportionately to the almost infinite collisions or impacts that would occur in the 
particles composing the spirits…But this is inconcevable, unless we allow in the soul an infinite number of 
volitions for the least movement of the body, because in order to move it, an infinite number of 
communications of motion must take place.” (671) This objection is a perfect analogue to Leibniz’s thesis 
of the little perceptions—just as any passive perception must contain an infinite number of components, so 
too must any active volition. Yet Leibniz developed two key notions that allowed him to resolve such a 
paradox: 1) The infinitesimal calculus and particularly the notion of differential summation, by which 
infinitesimal qualia are capable of being aggregated into a consciously perceived quale. 2) A notion of the 
unconscious, wherein this aggregation takes pace. Malebranche, though an exact contemporary with 
Leibniz, never considered the metaphysical ramifications of the calculus, nor did he deviate from the 
Cartesian principle of the transparency of the self. In this light follows his claim that “since the 
soul…cannot know [i.e. consciously] exactly the size and agitation of an infinite number of particles that 
collide with each other when the spirits are in the muscles, it [cannot] establish a general law of the 
communication of motion, nor follow it exactly had it established it.” (Ibid.) 
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While Malebranche’s argument here has been harshly criticized by modern 
commentators,214 it was common among his fellow Cartesian occasionalists215 and even 
quite favorably regarded by David Hume; and the Hume of the Enquiry no less, who, by 
that point, professed nothing but contempt for occasionalism—yet apparently had still not 
finished mining it for ideas. Hume explains: 
We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in voluntary 
motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and 
nerves, and animal spirits…through which the motions is successively 
propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate 
object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by 
which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and 
fully know by an inward sentiment of consciousness, is, to the last degree 
mysterious and unintelligible?...But if the original power were felt, it must 
be known…And vice versa, if the effect be not known, the power cannot 
be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move 
our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to move certain 
                                                
214 See Jolley 1997: “the key principle [behind the argument] seems to have little intuitive plausibility. It 
appears to rest on a wild generalization from a few cases of causal agency.” (xxiv-xxv) Lee attempts to 
defend Malebranche against criticisms by reformulating his argument, but it seems to me that Lee’s 
reformulation is rather different from what Malebranche intended. (See Lee 2007) I find Malebranche’s 
argument to be at least internally convincing. For example, were one training a novice in how to complete 
some complex task, say write a computer program, I think it would be readily accepted that he would only 
be able to do (i.e. cause) what he specifically knows how to do. Malebranche’s argument lies in the 
question: Even supposing he is a master programmer, does he know how his will to press the ‘C’ key 
causes the muscles in his finger to contract and do so? He clearly does not. Indeed, all he knows is that 
when he does will as much, the effect (typically) follows. Clearly then, there is something markedly 
different in this type of efficacy as compared to his efficacy as a programmer. Thus, and given previously 
discussed epistemological tenants of Cartesianism and Cartesian occasionalism, I find Malebranche’s 
argument to be coherent if not conclusive. 
215 François Lamy repeats the thrust of Malebranche’s argument (in 1694), claiming: “It is true (and this is 
what creates the illusion [sc. of mind-body interaction]) that as soon as the soul wills that the arm should 
move, the arm is moved. But a sure sign that the soul cannot produce this movement as a true cause is that 
it does not know exactly what is necessary for its execution. To do this, it is necessary to control the 
antagonistic muscles to which the arm is attached; for the action of these muscles, it is necessary to release 
a certain quantity of spirit from the brain. From among a great number of tubes that end at the brain like a 
common reservoir, it is necessary to chose those that lead to the muscles of the arm that one wants to move, 
to then make the spirits flow through the tubes, and to give [the muscles] different pulls in the direction of 
the different agitations that one wants to produce in the arm. Of all those who move their arms with the 
utmost ease, who among them knows the soul and knows all these things.” (De la connoissance de soi-
même, (Paris: Nicholas Le Clerc, 1701), II. 215-6; trans. by Albondi, “François Lamay, Occasionalism, and 
the Mind-Body Problem,” 626) 
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animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the motion of our limbs, 
yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension?216 
While these two arguments might look substantially different, Hume is merely 
appropriating Malebranche’s occasionalist reasoning in the way he always does: by 
converting it from a positive metaphysical argument against the possibility of causal 
powers, to a skeptical epistemological argument against the possibility of understanding 
causal powers. 
 
Malebranche’s Critique of Thomistic Concurrentism 
In spite of his status as the premier and most rigorous of the Cartesian occasionalists, 
Malebranche nonetheless falls into the familiar pitfall of failing to adequately argue 
against Thomistic concurrentism. Unlike the rest of his cohort, he does explicitly 
distinguish his views from those of the “theologians,” but seems frankly lost as to how to 
argue metaphysically against their causal model.  
In Eclaircissement XV Malebranche does his best to present a critique of 
concurrentism, but it is obviously weak and of an essentially social and propaedeutic 
concern. Malebranche summarizes what he takes to be impetus of concurrentism and 
conservationism: 
The most enlightened, and even the greatest number, of theologians, 
seeing on the one hand that Sacred Scripture opposed the efficacy of 
secondary causes and on the other that the impression of the senses, public 
opinion, and especially the philosophy of Aristotle…in order to accord 
faith with the philosophy of the pagans and reason with the senses, have 
been inclined to the view that secondary causes would do nothing unless 
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God lent them his cooperation. But because this immediate cooperation by 
which God acts with secondary causes involves great difficulties, some 
philosophers have rejected it, claiming that in order for them to act it is 
enough that God should conserve them with the virtue He gave them in 
creating them.217 
Malebranche never explains exactly what the “great difficulties” concurrentism involves 
are, but instead turns to flogging the defenseless whipping-boy of conservationism:218 
“As this opinion agrees entirely with prejudice, since God’s operation in secondary 
causes involves nothing sensible, it is ordinarily received by the common man…[who] 
imagine that God first created all things, that He gave them all the faculties or qualities 
necessary for their preservation.”219 While this view holds sway among the laity and 
those “who follow their senses and the authority of Aristotle rather than their reason and 
the authority of the holy books,”220 Malebranche concedes that “the opinion of the 
immediate cooperation of God with each action of secondary causes seems to agree with 
passages from Scripture, which often attribute the same effect to God and to creatures.” 
In response, Malebranche cites Isaiah 44:22: “This is what the Lord, your protector, says, 
the one who formed you in the womb: ‘I am the Lord, who made everything, who alone 
stretched out the sky, who fashioned the earth all by myself.’” The important part of this 
quote is not the claim of God (even the conservationists accepted that God acted alone in 
                                                
217 Recherche, 676-677 
218 Indeed, conservationism was implicitly but directly condemned in 1277, at least insofar as it maintains 
“That, among the efficient causes, the secondary cause has an action that it did not receive from the first 
cause.” (Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, I, 544) This condemnation was more than likely directed 
against the Aristotelian/Averroist thesis that nature operates autonomously with God as only its final cause; 
however, extending its to conservationism is facile. 
219 Recherche, 677 
220 Recherche, 677 
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the moment of creation), but rather Isaiah’s claim that, as Malebranche puts it: “only God 
acts and forms children in their mother’s womb.”221 
 Acknowledging the weakness of his rebuttal, Malebranche argues that, “even if 
God’s immediate cooperation with secondary causes could reconcile the different 
passages of Sacred Scripture, I do not know if withal it should be received.”222 He then 
reiterates his two main arguments in favor of occasionalism (sc. those from continual 
creation and necessary connection) and concludes: “when a body collides with and moves 
another, I can say that it acts through the cooperation of God, and that this cooperation is 
not different from its own action.”223 Here Malebranche is, quite uncharacteristically,224 
arguing ad captandum benevolentiam in order, as he himself professes, to do “all I can do 
to reconcile what I think with the view of the theologians.”225 He avers that “almost all 
theologians” agree with his above description, and do so on the basis of the same 
concern, viz. that “action qua efficacious action would be…independent [of God].”226 
Malebranche seems here to be trying to beguile his concurrentist opponents—or at least 
                                                
221 Recherche, 677. This point had been made previously by Geulincx in an annotation to his Ethica: “we 
should reprehend that crude expression, according to which someone who has begotten offspring is said to 
have ‘made’ a child…as the phrase considered in itself sounds like impiety, and ultimately ascribes to some 
ruffian or other what is proper to God.” (2006, 223) Similarly, Augustine held that, in contrast to the 
generation of Adam from “the slime of the earth,” God “makes human beings today in mothers’ wombs.” 
(De genesi ad litteram, VI.13) Unlike Malebranche, however, he does not unequivocally claim that God is 
the direct cause of this. Malebranche might have cited further Scriptural support for his position though, 
such as the mother of the Maccabean martyrs, who tells her children: “I know not how you were formed in 
my womb: for I neither gave you breath, nor soul, nor life, neither did I frame the limbs of every one of 
you.” (2 Macc. 7:22) On God’s causal activity in the womb see also Job 31:15, Psalms 139:13.  
222 Recherche, 678 
223 Recherche, 678 
224 As a philopolemist, Malebranche was second in his day only to Arnauld.  
225 Recherche, 680 
226 Recherche, 679 
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his reader—into occasionalism by claiming that what they understand as the cooperation 
between agent cause and divine cause, he understands as the occasional connection 
between occasional cause and divine cause. The Thomistic theologians mistake lies in 
assuming that these secondary causes that God cooperates with actually do something of 
their own metaphysically: “there is nothing God does not do by the same action as His 
creature’s—not because creatures have any efficacious action by themselves but because 
God’s power is, as it were, communicated to them by the natural laws God has 
established in their favor.”227 In this remarkable quote, the transformation from an ancient 
and medieval science based on ‘bottom-up’ powers and dispositions to a modern science 
based on ‘top-down’ natural laws is apparent. 
 Regardless, Malebranche is not unaware of the interpretive liberties he is taking 
by claiming that he and the concurrentist theologians are really on the same page and 
concedes that they “do not understand it exactly as I have explained it, and that with the 
possible exceptions of Biel and Cardinal d’Ailly, all those I have read think the efficacy 
that produces effects comes from the secondary cause as well as the primary.”228 Thus 
Malebranche is compelled to offer a final ethical—even political—argument against 
concurrentism: 
I believe I shall not be found amiss in relinquishing [their] view…and in 
establishing another that perfectly agrees not only with reason but also 
with the sanctity of religion and Christian morality…[for] the philosophy 
that teaches us that the efficacy of secondary causes is a fiction of the 
mind, that Aristotle’s…nature is a chimera, that only God is strong and 
powerful enough…to give the least motion to matter, this philosophy, I 
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say, agrees perfectly with religion, the end of which is to join us to God in 
the closest way.229 
Earlier in the Recherche, Malebranche described acceptance of secondary causes as “The 
most dangerous error in the philosophy of the ancients,” insofar as it distracts us from our 
Christain imperative: “Soli Deo honor et gloria”:230  
We should fear only what can do us some evil; this [sc. occasionalist] 
philosophy therefore sanctions only the fear of God and condemns all 
others…[Moreover,] we should love only God, for it teaches us that only 
He is the cause of our happiness. According to [my] philosophy…[i]t is 
not the sun that illuminates us and gives us movement and life. It does not 
cover the earth with fruits and flowers and does not provide us with our 
food. This philosophy teaches us, as does Scripture,231 that it is God who 
provides the rain and regulates the seasons, who gives to out bodies their 
food and fills our hearts with joy.232 
Thus Malebranche concludes: “Following the language of this philosophy, we must not 
say that nature provides us with goods; we must not say that it is God and nature. We 
                                                
229 Recherche, 680-1 
230 Recherche, 446-447; 1 Tim 1:17 
231 Malebranche cites Acts 14:15: “We are proclaiming the good news to you, so that you should turn from 
these worthless things to the living God, who made the heaven, the earth, the sea, and everything that is in 
them.” 
232 Recherche, 681. Clearly this aspect of occasionalism profoundly exacerbates the problem of evil, as was 
pointed about by Gassendi. (2.817a; LoLordo 2007, 41) Unsurprisingly, Malebranche was never able to 
successfully respond to this charge. Nonetheless, the claim that God alone has the power to effect 
experiences in us leads to an unintentionally humorous aside from him: “Perhaps the drunkards would not 
love wine so much if they were well aware of what it is, and that the pleasure they find in drinking comes 
from the Almighty, who commands them to be temperate and whom they unjustly cause to serve their 
intemperance.” (447-448) Not only is the notion of God as an enabler hysterical, so is Malebranche’s 
contorted denial of this rather blatant fact—which amounts to the accusation that it is the drunkard who 
degrades God by forcing him to effect (and thus serve) the opposite of what he commands. That God 
demands temperance and yet effects such pleasure upon imbibing, or that it is somehow possible for a finite 
drunken wretch to degrade an infinite omniperfect being are problems Malebranche wisely ignores. As 
Bayle imagines Zoroaster responding to the optimism of Melissus: “God foresaw the sin of his creature; 
and I conclude from this that he would have prevented it; for the ideas of order will not allow that an 
infinitely good and holy cause that can prevent the introduction of moral evil does not stop it, especially 
when by permitting it he will find himself obliged to pour down pains and torments upon his own work.” 
(Dictionairre, art. Manichees, rem. D) 
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must say that it is God alone and speak in this way without equivocation in order not to 
deceive the simple.”233 
By still speaking of natural agents and effects, concurrentism risks driving the 
laity, who Malebranche notes are already inclined to conservationism,234 to materialism 
or even (as Berkeley likewise warned) idolatry and physiolatry.235 The reasoning behind 
this claim hinges on his notorious236 “leeks and onions” argument: If we did not share 
this utter dependency upon God, we would be capable of deriving happiness from things 
other than Him, such as leeks and onions. Malebranche sternly warns: “one should not 
render sovereign honor to leeks and onions,”237 and quotes Maimonides’ treatise on 
idolatry to make his point: 
                                                
233 Recherche, 681-2 
234 Recherche, 677 
235 For Berkeley, see Principles, §94. Also compare Berkeley to Malebranche’s aforementioned attack on 
the “chimera” of Nature: “Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all 
ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series 
of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain 
that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being 
distinct from God, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that 
word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is 
a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite 
perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing 
belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that 
heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and 
substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) He be not far 
from every one of us.” (Principles, §150) See also McCracken 1983, 211-217 and Jolley 1990, 234-238. 
236 Hume pointedly ridicules Malebranche (under the eponym of his alma mater) on this point in his 
Natural History of Religion by imaging him in conversation with an ancient Egyptian priest: “How can you 
worship leeks and onions? we shall suppose a Sorbonnist to say to a priest of Sais. If we worship them, 
replies the latter; at least, we do not, at the same time, eat them. But what strange objects of adoration are 
cats and monkeys? says the learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relics or rotten bones of 
martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist. Are you not mad, insists the Catholic, to cut one another’s 
throat about the preference of a cabbage or a cucumber? Yes, says the pagan; I allow it, if you will confess 
that those are still madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of sophistry, ten thousand of 
which are not equal in value to one cabbage of cucumber.” (xii. 56-57) 
237 Recherche, 447 
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“In the time of Enos, men fell into strange errors…Because, they said, 
God created the stars and their heavens to govern the world, placed them 
in a high place…and uses them to carry out his orders, it is right for us to 
honor them and pay them our homage and respect. It is the will of our God 
that we honor these things He has raised up and covered with glory, just as 
a prince wishes his ministers to be honored in his presence because the 
honor paid to them reflects on him…After this thought came into their 
heads, they began to build temples to the stars, make sacrifices to them, 
speak their encomiums, and even prostrate themselves before them, 
imagining that they were thereby making themselves pleasing to Him who 
created them.”238 
Such sideristic idolatry is a dangerous tendency indeed, particularly given the response to 
such slights typical of the God of the Old Testament; but surely this cannot be described 
as a philosophical critique of concurrentism. 
Perhaps Malebranche should not be overly castigated for this shortcoming as none 
of the other figures associated with occasionalism ever advanced such a critique. But, the 
question remains: What would a philosophical critique of concurrentism look like? I 
offered something of such an argument in Chapter 3 against Aquinas, which can be 
reiterated here to greater effect against Lee, who, in response to Malebranche, offers a 
defense of concurrentism by asking “why could not [an effect’s] obtaining be 
overdetermined? Why could not [the effect] have been caused by both [the agent] and 
God?”239 In the case of a positive overdetermination, such as in this example, there are 
really no grounds for objection, for God does indeed concur with the activity of the 
cause.240 The objection comes—as is customary of miracles—when God resolves not to 
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239 Lee, 545 
240 It should be noted that, pace Lee, most Thomists categorically rejected the possibility of 
overdetermination. (See Suaréz, DM 18.1.9)  
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concur with the activity of the cause, and either withholds his assent or wills for the 
opposite of the cause’s determinate effect to obtain. Lee asserts that: 
[T]he basic idea behind overdetermination is fertile enough to suggest 
that, even in [such a] case, it is not that the creature’s efficacy is 
nonexistent but rather that the creature’s power is overpowerd by God. So 
when A wills p and God brings about not-p, it is not the case that A was 
causally inert. Rather the creature’s causal powers were overridden by 
divine causal power.241 
But overridden how? The systems of ancient metaphysics, including the Aristotelian 
causal ontology underlying Thomistic concurrentism, regard causes as necessitating their 
effects;242 and thus simply cannot tolerate such an overriding of established causal 
interactions. As I have argued throughout, this negative consideration was the primary 
and irreducible impetus of Abrahamic skepticism towards ancient accounts of the 
metaphysics of causation. The concurrentist response, which sought to synchronize the 
Aristotelian metaphysic of causality with God’s status as a supramundane efficient cause, 
hinged on Aquinas’ and Augustine’s innovative distinction between the “natural” and 
“obediential” potentiality in finite causal agents. Now, as will be recalled, the problem 
with the notion of “obediential potentiality” is that it effectively renders any notion of 
“natural potentiality” otiose. This can been seen when Lee argues: 
It is fundamental to the concurrentist position that God’s causal 
contribution in bringing about an effect is a necessary component, and 
thus, unlike overdetermination, the creature’s causality is not in itself 
sufficient to produce the effect. Both powers are needed.”243 
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The problem with this defense of concurrentism is that the conclusion is simply false. 
Both powers are not needed because Aquinas and his concurrentist followers all 
conceded—as they were theologically compelled to—that “God has the power to move 
matter towards form without an intermediary,”244 and thus may produce immediately any 
effect that could otherwise be brought about by secondary causes. This concession entails 
that God’s “causal contribution” is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of the 
effect, while the “creature’s causality” is neither—a point that reveals just how 
metaphysically supererogative secondary causes are,245 as well as the extent to which the 
concurrentist commitment to them is ultimately made sauver les apparences.246 
                                                
244 Summa Theologiae, 1a. 105, 1 
245 This objection to concurrentism was raised by Aquinas himself: “when a thing can be done adequately 
by one agent, it is superfluous for it to be done by many; in fact, we see that nature does not do with two 
instruments what it can do with one. So, since the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is 
superfluous to use natural powers, too, for the production of the same effects. Or, if the natural power 
adequately produces the proper effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act for the same effect.” 
(Summa contra gentiles, 3.70) 
246 Lee argues, on the basis of her foregoing interpretation, that Malebranche effectively abandoned his “no 
necessary connection” argument for occasionalism due to its inability “to cut any ice against his 
concurrentist opponents,” and emphasized the argument from continual creation in its stead. (Lee, 548) It is 
true that the “no necessary connection” is not particularly effective against the concurrentism of Aquinas 
and his followers, unless one somehow forced them to explain what, exactly, constituted a non-necessary 
connection. As I argued previously, the various attempts of Averroes and Aquinas in this regard were 
failures. Regardless, the concurrentists also upheld a continual creation metaphysic that was only slightly 
distinct from the occasionalist conception, and thus I doubt that Malebranche would have really found that 
argument any more decisive, but rather would have merely swapped one quibble for another. 
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